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Political disillusionment is widespread in contemporary Japanese society, 
despite people’s struggles in the recession. Our social relationships become 
entangled, and we can no longer clearly identify our interest in politics. The 
search for the outside of stagnant reality sometimes leads marginalised 
young people to a disastrous imaginary for social change, such as war and 
death. 
 
The imaginary of disaster was actualised in March 2011. The huge 
earthquake and tsunami caused the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear plant, which triggered the largest wave of activism since the 1960s. 
Based on the author’s fieldwork on the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movements in Tokyo, this thesis investigates how the disaster impacted 
people’s sense of agency and ethics, and ultimately explores the new political 
imaginary in postmodernity. 
 
The disaster revealed the interconnected nature of contemporary society. The 
thesis argues that their regret about their past indifference to politics 
motivated the protesters into social commitment without any totalising 
ideology or predetermined collective identity. They also found an ambiguity of 
the self, which is insufficient to know what should be done. Hence, they 
mobilise their bodies on to the streets, encountering others, and forcing 
themselves to feel and think. This is an ethical attitude, yet it simultaneously 
stems from the desire of each individual to make a difference to the self and 
society. The thesis concludes that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movements signify a new way of doing politics as endless experiments by 
collectively responding to an unexpected force from an outside in a creative 
way.  
ii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
For about 20 years, I wanted to know about ‘something’, but I was not clear 
what it was. The only thing I was sure about was that none of the answers 
given to me were the right ones. I stopped searching for it when I finished my 
BA, because I thought that this ‘something’ may never be grasped. 
 
I am so glad that I was allowed another chance to explore it. I can say that 
what is written here is what I wanted to know, although it is still an on-going 
exploration. This work would have never been completed without the 
following people: 
 
 My supervisor, Dr Graeme Chesters—you are the first teacher to make 
me feel that this ‘something’ is pursuable. I really appreciate that you 
always taught me how to explore, instead of giving answers. 
 
 All the interviewees in my fieldwork: people in NFS, MCAN and the 
protesters I met in the post-Fukushima social movements—I learned a lot 
from your passion, honesty and bravery. In particular, my gratitude goes 
to the following three women whom I really respect: 
 
 Yumi Nakamura—for your earnest responses to my work which gave me 
new motivation and new perspectives. You always encouraged me by 
telling me how my work could resonate with this on-going movement. 
 
 Kaori Nawa—for your encouragement to do this PhD. It was you who 
taught me to open myself to a new potential in life by celebrating new 
encounters. 
 
 Misao Redwolf—for sparing your busy time for my interviews, and for 
always being my inspiration with your strength and resilience. 
 
 My colleagues in the University of Bradford, especially Miriam, Fang and 
Nura—for helping me to overcome many obstacles in this course, and 
giving me a nice relaxed time away from work. 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 John R Coast—for proofreading the entire thesis and polishing my 
English within a very tight schedule. 
 
 My father Toshiaki and my mother Mari—for your support, 
encouragement and patience in allowing me to finish this thesis, despite 
the difficult times. 
 
 Marie Morrow, my other ‘mother’ in the UK—for supporting my work, 
sharing the feelings and thoughts, and giving me a wonderful life in 
Bradford.  
 
  
iv 
 
Table of contents 
Abstract  ......................................................................................................  i 
Acknowledgements  ..................................................................................  ii 
Table of Contents  .....................................................................................  iv  
 
Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Background  .......................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Personal motivation, research objectives and questions  ..................... 7 
1.3 Structure  ............................................................................................ 10 
 
Chapter 2 Literature review: Political predicament in the pre-disaster 
Japan ........................................................................................................... 15 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 15 
2.1 The era of the ideal   .......................................................................... 16 
2.1.1 The United States as a role model  .............................................. 16 
2.1.2. The Zenkyoto movement and the beginning of postmodernity ..... 19 
2.1.3 The end of the era of the ideal....................................................... 22 
2.2 The era of the fictive  .......................................................................... 26 
2.2.1 Triumph of economy and emergence of new identity  .................. 26 
2.2.2 Consumer society and the self as ‘crystal’  ................................... 28 
2.2.3 Consuming post-structuralist knowledge ....................................... 30 
2.2.4 Search for an outside in subculture ............................................... 32 
2.3 The era of the impossible..................................................................... 36 
2.3.1 The exposure to the postmodern condition ................................... 36 
2.3.2 Desperation for connection and recognition .................................. 40 
2.3.3 Accepting the transparent existence ............................................. 43 
2.4 Difficulty of social change in the era of the impossible ......................... 46 
2.4.1 Prevailing culture: consuming the other without otherness ........... 46 
2.4.2 Periphery: Searching for the lost ‘other’  ....................................... 50 
v 
 
2.4.3 Outside: hopeless hope of disaster  ............................................. 55 
2.4.4 Politics in the era of the impossible ............................................... 59 
Summary and further directions ................................................................. 64 
 
Chapter 3 Theoretical framework: Political projects in the postmodern  
condition ...................................................................................................... 66 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 66 
3.1 What is the ‘postmodern condition’?  .................................................. 68 
3.1.1 Loss of meta-narratives and political disenchantment ................... 68 
3.1.2 The postmodern condition in the Japanese context ...................... 72 
3.1.3 Prescriptions for the postmodern condition ................................. 75 
3.2 Politics in the postmodern condition: Liberation from what?  .............. 80 
3.2.1 Biopower and micropolitics  .......................................................... 80 
3.2.2 The concept of flight/becoming  .................................................... 84 
3.3 Motivation and agency: Who wants social change?  ........................... 87 
3.3.1 Situationist theory and authentic desire ......................................... 87 
3.3.2 Simulation theory ........................................................................... 91 
3.3.3 Autonomist theory and the concept of ‘multitude’  ........................ 94 
3.3.4 New meta-narratives?  ................................................................. 98 
3.4 Direction and teleology: Where to go?  ............................................. 102 
3.4.1 Communicative rationality ........................................................... 102 
3.4.2 Politics of emotions and experiences .......................................... 104 
3.4.3 The concept of rhizome and plateaus ......................................... 109 
3.5 Possible political imaginary in the postmodern condition ................... 113 
3.5.1 Deconstructed subject ................................................................. 113 
3.5.2 Radical opening ........................................................................... 116 
Summary and further directions ............................................................... 119 
 
 
vi 
 
Chapter 4 Methodology  .......................................................................... 121 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 121 
4.1 Choosing a case-study  .................................................................... 122 
4.2 Approaches to social movement studies  .......................................... 124 
4.2.1 Popular social movement theories  ............................................. 124 
4.2.2 Social movements as knowledge practice  ................................. 127 
4.3 Fieldwork plan and methods .............................................................. 131 
4.3.1 The process of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements  ... 131 
4.3.2 Fieldwork term  ........................................................................... 133 
4.3.3 Research subjects  ..................................................................... 137 
4.3.4 Role of typology  ......................................................................... 140 
4.3.5 Methods  ..................................................................................... 142 
4.3.6 Sampling and its limitations ......................................................... 145 
4.4 Ethics  ............................................................................................... 146 
4.4.1 Interview consent ........................................................................ 146 
4.4.2 The researcher’s position ............................................................ 146 
 Summary and further directions ............................................................. 148 
 
Chapter 5 Fieldwork Analysis I: New political agency in the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement  .............................................. 150 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 150 
5.1 Overview of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements in Tokyo .. 151 
5.1.1 Process of the movements .......................................................... 151 
5.1.2 The reputation of the post-Fukushima social movements ........... 154 
5.2 Motivation and discourses of the anti-nuclear protest ........................ 158 
5.2.1 Motivation for the protest ............................................................. 158 
5.2.2 The political language of emotion ................................................ 161 
5.2.3 New grammars of action ............................................................. 165 
5.2.4 New form of collective subjectivity  ............................................. 167 
vii 
 
5.3 Political practices in the post-Fukushima activism  ........................... 171 
5.3.1 Democratisation movement: the Kanteimae protest  .................. 171 
5.3.2 Criticism of the Kanteimae protest ............................................... 176 
5.3.3 Broadening the political: Nuclear-Free Suginami ........................ 179 
5.3.4 Action as a ‘vessel’ ...................................................................... 184 
5.4 Activism and representative politics ................................................... 188 
5.4.1 The 2012 general election: Setback of the movements ............... 188 
5.4.2 The 2014 Tokyo governor election: the division within the 
movement ............................................................................................ 193 
5.4.3 The 2013/14 general election: solidification of the movements? . 196 
5.4.4 Beyond elections and representative politics............................... 201 
Summary and further directions ............................................................... 205 
 
Chapter 6 Fieldwork Analysis II: Ethics of the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear protesters ............................................................................. 207 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 207 
6.1 New form of ethics after the disaster ................................................. 210 
6.1.1 From obligation to interaction ...................................................... 210 
6.1.2 Deterritorialisation as the beginning of ethical awareness  ......... 214 
6.1.3 Fear of oblivion and the role of places ......................................... 216 
6.1.4 Language and embodied experience .......................................... 219 
6.2 The concept of the self and the other  ............................................... 221 
6.2.1 Disaster and the ambiguity of the self ......................................... 221 
6.2.2 The role of humour and redemption  .......................................... 223 
6.2.3 Desire of the dissolved self  ........................................................ 226 
6.3 Emergence of the politics of life ......................................................... 229 
6.3.1 Two concepts of life  ................................................................... 229 
6.3.2 The meaning of life for the post-Fukushima protesters  .............. 233 
6.3.3 Politics as the experimentation of bodies .................................... 236 
viii 
 
6.4 Implications of the post-Fukushima activism...................................... 241 
Conclusion and further directions ............................................................ 246 
 
Chapter 7 Synthesis discussion I: A political imaginary in 
postmodernity  ......................................................................................... 249 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 249 
7.1 Post-Fukushima activism as postmodern politics .............................. 251 
7.2 The molecular politics of emotions ..................................................... 255 
7.2.1 Liberalism and the limit of rationality  .......................................... 255 
7.2.2 Radical democracy by the inconsistent subject  ......................... 258 
7.2.3 Major politics of emotions  .......................................................... 263 
7.2.4 Minor politics of emotions  .......................................................... 268 
7.3 Understanding the politics of affect  .................................................. 271 
7.3.1 Anarchism of subjectivity ............................................................. 271 
7.3.2 Reconciling unity and diversity? .................................................. 277 
7.3.3 Post-anarchism and the concept of rhizome ............................... 282 
7.4  A new political imaginary of disaster ............................................... 289 
7.4.1 Post-Fukushima activism and the rhizomatic ontology ................ 289 
7.4.2 A new political agency of “crossing the border” ........................... 293 
7.4.3 Politics of life in the postmodern condition  ................................. 299 
Summary and further directions ............................................................... 302 
 
Chapter 8 Synthesis discussion II: Knowledge and life after  
the disaster  .............................................................................................. 306 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 306 
8.1 Reconsidering ethics  ........................................................................ 308 
8.1.1 Disaster and the limit of rational knowledge  .............................. 308 
8.1.2 Moving away from ethical principles ............................................ 313 
8.1.3 Ethico-politics of desire ............................................................... 317 
ix 
 
8.2 Reconsidering identity and meaning  ................................................ 320 
8.2.1 The Self and the Other ................................................................ 320 
8.2.2 Beyond identity and recognition .................................................. 326 
8.2.3 Life as an art ................................................................................ 332 
8.3 Reconsidering knowledge ............................................................... 336 
8.3.1 Self-organisation and the ontology of becoming.......................... 336 
8.3.2 Philosophy and the epistemology of creation .............................. 342 
8.3.3 The position of my research  ...................................................... 347 
8.4 The politics of disaster and its knowledge contribution ................... 349 
Summary ................................................................................................. 356 
 
Chapter 9 Conclusion ............................................................................... 359 
9.1 How I started my research  ............................................................... 359 
9.2 Findings (Chapters 2 & 3): Social struggles in the postmodern  
condition  ................................................................................................ 361 
9.3 Findings (Chapters 4, 5 & 6): Identity and ethics in the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear movements  ......................................................................... 366 
9.4 Findings (Chapters 7 & 8): New political imaginary in the postmodern    
condition .................................................................................................. 370 
9.5 Implications and contributions ............................................................ 376 
 
References................................................................................................. 380 
Appendices................................................................................................ 404 
Appendix 1 List of interviewees ............................................................... 404 
Appendix 2 Fieldwork schedule ............................................................... 405 
Appendix 3 Sample of interview questions .............................................. 409 
Appendix 4 Sample of cover letter ........................................................... 411 
Appendix 5 Interview consent form .......................................................... 412 
1 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
We narrow our horizons, we reduce our expectations. Hope goes out 
of our lives, hope goes out [of] our work, hope goes out of the way we 
think. Revolution, even emancipation, become ridiculous words. 
Well, of course: we are getting old. But that is not the problem. The 
problem is that the young too are old, many of them, sometimes even 
older than the old. The problem is that the world is getting old 
(Holloway, 2002, p. 154). 
 
The imaginary of social change has been uncommon in contemporary 
Japanese society since the collapse of the student revolts in the 1960s and 
1970s. Activism has been rare in Japanese society since then, and the rapid 
economic growth provided most Japanese people with an accessible form of 
satisfaction derived from the dominant system.  
 
However, in the post-bubble Japan that has existed since the 1990s, many 
young people are facing the “pain of living (ikizurasa)” (Amamiya, 2010). In 
2007, a 31-year-old part-time worker Tomohiro Akagi (2007) published an 
essay claiming that his “hope is war”. With his monthly income of 100,000 yen, 
he is unable to support himself and is living in an “unendurable humiliation”. 
To him, peace means only the continuation of social stability, in which he is 
too poor to support even himself. In contrast, war brings an opportunity for 
change. 
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Waiting for a destructive war for the opportunity of change is an absolutely 
passive attitude. Akagi shows no hope for social change through collective 
action. Akagi (2011) notes that, according to the prevailing norm of Japanese 
society, it is his own fault that he is a precarious worker. Although finding a 
secure job is difficult in recessionary Japan, Akagi is still blamed for his 
poverty because he is too ‘lazy’ to get a stable job (Akagi, 2007, 2011).  
 
The anti-poverty activist Makoto Yuasa (2008) describes contemporary 
Japanese society as a “sliding-down society” (Suberidai-shakai); once people 
drop out of mainstream stability, they simply slip to the bottom. There is little 
sympathy and social support for precarious workers. For them, perhaps war 
or disaster is the only imaginary of social change, coming from outside like a 
fate, to destroy the stagnant system.  
 
Akagi’s hope of war signifies the political impasse. There is a sense of 
powerlessness permeating contemporary Japanese society, in which people 
are living with pain but have no idea how to escape it. The violent search for 
the outside of a stagnant reality has been seen in Japanese society. In 1995, 
members of the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo spread sarin gas in the Tokyo 
subway. As the title of Lifton’s book suggests, they were “destroying the world 
to save it” (2000) from the corruption of the spirit. In 1997, 14-year-old ‘Boy A’ 
killed two pupils and claimed that he wanted to be recognised in his society as 
“a real existing person”, since he had been living everyday life as “a 
transparent existence” (Asahi Shimbun Osaka Shakaibu, 2000).  
 
In 2008, an alienated young temporary worker, Tomohiro Kato, randomly 
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killed seven people on a busy street in Tokyo. Having grown up in an 
estranged family relationship and finding himself working in precarious 
conditions, Kato’s remaining comfort was the online chatting community; 
when he lost this last space to belong to due to harassment, he considered 
himself to have been “killed” (Kato, 2012) and his anger turned towards the 
stranger on the street. 
 
The desperate hope for an outside also generates another form of violence, 
not to others but towards the self.1 The book entitled The Complete Manual of 
Suicide (Tsurumi, 1993) became popular among young Japanese people in 
the 1990s. Its opening remark informs us that, since there is no more ‘nuclear 
war’ to destroy the world, suicide will be our last resort to end the misery of 
everyday life. In the 2000s, ‘internet group suicide’ (netto-shinju) became a 
familiar phenomenon, where strangers arranged the plan online, assembled 
and committed suicide together (Ozawa-de Silva, 2010; Ikunaga et al., 2013). 
They built solidarity not for resistance or for living, but for dying. 
 
On the other hand, for most young Japanese people, hopes for an outside of 
reality itself seemed to have almost disappeared. A young sociologist 
Noritoshi Furuichi (2011) claimed that, despite the image of a young 
generation being precarious and miserable, the majority of them express their 
satisfaction with their lives. The title of Furuichi’s work (2011) describes his 
generation as “the happy young people in the nation of despair”; they regard 
                                                   
1 The suicide rate in Japan was the 4th highest in OECD countries in 2012 with 19.1 per 
100,000 persons, following Lithuania (29.5), Korea (29.1) and Latvia (20.4) (OECD, 
2015). 
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the future as hopeless but are living quite happily in the here and now, never 
hoping to change it (Furuichi, 2011).  
 
This affirmation of reality sounds strange, considering the instability and 
insecurity of life in recessionary Japan. Lifetime employment systems have 
collapsed, and finding a full-time job is becoming difficult, particularly for those 
young people. Even successful full-time workers are forced to work extremely 
long hours. Deaths and suicides from overwork have already become a 
serious social problem in Japan. In 2008, a 26-year-old woman committed 
suicide two months after being hired as an employee at a restaurant chain. It 
turned out that she had been forced to work 140 hours overtime per month 
(Brasor, 2012). Her diary contains her desperate pleas: “my body is in pain 
[…]. I can no longer move quick enough. Please somebody help me” (Sankei 
West, 2013).  
 
The once shared sense that ‘all Japanese people are middle classes’ has 
long gone, and in 2014 about 16 per cent of Japanese people were living 
below the relative poverty line (Economist, 2015). “Japan is becoming an 
impoverished country” where even the term ‘starving to death’ has become 
familiar in news reporting (Allison, 2013, p.6). In 2013, a 28-year-old mother 
and her three-year-old son died of starvation. It is reported that, having fled 
her husband’s violence and concealed her address, the mother had no one to 
ask for help (Huffington Post, 2013).  
 
There seems to be a strange stagnation in Japanese society. Most young 
Japanese people claim to be “satisfied” with their lives (Furuichi, 2011), as 
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they manage to maintain some stability of life in a sea of uncertainty. However, 
their stability is actually fragile and they are at risk of slipping down the “sliding 
society” (Yuasa, 2008). Many people are already drowning, isolated from 
each other. There is a vacuum in politics. Their lives seem to be fragile, be 
they in the prevailing norm or not; however, there are few political actions 
from them to change the situation. The voter turnout in general elections is 
lowest among the younger generation. 2  Akagi’s “hope for war” (2007) 
conveys his desire for change, but he himself feels so powerless that he is 
only passively waiting for the scene to change, rather than becoming a 
political agent of social change. 
 
In March 2011, a catastrophic disaster occurred in this political vacuum. Just 
like Akagi’s imaginary of war, it came from outside and destabilised the 
stagnant everyday life which seemed to offer ‘no way out’. The earthquake 
and tsunami took the lives of nearly 16,000 people and more than 2,500 
people remain missing. Then the nuclear plants exploded and the accident 
displaced more than 150,000 people from their homes.  
 
The political theorist Satoshi Shirai explains that the Fukushima disaster 
revealed a dysfunctional social structure in Japan, which has been covertly 
sustained under the booming economy with the deceptive narrative of Japan 
as a “peaceful and prosperous” nation (Shirai, 2013, p.21). What lay beneath 
this structure was a “system of irresponsibility” (Shirai, 2013, p.10) which led 
Japan into the Pacific War. This system of irresponsibility fostered the culture 
                                                   
2 For example, at the general election in 2014, voter turnout among young people in their 
20s was 32.58%, and among those in their 30s it was 42.09%, according to the 
Association for Promoting Fair Elections (2015). 
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of concealing inconvenient information to save face, and advancing the once 
established plan with groundless optimism. In fact, although the potential risks 
of nuclear accidents had been documented before the Fukushima disaster, 
the government and the energy company took no precautionary measures 
and insisted that an accident was “unimaginable” (Shirai, 2013, p.8).3   
 
Shirai (2013) points out that this ‘system of irresponsibility’ is not solely the 
culture of decision-makers but is also largely shared by ordinary Japanese 
people, who blindly obey the authorities without thinking. This culture of 
obedience seems to correspond with their passive attitude toward politics. 
Hence the question is: has the Fukushima disaster brought change to this 
culture? 
 
After the disaster, some Japanese people started raising their voices. The 
anti-nuclear movements after the Fukushima disaster became the largest 
social movements since the 1960s, mobilising more than 100,000 people in 
the summer in 2012, and still continuing in 2015. One of the anti-nuclear 
demonstration organisers, Misao Redwolf (2013, p.58), believes that “by 
destabilising the system supporting the nuclear energy industry, we make a 
crack and send winds to mobilise society.”  
 
                                                   
3 Shirai (2013, p.8) points out that in the interpellation in the lower Diet in 2006, the MP 
Hidekatsu Yoshii submitted a question on the risk of the nuclear accident, due to station 
blackout induced by earthquake and tsunami (House of Representative, 2006). In 
addition, the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission reports 
that since 2006, “the regulators and TEPCO were aware of the risk that a total outage of 
electricity at the Fukushima Daiichi plant might occur if a tsunami were to reach the level 
of the site” but TEPCO “had not prepared any measures to lessen or eliminate the risk” 
and the regulators “failed to provide specific instructions to remedy the situation” 
(National Diet of Japan, 2012, p.16). 
7 
 
The protesters insist that Japanese society needs to change, and that they 
must be the agents of this change. Those protesters who gained confidence 
in their activism joined other protest actions against racism and against the 
government. Although they still have only a small presence in the dominant 
atmosphere of political disillusionment, this thesis argues that these 
movements show how ordinary people, who used to be rather apolitical, are 
able to engage with the political, and it tries to theorise their “politics of 
disaster.”   
 
1.2 Personal motivation, research objectives and questions 
The primary aim of my research is to illustrate a new political imaginary to 
describe ‘hope’ for Japanese society, which seems to be immersed in 
disillusionment and a sense of ‘no way out’. My ultimate research question is: 
How might we change society politically in postmodernity? In other words, I 
explore how our desire for fulfilled lives might become a creative political force 
rather than an imaginary of destruction. 
 
This is motivated by my personal background. As a Japanese citizen born in 
1980, I stand between the generation of Akagi (born in 1975) and Furuichi 
(born in 1985). I have lived with the same political disillusionment as they 
have done. Living in a “sliding-down society” (Yuasa, 2008), we are living with 
the fear of stepping out of the dominant norm, because once we deviate from 
it, what awaits us is a “humiliating” life threatened by poverty (Akagi, 2007). As 
Holloway (2002, p.154) notes, “hope goes out of the way [I] think”, and I have 
been living strictly in the prevailing norm, knowing that the system is 
dysfunctional, as Shirai (2013) points out.  
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Unlike in the 1960s, people no longer share any political meta-narrative that 
might help produce a better society. Unlike the era of economic growth, 
finding a stable and satisfying life in the dominant system appears very 
difficult in recessionary Japanese society. The “pain of living” (Amamiya, 
2010) lies in this predicament, where people are living precarious lives in a 
post-industrial society without any political narrative of hope. I believe that 
Japanese society needs a new political imaginary and practice, facing the 
precariousness of life in a society with contingency. The protesters in the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements have taken on this task.  
 
Since my primary research question of “how to change society” and the aim of 
describing a “new political imaginary” are abstract, this thesis also identifies 
several secondary aims and research questions. These are approached from 
three angles: 
 
Aim 1) To describe the social struggles and political disillusionment in 
post-war Japanese society and the postmodern condition.  
 
First of all, the thesis investigates the source of political disillusionment 
permeating contemporary Japanese society. It examines how the hope for 
change is expressed in post-war Japanese society. Although collective action 
for social change was imaginable for many young people in the student 
movements of the 1960s, such political voices have been lost in the later era. 
There are two questions in regard to this part: what has changed since then, 
and how has this led to most Japanese people becoming politically 
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disillusioned? These questions include an enquiry into the shift in their identity, 
sense of agency, perception of society and goals in life, as well as more 
objective factors such as the change in economic conditions and cultures.   
 
Aim 2) To examine the emergent identities and ethics demonstrated by 
protesters in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements. 
 
Secondly, the thesis analyses the political practices in the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear movements. The analysis is based on my fieldwork in Tokyo 
conducted on several occasions between 2012 and 2015. The Fukushima 
disaster worked as a force from the outside which destabilised the stagnancy 
of everyday life, just as Akagi imagined in his “hope of war” (2007). These 
movements mobilised the largest number of people since the 1960s student 
revolt.  
 
It is notable that this mobilisation occurred in the so-called postmodern 
condition where people do not share a political ideology. Most of the 
participants identified themselves as apolitical before the disaster (Gonoi, 
2012: Oguma, 2012, 2013). We will therefore be able to see these 
anti-nuclear movements as the on-going efforts of people regaining a sense 
of political agency for social change. My research questions here are as 
follows: In what ways are people motivated to join the protests, what kind of 
identity do they describe, and how do they make their commitment to politics?  
 
Aim 3) To envisage a new political imaginary in postmodern Japan with 
the implications of the knowledge-practice of the post-Fukushima social 
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movements.  
 
Thirdly, although any such endeavour has evident limitations, I explore a 
political imaginary and practices for social change carried out without people 
resorting to violence or falling into nihilism. My objective here is to articulate 
‘postmodern’ political theory. Although conventional political theories presume 
a solid collective identity and rational discourses to describe clear objectives, 
these aspects have become vague in contemporary society. On the other 
hand, the politics that emerged from the Fukushima disaster had no such 
preconditions. By comparing their politics with the existing political philosophy, 
I explore what might be a new agency, social relationships, and ethics in a 
complex society. Finally, this exploration led me to ask: What kind of 
knowledge is needed to respond to the ‘pain in life’ in contemporary society? 
 
1.3 Structure 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. After this introductory chapter, chapters 
two and three address my first research aim: to describe the social struggles 
in post-war Japanese society and the postmodern condition. Chapter two is 
the literature review section and provides a descriptive approach to 
investigate the imaginary of social change in post-war Japanese society. 
Based on the sociologist Masachi Osawa’s (2008) framework, it explains how 
people’s imagination of ‘anti-real’ or an alternative to reality has been lost 
political sense, turning to fictional images in the 1980s, and almost 
disappearing since the 1990s. Then I argue that, now, without any shared 
political narrative to describe hope, many people have ended up in 
self-subjugation to authority in order to prevent their lives becoming insecure 
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and meaningless. 
 
A more theoretical analysis of the postmodern political impasse is conducted 
in chapter three. After examining the definition of postmodernity, the chapter 
articulates the difficulty of identifying a possible political subject who desires 
social change, because in a complex society the source of oppression 
becomes unclear. In addition, cultural diversity in contemporary society 
makes it difficult for people to share a plausible meta-narrative for social 
change. Using the framework of the autonomists (Holloway, 2010a, b, 2011; 
Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2004; Virno, 2004a, 2006a, b), the situationists 
(Debord, 1983; Vaneigem, 1983) and the post-anarchists (Call, 2002; May, 
2005; Newman, 2007), this chapter explores a political project in such a 
condition. I argue that the ‘postmodern’ subjects without predetermined 
collective identity and shared ideology can still motivate themselves into 
politics through their own emotions (Goodwin et al., 2001; Gould, 2004) and 
construct a collective identity from their embodied experience in the social 
movements. These actions then make “rhizomatic” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1988) connections, which allow further development of the movement. 
 
Chapters four, five and six are devoted to the second aim of my research: to 
examine identities and ethics among the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
protesters. Chapter four constructs a methodological frame for my fieldwork 
research. Conventional social movement research tries to discover the 
objective truth of social movements, with its analysis of resources, political 
structures or strategic frames (McAdam et al., 1996; Benford and Snow, 2000). 
Yet these theories only allow analysis within the context of institutional politics, 
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whereas my research explores a political approach by those who have no 
access to these resources. Thus, my thesis suggests that social movements 
themselves are the subjects of new knowledge (Chesters, 2012), and it 
investigates their practices as a new way of doing politics. Based on this, I 
describe the details of my fieldwork, the choice of the case, identification of 
interviewees, my position as the researcher, etc.  
 
Based on my interviews with the protesters in the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear movement, chapter five examines the motivational factor of this 
movement. I argue that the politics that emerged in the movements is neither 
led by shared ideology nor based on predetermined identity. The protesters 
are motivated by emotions, as Goodwin et al. (2001) suggest, such as shock, 
anger, and regret at their previous indifference to politics. They reject who 
they used to be, and such emotions construct new “project identity” (Castells, 
1997).  
 
While the diverse emotional expressions in the movement create new political 
practices, this chapter also points out the weakness of this movement, as 
demonstrated by elections which require consensus. I also argue that the 
protesters’ confidence in activism changed fluid emotional discourse into 
more solid political concepts, which might be rendering the movement closed 
to people outside. 
 
Chapter six examines the protesters’ ethics, asking how their actions, 
motivated by personal emotions, avoid being selfish. I argue that the disaster 
brought a sense of ambiguity and incompleteness of the self, and this 
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awareness causes the protesters to remain open to the radical others 
(Critchley, 2007) who force them to feel and think. The protesters’ concept of 
life goes beyond the individual bodies, and they often express their desire as 
indiscernible subjects in whom the boundary of the self and the other is vague. 
I examine such subjectivity with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) concept of 
‘machinic’ assemblage, which seems to suggest a new ethical relationship 
with other people.  
 
Chapters seven and eight explore my third objective, which is to envisage a 
new political imaginary in postmodern Japan. Chapter seven compares 
several actions in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements with different 
strains of political philosophy to face the postmodern predicament: radical 
politics in liberalism and post-anarchism. I argue that some actions in the 
post-Fukushima activism are “majoritarian” actions which intend to “pluralise” 
hegemony (Mouffe, 2005) by framing the protesters’ emotional language into 
a unified political demand. Other actions use emotions as a driving force for 
encounters, connections and creation (Call, 2002; Day, 2005), and therefore 
they are “minoritarian” actions. This chapter insists that the novelty of this 
movement is the co-existence of these actions. It indicates a flexible 
subjectivity and open ontology which does not require a coherent model of 
politics. 
 
These analyses lead me to the final exploration in chapter eight, which is to 
map out a potential political imaginary in postmodernity. The knowledge 
created in the post-Fukushima activism signifies an ontological reversal; it 
proposes the ethics as the desire of a “dissolved” self who is permeated by 
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the otherness, rather than the moral obligation of a solid self to the other. It 
suggests that the meaning of life might be acquired not by a self being 
recognised but by mingling one’s desire with that of others in an assemblage 
and making a difference to it, which I describe as the affirmation of ‘dignity’. 
Such ontology is explained as the ontology of ‘becoming’ with the philosophy 
of Bergson and Deleuze, who consider that the world is constantly changing. 
The role of knowledge in this ontology is not to provide an invariant model but 
to live with the changing situation (Williams, 2013). I explore it through the 
concept of ‘self-organisation’ (De Landa, 2013; Connolly, 2013). Based on 
these arguments, I suggest that my research be considered as one part of 
such knowledge. 
 
Chapter nine summarises the key findings of my research and highlights its 
implications and contributions. I reiterate that a new political imaginary needs 
to go beyond thinking about legitimate models or looking for ‘solutions’ for 
alienated young people. I conclude that my research describes many 
experiments in turning our desires for fulfilled lives into political forces for 
change, from which each of us may create hope. 
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Chapter 2 Literature review: 
Political predicament in the pre-disaster Japan 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the political impasse and a sense of powerlessness in 
contemporary Japanese society. How did people lose a plausible narrative to 
guide their life, and how did it affect their sense of political agency? This 
chapter conducts a chronological analysis of the changing perceptions and 
sense of agency among Japanese people in post-war society.  
 
The sociologists Munesuke Mita (1971, in Osawa, 2008) and Masachi Osawa 
(2008) acknowledge that there was a conceptual shift in how Japanese 
people describe the imagination of the “anti-real” or the alternative to reality. 
According to Mita (1971, in Osawa, 2008), the concept of the “anti-real” in the 
post-war Japanese society shifted from the “ideal” (the United States as a role 
model) in 1945-1960 to a “dream” (of revolution) in the 1960s and 70s; since 
then, it has turned into an era of the “fictive.” Osawa (2008) develops Mita’s 
analysis by unifying the era of the ideal and the dream, and adding a new 
period after the “era of the fictive.” Osawa argues that, in contemporary 
society, the concept of the anti-real is no longer fictive but “impossible” (2008). 
 
This thesis adopts Osawa’s categorisation to analyse how the hope of social 
change has been diluted in contemporary Japanese society. The first “era of 
the ideal” (2.1) covers approximately the period between 1945 and 1970, 
when Japanese people still shared some sort of meta-narrative of what 
society should be like. With the clear vision of an alternative to the reality, 
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counter-hegemonic social movements became popular in this era (Osawa, 
2008). The next “era of the fictive” (2.2) was the high noon of consumer 
capitalism in Japanese society, which corresponds with the period between 
1970 and 1995. Stable economic growth provided legitimacy for the prevailing 
system, instead of the dead political meta-narratives. It allowed people to 
consume a preformed identity to make their lives meaningful, and even the 
hope for an ‘outside’ was provided within the system as a form of culture (Iida, 
2002; Osawa, 2008; Uno, 2011).  
 
On the other hand, the recession of the 1990s onward undermined the 
stability of the dominant system and the legitimacy of prevailing norms. More 
and more people are excluded from a stable life, yet they are unable to 
experience a sense of agency for social change. This is what Osawa calls 
“the era of the impossible” (2.3 and 2.4). The loss of meta-narratives in this 
postmodern era makes it difficult for them to share a motivation for collective 
action and causes significant frustration. The main theme of this chapter is to 
illustrate how young people try to find their identity in these conditions where 
the social relationship between individuals and society has become vague.  
 
2.1 The era of the ideal  
2.1.1 The United States as a role model 
Masachi Osawa (2008) articulates that “the era of the ideal” refers to the time 
between 1945 and around 1970. According to him, this era is characterised as 
the existence of the transcendent other which provides the absolute guide for 
a life.  
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The post-war period of Japan started with the five-year occupation by the 
allied powers. In particular, the United States provided Japanese people with 
the image of ‘ideal’ form of society (Osawa, 2008). Osawa argues that, at the 
end of the war, Japanese people immediately switched the authority for value 
judgement from the emperor to the United States. Through the mediation of 
the United states as ‘the transcendental Other’, Japanese people could 
broadly agree on what the ideal life consisted of (Osawa, 2008). The 
intellectuals celebrated the democratic system and the peaceful Constitution 
renouncing war (Suga, 2006; Kasai, 2012). Many ordinary Japanese people 
were attracted by the American lifestyle surrounded by electronic appliances 
(Osawa, 2008).  
 
The United States was more than the ideal. In 1951, the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty ended the military occupation by the allied powers, and Japan 
regained its sovereignty. At the same time, the Japan-US security treaty (the 
Ampo treaty) was signed, allowing the US military to stay in Japan and 
shoulder the country’s defence. The revision of the Ampo treaty was sought 
by the Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who demanded a more equal military 
partnership (Hosaka, 2007). This incited mass protest movements in 1960 by 
Japanese people who strongly opposed to any involvement in US-led wars. 
 
The protest against the Ampo treaty was originally led by leftist political 
parties, labour unions and the group of university students called Zengakuren. 
This was originally a youth organisation of the Japanese Communist Party 
(JCP). However, rejecting its party’s parliamentarism, Zengakuren separated 
from it and established a new independent communist party ‘Bund’, which 
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initiated direct actions including violent confrontation with the police (Tomono, 
2010).  
 
The movement expanded into general public when Kishi signed the treaty and 
steamrollered the Bill through the Diet. Housewives, farmers and retired 
people all joined the movement and more than five million people participated 
in general strikes (Hosaka, 2007). The movement peaked on 18 June 1960, 
when 250,000 people demonstrated around the National Diet; however, the 
treaty became law the next day (Hosaka, 2007; Tomono, 2010).  
 
On the one hand, the Ampo struggle was not quite about the movement 
against the Ampo treaty (Hosaka, 2007; Tomono, 2010; Kasai, 2012). For 
ordinary people, it was an anti-Kishi movement in the first place, as he had 
ignored parliament to pass the Bill. The protesters believed that they were 
‘protecting’ post-war democracy from Kishi’s dictatorship, which reminded 
them of wartime Japan (Hosaka, 2007; Tomono, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, the Zengakuren students was expecting communist 
revolution. They believed that the turmoil of the Ampo struggle would create 
an opportunity for revolution, although they did not have a clear vision of how 
to achieve it (Tomono, 2010). Zengakuren chose violent confrontation with the 
state hegemony, and when the movement peaked on 18 June, many of its 
leaders had already been arrested. Despite the huge number of people 
surrounding the National Diet, they could do nothing but to sit in until the Bill 
became law (Tomono, 2010).   
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The Prime Minister Kishi resigned due to the turmoil of the Ampo struggle in 
1960. His successor Hayato Ikeda introduced an economic-centred agenda, 
promising to double the nation’s income in ten years. While the left social 
movements failed to create a new counter-ideology, the conservative Liberal 
Democratic Party’s government successfully articulated the desire of the 
people within the new national goal (Iida, 2002, p.116).  
 
2.1.2. The Zenkyoto movement and the beginning of postmodernity 
The limitations of a totalising ideology for social change became clearer in the 
second upsurge of the student movements in the late 1960s. These were 
triggered by conflicts in two universities, in both of which the students 
challenged the authoritarian management system to demand their autonomy. 
4 The student revolts expanded into more than 100 universities during 1968 
and early 1969 (Tsurumi, 1970), and the protesters organised a nationwide 
non-sect coalition ‘Zenkyoto’. Their revolts included protests against the 
Vietnam War and the revision of the Ampo treaty in 1970. 
 
What differentiates Zenkyoto’s revolt from the 1960’s Ampo struggle was its 
concept of “self-interrogation”, which was intended to investigate the power 
inside its members. This was especially pursued in the conflict at the 
University of Tokyo, the highest-profile university in Japan. As 
elites-in-the-making, these students’ anti-hegemonic struggle inevitably 
questioned their own identity (Iida, 2002). This concept of self-interrogation 
                                                   
4 The conflict in the University of Tokyo was enflamed when the University punished the 
medical students who had clashed with the university management in demanding the 
improvement of the intern system. Another conflict arose in Nihon University, where the 
students raged against the University’s accounting fraud. 
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was also theorised in the anti-Vietnam War movement ‘Beheiren’ (Peace for 
Vietnam committee). Established in the mid-1960s, Beheiren activists 
engaged in supporting US deserters who were seeking asylum (Iida, 2002).  
 
The Ampo struggle in 1960 was aimed at ‘protecting’ democracy and 
maintaining a peaceful everyday life as the status quo, by ensuring that Japan 
would never be involved in war. In contrast, Beheiren paid attention to the fact 
that their peaceful daily life itself could contribute to the Vietnam War. They 
had accepted US bases inside Japan and given a justification for the 
Japanese government to support the war (Muto, 1969; Oda, in Iida, 2002; 
Kosaka, 2006). While the 1960 Ampo movement framed the protest as the 
good citizens against the bad hegemony, the Beheiren movement accused 
citizens because of their own complicity (Kosaka, 2006). The theory of 
anti-war inevitably required a change in society itself (Muto, 1969) or even its 
“destruction” (Yoshikawa, 1969).  
 
Moreover, the Beheiren movement was distinguished by its decentralised 
nature. It had “no clearly defined membership or organizing principles, nor a 
central office or hierarchically organized command structure” (Iida, 2002, 
p.121). In the movement, “self-educated individuals” came together with “a 
strongly shared and vaguely defined feeling”; Beheiren was the antithesis of 
the organised conventional left politics based on ideology (Iida, 2002, p.121).  
 
Although the Ampo struggle, the Zenkyoto movement and Beheiren’s action 
all challenged the hegemony, the latter two emphasised the challenge to the 
power within their own identity. It might be said that the Zenkyoto and 
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Beheiren movements reflected the postmodern condition in Japanese society. 
Iida describes that, throughout the 1960s, “systems of control shifted from 
hard, tangible institutions to soft, intangible networks of knowledge.” Here “the 
formerly objectifiable enemy was transformed into the more abstract systemic 
authority of which one was a part” (Iida, 2002, p.158). 
 
However, this novel imaginary for social change in the late 1960s failed to 
identify the political discourse for their struggle. The Zenkyoto activist and 
theorist Shuhei Kosaka recalls that they “did not know who the enemy was at 
that time.” He continues; 
 
I had even no idea about whether the enemy belongs to some 
objective social entity, or it resides in personal situation. As a result 
we had no other choice to use the old language to criticise our enemy 
[...]. By the term ‘old language’ I mean the discourse of the Japanese 
post-war democracy regime and traditional Marxist language. […] We 
shared the feeling of uncomfortableness and alienation in a newly 
emerged society, but there was a twist between our feeling and 
language (Kosaka, 2006, p.36). 
   
Although the movement was motivated by its members’ everyday life 
experiences, it was still framed by a totalising ideology (Oguma, 2012). There 
was indeed a twist; those student revolutionaries in the sixties only had 
Marxism to describe the alternative, while the Marxist ideology of 
overthrowing the capitalist system had already lacked a sense of reality in 
Japan, because capitalism was already deeply rooted in its consumer society 
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(Kotani, 2004).  
 
After the occupation of Tokyo University collapsed, some claimed that the only 
way to achieve social change was through violent revolution; the Japanese 
Red Army flew overseas to establish bases for such a violent revolution 
(Tomono, 2010). Inside Japanese society, student revolutionaries were 
divided into small groups and started violent infighting, which killed more than 
100 members (Suga, 2006). Some student activists believed that creating 
turmoil would bring a chance of revolution; however, this ‘creation of turmoil’ 
itself eventually became the objective (Tomono, 2010).  
 
Their self-criticism against the hegemonic power within their identity also 
pushed some young people to extremes. The Asama Sanso incident5 in 1972 
showed how extreme ‘disciplining’ inside the student group ended up in a 
deadly purge against its own members. In 1974, a group called the East Asia 
Anti-Japan Armed Front bombed the offices of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
and killed eight people, claiming that it was a part of their battle against 
Japanese imperialism (Kasai, 2012; Oguma, 2012).  
 
2.1.3 The end of the era of the ideal 
The ‘failure’ of the student movements signifies the difficulty of describing their 
struggle politically in a complex post-industrial society. This was not only the 
problem of the radical left movement. The nationalist approach to radical 
                                                   
5 The Asama Sanso incident was a hostage crisis involving a far-left student group, the 
United Red Army. After the violent purge which killed its group members, the remaining 
activists fled from the police, broke into a mountain lodge and took the lodge-keeper’s 
wife hostage.  
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politics also came to an impasse. For the novelist Yukio Mishima, the spirit of 
the Japanese people became empty in post-war society. He strongly criticised 
Japanese people who immediately discarded their strong respect for the 
emperor after their defeat in WWII and welcomed the hegemony of the United 
States and its economic prosperity (Iida, 2002; Osawa, 2008). Mishima hoped 
to restore Japanese society under the unification of the emperor. In 1970, he 
seized the base of the Japanese self-defence force and urged soldiers to 
instigate a coup. When hardly anybody in the force showed sympathy, he 
killed himself by ritual disembowelment.  
 
Iida (2002) argues that Mishima and Zenkyoto share a similar anti-modern 
orientation in their pursuit of a collective identity. In the late 1960s, they were 
living in a society where subjective interiority had become the product of the 
market and had become foreign to them. Their resistance targeted 
mainstream political realism and economic functionalism, which “went 
hand-in-hand with corporate capital’s ongoing restructuring of society” (Iida, 
2002, pp.160-161). Iida states that both actions attempted to reconnect the 
broken linkages between the individual and the social whole, rationality and 
emotion, mind and body.  
 
According to Osawa (2008, p.75), the Zenkyoto movement signifies the end of 
the era of the ideal, as ‘the ideal’ of young people who joined this movement 
“hardly had concrete details” and it was “merely the negation of the present 
authority, the present ideal.” This is a typical analysis of this movement, which 
was considered an immature rebellion or a “make-believe game of revolution 
(kakumei gokko)” (Suga, 2006) without any political claim.  
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However, Miyauchi (2006) explains that the Zenkyoto movement was “a 
movement without language” and therefore a movement “to seek language.” 
In other words, the Zenkyoto movement was creating a new political 
imaginary based on “language of the body (e.g. emotions, feelings)” in an era 
when people were unsure about who was alienating whom and what was 
causing their sufferings (Miyauchi, 2006). As Jasper (1997, p.127) explains, 
emotions are in fact political resources to “give ideas, ideologies, identities, 
and even interests their power to motivate”. Hence, rather than being 
described as immature rebellion, the Zenkyoto movement should be seen as 
the failed attempt to construct a new political imaginary based on emotion. 
 
Suga (2006) claims that the political movement after the Zenkyoto movement 
took two different paths; while the revolutionist movement turned to violent 
infighting, a newly emerged minority movement engaged in the struggle for 
the rights of subjugated people, such as ethnic minorities and Buraku people 
(descendants of a feudal outcast group). According to Suga (2006), these 
minority movements emerged as a counter-response to the revolutionary 
movement. In particular, the feminist movement sought a ‘new political 
language’ to counter the state-centred revolutionary politics and challenged 
the hegemonic nature which was internalised within the activists themselves. 
However, as Suga (2006) points out, a minority movement has to stand on a 
particular fixed identity, while such identities are often socially constructed. 
 
Moreover, questioning the foundations of society itself became uncommon in 
the materially affluent Japanese society. Oguma (2012, p.151) introduces the 
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voice of one student who was helping people affected by environmental 
pollution because he/she “does not have any problem in [his/her] own life.” In 
an era when 90% of the people consider themselves part of the middle class, 
the political imaginary as the majority of Japanese people is to help the small 
number of people with subjugated identities to achieve equality with them 
(Oguma, 2012). 
 
In the 1970s, the desire for social change itself seemed to fade away. After 
the Ampo turmoil in 1960, the Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda announced 
economic prosperity as a new national strategy. Thereafter, Japan entered a 
period of rapid economic growth, which diverted people’s dissatisfaction 
“away from real concerns towards the aspiration for a better economic life” 
(Iida, 2002, p.116). The student protesters of the 1960s were themselves later 
assimilated into a comparatively prosperous Japanese society and became 
‘corporate warriors’.  
  
It is often pointed out both in Japan and Western societies that the sixties 
movement itself had an affinity with the capitalist market, as the movement 
pursued the liberation of desire. Stephens (1998) rejects the common view 
that the sixties movement has been co-opted by consumer capitalism. 
Analysing the fate of sixties activism in Western society, Stephens (1998) 
acknowledges that what happened was not one-sided co-optation but the 
tense interaction between market capitalism and counterculture. A new set of 
grass-roots values was created by young people, and it impacted the market, 
just as the market affected them. Although the sixties movement might be 
considered a ‘failure’ in a conventional political frame, Stephens (1998) 
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argues that the resistance in the sixties expanded the political arena into the 
sphere of culture. 
  
A similar analysis is presented in Japan. Gonoi (2012) argues that 
anti-hegemonic resistance permeated the sphere of everyday life, forming the 
political-cultural sphere. However, Japanese counterculture seems to be a 
marginal phenomenon compared to that of Western societies. As Kotani 
(2004) analyses, the huge economic success since the 1960s has preserved, 
or even solidified, the traditional values in Japanese society, such as a man 
as a breadwinner and a woman as a mother and housewife. The old 
establishment has never been seriously challenged in Japanese society, as 
the successful economy provided stability in life. 
 
2.2 The era of the fictive 
2.2.1 Triumph of economy and emergence of new identity 
Japanese society in the 1960s enjoyed an ‘economic miracle’. In 1968, 
Japan’s Gross National Product became the second highest in the world, 
overtaking that of West Germany. Although the Japanese economy 
experienced stagnation in the early 1970s, due to the Nixon shock in 1971 
and the oil shock in 1973, its prompt recovery ensured long-term stable 
economic growth until the 1990s. It allowed most Japanese people to share a 
new collective identity as “middle-class Japanese” (Iida, 2002).  
 
This triumphant economic success worked as a meta-narrative (Iida, 2002; 
Azuma and Kasai, 2003; Oguma, 2012). It supplied a plausible universal goal 
for Japanese people as they could believe that a good education would 
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assure them of a good job in a big company, which would bring a good life 
(Yoda, 2006; Oguma, 2012). This narrative was ingrained so deeply in 
everyday life that it even embroiled young children in a highly competitive 
society (Yoda, 2006).  
 
According to Iida (2002), the confidence in economic success endorsed 
people’s identities. Japan’s economic success invited huge attention from 
Western countries, best illustrated in Ezra Vogel’s book Japan as Number 
One (1979, in Iida, 2002). This external attention helped Japanese people to 
rediscover and reconstruct their sense of identity by celebrating the 
uniqueness of Japan. (Iida, 2002, p.200-201). 
 
In addition, a prosperous economy and the materially affluent society enabled 
young Japanese people to actualise the ideal life through consumption. The 
young generation, who enjoyed consuming ever changing fashions, signs and 
images, were described as a ‘new humankind’ (Shin-jinrui) (Iida, 2002; Osawa, 
2008). According to Osawa, this ‘new humankind’ avoided a serious 
commitment to real society, which he describes as the mode of “ironical 
devotion” (Osawa, 2008, p.105). Although they enjoyed consumption, they 
simultaneously kept an ironical distance from the values created in the market 
and mass media. According to Osawa, they did not believe the authentic 
value they consumed, but just “pretended” that the value existed. Osawa calls 
this period the new “era of the fictive,” when “even the ‘real’ might be seen as 
a fabrication through the mediation of language or symbols” (Osawa, 2008, 
p.68). It is a celebration of the society of simulacra (Baudrillard, 1994).  
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2.2.2 Consumer society and the self as ‘crystal’  
The lifestyle of this ‘new human race’ is illustrated in Yasuo Tanaka’s 
best-selling novel in 1981 entitled Nantonaku Kurisutaru (Somehow Crystal) 
(Tanaka, [1981] 2013). The story is about the urban life of a female university 
student and fashion model, Yuri. She lives with her boyfriend, who is a 
musician, but she has a one-night relationship with another man out of 
boredom.  
 
This novel is notable as it contains a huge number of footnotes (442) to 
explain fashion items, cafes, restaurants and the music that appears in the 
novel. It serves as a ‘how to’ guidebook for a fashionable urban life, by 
providing information on what to buy and where to go (Iida, 2002; Inouye, 
2008). This explicit celebration of material affluence highlights the new urban 
lifestyle of young people liberated from a moral anchor (Iida, 2002).  
 
The meaning of its title ‘somehow crystal’ is described during a conversation 
between Yuri and her one-night-stand partner Masataka. Yuri describes her 
lifestyle as being as clear as crystal because she does not have any concerns. 
This is followed by Masataka’s comment that they have “never had a 
philosophical question like what love is,” and “never become passionate about 
anything.” However, he thinks that they are “neither empty nor opaque” as 
they are not naive enough to accept whatever they are told (Tanaka, [1981] 
2013, p.130).  
 
The author Tanaka was a university student in Tokyo when he wrote this 
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novel. 6  Tanaka explains that, in writing this novel, he was mounting a 
challenge to Japanese literature. He notes: “in the time when Japanese 
society has become so affluent, Japanese novels are still obsessed with the 
old questions such as ‘what life is.’” What Tanaka wrote instead was the 
“reality of young people whose life theme is ‘feeling good’” ([1981] 2013, 
p.230). 
 
In fact, Tanaka has his heroine Yuri state that, for her generation, “feeling is 
the measure of all things” (Tanaka, [1981] 2013, p.58). However, Inouye 
(2008) asserts that this seemingly anarchistic thought expressed by Yuri does 
not mean that she is completely free, because she internalises a certain code 
describing what it means to be fashionable. In one sense this era was 
miraculous in that the identity of young Japanese adults and their ‘feeling’ 
somehow corresponded with branded materials, and these were all financially 
available to them. Still, Inouye claims that the cultural codes in this era are 
difficult to follow; hence, “[t]he best we can do is to produce an exhaustive 
listing of what concretely is in style at any given moment” (Inouye, 2008, 
p.184). 
 
This image of the self as something solid and clear but not empty is an 
interesting signifier of identity in 1980s Japan, when it is compared with the 
identity of a later era. In 1997, a 14-year-old murderer described himself as a 
“transparent existence.” This indicates a more formless, unidentifiable self 
than being “somehow crystal.” 
                                                   
6 Yuri, the main character of the novel, was born in 1959, and the author Yasuo Tanaka 
was born in 1956.  
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2.2.3 Consuming post-structuralist knowledge 
The self as crystal and its attitude of ironic devotion to simulacra was 
endorsed by the young academic Akira Asada, who introduced 
post-structuralism to the general public. His book Kozo to Chikara (Structure 
and Power; 1983) explains the theories of Lacan, Battaile, Deleuze and 
Guattari. In his following work Tosoron (On Escape; 1984), Asada celebrates 
a nomadic individual who escapes from the code.   
 
Asada’s intention was to introduce “schizophrenic” thinking to Japanese 
society, which was haunted by “paranoiac” thinking: people were running in 
the same direction through competition (Asada, 1983, 1984). Asada’s Kozo to 
Chikara sold 80,000 copies in the first few weeks of its publication, which was 
unusual for an academic book. It was soon picked up by the mass media and, 
together with several other young intellectuals, Asada was seen as the 
leading figure of “new academism.”  
 
This may be an ironical phenomenon. As an intellectual with post-structuralist 
ideas, Asada’s aim was to provide ‘joyful wisdom’ instead of meta-narratives. 
He claimed that knowledge should be used as a tool that the reader can utilise 
to create something new (Ivy, 1989). However, in conjunction with the mass 
media campaign in consumer society, this knowledge itself serves the 
dominant market system rather than becoming a tool for ‘schizophrenic 
thinking.’  
 
Iida (2002) criticises Asada for simplifying sophisticated post-structuralist 
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knowledge and, in the worst case, turning it into a mere entertainment. For 
Iida, Asada seemed to be encouraging an irresponsible attitude, because 
Asada interprets Deleuze’s nomadism as men running away from their wives 
and families “simply because that is much more fun” (1984, p.4; in Iida, 2002, 
p.184).  
 
Nakamasa (2006) identifies Asada’s nomadic subject as a ‘freeter’, a 
Japanese coinage signifying a temporary or part-time worker. In the 
prosperous economy of 1980s Japan, a ‘freeter’ was regarded as a person 
enjoying a liberated working style in which he/she might flexibly choose where 
and how much to work. However, in the post-bubble Japanese society after 
the 1990s, these freeters became the symbol of precarious workers; they are 
no longer what young people choose to be but, rather, what they are forced to 
be (Genda, 2005, p.52). In the post-bubble society, Asada’s schizophrenic 
lifestyle only signifies a disempowered and atomised subject. 
 
It can be said that Asada’s prescription was only viable in 1980s Japanese 
society with its prosperous economy. Although Asada (1984) introduces a 
nomadic attitude as the strategy of liberation, the critic Hiroki Azuma interprets 
it as the strategy of “withdrawing himself to the shelter and only reaching out 
his sensory organ” (Azuma and Kasai, 2003, p.167). Deleuze and Guattari 
(1988) note how dangerous this nomadism can be. However, the nomadic 
subject that Asada emphasises is actually someone whose identity is 
protected from the chaotic outside, and who only consumes the sense of 
liberation without exposing him/herself to the unstable complexity of 
postmodernity.   
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The Zenkyoto activist Shuhei Kosaka (2006) suggests that so-called 
‘postmodern’ philosophy was utilised in Japan as an excuse to accept a reality 
penetrated by consumer capitalism. It might be said that, in the 1960s, the 
Zenkyoto generation first faced the postmodern condition in Japan. They 
found that the existing ideology had become incompatible with their reality, 
and they tried to bridge their real experience of body and the political ideology 
(Kosaka, 2006). However, in the 1980s, imported post-structuralism allowed 
intellectuals to abandon their quest to theorise about how they might live well 
in a complex society. It spread “cheerful nihilism” in society and affirmed the 
way of life in the prevailing norm (Kosaka, 2006, p.166). 
 
2.2.4 Search for an outside in subculture 
The generation of “ironic devotion” (Osawa, 2008), the identity of a “crystal” 
self (Tanaka, [1981] 2013) and the attitude of tasting a sense of liberation 
seem to represent the dominant culture of 1980s Japanese society. However, 
not all people could be satisfied by filling their identities with slightly 
differentiated commodities in the dominant culture.  
 
The discomfort in society could no longer be described as an imaginary of 
revolution; rather, it was “expressed differently as occultism to the desire for 
the fantasy world” (Kosaka, 2006, p.173). TV animation, comic books and TV 
games provided the remaining imaginary of the anti-real for those young 
people who desired an outside of stagnant reality. Among boys, stories on the 
theme of ‘society after nuclear war’ were popular (Miyadai, 1998). In such 
stories, the main character makes a whole new start in extremely difficult 
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conditions, and overcomes hardships with his friends and colleagues. Among 
girls, stories about reincarnation were favoured (Miyadai, 1998). A typical 
storyline involves the main character suddenly finding that she is a 
reincarnation of someone who died in the past before achieving their mission. 
These imaginative excursions indicate young people’s desire for the 
“extra-ordinal outside,” which might provide them with a historical meaning 
(Miyadai, 1998; Osawa, 2008). 
 
However, Uno (2011) claims that the image of an outside in subculture 
changed in the 1990s. The popular cartoonist Kyoko Okazaki’s comic book 
River’s Edge ([1994] 2000) describes the empty and stagnant everyday life of 
alienated high school students, such as a bullied gay boy and an anorexic 
fashion model. Although their lives are filled with dead-end love, prostitutes, 
estranged family relationships and so on, they hardly share the pain with their 
friends, and their chats are preoccupied with celebrity gossip and branded 
cosmetics. In such a “boring everyday life”, things accumulate, and in the end 
bloody violence explodes like “a balloon bursting” (Okazaki, [1994] 2000, 
p.192). Okazaki describes their everyday lives as “living in a flat battlefield” 
([1994] 2000, p.207). 
 
After seeing her friend destroyed in this episode of bloody violence, the 
heroine regrets that they “were chatting forever after school” in order “to hide 
something” (Okazaki, [1994] 2000, p.219). In a flat battlefield, not even pain 
can be felt and it is buried under symbols and signs. Unlike Yuri in Tanaka’s 
novel in the 1980s, for whom most branded goods represented her feelings, 
Okazaki’s comic highlights the generation for whom these goods are actually 
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nothing to do with their reality with a sense of stagnation. Those goods are 
simulacra (Baudrillard, 1994) which have lost touch with their feeling, but they 
fill their lives with simulacra because they have nothing else to express 
themselves and to share with their friends. Reality can only make sense 
through simulacra. The only exception is their secret ‘treasure’: a stranger’s 
body found by the murky river. The cultural critic Uno (2011, p.20) states that 
the lives of these young people are so stagnant that death is the only 
imagination of an outside. 
 
Around the same time, a book entitled The Complete Manual of Suicide 
(Tsurumi, 1993) became popular among young people. This million-seller 
book describes many ways to commit suicide and has a very provocative 
opening message. Alongside Okazaki’s work, Tsurumi describes death as the 
only attainable ‘outside’ of a stagnant reality. 
 
…the world never ends. Nuclear plants have never exploded and our 
dream of fatal nuclear war has vanished. […] Now we have finally 
realised. ‘The fatal impact’ will never come. […] If we desperately 
want the world to end, then our last resort will be ‘that thing’ (Tsurumi, 
1993, p. 4). 
 
Of course, “that thing” means suicide. Okazaki and Tsurumi’s imagination of 
death as the only ‘outside’ signifies the end of “the era of the fictive”. Now the 
anti-real is unimaginable even as a fiction. Tsurumi ridicules the naive desire 
for a nuclear disaster coming to deconstruct stagnant reality. He tells people 
to stop waiting for the fiction to become true, and he reminds them that there 
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is still a way in this reality to save ourselves from misery.   
 
Probably the most devastating pursuit of an outside during this period was 
attempted by the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo. In March 1995, Aum attacked 
the crowded Tokyo subway with deadly sarin nerve gas. Thirteen people were 
killed and more than 6,000 were injured. The founder of Aum Shinrikyo, 
Shoko Asahara (born Chizuo Matsumoto), encouraged his followers to adopt 
a Buddhist-like practice to become spiritually more developed in order that 
they might survive in the world after Armageddon. The sarin gas attack was 
explained as a salvation project to rescue the general public from corruption 
(Inouye, 2008).  
 
It is often pointed out that the Aum incident was the actualisation of the 
subcultural imagination of the 1980s, which provided a sense of an outside to 
a simulated society (Iida, 2002; Miyadai, 1998). Aum’s doctrine was a mixture 
of Tibetan Buddhism, yoga, and Christian apocalyptical theology, with the 
imaginary of a ‘sacred mission’ from popular TV animations, comic books and 
TV games. Aum attracted highly educated young people from the top-ranked 
universities. They developed deadly chemical and biological weapons in their 
underground laboratories and even conducted research on nuclear bombs 
(Iida, 2002).  
 
Citing Yazawa’s argument (1997, in Castells, 1997), Castells argues that Aum 
appealed to alienated Japanese youth, who could not find their place in the 
material affluence of Japanese society. Aum articulated a supreme mission 
for them which connects their lives with the wholeness and a historical 
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meaning (Iida, 2002; Uno, 2011). The members of Aum were encouraged 
practice and meditation to create a ‘spiritual communication’ with the guru 
Asahara; and this was helped with electric ‘head-gear’ which was said to 
configure Asahara’s brain wave (Castells, 1997). Aum also provided a space 
for a communal life, which attracted young people who had estranged family 
relationships and hoped to satisfy their lack of emotional engagement with 
their everyday lives (Iida, 2002).  
 
Aum Shinrikyo successfully portrayed the image of “anti-real” with its 
apocalyptic narrative, high-tech warfare, spiritual perfection and a life of 
commonality (Castells, 1997). However, this imaginary resulted in a 
grotesque mass murder. Many intellectuals agree that the year 1995 marked 
the turning point in Japanese society (Miyadai, 1998; Azuma, 2001; Osawa, 
2008; Uno, 2011). It was the beginning of what Osawa (2008) calls “the era of 
the impossible” when the imaginary of the anti-real became impossible to 
narrate. 
 
2.3 The era of the impossible  
2.3.1 The exposure to the postmodern condition 
After Aum’s sarin attack, the sociologist Shinji Miyadai proposed a radical 
antidote: stop asking about the true meaning of our life. He warns that seeking 
something authentic or an absolute meaning in life is dangerous. Instead, he 
proposed that we should accept the emptiness of reality and live “an endless 
everyday life” (Miyadai, 1998).  
 
Miyadai identifies this attitude in the middle-class high school girls in the 
37 
 
1990s called kogyaru (little gals). Some kogyaru in this era engaged in 
‘compensated dating’ or enjokosai, which is a dating service including sexual 
relationships mainly for middle-aged men. Miyadai (1998) suggests that 
kogyaru discarded their subjectivity which seeks the meaning of life. Hence, 
they could casually exchange their bodies for money.  
 
Miyadai did not see this as a form of sexual abuse, but rather as ‘liberation’. 
He describes enjokosai as a fashionable technique employed by teenage girls 
to access a sense of ‘extra-ordinariness’ and obtain money for pleasure, while 
continuing their boring everyday lives as high school students. Iida (2002) 
argues that it brought more than material gain for kogyaru, as it shows “the 
desire for access to the world outside the school yard and the family embrace.” 
Becoming a commodity means becoming anonymous, which brings a sense 
of liberation from one’s identity and social morality (Iida, 2002, p.231-232).  
 
Whilst Miyadai emphasises the ‘casualness’ of this behaviour in which they 
painlessly sold their bodies for a sense of extra-ordinariness, he fails to see 
that the relation between these middle-aged men and the girls is not equal. 
Moreover, Miyadai describes kogyaru in the almost same way as the ‘crystal’ 
generations of the 1980s, who gained momentary pleasure by consuming 
branded goods, even though these kogaru were sacrificing their body for 
getting pleasure.  
 
Miyarai’s prescription for the Aum incident was to stick to this prevailing 
lifestyle of the 1980s or even accelerate the society of simulacra to the limit. 
This is a problematic prescription. In the 1980s, the act of consumption 
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seemed to provide the ‘crystal generation’ with a sense of liberation from the 
traditional way of life. Nevertheless, their ‘liberated’ life with a ‘free’ choice was 
following consumer catalogues and ‘how-to’ guidebooks (Inouye, 2008). In the 
1990s, Enjokosai was also framed as a ‘free choice’ for these girls to gain a 
sense of liberation. However, this ‘liberation’ from the coerced meaning of life 
by their parents or schools was immediately exploited by another 
asymmetrical power relationship. Enjokosai was the commodification of their 
entire life, and it was a form of exploitation by middle-aged men with power 
and stability over the precarious girls without power. 
 
Uno argues that seeing enjokosai as the act of abandoning meaning is 
inaccurate. For many teenagers, enjokosai was the pursuit of the very 
meaning of life. Uno (2011) insists that they sought a meaning in life by being 
needed by middle-aged men, and they tried to regain reality through traumatic 
experience. Far from the liberation from meaning, they may have attempted to 
engrave a strong narrative directly onto their bodies to regain the meaning of 
the self. Uno (2011) points out that enjokosai is closer to self-harming. 
Miyadai himself later admitted that enjokosai had become self-harming rather 
than the casual play of fashionable teenagers, and he withdrew his earlier 
advice (Uno, 2011). 
 
Uno points out the different socio-economic contexts of the 1980s and the 
1990s. In the stable consumer society of 1980s Japan, young people could 
construct their identities through acts of consumption. They could actualise 
themselves by attaching values created through the mass media. The 
dominant culture of the 1980s encouraged people to “have fun playing in the 
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sea of a multicultural consumer society” (Uno, 2011, p.75) by consuming 
differentiated goods. Some people failed to accommodate themselves to this 
dominant form; however, their desire for an alternative to the simulated 
society was already fictive and was provided within the dominant system as 
subculture.  
    
The fluid market value brings enjoyment to our lives if we could merely focus 
on the act of consumption, and assume that our life itself is never threatened 
by this fluidity. This was the case of Japanese society in the 1980s, when 
even the nomadic freeters (temporary workers) had been safely protected by 
a growing economy. However, the collapse of this bubble economy around 
1990 brought a long recession. It undermined the lifetime employment system, 
which had laid the foundation for a stable life for Japanese people with a clear 
life goal. It degraded ‘freeters’ into the precarious ‘working poor’ who even 
face death by starvation. Since the 1990s, Japanese society has faced the 
fluidity of postmodernity without any protection and security. 
 
In the era of the impossible, what provides the transcendental reference of life 
is neither a shared ideology nor trends of consumer society: according to 
Osawa, what determines the value of life is the fluid and changeable “eyes of 
the others.” People need to seek recognition from others in order to make 
their lives valuable (Osawa, 2008). In this perspective, enjokosai in the 1990s 
may be described as the girls sacrificing their bodies to gain recognition, 
rather than enjoying the endlessness of everyday life without meaning.  
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2.3.2 Desperation for connection and recognition  
In what Osawa (2008) calls “the era of the impossible”, we can identify some 
hopeless attempts by young Japanese people to gain recognition, acceptance 
and approval. The published diary of a teenage girl, Aya Nanjo (2004), 
highlights her desperate attempt to regain her sense of self and gain attention 
by hurting her own body. She reported her attempts at wrist-cutting and drug 
overdosing on an online website and eventually became a popular ‘idol’ of 
those young people who shared the same emptiness and pain of living. Nanjo 
died of a drug overdose in 1999 at the age of 18. 
 
Doi (2008) compares her diary with that of Etsuko Takano, a 20-year-old 
female university student who killed herself during the student movement in 
1969. At the end of what Osawa (2008) calls “the era of the ideal,” Takano 
suffered in the conflict between her ideal picture of herself and herself in 
reality. In her diary (Takano, 1971), Takano noted her strong desire to change 
herself, to be autonomous, to establish an independent thought not to be 
affected by other people. Eventually, this turned into a harsh self-interrogation 
and she blamed herself for being unable to change.  
 
Doi (2008, pp.86-87) investigates the words these women left before their 
deaths. Takano (1971, pp.164-165) noted that she wanted to “go somewhere 
far away” in order to become independent. In contrast, Nanjo wonders “who 
will remember me after I disappear” (Doi, 2008, pp.86-86). Takano wanted to 
disconnect her relationship from others since it disturbed her will to 
accomplish her ideal self. In contrast, Nanjo had no sense of the ideal self. 
She hoped to solve her emptiness by connecting with someone and being 
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recognised by them. While the former pursued the liberation of the subject 
from the meaning that was attached to her by society, the latter desired 
salvation from meaninglessness, or the recovery of a solid meaning.  
 
A similar comparison is made between the juvenile crimes in “the era of the 
ideal” and those in “the era of the impossible.” In 1997, a 14-year-old, ‘Boy A’, 
killed two pupils and placed the head of one of his victims in front of his junior 
high school. He left a criminal confession with it, in which he identified himself 
as ‘Sakakibara Seito’ and provoked the police, stating: “this is the beginning of 
the game.” Later he sent another crime statement to the local newspaper and 
explained his motivation:  
 
…I tried to attract public attention, because I had been, and I will 
forever be, a transparent existence, and I would at least like to have 
myself recognised as a real, living human being (Asahi Shimbun 
Osaka Shakaibu, 2000, p.262). 
 
According to Osawa (2008), what Sakakibara needed was “the eyes of 
others”; and this motivation is oppositional to another juvenile crime in the era 
of the ideal.  
 
Between 1968 and 1969, 19-year-old Norio Nagayama killed four people 
randomly with a gun stolen from the US base. Born to an extremely poor 
family in a rural area, Nagayama was one of those middle school graduates 
who were employed en masse in the rapidly growing Tokyo area. Osawa 
(2008) notes that Nagayama strongly aspired to an affluent urban life, and he 
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desired to be included in his ideal society. However, in Tokyo he suffered from 
“the eyes of the others” which still stigmatised him as a poor, rustic, 
uneducated man. Nagayama later explained his crime as revenge on society 
(Osawa, 2008).  
 
While Nagayama wanted to be free from the eyes of those who stigmatised 
him, Sakakibara wanted the eyes of the others to identify him as something 
(Osawa, 2008). Osawa’s analysis of Sakakibara’s crime appears similar to 
Doi’s analysis of Nanjo’s self-harm. They both wanted recognition, although 
Sakakibara sought it by destroying the bodies of other people, while Nanjo 
destroyed her own body. Osawa (2008) notes that, in this “era of the 
impossible,” bodies may be the only solid basis on which to narrate life, and 
destructive action against them may be the last remaining imagination for the 
outside of the meaningless void. 
 
If we take a closer look, the motivation for Sakakibara’s murderous acts is 
also different from what motivated Aum’s attack. Aum Shinrikyo attempted to 
establish an ‘alternative society’ for those who were not accepted in the 
dominant culture. However, Sakakibara established a personal god only to 
justify his behaviour. Miyadai (1998) insists that Sakakibara’s murders may 
signify the progress of “dis-sociality,” and he notes that this tendency may 
have been accelerated. While Sakakibara was still pursuing the meaning of 
his existence, other juvenile murders in the later era seem to have had more 
personal and impulsive reasons. An example of this further dis-socialisation 
might be identified in a juvenile murder committed in 2000; a 17-year-old boy 
in Aichi prefecture killed a stranger “out of boredom” and explained that he 
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“wanted to experience killing people” (Asahi Shimbun, 2000).  
 
Aum attracted those who had lost the meaning of life in the dominant culture 
as they could visualise an alternative society and a new meaning of life. 
Sakakibara also felt that he had become empty in his everyday life, although 
what he sought was mere recognition by the existing system. As a 
“transparent existence” who was invisible to society, Sakakibara needed 
some extreme colour to be recognised, and murder was the colour he chose. 
However, the ‘murder out of boredom’ sounds as though he merely wanted to 
relieve the frustration of being transparent. If so, he seems to accept being 
transparent. In this attempt, we can no longer identify any pursuit of the 
meaning to be shared.  
 
However, it is also important to note that, even at this level, some sort of 
subjectivity still exists, in contrast to Miyadai’s (1998) original suggestion to 
discard it. Even if there is no longer a subject who is desperate to recover the 
meaning of the self, there is still a desire to make his life more satisfying; the 
problem is that the way of gaining satisfaction has become less and less 
clear. 
  
2.3.3 Accepting the transparent existence 
The term ‘transparent self’ explains the feeling of alienation and ambiguous 
identity in contemporary Japanese society. However, rather than rejecting it 
like Sakakibara, most young people now seem to accommodate themselves 
with the transparent self, by reflecting the colour required in a particular 
situation in the dominant system. 
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A case in point is the job-hunting activity undertaken by university students, 
which is called ‘shushoku katsudo’ or ‘shukatsu’ in short. Japanese university 
students spend their third and final year on this activity, starting with 
self-analysis, company analysis, taking guidance of how to write ‘entry sheets’ 
(CVs), and how to behave in interviews. Through this process, they prepare 
themselves to become whomever the company wants. They install the ideal 
characteristics for a society or a particular company (Ouchi and Takenobu, 
2013).  
 
In a society in recession, most Japanese companies limit their recruitment to 
new graduates. To obtain stable regular employment, the students must 
succeed in this one chance to brand themselves ‘new graduates’. The 
students tend to devote their entire lives to shukatsu. Ouchi calls this 
‘zenshin-shukatsu’ (a whole-body job-hunting) and explains that failure in the 
shukatsu activity signifies to the students that their entire life is a failure 
(Ouchi and Takenobu, 2013). The pressure of shukatsu even drives students 
to suicide (Morioka, 2013). Morioka introduces a note posted online by a 
student engaged in shukatsu, who claims that continuing shukatsu is “getting 
utterly, unbearably painful” when he keeps “submitting entry sheets, joining 
guidance sessions, taking interviews, making an artificial smile, explaining 
fake motivation, being evaluated by interviewers only to be told that [he is] 
useless” (Morioka, 2013, p.103). 
 
The students are selling themselves by pretending to have whatever 
personality the company wants. Zenshin-shukatsu, as its name suggests, is 
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the total permeation of the hegemonic power into their lives. They are no 
longer the ‘crystal’ self of the 1980s, but literarily transparent; they have no 
protection of the self from the fluid power penetrating the self and moulding 
their lives. Takenobu and Ouchi (2013) also note that the students internalise 
not only the company’s preference but also the dominative values around 
them; hence, the young people are deprived of the right to be hated 
(Takenobu and Ouchi, 2013) by friends and other people around them.   
 
Doi (2008, 2009) identifies this tendency in the classroom relationship in 
contemporary Japan. He notes that the students are extremely fearful of 
standing out in the group or breaking the harmonious communication in the 
group. Hence, they are carefully reading “the atmosphere” in the group and 
talking/behaving in conformity with the culture of the group. Moreover, each 
member plays a certain character and familiarises the discourse inside the 
group. Doi (2009, p.23) describes this role-playing as “characterisation.” They 
narrow down their community, fix their roles and discourses, and maintain 
pre-established harmony in order to reassure the certainty of the self. The 
social relationships of young people are fragmented into small groups, among 
whom there is hardly any interaction (Doi, 2009).  
 
 According to Osawa (2008), people in the era of the impossible need to 
outsource the sense of value to the eyes of the others around them (Osawa, 
2008). Since this reference is fluid, people are required to be flexible and 
reactive. To reduce this burden, they close their territory and restrict others 
who evaluate them. They are avoiding the radical other who destabilises this 
certainty. 
46 
 
 
Osawa (2008) believes that, in such an era, those young people actually 
desire “the other without otherness.” This other will be accepted as long as it 
does not threaten their lives. In other words, the other is welcomed unless 
they demonstrate the unexpected otherness. Doi’s (2008; 2009) analysis of 
“characterisation” and “reading atmosphere” seems to signify the attempts to 
assure this “other without otherness”: the other who provides acceptance but 
never hurts. Doi (2009) explains that this self-subjugation to the simulative 
narratives is the strategy adopted by young people to prevent their lives 
becoming meaningless. However, it creates an extreme pressure inside the 
group. They need to talk and behave in accordance with this preformed 
narrative in order to ‘be liked by the other’.   
 
Baudrillard claims that, because people in contemporary society have 
expelled the radical otherness which brings uncertainty, their community has 
now become “the hell of the same” (Baudrillard, 1993, p.122). Without 
otherness, people cannot even distinguish their identities from those of others. 
On the other hand, the outside of their community is another world, the world 
of those who are expelled, which operates on a totally different logic and is 
becoming more and more different from the inside. This image of parallel 
worlds portrays contemporary Japanese society with a deadly stagnant inside 
and a completely meaningless outside. 
 
2.4 Difficulty of social change in the era of the impossible 
2.4.1 Prevailing culture: consuming the other without otherness 
The parallel worlds of the deadly stagnant inside and the deserted outside 
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both create what Amamiya (2010) identifies as “the pain of living” (ikizurasa). 
However, these pains were hardly shared as the political claim, and their 
struggles are isolated.    
 
It seems that, in contemporary Japanese society, many people are still 
successfully maintaining stability and certainty in their lives by limiting their 
territory. A young sociologist, Noritoshi Furuichi (2011), acknowledges that his 
generation is not unhappy, contrary to the image of young people in the “pains 
of living” (Amamiya, 2010). From the governmental statistics of 2010, Furuichi 
insists that 65.9% of male and the 75.2% of female respondents in their 20s 
claimed to be satisfied with their lives. According to Furuichi (2011, p.104), 
these young people are in the state of “consummatory.” Instead of hoping for 
better conditions or an alternative to reality, they are happy with what they 
have here and now, and they cherish the time spent with their close friends.   
 
Furuichi admits that this self-contained lifestyle may invite boredom; however, 
he indicates that undertaking voluntary work in the developing countries or the 
disaster-hit area would allow them to acquire a meaning in life. Miyadai (1998) 
points out that the voluntary work following the Hanshin earthquake in 1995 
was the partial actualisation of the imaginary of the ‘life after the nuclear war’ 
in the 1980s subculture. Such voluntary activity supplies a sense of the 
outside without seriously affecting their stable territory in everyday life. 
Furuichi (2011) also notes that young people prefer voluntary work with a 
simple narrative, such as “if you do this, we can build a school in Cambodia.” 
Such descriptions are similar to “the era of the fictive” when people were 
withdrawing from the instability and complexity of society and simply 
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consuming a sense of the outside from their shelter. Furuichi’s argument 
indicates that a significant number of young Japanese people are still capable 
of, and content with, “the endless everyday life” (Miyadai, 1998) with the 
occasional excitement supplied from the tamed otherness.  
 
However, we cannot ignore the crucial difference between the era of the 
fictive and the era of the impossible. First of all, as discussed earlier, the 
post-bubble recession since the 1990s has threatened their “endless 
everyday life.” Furuichi’s statistical analysis cannot show what these young 
people meant by saying that their lives were satisfactory. If they manage to 
obtain some stability in a fluid society, they might say that they are happy. 
However it costs a lot to obtain and maintain this stability. The pressure to 
accommodate the self to the dominant value system is strong, and failure to 
do so means the failure of their entire lives, as seen as the example of 
shukatsu activity. 
  
As Osawa (2008) points out, people now believe that their value of life is not 
described as some kind of shared narrative; rather, it depends on the 
evaluation by the other people around them. This leads many young people to 
become desperate for recognition and acceptance by other people, as seen in 
the example of “reading atmosphere” and “characterisation” (Doi, 2008, 2009). 
In addition, this pursuit of recognition often sacrifices the meaning in 
communication. The sociologist Akihiro Kitada (2005) acknowledges that the 
communication of young people becomes formalistic in contemporary society. 
They are not communicating to share meanings; they are merely exchanging 
conversational materials (neta) in order to connect, because connection 
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shows that they are recognised and valuable (Kitada, 2005). 
 
The abandonment of meaning in contemporary society is pointed out by the 
critic Hiroki Azuma (2001). In his analysis, contemporary Japanese society 
consists of two layers, with small narratives (simulacra) and a grand 
non-narrative (database). What we share is the meaningless database, and 
we construct simple small narratives by combining data (Azuma, 2001). 
Meaning is delegated to a mere combination of data; it does not claim a 
coherent message to be shared but only brings personal satisfaction. For 
Azuma, the 1990s onward is the “era of animals,” indicating that people no 
longer demand shared meanings or narratives for their lives (Azuma, 2001).   
 
We may be able to compare this exchange of data with the communication of 
high school students in Kyoko Okazaki’s comic ‘River’s Edge’ ([1994] 2000). 
Their conversation was also filled with simulacra. However, while Okazaki 
allows her heroine to sense that these simulacra were ‘hiding’ their pain which 
should have been expressed and shared, Kitada and Azuma’s argument 
shows the pursuit of the shared meaning has become outdated, and therefore 
simulacra are easily accepted and utilised as neta. Exchanging neta and 
mutual recognition became the dominant communication style in the late 
1990s to the 2000s, according to Kitada (2005).  
 
In the era of the impossible, the economic instability accelerates people’s 
self-protective strategy to accommodate themselves to the dominant norm. 
This strategy is supported by social relationship of ‘reading atmosphere’ and 
communication without sharing the meaning. This culture brings a sense of 
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‘no way out’ and triggered hopeless violence, which I analyse in the next 
section. 
 
2.4.2 Periphery: Searching for the lost ‘other’ 
The Akihabara incident was a massacre in 2008 committed by 25-year-old 
temporary worker Tomohiro Kato. He deliberately drove a truck into a group of 
pedestrians on the street in Akihabara, Tokyo, and proceeded to stab them 
with a knife. Seven people were killed. 
 
The sensational crime led many researchers to investigate the background 
cause of the massacre. Kato had an estranged relationship with his family. His 
mother had imposed strict discipline on Kato when he was a child. She 
controlled his choice of clothes, put him into water to punish him when he 
failed to memorise the multiplication tables, and forced him to stand barefoot 
in the snow to punish him for soaking his shoes (Kato, 2012). These 
punishments were given without any verbal explanation, and Kato just 
“learned to accept” them without thinking (2012, p.67).  
 
Moreover, at the time of his crime, Kato was a typical member of the ‘working 
poor’ who was frequently changing his job. A few days before the murder, he 
left his workplace with anger because he could not find his work uniform and 
thought that someone was trying to force him to quit. This background 
provided a plausible assumption that Kato sought revenge against society, or 
at least hoped for recognition from society through the mass murder (Kano, 
2008; Serizawa, 2008; Ogi, 2008; Sasaki, 2011). 
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However, at his trial in 2011, Kato denied that his intention was revenge on 
society or an appeal to society. Instead, he claimed that the massacre was 
revenge on ‘a particular person’ who had harassed him on the online 
community, which was his only comfort (Sankei News, 2010a). This confused 
researchers, mass media and the general public because they could not 
understand how such a ‘tiny’ problem had led him to commit mass murder.  
 
Kato attempts further self-analyses of his crime in his memoir (2012). He 
reiterates that he had no intention of taking revenge on society. Instead, he 
notes that he always wanted a “connection to society” (Kato, 2012). For 
example, he bought a car which cost more than he could afford, and he 
explains that he did so for the sake of the car dealer, because that 
salesperson was his “connection to society.” It is notable that what he 
describes as a “connection to society” is actually a connection to ‘somebody’. 
He explains that he feels lonely when he is “not sure if he exists in 
somebody’s mind” (Kato, 2012, p.16). For him, isolation is social “death,” 
which scares him more than physical death.  
 
Kato’s existence was probably a transparent one; however, unlike Sakakibara, 
his crime was not to invent his colour and display it. Kato believes that he 
does not have his self (Kato, 2012, p.23). In childhood he was strictly forced to 
accommodate his mother’s values, and in school he tried to be a good student. 
Exhausted by these imposed roles, he eventually diverted his way, which led 
to him becoming a nomadic temporary worker (Nakajima, 2011). Alienation 
gave him a desperate desire for connection, and he played a certain 
“character” to be liked by friends or the others.  
52 
 
 
Although Kato had friends in his real life, he found more comfort in the online 
community where he could be honest with himself (Nakajima, 2011). In this 
online community he expressed his grief at having no friends and his distress 
as a temporary worker. According to Kato (Sankei, 2010c), the online 
community was like a “home,” where he could exchange honne (honest 
feelings) “without worrying about others’ reaction” while, in the real world, he 
had to communicate with people through tatemae (the accepted view).  
 
However, his communication was actually far more complex than this. 
Although he explains that he wrote honne in the online community, he also 
comments that they were not the expression of his real emotion. What he 
commented as ‘honne’ were neta (conversation materials) to entertain people, 
which is different from ‘honshin’ (true feeling, or ‘real mind’ in direct 
translation) (Sankei News, 2010b). He explained that he had played the 
fictional character of the ‘bad looking guy who has no friends’ in order to 
attract people.  
 
This corresponds with Kitada’s analysis (2005) of communication for a mere 
“connection” rather than for sharing a meaning. Kato never tried to share his 
real pain in life; he gave up sharing it from the beginning and instead pursued 
a mere connection by fictionalising his life and making it more attractive to the 
eyes of the others.  
 
Kato had a transparent existence unless he was recognised by someone, and 
he devoted himself to the online community to gain recognition. However, by 
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sacrificing his body to make a connection, he became another form of 
‘transparent existence’. In the online community, someone started pretending 
to be Kato. Having had his identity taken over, he felt he had been “killed” 
(Kato, 2012, p.53). He sought revenge against the person who had “killed” 
him, but he was unable to identify him/her. He had no way to communicate his 
pain. He created honest fiction (neta) to reach the harasser, which is the story 
of mass murder (Nakajima, 2011).  
 
He posted on the online bulletin board that he had bought knives. He hinted at 
his desire to kill. He continued with this fictional story and finally managed to 
get his murder plan noticed online in order that the harasser might recognise it 
and feel guilty. With this notice posted, he felt that there was no going back 
(Nakajima, 2011). He explained at his trial that he had wanted someone to 
stop him, but at last decided to continue the plan because;  
 
If I do not take action, I can never regain the BBS (the community in 
the online bulletin board system). I do not have a loving family. No job. 
No friends (Kato, in Sankei News, 2010b). 
 
Nakajima (2011) indicates that what Kato really wanted was honest 
interaction in real life, rather than communication through neta online. By 
fictionalising his life, he was looking for someone to whom he could reveal his 
true pain. Once, Kato even quit his job to visit some people whom he had got 
to know online (Nakajima, 2011).  
 
In his autobiography, Kato (2012) analyses what might have stopped him from 
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committing this crime. He acknowledges that his desperation for connection 
would have been satisfied through “voluntary work” (Kato, 2012, p.156). It is 
tragic that this desire for connection turned him away from real society, led 
him to the online community, and made him fictionalise his life, which further 
alienated him. He wanted the others but failed to connect with them and 
ended up devastating the lives of others. Kato’s crime signifies the difficulty of 
encountering the others and relating to them in contemporary society.  
 
In addition, Kato’s confession signifies the difficulty of identifying the cause of 
frustration in this era. For instance, he confessed at his trial that he felt a 
“doubt” that temporary workers like him were treated like disposable tools. Yet 
he explained that he “was not furious” about it. He said that he was content 
with the advice given to him online, which said “that [being treated like a tool] 
is the way it is when you belong to the organisation” (Sankei News, 2010b). 
He commented that his job status was not “dissatisfying” and that it only gave 
him a “doubt” (Sankei News, 2010d). Then he clarified that “dissatisfaction” 
describes the thing that he cannot accept, and “doubt” describes what he has 
already accepted (Sankei News, 2010d). He accepted being treated like a tool 
– it appears that he was alienated even from his ability to feel dissatisfaction. 
As Berardi (2015, p.49) notes, precariousness in contemporary society is “not 
only the condition of labour” but “is also the fragmentation of the social body, 
the fracturing of self-perception and of the perception of time.” 
 
The Akihabara incident highlights several aspects of political impasse in 
contemporary Japanese society; alienation from feeling, impossibility of 
sharing ‘the pain of living’ with other people, and difficulty in describing the 
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outside of reality. This Akihabara incident evoked sympathy from young 
people, especially those of the same generation as Kato. He was considered 
the last member of the “lost generation,” those born between 1972 and 1982 
who left school when the recessionary Japanese economy brought serious 
job shortages. In their eyes, what Kato had done was “terrorism” in an era 
when the enemy of the struggle had become unclear and all the political 
language for narrating hope had vanished (Asao et al, 2008; Akagi et al, 
2008).  
 
2.4.3 Outside: hopeless hope of disaster 
Kato’s violence seems to have been caused in the periphery of the dominant 
norm. He could not accommodate himself to the dominant norm; however, he 
could not imagine an outside of it.  
 
Nevertheless, some actually articulate the language-less vision of an outside: 
the imaginary of disaster and war. In 2007, a part-time worker, Tomohiro Akagi, 
published a provocative essay to challenge the dominant norm, stating that 
his “hope is war” (2007). He identifies himself as a low-waged worker in his 
30s, who is still unable to earn enough money to support himself. For him, war 
is the only solution to his misery and it is an opportunity for change rather than 
tragedy. War would spread equal suffering to everybody and would provide 
him with a respectable role as a soldier, which is “better than dying as a 
member of the economic weak” (Akagi, 2011, p.228). Most importantly, this 
kind of total destruction would destroy norms, mobilise society and bring 
about a paradigm shift.  
 
56 
 
Like Japanese society after the pacific war, I want the present 
structure to be destroyed and to make a new start. In that sense, 
being invaded by a foreign country or hit by a disaster would also 
serve the purpose (Akagi, in Koizumi, 2009, p.60). 
 
War as hope is in fact the actualised imaginary. In 2014, it was reported that a 
university student had been arrested because he had planned to join ‘Islamic 
State’. He explained that his motivation had come from the failure of his 
job-hunting activities (shukatsu), and he had a suicidal desire (Asahi Shimbun, 
2014b). As Akagi claims, war might be better than the miserable peace. 
 
“(Being in the battlefield) makes me feel comfortable. It suits me! The people 
here are living all-out, in order to live”— Haruna Yukawa (2014a) wrote a blog 
about his experience of visiting war-torn Syria in 2014. Yukawa had been 
bullied in childhood; after his attempted suicide in his 30s, he started a private 
military company in order “to use his life for people” (Yukawa, 2014b) and 
went to Syria. He was taken hostage by Islamic State and executed in 2015 at 
the age of 42, together with his friend, the journalist Kenji Goto, who tried to 
rescue him. 7  
 
War seems to be the game-changing tool. Akagi’s imaginary of war as the 
opportunity for change is shared by many. Still, Akagi’s argument (2007, 
2011) appears significant, because he is able to explain why politics does not 
provide any hope. Akagi (2011) does not believe the leftists’ call for solidarity. 
He shows his strong distrust of the liberal left discourse, since their 
                                                   
7 For the English source about Yukawa’s life, see the McCurry (2015).  
57 
 
celebration of peace and human rights does not include him. In addition, he 
claims that the labour movements only care about protecting their own 
interests by sacrificing more precarious irregular workers (Akagi, 2011). 
Therefore he claims; 
 
Those whom I wish to suffer from the war are not those in power, but 
the majority stable workers who trample over the working poor in 
order to secure their own lives, and dare to demand their rights and 
money from the powers, as if they were the oppressed (Akagi, 2011, 
p.232). 
 
His anger is never directed at the so-called ‘1%’ of society, the rich people. 
Rather, it is directed at the middle-class people who accept and support the 
system, knowing that it is alienating many people. In a fluid society, some of 
the 99% are still able to retain stability and become self-enclosed, paying no 
attention to those who have already lost the stability of life.  
 
It is notable that Akagi’s hope of war is absolutely passive. He has no sense of 
agency, and is simply waiting for catastrophic war to afflict Japanese society 
and destroy its foundations. Asked why he does not desire revolution, he 
replies that “revolution is a turnabout by majority number of people against the 
small number of authorities”; he claims that it is impossible for him to call for it, 
as he bears the label of an “idler” and would not receive sympathy from the 
majority of society (Akagi, 2011, pp.231-232).  
 
There is a twist between the flexibilisation of the economy in the 
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post-industrial society and the inflexible social order in Japan (Allison, 2013, 
p.60). In the era of economic growth, working as a freeter (temporary worker) 
was a matter of choice, and it was even a symbol of freedom. Although those 
days are long gone, Japanese society still regards precarious workers as the 
architects of their own misfortune.  
 
Economic growth used to be “a self-sustaining mechanism,” in which the 
“hegemony of large corporations” has preserved traditional Japanese social 
structures, disciplines and harmony (Yoda, 2006, p.40). “Japan wasn’t a 
welfare state” according to Allison (2013, p.10); it was the corporation and the 
family (unpaid housewives) that “figured as the de-facto welfare institutions.” 
However this “de-facto” welfare system collapsed when lifelong employment 
eroded. The “sliding-down society” (Yuasa, 2008) emerged, in which one step 
away from the dominant norm sends people directly down to the bottom due 
to the lack of a social safety net (Yuasa, 2008).   
 
Several liberal left intellectuals tried to dissuade Akagi, claiming that war 
would bring more suffering to him (Fukushima, 2007; Mori, 2007). However, 
for Akagi (2011), they fail to realise how miserable the life of young people is 
in a so-called ‘peaceful’ society. Amamiya (2010) reveals the precarious 
nature of young people’s lives; for example, temporary workers might easily 
lose their jobs if they take a day off due to illness. Homeless daily hired 
workers sleep overnight at 24-hour internet cafés. Finding regular 
employment does not guarantee a stable life either. Many workers are 
exhausted by extreme overwork, which even leads to death or suicide 
(Amamiya, 2010). As was mentioned in Chapter one, even dying from poverty 
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is now a very real possibility. It is understandable that Akagi prefers “the 
gamble of war which brings a 99% chance that he would lose” to “peace in 
which he would remain a loser with 100% certainty” (Akagi, 2011, p.264).  
 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that catastrophe itself is not what Akagi really 
wants. After the disastrous earthquake in March 2011, Akagi (2011) discloses 
his ambivalent feelings; it seems that Japanese society will only be changed 
by a disastrous event, although a disaster never brings hope. The 
mobilisation brought about by war would be devastating, and any change 
brought about by war or disaster is once and for all. Whoever emerges as the 
winners in the war will try to cement society again, creating other outsiders 
(Akagi, 2011, p.241). Thus, he notes: “what I criticised in my essay is the 
society which cannot change until someone dies. What I do hope for is the 
society which changes without anyone dying” (2011, p.381). What he is really 
hoping for is probably a continuous openness and change without intense 
pain. Hence, the question to be asked is: What is a non-violent and 
sustainable imaginary for social change? 
 
2.4.4 Politics in the era of the impossible 
In contemporary Japanese society, several attempts have been made to 
overcome this deadly imaginary of an outside. For example, Karin Amamiya is 
a female activist who is the same age as Akagi. She has experience of being 
bullied in school; she used to work as a precarious ‘freeter’ who could not 
foresee her future, and she made repeated attempts to cut her wrists. She 
has experience of being a member of a far-right group (Amamiya, 2004; 
Amamiya and Kayano, 2008). Furthermore, she was also a battlefield hunter. 
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Everyday life in Japanese society does not bring her any sense of living, and 
she visited Iraq - a real battlefield with real pains. She notes: “we see the 
news (about Iraq) but forget about it as soon as we change a channel. I just 
did not want such an engagement with the world” (Amamiya, 2004, p.61).  
 
Amamiya eventually started reporting about the “pain of living (ikizurasa)” 
among young Japanese people like her. Then an encounter with the term 
“precariat” broadened her horizons. She felt that this term describes all the 
sufferers she had observed. It gave her a new identity on which to fight for her 
right to live (Amamiya, 2010). As Standing (2011, p.7) points out, the precariat 
should be understood as a “class-in-the-making” rather than a “class-as-itself”. 
Originally, the term ‘precariat’ was a neologism from the adjective ‘precarious’ 
and the noun ‘proletariat’; it described people living with insecurity, such as 
the poor protection from dismissal, unhealthy working environments and low 
incomes (Standing, 2011). However, Amamiya’s definition is broader than 
this: 
 
The ‘precariat’ includes freeters, temporary or contract employees, 
fragile self-employed people, NEETs and hikikomori 8  who have 
withdrawn from working, people who have a mental illness or a 
suicide wish, and permanent employees facing death from overwork 
(Amamiya, 2010, p.24). 
 
Amamiya now actively joins and organises precariat demonstrations, as well 
                                                   
8 The term Hikikomori literally means withdrawers, who seldom go out of their house or 
room and avoid social interactions. 
61 
 
as reporting on the struggles of young alienated Japanese people. The 
demonstrations include those by right-wing youths and mentally unstable 
people. She describes how she heard “a great, primitive scream” when some 
teenagers with mental problems joined the street demonstration and cried out 
“don't make a fool of me” or “we are here living” (Amamiya and Kayano, 2008, 
p.179). This is an attempt to negate the prevailing ‘self-responsibility’ 
discourse in Japan, which says that people have to be responsible for their 
own lives.   
 
This type of movement is not an entirely new phenomenon in Japanese 
society. In the early 1990s, a group called ‘Dame-ren’ became known as an 
alternative community movement among young people. Dame-ren, which 
means the ‘association of useless people’, provided a communication space 
for those who regarded themselves as ‘dame’ (useless) in society because 
they have no job, skills, friends and so forth (Mouri, 2005). It aimed to 
“establish a comfortable society that any dame could enjoy” instead of 
improving themselves, and intended to reverse the negative label ‘dame’ 
(Mouri, 2005, p.24).  
 
This counterculture has been revived in the 2000s by the anarchistic 
collective Shitoro no Ran, meaning ‘amateur’s revolt’. These are the young 
people around 30s associated with the recycling shop called Shiroto no Ran in 
the Koenji area of Tokyo; they create an alternative space for encounters, hold 
small street parties, and organise humorous demonstrations such as ‘make 
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rent free’ and ‘return my bike’ demos 9  (Amamiya, 2010). When the 
Fukushima disaster occurred in 2011, it was these people in Shiroto no Ran 
who triggered the surge in anti-nuclear movements. 
 
However, while the sociologist Yoshitaka Mouri (2011) insists that Shiroto no 
Ran is “inventing a new form of cultural politics,” Furuichi (2011) analyses it as 
rather apolitical in its actions. Examining the anti-nuclear protest mobilised by 
Shiroto no Ran, Furuichi (2011) argues that the movement will stabilise the 
status quo rather than changing society, because it works merely as a 
convenient outlet for the feeling of dissatisfaction.  
 
This discourse of social movements as safety valves is common criticism of 
the carnivalesque street movement (Grindon, 2004), and it was already 
claimed in Japan against the anti-Iraq war movement in 2003. This movement 
was known as the first ‘performative’ street protest in Japan which combined 
politics with music and art (Mouri, 2005; Gonoi, 2012). However, it was 
criticised by traditional activists for being an ‘apolitical’ event that was 
pursuing entertainment rather than expressing anger (Henmi, 2004). The 
Beheiren activist Yuichi Yoshikawa (2004) pointed out that young peace 
activists in the anti-Iraq war movement tended to avoid deep discussion 
because they ‘respected’ each other’s position and were afraid of hurting 
human relationships. This is reminiscent of the dominant culture of “reading 
the atmosphere” (Doi, 2008) and fixed discourses (Doi, 2009), which may 
signify a political impasse rather than a new form of politics.  
                                                   
9 In Japan, illegally parked bicycles are removed by the local administrative office, and 
the owners have to pay to get them back.  
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The street protest may not necessarily signify a new political imaginary. 
Commenting on the upsurge in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements, 
a young sociologist, Hiroshi Kainuma (2012), warns against the unconditional 
celebration of demonstrations, saying that there are also xenophobic 
nationalist demonstrations in contemporary Japanese society. Nationalism is 
a more familiar reaction to the precariousness of life in Japan. The critic and 
psychiatrist Rika Kayama (2002) had already pointed out a ‘casual’ 
nationalism among young people who openly celebrate their identity as 
Japanese, and warned that it might be poured into xenophobic attitudes. In 
fact, the internet society has provided an anonymous space in which to 
express and share xenophobic feelings, and some have been organising 
anti-Korean demonstrations since the late 2000s (Yasuda, 2012).   
 
Although the rise of nationalism seems to reflect the desire for shared 
meta-narratives and the reassurance of a stable identity, Kitada (2005) 
believes that the nationalistic discourse itself is being treated as ‘neta’ for 
connections. The precariat activist Amamiya discloses her experiences in a 
far-right group, confessing that it was comfortable because she did not have 
to think (Amamiya, 2004). She was accepted as long as she followed the 
stereotypical code of the group. Her self-analysis indicates that even the 
seemingly ‘political’ discourse in nationalism is already simulated. 
 
It appears that street politics since the 2000s has received mixed evaluation. 
Amamiya describes it as a new form of politics by the ‘precariat’, who are 
expressing a ‘primitive scream’. On the other hand, Furuichi (2011) implies 
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that it is the apolitical consumption of extra-ordinariness, which entails the 
same culture as the 1980s when even the imaginary of an outside was tamed. 
Not all street actions are creative or revolutionary. Still, it can be said that such 
street protests at least visualise the desire for an outside which has been 
hidden and fragmented in contemporary Japanese society.  
 
Summary and further directions 
This chapter provided an overview of how Japanese people have lost their 
‘political’ voices for social change in the socio-economic shift in post-war 
Japan. The sixties movement, especially the Zenkyoto movement, revealed 
that the totalising ideology and the state-centred imaginary of revolution was 
incompatible with the struggles of many young people, whose lives were 
already immersed in the capitalist system.   
 
A new political language was no longer sought on a large scale thereafter. 
The rapid economic growth provided many Japanese people with financial 
stability, a shared identity as middle-class Japanese nationals, and an 
accessible guideline for life. In this period, even a sense of the outside was 
obtained through consumption.  
 
The collapse of the economic bubble in early 1990s and the nagging 
recession undermined all these aspects. Japanese people came to face the 
precariousness of life in a complex society. Nevertheless, their identities are 
already too fragmented to form a collective political agency for resistance, and 
a political meta-narrative to provide a common cause for revolt has also 
already vanished. Many alienated young people cannot describe their hope 
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for an alternative and some end up making violent attempts to end their 
miserable everyday lives through mass murder and suicide. Others seem to 
retain stability of life in the prevailing system, yet their lives are also 
threatened. The feeling of insecurity drives many of them to over-conformity.  
  
The earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear accident in March 2011 destabilised 
this stagnant condition of contemporary Japanese society. As Akagi says, if 
we state that only disaster can provide an opportunity for social change, it will 
sound too cynical. However, the disaster actually happened, and it mobilised 
many people onto the streets to join the anti-nuclear movements. The 
evaluation of this movement has not yet been fully conducted: Is it 
consumption of excitement or new political practices for social change? Has 
even this catastrophic event become simulacra to prolong our everyday lives, 
or has this disaster ended the “endless everyday life” (Miyadai, 1998)? 
 
Rather than answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to these questions, this research starts 
from the premise that these movements show people’s desire for something 
new, which cannot be explained in a conventional political framework. The 
important point is that these street protests are less painful and potentially 
more creative than all the destructive attempts to articulate an outside 
examined in this chapter. It is worth seeking a new political imaginary in these 
movements.  
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Chapter 3 Theoretical framework: 
Political projects in the postmodern condition 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the condition of the political predicament in 
post-industrial Japanese society. The reaction of Japanese people to this 
condition seems to be fragmented. Although many young people describe 
themselves as “satisfied” with their lives in narrow relationships with their 
friends (Furuichi, 2011), in reality they push themselves to assimilate into the 
dominant norm in order to maintain a stable life (Doi, 2008, 2009; Ouchi and 
Takenobu, 2013). They can hardly have a sense of agency for social change. 
As the example of Tomohiro Kato in the Akihabara incident suggests, perhaps 
they cannot even ‘feel’ dissatisfaction and, therefore, cannot desire change. 
Akagi’s hope for war (2007) signifies a hopeless desire for social change in 
contemporary society. 
 
The last section of the previous chapter suggested that the carnivalesque 
protests by the “precariats” (Amamiya, 2010) and the anti-nuclear movements 
after the Fukushima disaster seem to imply a new political imaginary in the 
postmodern condition. Before conducting a detailed analysis of this, this 
chapter overviews the contemporary political theories with several questions 
raised in the previous chapter: why has the raising of voices for social change 
become so difficult? What kind of language can describe the struggles and 
hope in this era, when all political narratives seem to be disembodied? What 
brings the oppressed people together, and what motivates them to take action 
instead of retreating into the smaller community in order to protect themselves 
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from a fluid society?  
 
This thesis articulates the struggle for life in “the era of the impossible” 
(Osawa, 2008) as the “postmodern condition.” Its definition is examined in the 
first section (3.1), paying particular attention to the different modes of 
postmodernity in Western society and Japan. In Japan, the prescription for the 
political predicament is mostly suggested by the ‘modernists’ who are 
attempting to re-establish some kind of meta-narratives. However, I argue that 
these meta-narratives cannot provide hope for alienated young people in 
contemporary Japan.  
 
This has led me to examine post-structuralist theories for indications of a 
possible political imaginary. First of all, the concept of power in contemporary 
society is examined (3.2). Here, the questions are as follows: who is alienated 
and from what, and who wants to be liberated, and from what? In 
contemporary society, the source of oppression is no longer identified in 
hegemonic institutions, outside the subject. Our social relationship is already 
permeated by the hegemonic power to define who we are and how we live. 
Therefore, rather than the insurrection against the state power to replace it 
with another hegemony, we need a particular struggles in our everyday life to 
reject our pre-determined identity. 
 
In the next section (3.3), the agency of this new liberation project is analysed 
in more detail through situationist theory (Debord, 1983; Vaneigem, 1983; 
Plant, 1992) and by using some concepts of the autonomists (Hardt and Negri, 
2000, 2004; Virno, 2004; 2006a, b; Holloway, 2010a, b, 2011). At the same 
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time, this section points out the difficulty of desiring an ‘outside’ of the 
hegemonic system since it is the hegemonic system that provides values and 
meanings in our life. Baudrillard’s simulation theory (1994) is examined here 
to analyse the authority of meaning. 
 
A new vision of the society-to-come is studied in the next section (3.4). How 
can we illustrate our political goal? This section starts by examining the 
liberalist attempt to re-establish some sort of transcendental meta-narratives 
(Rawls, 1999; Habermas, 1990). It then searches for an un-essential form of 
universality as the possible impetus for radical politics (Newman, 2007). 
Finally, the study explores the potential for deconstructing the telos, as well as 
the subject. The role of emotions and improvised actions in politics is 
examined here (Goodwin, et al., 2001; Chesters and Welsh, 2006; McDonald, 
2006). Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) “rhizome” becomes the key concept of 
imagining a politics without the ultimate telos.  
 
The final section (3.5) constructs a premise of a possible new political 
imaginary in contemporary Japanese society. My emphasis is on a 
heteronomous subject rather than a self-conscious subject who acts on the 
basis of his/her rational interest. The study also seeks a new form of ethics 
which encourage a heteronomous subject to remain open to new encounters 
instead of remaining self-enclosed and self-sufficient. 
 
3.1 What is the ‘postmodern condition’? 
3.1.1 Loss of meta-narratives and political disenchantment 
A well-known definition of the postmodern condition by Lyotard is “incredulity 
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toward meta-narratives” (1984, p. xxiv). Newman (2007; pp.18-19) states that 
the term ‘meta-narratives’ signifies the universal ideas or discourses that 
derive from Enlightenment thinking: the idea that scientific knowledge enables 
us to discover the absolute ‘truth’ and that the world is able to be rationally 
understood. ‘Modern’ knowledge of science and rationality has provided a 
new understanding of the world, replacing the ‘pre-modern’ authority of God.  
 
However, the legitimacy of these universal narratives has been questioned in 
contemporary society with its diversity and complexity. The postmodern 
condition acknowledges that “all forms of knowledge have to be seen as 
particular narratives,” each of which claims its own legitimacy (Newman, 2007, 
p.20). 
 
The ‘political’ grand narrative based on this scientific thinking used to be 
understood as the “proletarian emancipation” or “the universal liberal notions 
of natural rights and freedoms” (Newman, 2007, p.24). We have already seen 
that those concepts have lost their plausibility in contemporary Japanese 
society, resulting in Akagi’s harsh criticism of a liberal ‘peace’ (See 2.4.3). 
 
Newman (2007, p.24) describes the postmodern political condition as follows. 
First of all, the subject “remains opaque” to him/herself, as s/he is affected 
and constituted by conditions outside of his/her control. Secondly, rationality 
and morality do not provide “the absolute foundations that guide the subject’s 
political and ethical judgment and ethical decision making”. Thirdly, therefore, 
people are fragmented in political and social fields, and are left with 
incommensurable identities and political ideologies. 
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The doubting of meta-narratives in postmodernity deprives the subject of the 
ability to describe a hope for a better society. He/she becomes a fragmented 
powerless entity with no foundation for building a collective identity. According 
to Newman (2007, p.39), this postmodern condition invites two reactions: 
some are thrown into a radical drift from their social identity, while others 
commit desperate attempts to cling to the remaining identities and discourses, 
or even seek to return to a ‘pre-modern’ condition of absolute authority. On the 
other hand, Critchley (2007, pp.4-5) describes two forms of political 
disappointment in the postmodern era: one is “passive nihilism,” a withdrawal 
from commitment, while the other is “active nihilism,” a violent destruction of 
what one believes to be meaningless.  
 
These arguments imply that the reaction to the postmodern condition tends to 
be either destructively open or deadly stagnant. This corresponds with my 
analysis in chapter two. Japanese society in “the era of the impossible” 
(Osawa, 2008) is a multi-layered society. Inside the closed territory are “the 
happy young people in the nation of despair” (Furuichi, 2011). People are 
constantly working to conform to the norm of the community they belong to, 
hoping that they could secure stable and meaningful lives. I described this 
norm as changeable and intangible “atmosphere.” People do not desire social 
change; they instead enclose themselves into a small territory and play fixed 
roles (Furuichi, 2011). Critchley’s (2007, p.4) “passive nihilism” explains this 
attitude well.  
 
At the periphery of these small communities, some people are completely 
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exhausted by their efforts to conform to the fluid and fragmented norm; 
however, they still believe that they have to stick to it, because beyond it lies 
precisely what Akagi (2007) calls a “humiliating” life. These ‘outsiders’ suffer 
from poverty, overwork and a feeling of isolation, but they receive little 
sympathy from society, as it is ‘their own fault’ (Akagi, 2007; Amamiya and 
Kayano, 2008; Allison, 2013). Akagi’s hope for war is what Critchley (2007, 
p.5) calls “active nihilism.”  
 
Although this mapping seems too simplistic, it shows the fragmentation of 
Japanese people who face the precarious condition in life. Newman explains 
that the fragmentation and alienation in contemporary society derive from the 
loss of the self-conscious subject and the universal foundation of political and 
ethical judgement. Despite the fact that most people face the precariousness 
of life, there is less chance of sharing it and constructing a collective identity 
for politics.  
 
As was examined in the previous chapter, the primary source of frustration for 
contemporary young Japanese people seems to be the over-conformity to 
these small narratives, rather than being rootless entities. The example of “the 
whole body job hunting” (Ouchi and Takenobu, 2013) highlights their tendency 
of self-submission in order to obtain recognition (See chapter 2). In this sense, 
the problematic reaction to the postmodern condition in Japanese society is 
neither a nihilistic drift nor a paranoiac re-establishment of traditional authority. 
The problem is the existence of a fluid authority, “the eyes of the other” 
(Osawa, 2008) and “atmosphere” (Doi, 2008; 2009). Japanese society has its 
own specific problems with the ‘postmodern condition’, which are slightly 
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different from those of Western society. 
 
3.1.2 The postmodern condition in the Japanese context 
Some researchers point out that what I have been describing as the 
‘postmodern condition’ is not a new phenomenon in Japan. According to 
Clammer (1995, p.62), “in some sense Japanese culture has always been 
‘postmodern.’” The subject of Japanese society is traditionally what David 
Riesman (1961) explains as the “other directed” society.10 People “must 
ceaselessly take the intention and calculations of the other into account” (Ivy, 
1989. p.34). This ‘other’ imposes the absolute value system on the subject. In 
Japanese culture, it is one’s relationship with the community that provides 
meaning to the self.  
 
The American anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1989) investigated Japanese 
culture during the Second World War and described it as “shame culture,” 
compared to the Western “guilt culture.” While a subject in the guilt culture 
internalises the conviction of sin, the shame cultures “rely on external 
sanctions for good behaviour” because “shame is a reaction to other people’s 
criticism” (1989, p.223). The characteristics of “reading atmosphere” (Doi, 
2008) and the obsession with relationships are indeed parts of traditional 
Japanese culture. 11 
                                                   
10 Riesman (1961) described post-WWII American society as ‘other direction type’ which 
people paid sensitive attention to the expectations to others. He distinguished this 
‘tradition-direction’, in which the personal goal is automatically decided by people’s 
background, or ‘inner-direction’, in which the individuals are guided by internalised goals. 
11  The anthropological analysis is conducted to trace the origin of this traditionally 
“other-directed” culture. It may be due to religious reasons as neither Shinto nor 
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According to Clammer (1995, p.62), the individual in Japanese culture “is not 
autonomous, but is both created and sustained in a social nexus that gives 
language, meaning, values and the kind of fulfilment that can only be found in 
social relationships.”  It is not the authenticity or the essence that gives value 
to things and makes people obey. The pressure from other people becomes 
an invisible authority. Hence, Japanese culture is traditionally anti-essentialist. 
Roland Barthes (in Iida, 2002, p.201) describes Japan as “an empire of signs” 
in that social interaction is “guided and constituted by the stylized exchange of 
signs, without the subject taking an active part in ascribing meaning to the 
world they live in.” The ‘postmodern’ aspect of Japanese culture is identified in 
its non-logocentrism, eclecticism, the privileging of aesthetic over function, 
and so on (Bird, 2002). 
 
This ‘postmodern’ nature may have helped Japanese ‘modernisation.’ The 
nineteenth century’s Japanese ‘modernisation’ slogan openly encouraged the 
mixing of Eastern ethics with Western science (Bird, 2002). It is notable that 
this modernisation slogan is itself fundamentally at odds with the very 
definition of Western modernity, because it is anti-Enlightenment (Bird, 2002). 
While Enlightenment thinking provides a totalising view of the world, 
Japanese society accepted the Enlightenment knowledge only as a form, 
rather than as a coherent knowledge system to explain the world (Bird, 2002). 
                                                                                                                                                
Buddhism has any concept of a permanent/immutable self. Its rice-growing culture may 
require cooperation, or it may stem from the traditional ancestor system which connects 
the subject with the traits of past generations (Clammer, 1995, pp.61-62). However, the 
investigation of this lies in the field of cultural studies, and it is beyond the scope of my 
research. 
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In Japan, enlightenment knowledge was separated from the practical 
knowledge of how people live. 
  
I agree with these researchers that Japanese culture has traditionally been 
‘postmodern-like’. However, it is still possible to separate Japanese modernity 
from postmodernity, because the majority of people used to share a 
homogeneous value system, or so-called meta-narratives. As Clammer (1995, 
p.19) argues, “‘the grand narrative’ of Japan is not the same ‘ism’ but a widely 
held image of Japan itself.” It was not metaphysics with which to explain the 
world, but more like a universal code or a form to regulate society. The actual 
content does not carry much importance as long as it provides a sense of 
certainty and stable orders.  
 
For instance, post-war Japanese society accepted Western democracy 
instead of the value system provided under the emperor. The student 
revolutionaries took communism as the universal reference. After the collapse 
of political meta-narratives, the stability of the Japanese economy could still 
provide the homogeneous belief of the Japanese that they are all middle class. 
These were Japanese meta-narratives which were “a widely held image” 
(Clammer, 1995, p.19). Interestingly, Clammer positively insists that these 
deconstructed subjects in Japan would be the alternative model to the 
European model of autonomous individualism. For Clammer (1995, p.118), 
Japanese culture cannot be understood as “groupism” in which the individuals 
are controlled by the solid value of the group. Japanese culture instead 
operates under “contextualism,” in which a flexible social nexus works as an 
anchor, authorising people’s identity and providing stability for a traditionally 
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heteronomous subject. 
 
Although this “contextualism” seems to be a plausible analysis of Japanese 
culture, Clammer’s evaluation seems too optimistic. The stability of Japanese 
society has been supported by shared meta-narratives as a ‘mode’, such as 
the authority of the emperor, liberal democracy and communism as the ideal 
political goal, and economic growth as a stabilising factor. The postmodern 
problem occurred when these meta-narratives ceased to be the shared image 
of Japanese people, as the previous chapter analysed. Instead of the 
universal image, they are now forced to accommodate the ever-changing 
small images. As Osawa (2008) points out, now the authorities are 
fragmented into the eyes of the other, and the desire for a fulfilled life drives 
people to cling to this fragmented authority.  
 
3.1.3 Prescriptions for the postmodern condition 
The previous section argued that, in Japanese society, what people value is 
not necessarily authenticity. Rather value is always created relationally, and 
what other people believe becomes the hegemonic value. In the ‘postmodern’ 
condition in Japanese society, this inauthentic but hegemonic value has 
become fluid and fragmented, and people find it difficult to conform to.  
 
It is no wonder that, in such a condition, the most convincing prescription 
proposed by Japanese intellectuals is ‘to achieve real modernity’: to achieve 
the inner-directed rational subject, which Japanese society has never had.  
 
The political scientist Masao Maruyama is the leading figure of this claim. 
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Maruyama (1965) insists that, since the self-conscious self was always 
absent in Japan, Western individualism was accepted in a somehow distorted 
manner. While modern subjectivity is independent but still associative, 
Japanese subjectivity is atomised and self-gratifying (Maruyama, 1965). 
Therefore, Maruyama claims that Japanese people bear little responsibility to 
the rest of society (Clammer, 1995, p.20).  
 
Following Maruyama’s argument, the political theorist Satoshi Shirai (2013, 
p.10) acknowledges that Japanese society has been sustaining the “system 
of irresponsibility.” He focuses on the Japanese people’s recognition of the 
pacific war; in Japan, the term “losing the war” is hardly used since it was 
replaced by the idiom “the war ended.” The pacific war is seen as something 
like a natural disaster beyond humans’ intention. Shirai (2013) argues that it 
has allowed Japanese citizens to excuse themselves from responsibility for 
the war. For Shirai, the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 again exposed 
this “system of irresponsibility”; the government and the energy company 
ignored the risk of accident although it had been documented (See 1.1). The 
novelist and critic Kiyoshi Kasai also argues as follows: 
 
[What allowed the pacific war to occur was] the rootless self-belief by 
the war commanders, […] groundless wishful thinking, irresponsible 
avoidance of decision making and turmoil, overdependence on 
stopgap measures. They were precisely traced in the nuclear disaster 
in 2011 (Kasai, 2012, p.87).  
 
It is a strong argument that Japanese society needs to achieve real modernity 
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with an autonomous, rational and responsible political subject. However, 
simultaneously, it is questionable whether this liberalist slogan of achieving 
modernity can provide hope for the alienation in contemporary Japanese 
society. Masao Maruyama was a professor at the University of Tokyo during 
the Zenkyoto student revolts, and these student activists saw Maruyama as 
one of the hegemonic symbols. They claimed that, while Maruyama 
condemned the system of irresponsibility during the war, Maruyama himself 
turned a blind eye to the autocracy of the professors in the University 
(Takeuchi, 2005). For these student activists, post-war liberalism already 
sounded disembodied and hypocritical.  
 
Maruyama’s name is also critically mentioned by Akagi. The precise title of his 
“Hope is War” essay (2007) is “I wanna slap Masao Maruyama: a 31-year-old 
freeter, whose hope is war.” Although Akagi’s essay never deeply examines 
the political philosophy of Maruyama, using his name in such a way suggests 
his cynical view of this post-war liberal theorist.12 
 
Furthermore, analysing the racist demonstrations against Korean residents in 
Japan since the 2000s, Yasuda (2012) acknowledges that what nourished this 
right-wing exclusionism is the feeling of antipathy towards the logic of liberal 
intellectuals whose life is always safely protected by fame. Yasuda argues 
that the xenophobic movements are the ‘anti-hegemonic’ movements of those 
who have the ‘pains of living’ (ikizurasa) in recessionary Japan. Akagi (2011) 
                                                   
12 Akagi (2007, 2011) only mentions the episode of Maruyama in the pacific war. This 
elite academician was recruited as a soldier and was bullied in the army by a mere 
private with no academic background. Akagi uses this episode to show how war could 
work as a paradigm shift.  
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also admits that his distrust in the liberal discourse has an affinity with 
nationalism; for those who are living with humiliation as the ‘working poor’, 
Japanese-ness is the only available majoritarian identity.  
 
It seems that the discourse of the post-war liberal could not deal with the 
resentment of those people with ’pain of living’ (ikizurasa). Although the 
proposal of ‘achieving Enlightenment modernity’ is dominant amongst 
Japanese political scientists, their adherence to the self-conscious subject 
ignores the complicity of the postmodern subject.  
 
The problem of postmodernity is more seriously examined in sociology. The 
sociologist Miyadai used to propose to give up searching for any 
meta-narratives and to live “an endless everyday life”; however, finding that 
this prescription is not working in the post-bubble Japanese society, he (2002) 
insists that the remaining prescription is to regain dignity under the unity of the 
emperor. He adds that it is not authentic belief in the emperor; emperor 
worship is a mere ‘mode’ to be shared by Japanese people as a source of 
unity (Miyadai, 2002). Hence, he proposes prolongation of the ‘Japanese-type’ 
modernity with a meta-narrative as a form.  
 
Many sociologists agree that the problem in contemporary Japanese society 
is ‘the lack of recognition/acceptance’ (Kitada, 2005; Osawa, 2008; Doi, 2009; 
Amamiya and Kayano, 2008; Miyadai, 2014). In an era when the universal 
‘image’ of transcendental reference becomes flattened, the source to provide 
‘recognition’ becomes fragmented. To survive this postmodern condition, 
sociologists search for the alternative provider of recognition and acceptance 
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for the identity loss. For Miyadai (2002), nationalism as a form is a possible 
prescription. Furuichi (2011) argues that it is a small community amongst the 
closest friends. However, these prescription would end up with the separation 
of ‘our’ community based on mutual recognition from the rest of the world.   
 
The precariat activist Karin Amamiya argues that the young Japanese people 
are in need of ‘ibasho’ (a home base) where they can feel safe. In the 
dialogue with Amamiya, the political theorist Toshihito Kayano suggests that 
they need “unconditional acceptance,” like a mother gives to her child 
(Amamiya and Kayano, 2008). This claim of ‘unconditionality’ makes their 
arguments more ethical than Miyadai and Furuichi.  
 
However, this brings another question: who provides this unconditional 
acceptance, and in what ways? Moreover, waiting to be “accepted” seems to 
be too passive. Thus, although Allison (2013, p.67) agrees with Amamiya that 
‘ikizurasa’ is the pressing issue in contemporary Japan, she is not supportive 
about the demand of unconditional acceptance, commenting that it reflects a 
Japanese culture of “dependence” on authority figures. Probably any 
argument that connects the alienation in contemporary Japan with a ‘lack of 
recognition/acceptance’ leads people to a dead end: to the self-subjugation to 
the authority which provides a safe place and acceptance. 
 
While the liberal political scientists ignore the sociological analysis of the 
alienated subjectivity in a complex society, these sociological approaches to 
the Japanese postmodern condition seem to lack a political view. Both the 
prevailing political theories and sociological analysis lack the imaginary of 
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‘politics in the postmodern condition’. Therefore my research attempts to 
theorise it. 
 
This thesis pursues a completely new political imaginary, which does not 
suggest achieving the self-conscious self, or re-establishing simulative 
meta-narratives, or demanding some kind of utopian authority to provide 
unconditional acceptance. It also avoids celebrating the meaninglessness 
because, as seen in the previous chapter, people need some kind of meaning. 
None of these prescriptions seems to provide hope, as we examined in the 
previous chapter with many tragic attempts to articulate the outside.  
 
The rest of this chapter attempts to map out the framework of politics in the 
postmodern condition. I investigate political theories based on 
post-structuralist concepts. Instead of presuming a rational subject who takes 
actions based on their solid interest or moral consciousness, they accept that 
the subject is embedded in a complex social nexus and their sense of value is 
highly affected by its external aspects. Although this claim undermines the 
conventional foundation of politics, I argue that there are a number of 
attempts which invent ways for such ‘postmodern’ subjectivity to become the 
agent of social change, instead of giving into nihilism.  
 
3.2 Politics in the postmodern condition: Liberation from what? 
3.2.1 Biopower and micropolitics 
It seems that collective action for social change sounds unrealistic nowadays 
because we share no clear notion of ‘who changes and how’. The Zenkyoto 
activist Kosaka (2006) recalls that he was unclear about who the enemy was 
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at that time (See Chapter 2), which marks a symbolic statement of political 
impasse in contemporary society. 
 
In traditional radical theory, hegemonic power had been considered to exist 
outside the subject, and to control, oppress or exploit them. The hegemonic 
power was articulated in a single system or institution, be it the state power or 
the economic system of capitalism. Radical politics were illustrated as a 
project of emancipation from this hegemonic power (Call, 2002; Newman, 
2007). It took the form of a counter-hegemonic struggle, which aims at the 
entire reversal of the power relations by establishing another hegemonic 
power (Day, 2005, p.8). 
 
However, in the post-industry society, power relations become more complex. 
Factory workers were alienated from the product of their labour under 
industrial capitalism; yet there was a clear distinction between private time 
and labour time. They could live up to their own values in their private time. 
However, in the transition from the Fordist economy of mass production to the 
post-Fordist economy of decentralised production networks, now workers are 
forced in to flexibility, mobility and precariousness.  
 
This brought unstable employment and change in the nature of work itself. 
The newly emerging ‘immaterial labour’ or ‘affective labour’ blurred the 
boundary between labour time and non-labour time (Hardt and Negri, 2004; 
Virno, 2004a). In a post-Fordist economy, not only the material production 
during the waged labour time are evaluated in the market; but every form of 
production in our lives, including knowledge, social relations, affects and DNA 
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code, are commoditised and are immersed in the values of the market (Hardt 
and Negri, 2004). The previous chapter examined how Japanese university 
students are already devoting a significant part of life into job-hunting 
(shukatsu) activity, accommodating themselves into the dominant narrative 
and acquiring communicative skills (See 2.3.3).  
  
When the entire values of life are immersed in the capitalist norm, it is difficult 
to envisage the alternative, or even to imagine the outside of this power. The 
power in contemporary society does not operate directly from oppressive 
institutions; it rather exists in the capillaries of our everyday life, as Foucault’s 
(1988) concept of ‘bio-power’ shows. It functions through the dynamic social 
relationships in our everyday lives, providing meaning, acceptance and 
legitimacy in our individual lives (Newman, 2007).  
 
Foucault (1998) acknowledges that this power to construct identities and 
norms has been invented historically. Although there is nothing essential and 
authentic in our identities and the norms, they are presented as absolute, and 
they define certain people as deviant. Since biopower exists in capillary form 
and operates in every social relationship rather than being operated by a 
single institution, it is difficult to identify a target of subversion. How can we 
identify the source of this omnipresent power of nomination, and how can we 
liberate ourselves from it?  
 
One answer is that, were the hegemonic power to be dispersed in our 
everyday lives, so would the struggles. Resistance in a postmodern society 
becomes pluralised, and each form of resistance is addressed in a specific 
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case in a particular situation (Call, 2002, p.76). In short, the capillary nature of 
power in postmodern society requires “micropolitics” rather than totalitarian 
revolution (Call, 2002). A simple attack on state institutions is ineffective, or 
perhaps harmful, because attacking one form of hegemony simply leads to its 
replacement by another hegemony, leaving the same power structure (Call, 
2002).  
 
However, the particularistic and localised struggles, or micropolitics, also 
seem to present a problem. Newman (2007) argues that micropolitics dismiss 
the old type of power: sovereignty. According to him (2007), sovereignty still 
exercises an overwhelming and monolithic power in contemporary society. 
Micropolitics, which is the affirmation of dispersed struggles, fails to challenge 
the fundamental problem of state capitalism (Newman, 2007). In fact, 
micropolitics can be seen as a reflection of the powerless fragmented subject 
in the neoliberal system, whose mind is occupied with protecting himself from 
the instability of society rather than changing society. 
 
Such criticism of micropolitics corresponds to a common argument regarding 
so-called ‘identity politics’. Since diversified identities in the post-industrial 
society have blurred the idea of a collective identity for political resistance, 
such as the Marxist revolutionary subject, the ‘proletariat’, new social 
movements pay more attention to particular subordinated identities such as 
women and ethnic minorities. Identity politics demands the rights of such 
subordinated identities. However, critical voices sometimes claim that such 
identity politics only seeks the inclusion of minorities into the system; hence, 
what it demands is a reform of the existing system, and it does not question 
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the structure of oppression (Melucci, 1996; Castells, 1997; Day, 2005; 
Papadopoulos et al., 2008).  
 
The conventional revolutionist approach and the reformist approach “are both 
state-centred approaches” (Holloway, 2002, p.157). They presume the state 
as the authorising power to provide rights to individuals. Therefore, there 
could be an argument between different identities over who should be given 
rights and in what way. Identity politics operates within the framework of 
institutional politics, and may lead to “identity wars” in which the “oppressed 
groups are forced to compete for political mediation and representation” 
(Chesters and Welsh, 2006, p.132).  
 
Demanding the recognition of identity from the existing system does not 
challenge the power to legitimate. On the other hand, post-structuralist theory 
provides a tool for “a systematic deconstruction of the claims to legitimacy of 
any institutional authority” (Koch, 2011, p.34); and it is “designed to decentre 
the production of language and truth to more accurately reflect the contingent 
and relative character of knowledge” (Koch, 2011, p. 33). Recognising the 
fluidity and instability of existing identities and norms is the first step to 
imagining the outside of the existing system. By questioning the power of 
nomination which gives a certain legitimacy to the fluid identities, we can open 
up a new way of thinking (May, 2005).  
 
3.2.2 The concept of flight/becoming 
Hence, it seems that post-structuralist micropolitics presents a new way of 
doing politics in order to challenge hegemonic power of nomination. Here, 
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micropolitics does not operate within the frame of the state, and it avoids both 
institutional reform and totalitarian revolution. As Holloway (2010a) explains in 
his book title, we need a political imaginary of “changing the world without 
taking power.” Day (2005) notes that this new political thought engages in a 
“flight” from the hegemonic power, rather than modifying it or replacing it with 
another. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1988) describe power in contemporary society 
as an “axiomatic.” The axiomatic is not like a traditional authority which 
compels people to obey. It is not a ‘code’, which has a clear rule of domination 
or restriction. Yet axiomatic power creates a certain ‘manner’ to regulate 
relationships (May 2005). For Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism is a liberating 
force in one sense, because capitalism undermined traditional authorities and 
invalidated old codes. It released a flow of desire and fluidised social 
relationships. However, the flow was not completely free because the 
capitalist axiomatic regulates its flow. It directs people to follow a certain flow 
which serves its own purpose: a market system (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, 
1988). The state is the apparatus of legitimatising this axiomatic, and this is 
why replacing a state power with a new one does not mean liberation 
(Holloway, 2010a; Day, 2005; Deleuze and Guattari, 1988).  
 
Instead, the tactics of flight enable a freer and more interactive flow of forces. 
Holloway (2010a) articulates two forms of power operation; “power-over” 
signifies a one-directional force imposed on another, while “power-to” is 
described as a communicative and creative force. He describes the 
resistance against the capitalist axiomatic as liberating the form of “power-to” 
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from the “power-over” (Holloway, 2010a, p.36). The axiomatic is still the 
“power-over”, which is based on the legitimising process conducted by the 
state or other institutions. In contrast, “power-to” is the power of creation 
motivated by our desire.  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari (1988), nomadic flight entails a tactic of “becoming 
minor.” They consider majority-ness a constant in the homogeneous system, 
while the minority is a subsystem defined by the dominant system; on the 
other hand, becoming minor means the escape from the dominant system 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p.105). It is an action taken to escape 
categorisation. While the traditional revolutionary movement to overturn state 
power can be explained as the attempt at “becoming major” and of acquiring 
“power-over” (Holloway, 2010a), the capillary form of postmodern power 
requires the tactics of “becoming minor” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) to ward 
off the power over us, defining who we are and how we live. 
 
Holloway (2010a) acknowledges that it is the struggle of “non-identity.” Rather 
than demanding the recognition of identity from the hegemonic power, this 
struggle questions and rejects the pre-existing identity legitimised by the 
power. In doing so, it negates the hegemonic power to define people, thereby 
undermining the power structure of legitimation.  
 
Castells (1997, p.8) adds a more productive meaning to these tactics of 
non-identity. In his analysis, identity is classified into three categories. 
“Legitimising identity” is enforced by the dominant system, which works to 
maintain the prevailing practice. “Resistance identity” attempts to overturn this 
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devalued and subsidised identity, asking for protection or empowerment. 
While this struggle based on the “resistance identity” corresponds to identity 
politics, a third category, “project identity,” describes a new building of identity 
by social actors, which transgresses a hierarchical, stabilised category of 
identity (Castells, 1997, p.8). This may be another signifier for the 
anti-essential, reflexive, collective identity in the postmodern era.  
 
Hence, ‘doing micropolitics’ in contemporary society means that each person 
involves the flight from the particular identity, and invents and exercises a new 
way of living by establishing flexible collective identity. 
 
3.3 Motivation and agency: Who wants social change? 
3.3.1 Situationist theory and authentic desire 
Hence, the next question to be asked is: who are actually capable of engaging 
in this resistance as flight? The sixties movement offers a good illustration of 
resistance based on this creative “power-to.” According to Bourg (in Evren, 
2011, p.6), the May 1968 movement in Paris was practising the new ethics of 
liberation, claiming that “freedom was not free enough, equality was not 
equitable enough and imagination was not imaginative enough.” The 
Situationist International thoughtfully and playfully pursued the liberation of 
their everyday lives from the hegemonic “power-over,” claiming in particular 
the autonomy of meaning and value.  
 
For example, they encouraged a tactic called “détournement,” which 
deliberately subverts or reverses the meaning used in the dominant 
discourses (Call, 2002, p.102). The tactics of flight operated in their everyday 
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lives. They challenged the axiomatic power which distorts their desire by 
articulating what to buy, where to go and how to use their time.  
 
The situationists claimed that, in modern society, people were alienated not 
only from the goods they produced, as the traditional Marxist theory 
addressed, but also from their own experience and desires (Debord, 1983; 
Vaneigem, 1983). Consumer capitalism attempts to commoditise every 
aspect of our lives, even our leisure time. According to the aforementioned 
authors, people are now living in a spectacular society, in which their entire 
social lives are mediated by the commodity relationship. Hence, people’s lived 
experience is falsified through the mediation of signs and symbols 
(Debord,1983; Vaneigem, 1983).  
 
In a consumer society, people are rendered passive and powerless entities, 
free only to choose from the existing products on the market and the 
pre-articulated lifestyle and roles (Vaneigem, 1983). People have lost control 
over their lives, have lost their ability to value their own lives, and have been 
alienated from their real desires. Needing to fill this void in their values, people 
seek their meaning of life by following the pre-established scenario or trying 
“to assimilate roles and play them according to official norms” (Vaneigem, 
1983, p.96). They try to achieve satisfaction by playing a role given by the 
dominant power, and end up strengthening the system. Vaneigem argues that 
this “survival sickness” (1983, p.123) causes frustration in the society of the 
spectacle, as it only provides people with boring stability without disparate 
passion. Between nihilistic submission and resistance, there is a “wasteland 
of the suicide and the solitary killer” (1983, p.136).  
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The sixties radical movement was the rejection of this system, claiming that 
they “don’t want a world where the guarantee of not dying of starvation brings 
the risk of dying of boredom” as some of the graffiti in Paris ’68 stated (Knabb, 
2006). Analysing the hopeless cycle of self-subjugation, the situationists 
proposed resisting the spectacle society by following one’s subjective will and 
creativity (Vaneigem, 1983). By creating the festive atmosphere, they 
intended to release the uncontained, collective pleasure which was supposed 
to become subversive energy for social change. Following Dadaism and 
Surrealism’s path of destroying the petrified form of art, the situationists’ 
tactics aimed to destabilise and deconstruct existing norms and to construct 
new situations.  
 
That is why they offered improvisational practices of positioning themselves 
outside the familiar orientation, fixed representation and definition in search of 
lived experience (Plant, 1992). The situationists did not claim any universal 
foundation for their revolution; instead, the revolution to them was the 
accumulation of people’s constant attempts to reject their impoverished 
everyday lives (Plant, 1992).  
 
The situationists’ vision is picked up in the later post-anarchist theory such as 
‘Temporary Autonomous Zone’ (TAZ) claimed by Hakim Bey (1991). TAZ “is 
like a uprising which does not engage directly with the State” because it is 
rather “a guerrilla operation which liberates an area” and soon “dissolves itself 
to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen before the State can crush it” (Bey, 1991). 
According to Grindon (2004), Bey stands further away from the Marxist 
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discourse compared to the situationists because Bey’s concept has accepted 
the postmodern logic of “suspicion towards meta-narratives.” Bey (1991) 
describes TAZ as the perfect tactics with which to fight against the 
omnipresent power in the postmodern society.  
 
However, the approach of the situationists and the neo-situationists such as 
Bey is problematic in several ways. The most fundamental question is: who 
are actually capable of, or willing to engage in, these tactics? They ignore the 
fact that not all people will “spend their days drifting about the street of Paris” 
(Day, 2005, p.164). Hence, Franks (2011, p.175) points out that Bey’s 
nomadism influenced by the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari is a 
somewhat “elitist forms of resistance” which is suited to “economically 
independent individuals.” Moreover, pure pleasure, which both the 
situationists and Bey identify as the revolutionary impetus, is what “everyone 
who gets caught up in capitalist production and consumption” is ultimately 
seeking (Day, 2005, p.165).  
 
The situationists seemed to presume that the impetus of rebellion is inherent 
in each individual. Vaneigem (1983) seems to believe that every individual 
has free will and the desire for ‘true life’ even though they submit themselves 
to the spectacle commodity relations. However, is it really possible for the 
subject to desire the outside of representation in contemporary society?  
 
The situationists may have overlooked the complicating nature of the 
hegemonic power in contemporary society. The capitalist axiomatic power 
does not deny or falsify one’s desire itself. It simply channels our desire into a 
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certain value system, resulting in our identity and the meaning in life being 
shaped in this value system. Our desire for a meaningful life does not 
automatically encourage us to resist the axiomatic power. The problem is that 
we desire this hegemonic system to give us meanings, identities and even the 
sense of outside such as thrills and excitement. People desire their own 
repression. As Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge, what we should ask is: 
"Why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their 
salvation?" (1984, p.38)  
 
3.3.2 Simulation theory 
The situationists’ assumption of the authentic desire for the true life was 
particularly problematic for ‘postmodern’ theorists such as Lyotard and 
Baudrillard, who believe that the distinction between the original and the 
representation has already been meaningless in contemporary society (Plant, 
1992).  
 
Baudrillard (1994) claims that, in contemporary society, we are surrounded by 
the empty simulacrum that has no reference to the reality. There is no 
essence behind the representation — and the representation itself has 
become fact (Call, 2002). Hence, it is not that the authentic desire is falsely 
represented by commodities, as the situationists claimed. Now we are living in 
the society of simulation, where the models/images without origins substitute 
the real (Baudrillard, 1994).  
 
Baudrillard (1994, p.6) acknowledges the successive phases of the image as 
(1) the image reflects a profound reality; (2) it masks and denatures a 
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profound reality; (3) it masks the absence of profound reality; (4) it has no 
relation to any reality and becomes pure simulacrum. The first case is 
probably applicable to Yasuo Tanaka’s novel Somehow crystal ([1981] 2013), 
in which the consumer goods are the “representation” of their feelings (See 
2.2.2). The situationist critique of the “spectacle” implies the second as they 
claim that it falsifies true desire. However, what has seen in the contemporary 
Japanese society is close to the third and fourth. Okazaki’s comic River’s 
edge ([1994] 2000) illustrates the young generation who are endlessly 
chatting about empty gossip, which hides the absence of narratives to 
describe their pain in life (See 2.2.4). The analysis of Kitada (2005) and 
Azuma (2001) signifies that exchanging simulacra becomes the very objective 
of communication amongst young people in Japan (See 2.4.1).  
 
The postmodern condition means the death of the real; we can no longer 
distinguish the ‘true’ needs from ‘falsified’ needs in our life, since every aspect 
of life has already been codified and commoditised (Baudrillard, 1994; Plant, 
1992). Now our desire and meaning can only be identified through simulacra 
(Baurdillard, 1994; Plant, 1992).  
 
Baudrillard’s simulation theory is potentially subversive, as Call (2002) argues, 
because it kills all meanings; nothing can ever claim its authenticity and 
legitimacy, so we can freely create new meanings. Declaring death to all 
meaning is far more radical than encouraging a flight from the stable meaning. 
Baudrillard himself argues that affirming meaninglessness is liberating: 
 
If we could accept this meaninglessness of the world, then we could 
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play with forms, appearances and our impulses, without worrying 
about their ultimate destination (Baudrillard, 2001, p.128). 
 
However, in this theory, nothing seems to be reborn after the death of 
meaning, whereas the situationists believe that the released desire for a ‘true 
self’ can become the driving force for creating alternative values. For 
Baudrillard (1993; 2001), the emancipation project is over. We are all 
liberated; yet what we had believed as a liberating experience was actually 
the void of meaning. The loss of authenticity and originality is potentially 
radical because legitimacy is no longer conditioned for creating new 
meanings (simulations). Then people can freely ‘play’ with forms which have 
lost their authenticity – but only if they desire it.  
 
The problem, however, is how they desire it. What motivates people to create 
new meanings? How do people dare jump into the void and invent new 
simulations on their own when no one can tell how meaningful this act is? If 
the outside of this world is the meaningless void, people will prefer to stay 
inside, pretending that they believe old regime of signs, because at least 
these signs provide some kind of anchor. In such a case, accepting the 
meaninglessness would only bring stabilisation rather than mobilisation and 
new opportunities. The outsiders would remain outside, left isolated, as they 
are incapable of sharing their experience of suffering.  
 
As has already been analysed in the first section in this chapter, Japanese 
society indicates that the simulacrum itself could become the legitimising 
authority. The philosopher Kojin Karatani (in Derrida et al., 1984) notes that 
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the authorities in Japanese society have traditionally been the 
“anti-constructed construction,” which should be differentiated from the 
construction in Western society. Here, Karatani’s term “anti-constructed 
construction” seems to have a similar meaning to today’s use of the term 
“atmosphere.”  
 
This “atmosphere” is the simulated authority, which is absolutely difficult to 
deconstruct. Despite being an anti-essential simulacrum, it is accepted by 
Japanese people as the legitimate regime to bring order, harmony, identity 
and meaning in life. Declaring death to the authentic meaning does not 
necessarily mean liberation from the hegemonic power. In the death of 
meaning, we do not know how to value and affirm our own lives, and end up 
desiring the authority to tell us what is valuable. 
 
It seems that people need meaning, and it is easier and safer to pretend to 
believe in obsolete meanings than face the void and create a new meaning as 
simulation. Moreover, when the simulacrum becomes the authority and 
operates its hegemonic power over us, how can we deconstruct it? We can no 
longer disprove it by saying that it is ‘false’. If it is not the desire for the ‘real’, 
what motivates us to reject the present condition, and desire the outside of it? 
The theory of simulation significantly undermines the belief in the political 
subject who engages in an emancipation project based on his/her desire for 
the ‘true life’, or ‘true self’.  
 
3.3.3 Autonomist theory and the concept of ‘multitude’  
We have been examining a potential political agency in contemporary society, 
95 
 
who neither pursues revolution to take the hegemony nor seeks a reformist 
approach to the existing system, but who engages in a non-hegemonic 
struggle of “flight” in everyday life and involves the construction of 
alternatives. 
 
This type of political agency is also sought by the autonomist Marxist tradition, 
most popularly acknowledged by Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) who outline 
the struggle of the “multitude” against the neoliberal global hegemony 
“Empire”.  For Hardt and Negri, Empire exercises regulative power through a 
networked relationship and dominates the world under the logic of the 
neoliberal system. The multitude is defined by them as “all those who work 
under the rule of capital and thus potentially as the class of those who refuse 
the rule of capital” (Hardt and Negri, 2004, p.106). Multitude, to them, is a new, 
flexible collective identity for social change, replacing a fixed identity such as 
the ‘proletariat’ in a traditional Marxist sense.  
 
Hardt and Negri (2004, p.99) explain the concept of the multitude in contrast 
to the other form of collective identities; unlike the “people,” which indicates 
the unified subject defined by the hegemonic power, “multitude” is a network 
of singularities, “a social subject whose difference cannot be reduced to 
sameness.” Moreover, this “multitude” is distinguished from the completely 
fragmented and individualistic “mass.” Neither a fragmented particular nor a 
unified whole, the multitude is described as the “plural singularity” (Hardt and 
Negri, 2004, p.99).  
 
What connects each singularity as the multiplicity? Hardt and Negri assume 
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that the multitude shapes its collective identity on the basis of what its parts 
share, the “common.” The “common” includes air, water, knowledge and 
information, which are now under the control of neoliberal regime of Empire. 
They argue that, because the multitude belongs to the network through which 
Empire operates its omnipresent power, the micro-political practices of the 
multitude can be unified to form a collective through this network (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000, 2004; Day, 2005). The struggle of the multitude are constructed 
“within Empire and against Empire” (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p.61).  
 
However, the concept of multitude invites some questions. First of all, Hardt 
and Negri presume that the new collective subjectivity of ‘multitude’ will 
naturally emerge in the postmodern condition (Newman, 2007, 2011; Day, 
2005). They argue that the multitude is a class concept (2004, p.103). 
Newman (2007) claims that they have the same tendency as traditional 
Marxism; just as Marx believed that the revolutionary subject, the proletariat, 
will emerge automatically from the capitalist system, Hardt and Negri believe 
that the global network society under the oppression of Empire gives people 
the motivation for revolt and a foothold for solidarity. Newman acknowledges 
that their argument ignores the process of subject formation, and therefore it 
is “the complete eclipse of politics” (Laclau, cited in Newman, 2007, p.184).  
 
In post-industrial society where the fluid values of the network encompasses 
people’s entire lives, almost everyone could be the multitude. However, being 
in the network does not explain “how this multitude comes together and why it 
revolts” (Newman, 2011, p.57). In Newman’s view (2007, 2011), Empire 
generates a new division inside its expanded territory, rather than bringing the 
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commonness. The emotional division within the multitude is demonstrated by 
Akagi’s resentment that did not turn against the rich ‘1%’ but against the upper 
side of ‘the 99%’ of ordinary people who protect themselves by sacrificing the 
poor. 
 
Secondly, Day (2005, 2011) questions Hardt and Negri’s description of the 
multitude having a static will of “counter-Empire.” This signifies their covert 
tendency towards the struggle for hegemony, towards a totalising political 
project rather than everyday struggles of flight. However, considering the fluid 
and omnipresent nature of postmodern power, it is impossible to pre-identify 
the objective of “counter-Empire” as the basis of collective identity. The 
struggles of the multitude inevitably take place locally, with their own reason. 
 
To sum up, although Hardt and Negri celebrate a fluid, spontaneous nature of 
the political subject named “multitude”, they regard the motivation and 
direction of their resistance as a pre-determined constant. Their motivation for 
revolt is inherent to the system, and the target of their resistance exists 
separately from the subject (Day, 2005). Day argues that their political thought 
still entails the hegemonic orientation which aims at replacing one authority 
with another, legitimate authority (Day, 2005, p.152).  
 
So, how can we describe the process of subject formation as the more flexible 
process, without presuming the pre-fixed objective and motivation? Day 
(2005) insists that another autonomist thinker, Paolo Virno, provides a 
different picture of the multitude. Virno’s “multitude” is based on the logic of 
affinity instead of the logic of hegemony and the totalising political project. To 
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Virno (2006b, p.196), the multitude involves the “exodus,” an engaged 
withdrawal from the State. People as the multitude never converge into a 
general will; what they share is a “general intellect” which plays a role as a 
“score,” and the multitude is expressed as an “ensemble of ‘acting minorities’” 
(Virno, 2006b, p.200).  
 
Virno describes the characteristic of the multitude as “not feeling at home” 
(2004a, p.34). He argues that labour in the post-Fordist era has a 
communicative and performative aspect without a script or a vision of the end 
product. This nature has brought insecurity to people’s lives. Therefore, in the 
post-Fordist society, people become opportunistic and cynical, trying to 
accommodate themselves to the ever-shifting values, and receiving an 
immediate self-affirmation.  
 
However, for Virno, this subject-less subject is not what we should overcome. 
Virno argues that the multitude is a form of being, and it has ambivalence. 
People’s sensitivity to contingency might make them opportunistic, powerless 
subjects; however, this same capacity can bring a new aspect to politics. 
Virno (2004a, 2006a) argues that its frivolity would form the radical political 
skills for the multitude to engage in the tactics of exodus.   
 
3.3.4 New meta-narratives? 
Another autonomist theorist, John Holloway, also reflects “the logic of affinity”, 
according to Day (2005). Holloway (2010a) joins in the criticism of Hardt and 
Negri’s assumption that the revolutionary subject is automatically born. 
Holloway identifies emotions and desires as the initial impetus for the radical 
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political agency. However, it is not a desire for the authentic life, as the 
situationists claim; it is a desire to reject the present condition, and it is more 
like an emotional burst of “No” and “that is enough” (Holloway, 2010a). Saying 
“No” is an attitude based on a particular experience; yet, simultaneously, it 
has the potential to form collective identity. Referring to the Zapatistas 
movement in Mexico, Holloway (2010a) acknowledges that many people took 
the Zapatistas’ struggle for human dignity as ‘ours’. People such as LGBTs, 
youths, migrants and workers took the energy of saying “No” from the 
Zapatistas movement and poured it into their own struggle in their place 
(Holloway, 2010a). 
 
It seems obvious that Holloway rejects the totalising and coherent political 
projects. To him, the novelty of the Zapatistas movement is that they advance 
by “asking” (Holloway, 2010a, p.215). He acknowledges that we cannot 
articulate our goal in advance. Still, he does not totally deconstruct the motive 
and the objective for the multitude to share. The expression of “No” and the 
hope for “dignity” are two faces of a “meta-narrative,” according to Holloway 
(2011). He offers a collective subjectivity based on the flexible, open-ended 
and non-hegemonic meta-narratives, instead of the presupposed 
meta-narrative to guide the multitude.  
 
Holloway (2010a) acknowledges the difficulty of going outside the system of 
Empire, because the domination of Empire has already disempowered us. 
Thus, rather than reversing the power relations in the flexible network and 
winning power, he proposes a movement of ‘negating’ its power relations. 
This leads him to argue that our struggle is the rebellion “against our own 
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complicity” by repeating “millions of experiments” (Holloway, 2010b, pp.256-7). 
Radical politics is never-ending practices, instead of pursuing a single correct 
answer.  
 
Are these flexible meta-narratives of ‘No’ and ‘dignity’ enough for the 
postmodern subject to engage in the tactics of ‘flight’? Holloway notes many 
examples of everyday struggle as the flight from capitalist values, including 
the one “[o]f the girl in Tokyo who says she will not go to work today and goes 
to sit in the park with her book” (Holloway, 2010b, p.5). Surely non-work is a 
radical flight. However, it is the most difficult everyday struggle in Japanese 
society, considering Akagi’s (2007, 2011) implication that having a proper job 
is the minimum condition for being recognised as a fully-fledged citizen by 
society. Both the hegemonic authority and the ordinary citizen tend to 
consider a person without a job simply a ‘lazy’ person.  
 
The girl’s ‘flight’ from her job, or from a role which the dominant system 
provides, might be the challenge against the system. However, this is suicidal 
because the flight only makes her invisible and alienated. Why does she loaf 
on the job and take flight from the capitalist axiomatic to regain her human 
dignity, when it means that she is risking her job and, therefore, her dignity? 
Who dares take up these seemingly suicidal tactics of ‘flight’ and 
‘non-identity’?  
 
We have been looking for a radical political agency involved in a struggle as 
flight from everyday life. However, the problem remains that most people may 
not be willing to be this subject. People are not forced to stay inside the 
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dominant norm. They have the option to take flight, but they choose to remain 
inside for their survival. As was seen in chapter one, in the recessionary 
Japanese society, people are even threatened by ‘the risk of dying from 
starvation’ if they step outside this norm and they therefore chose to stay 
inside the prevailing norm, where there is a risk of ‘dying from overwork’. 
Sometimes it is neither the enforcement nor their own choices that cause 
people to remain inside. Work is just a ritual of everyday life which people 
‘accept’. In the previous chapter, we examined that the culprit in the Akihabara 
incident, Tomohiro Kato, commented that he had ‘accepted’ his precarious 
working condition, in which he was even alienated from his feeling of 
alienation. 
 
Akagi feels hopeless about social change because he knows that no one 
inside the dominant norm will aid his resistance, regardless of the fact that 
those people are all part of the precarious “multitude.” This unfortunate 
miscommunication among the multitude should be paid more attention. The 
“multitude,” a possible radical agency in the postmodern era, is never formed 
as long as the majority of people continue to accept the axiomatic authority. It 
cannot be formed just because we are living in an interconnected network 
society. In addition, our desire for a better life does not necessarily take a 
political form. We have no coherent and sharable language in politics to 
identify the pain in life. We still cannot see the emergence of the political 
subject in such postmodern conditions. 
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3.4 Direction and teleology: Where to go? 
3.4.1 Communicative rationality 
A new political project of ‘flight’ invites the question not only of ‘who does’ but 
also of ‘where to go’ after rejecting the hegemonic power of identification.  
 
This question seems to connect with the problem of political agency because, 
without knowing where to go, people cannot just take a step outside the 
dominant norm, even though they are threatened by the oppressive power. 
Post-structuralist theory acknowledges that the meaning and identity that bind 
people and devalue them are actually contingent and inauthentic. The 
simulation theory will radically disprove any authority figure. However, people 
voluntarily bestow authority of simulacra to secure their identities and roles. 
We are more afraid of incommensurable chaos than a life under the 
oppressive hegemony, and chapter two examined that the political 
predicament stems from this complicity of the postmodern subject. 
 
There are several approaches to reassure some kind of universal narrative as 
a common ground for politics amongst fragmented individuals. Just as the 
Japanese liberal intellectuals proposed the project of ‘achieving 
Enlightenment modernity’ to political apathy in Japan, the project of ‘saving 
Enlightenment modernity’ by re-establishing meta-narratives is a common 
proposal in Western political philosophy to deal with the postmodern 
condition.  
 
John Rawls (1999) redefines the concept of justice as “fairness” and 
establishes the principle of justice which he thinks is agreeable to diverse 
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people in a complex society. Rawls proposes his famous thought experience 
called “the veil of ignorance.” Wearing the veil means having the condition of 
“non-identity,” where people cannot know their identities, economic conditions 
and so on. Rawls (1999) insists that, under this hypothetical condition, people 
can make rational judgements based on the common interest, rather than on 
their own interest, and agree with the universal value of justice and general 
principle based on that.  
 
However, articulating universal values and constructing general principle is 
not enough to deal with particular struggles, since it will inevitably become 
abstract and disembodied. As already examined, what Akagi (2007) criticises 
about the liberal approach is the laziness of those who merely preach the 
abstract languages of peace and human rights, when the promotion of this 
concept itself does not respond to his immediate struggle in life as one of the 
working poor.  
 
Habermas is another notable figure to “defend and renew the legacy of the 
Enlightenment and modernity” (Newman, 2007. P.29). He provides 
universality to the procedure of decision-making rather than to the ultimate 
goal to be realised. In this sense, he may have moved away from the 
essentialist approach. Habermas outlines the universal theory of rational 
communication in the public sphere, where the subject engages in honest and 
free speech acts and achieves consensus (Habermas, 1990). Here, rationality 
is not internalised to the autonomous subject. Instead, what he proposes is 
“communicative rationality,” which is retrospectively established 
intersubjectively, through the deliberation process in the public sphere (Call, 
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2002; Newman, 2007).  
 
However both Call (2002) and Newman (2007) claim that this rational 
communication itself is essentialist in its process, although not in its goal. To 
ensure free speech acts, his theory presumes certain rules and procedures to 
be agreed in advance by the participants. This restricts the way of 
communication, and the diversity of the participants will be blunted (Newman, 
2007). The adherence to rationality in the procedure excludes ‘irrational’ 
emotion from politics, despite it being a crucial part of human subjectivity 
(Newman, 2007).  
 
Call (2002) is more critical of Habermas’s trust in rationality as a fair ground 
for politics. According to him, fair decision-making through a rational process 
is impossible in an era when people are surrounded by advertisements and 
media-led discourses (Call, 2002). Our sense of value has been affected by 
the media spectacles before fair and honest political deliberation. It is easier 
for us to accept the value system promoted by mass media than to establish 
the legitimate value system to be retained through rational deliberation. In 
short, we cannot presume that individuals are motivated to engage in the 
rational decision-making process.  
   
3.4.2 Politics of emotions and experiences 
Politics have been predominantly thought to be within the frame of rational 
discourse. Political studies usually focus on institutional politics, and emotions 
have not received much attention in such politics. However, some recent 
research has re-evaluated the role of emotion as a significant mobilisation 
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resource for politics (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). Social movements are seen 
as the arena for such ‘emotional’ politics. For example, ACT UP, a direct 
action group against the HIV/AIDS epidemic, successfully articulated the 
feeling of anger and channelled it politically against the government (Gould, 
2004). What characterises today’s anti/alter-globalisation movement (AGM) is 
their carnivalesque, festive style of protests (Hardt and Negri, 2004; Chesters 
and Welsh, 2006; McDonald, 2006), which also has brought emotional 
expression into the political field. 
 
Emotional experiences enable people to imagine a collective subjectivity 
without rational consensus. In his analysis of AGM, McDonald (2006) 
acknowledges that collective identity is constructed through participation. He 
argues that there should not be a strict separation between emotions and 
reason, between body and mind. Instead, a body shapes cognition through its 
experience (McDonald, 2006). According to him, the conventional social 
movements have been using a grammar of disembodied representation, 
which identifies the purpose of the movement and controls its direction. In 
contrast, the contemporary social movements have employed a new 
grammar: a grammar of action and embodied experience (McDonald, 2006). 
This seems to resonate with Day’s proposal for new politics with the “logic of 
affinity” instead of the conventional politics based on the “logic of hegemony” 
(Day, 2006). 
 
These kinds of politics based on embodied actions, or the logic of affinity, do 
not represent a fixed message. Each participant brings his/her own particular 
reasons to be shared, and the movement works as an improvisation without 
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the entire blueprint for a society to come (McDonald, 2006). Rather than 
making a coherent and unified claim, this grammar of action allows a 
movement to be interpreted by society just like performance art. Its meaning 
and value are acquired through practice, in the presence of others (McDonald, 
2006). 
 
However, the question arises of how this eruption of emotions can become 
political actions without the Habermasian notion of ‘rationality’ that allows 
constructive deliberation to achieve consensus. Newman (2007) argues that 
the AGMs visualises a kind of unessential universality. Although the AGM 
emerges out of unpredictable, contingent, singular events in each particular 
region, they are, as a whole, projecting a universal narrative of 
anti-neoliberalism. Therefore, he acknowledges that the AGM needs a next 
stage to become a global political project for articulating “what the world 
should be” (Newman, 2007, p.189).  
 
Here, AGMs are illustrated as a kind of a convertor, which translates particular, 
individualistic and incoherent voices into something intelligible, a universal 
political language of anti-neoliberalism. Newman seems to describe emotion 
as the initial impetus of the movement; however, that emotional language 
itself is not sustainable enough to retain a political project for social change. 
To him, AGMs need a unification process to be more politicised, in order to 
engage in radical politics for social change.  
 
Newman’s position seems to be well balanced. He (2007) contrasts the 
approach of Habermas with the claim of Lyotard; while Habermas seeks to 
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recuperate modernist rationality in discourse to ensure a social bond, Lyotard 
celebrates incommensurability and claims that all phrases have 
heterogeneous meanings. As mentioned earlier, Newman rejects 
Habermasian rationalism. However, he is also suspicious of Lyotard’s 
celebration of difference and heterogeneity (Newman, 2007).   
 
For Lyotard, the role of communication is to reveal difference and 
incommensurability. On the other hand, Newman (2007) considers that this 
would merely result in the absolutising of difference. This suggests the 
impossibility of reaching a consensus, and it seems unproductive as a political 
project. In the same manner, Newman (2007) is also doubtful about 
Foucault’s anti-institutionalism and Deleuze’s nomadic subject, because they 
would lead to an individualistic judgement. His stance is determined to offer 
the middle way of the rationalistic approach by Habermas and the 
individualistic and nomadic approach of the so-called ‘postmodern’ trend. 
 
Newman agrees with the post-structuralist rejection of the Cartesian rational 
subject. Hence, Newman insists that politics “does not emerge on the basis of 
one’s essential or pre-existing identity”; instead, people become political 
through the process of “de-subjection” or “dis-identification”, which Newman 
explains as involving “a separation or a disengagement from one’s 
established social identity or role” (Newman, 2007, p.88). This appears to 
resonate with Holloway’s “non-identity” (2010a, p.151) and the politics of flight 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). 
 
However, for Newman, political action needs a certain coherence and anchor 
108 
 
for the subject (2007). He introduces a Lacanian subject, who finds the 
uncertainty of the self, or the lack of complete self-knowledge. In the theory of 
Lacan, a subject is not completely grasped because some part of it exists 
outside the individual’s own understanding, and also because the external 
order (language) fails to signify it. This incomplete, “partial identification” 
drives the subject to fill this gap to act politically (Newman, 2007, p.87).  
 
In Newman’s view, political agency emerges between universality and 
particularity. In other words, political agency emerges when an individual is 
involved in a particular struggle in the pursuit of universality. Here, universality 
emerges retrospectively, as a result of particular struggles interacting and 
resonating with one another. Hence, social movements are creating “unstable 
universalities,” an unpredictable goal which is yet to come and is only 
projected through a singular event (Newman, 2007). This universality might 
be described as justice, equality or human rights; it is something perfectible, 
although it is not articulable in advance.  
 
His concept avoids any essentialist concepts such as the authentic self, the 
pre-fixed principle of justice or the rationalistic procedures, but it still offers 
some anchors for collective action for social change. To put it differently, 
although Newman accepts the ‘postmodern’ subject and politics of particular 
actions and emotions, he presumes that radical politics needs to establish a 
common ground to project a general will.  
 
However, it remains unclear how this unessential universality might be 
established. Although I agree that the current global movements share the 
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anti-neoliberal aspect, I am not sure whether everyone who hopes for radical 
social change necessarily shares this notion. Can multiple singularities ever 
achieve consensus over “what the world should be”? Even if nobody 
disagrees with abstract ideas such as human rights and justice, it is 
questionable whether we can agree on what should be done at a practical 
level. Therefore, is it really meaningful to assume some universality of the 
project? This raises one simple question: What if we do not assume any 
universality?  
 
3.4.3 The concept of rhizome and plateaus 
The politics of emotions and the grammar of embodied action seem to be key 
concepts for the political imaginary in the postmodern condition, where the 
source of oppression and the coherent political subject is unidentifiable.  
 
Hardt and Negri declare that the movement of the multitude is necessarily 
carnivalesque. It is “the prose that opposes the monologue” and it thus 
“refuses to claim an already completed truth, producing instead contrast and 
conflict in the form of narrative movement itself” (Hardt and Negri, 2004, 
p.210). When we cannot describe a theme with any rationalistic language, 
emotions must be poured directly into politics, and grammars of action as 
embodied experience (McDonald, 2006) are utilised, in contrast to the familiar 
organisational politics with control, purpose and cognition. Holloway’s (2011) 
meta-narrative of “No” and “dignity” seems to be understood as these 
embodied expressions. 
 
In this carnivalesque movement, emotional expressions are not translated 
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into a coherent and cognitive political language. This virtuosic activism blurs 
the boundary between the political and cultural spheres and it therefore 
broadens a concept of political struggles (Chesters and Welsh, 2006). This 
carnivalesque movement probably cannot be illustrated as a convertor of 
chaos to coherence, but it is more like a disseminator of actions. 
 
Using a concept of Deleuze and Guattari (1988), Chesters and Welsh (2006, 
p. 90) describe the actions in the AGMs as “plateaux,” which is the “temporary 
stabilisation and heightening of collective intensities.” Inside the movement, 
participants experience a number of encounters, networking, collective 
deliberation and capacity-building processes, and its resonance works as a 
“strange attractor” (Chesters and Welsh, 2006, p.91) to direct people to many 
different plateaus, forming a new network.  
 
A plateau avoids “any orientation toward a culmination point or external end” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p.22). It exists as a node in the interconnected 
network in society. Deleuze and Guattari describe this network as a “rhizome,” 
in contrast to the arboreal form within a hierarchy. They note: 
 
A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, 
between things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the 
rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb “to 
be,” but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, 
“and…and…and…” […] Where are you going? Where are you 
coming from? What are you heading for? These are totally useless 
questions (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p.25). 
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The concept of a rhizomatic network and collective action as a plateau 
provides an alternative model to the conventional politics that are converging 
into some sort of meta-narratives to be perfected. It suggests that we will be 
motivated, and kept motivated, without assuming any universal references. 
The concept of a rhizome implies that we can still engage in radical politics in 
the postmodern condition, where we cannot articulate any ‘authentic self’ to 
be liberated and the final destination to be reached.  
 
Since rhizomatic thinking provides no concept of beginning or end, it will 
invalidate the question of “where to go.” However, the question remains as to 
how the alternative can be realised. In this rhizomatic view, the political project 
cannot be identified in the pre-fixed model; neither is it heading towards an 
unessential universality to be agreed upon through collective deliberation or 
emotional exprience. This abandonment of the building of a universal 
consensus may strengthen the postmodern incommensurability. Newman 
(2007) worries that it merely embraces atomised individualism, from which 
nothing creative will be generated.  
 
Newman’s position can be seen in the light of contemporary anarchism under 
the influence of post-structuralism, since he does not presume any 
pre-identifiable order either as the goal or as the procedure. However, there 
seem to be two approaches in this anti-essentialist politics. One approach 
presumes the convergence towards some sort of universality which is yet to 
come. Another approach, suggested by a rhizomatic view, rejects any 
convergence toward universality. Newman (2011, p.64) clarifies that this is the 
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ontological difference; while the former refers to “lack” and “transcendence,” 
the latter pays attention to “abundance” and “immanence.”  
 
Newman (2007, p.189) acknowledges that radical politics needs a universal 
project to identify the alternative, or “what the world should be.” However, this 
term “should” seems to be rejected in the latter approach. In Deleuzian 
philosophy, the alternative is described as ‘how one might live’ instead of ‘how 
one should live’ (May, 2005). Here, the question of life is illustrated as an 
actualisation of one form out of countless possibilities.  
 
While an arboreal view describes the aspect of life as the movement towards 
the ultimate form of ‘what it should be’, a rhizomatic view describes life as 
endless encounters, connections and temporary assemblages, which 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988) call plateaus. The world is not composed of 
identities to be represented; rather, it is composed of “swarms of differences 
that actualise themselves into specific forms of identity” (May, 2005, p.114). 
Difference is never identified in a coherent language. It cannot be 
comprehended, but only felt through “palpation” (May, 2005, p.20). This 
seems to correspond with the carnivalesque movement which does not 
convey rational political messages, but co-create of new emotional 
experiences. 
 
In this concept, ‘postmodern’ radical politics is explained as an experiment in 
actualising difference from many potentials. This enables a nomadic subject 
to engage in some meaning-making activities instead of degenerating it into 
an ever-fleeting entity without a name. According to this worldview, there is no 
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chaos outside the existing order. There is an anchor, which is nameless, 
formless, and more like an ever-changing network that includes ourselves. 
 
3.5 Possible political imaginary in the postmodern condition 
3.5.1 Deconstructed subject 
Finally, I outline the framework of a new political imaginary in contemporary 
Japanese society, suggested by my analysis in this chapter. There are two 
different types of prescriptions for the postmodern political predicament. One 
is to separate the subject from the complex network and to reconstruct the 
self-conscious subject who can rationally design a new normative order to 
affirm our lives. The other is to accept the political subject under the influence 
of the capillary power but to supply the impetus for political engagement from 
the emotions and particular experience; s/he is loosely anchoring him/herself 
with the ‘rhizomatic’ network created by the experience of encounters. 
 
The former type is most clearly addressed by the liberalist approach of saving 
(or ‘achieving’ in the case of Japan) modernity. Rawls’ “veil of ignorance” tries 
to salvage an autonomous subject from the entangled social relationship and 
enable these subjects to rationally agree with the universal concept of justice. 
The “communicative rationality” proposed by Habermas may not be clearly 
categorised as the ‘reconstructing-modern’ project. However, he also tries to 
save a rational subject from the complex social nexus, so that he/she will be 
able to identify new norms and orders through communications.  
 
However, from the post-structuralist view, it seems impossible for any 
individuals in contemporary society to separate themselves from the influence 
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of a networked society. As Call (2002) acknowledges, people are surrounded 
by advertisements that constantly influence our sense of value. Hence, the 
post-structuralist view discards the idea that the political subject must be 
rational. It proposes a heterogeneous, deconstructed subject rather than a 
self-conscious and rational political subject. This deconstructed subject finds 
his/her own way from the encounters and emotional experiences in the 
rhizomatic network.  
 
What is notable is that this image of a deconstructed subject resonates with 
the subjectivity traditionally present in Japanese society. As was mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter, Japanese culture is traditionally ‘postmodern’ 
because the subject is always deconstructed and embedded in the social 
relationship. A network composed of particular small narratives has been their 
anchor and the source of order. Their anchor has always been a simulative 
narrative created in the network.  
 
To Japanese liberal theorists, this deconstructed subject is the very reason for 
political apathy in contemporary Japanese society. People become a passive 
entity who internalise the value system created in the social network to which 
they belong. Here, a network as the anchor operates a hegemonic power. 
People voluntarily authorise the value created in the network and internalise it 
as the absolute norm to follow. In a complex society, the norms emanating 
from the network became fragmented and fluidised, and they have brought 
insecurity to life. People chose to retreat into a small territory to secure their 
lives; however, this survival strategy sacrifices the people outside and also 
suffocates those inside. 
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Hence, it is understandable that Japanese liberal intellectuals, such as Masao 
Maruyama (1965), claim that the deconstructed subject can never be political. 
However, as I have repeatedly mentioned, the liberal political project of 
reconstructing the rational and self-conscious subject consequently looks 
almost impossible in a contemporary society. Hence, this chapter has outlined 
a new imaginary of ‘postmodern’ politics, which is scarcely argued by 
Japanese political theorists.  
 
This chapter has articulated a deconstructed self as the potential political 
subject, rather than insisting on overcoming it. It asked how we can save this 
postmodern deconstructed subject from becoming a passive entity in a 
networked society, an entity whose members are only accommodating 
themselves to ever-changing norms. 
 
I argue that post-structuralist knowledge indicates that although an individual 
is under the influence of the complex and fluid value systems, s/he can 
anchor him/herself to a rhizomatic network created by his/her emotions and 
encounters. More importantly, it is possible to do so without authorising the 
value created in the network as the absolute norm. In this sense, the 
‘immanent’ trend of post-anarchism suits my purpose more than the 
‘transcendental’ one, since a rhizomatic network encourages endless 
encounters, and it does not seek a convergence into the permanent stability.  
 
In practice, it seems difficult to identify this ontological difference between 
‘lack/transcendence’ and ‘abundance/immanence’ theory, because both reject 
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the concept of the self-conscious political subject and the pre-identifiable 
order for politics. However, the former tends to see that encounters and 
connections in the movement are important for realising some sort of 
complete form. Although I am aware that Newman emphasises that this 
universality should be unstable, any transcendental reference seems at risk of 
being treated as hegemonic authority.  
 
On the other hand, a rhizomatic view considers connections and encounters 
as the temporary actualisation of difference. Thus, the encounters and 
connections in the rhizomatic network create nothing like a universal value 
that everyone should accept. Instead, it creates body experiences, new 
emotions and desires which motivate people from within.  
 
3.5.2 Radical opening 
The rhizomatic model of thought indicates that radical politics is still possible 
even though we cannot assume that any authenticity will be released or 
constructed, or even though we cannot become a rational subject who is 
independent of the influence of the complex network. A new political subject 
experiences encounters in a complex network, acquires new emotions and 
inputs for further political commitment. 
 
However, this rhizomatic thinking is still not enough to explain how people 
might become political in the postmodern condition. The encounters and 
emotional experiences in a rhizomatic network do not necessarily bring 
creative results. Relationships with others may be destructive or dominative. 
Moreover, the encountering is a risky operation. In this complex society, we 
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cannot predict the impact of our action. A small encounter could have a fatal 
effect on an individual.  
 
The insight of rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) suggests that the outside 
of the existing order is not a meaningless void. However, the creative 
interaction and resonance in the rhizomatic network will never occur unless 
they are willing to interplay. A possible political subject at least needs to create 
an escape velocity to the proximate ‘other’ to connect and interact. The 
question remains as to how this initial opening occurs. 
 
Akagi’s hope of war (2007) is one imaginary of this opening; it is a very radical 
one, because he does not believe that people will voluntarily open themselves 
to the risky outside. He claims that war is a last resort to deconstruct the 
closed territory of those who desperately try to reassure stability by sacrificing 
other people outside.  
 
If such a violent rupture is the only way of achieving the opening, it is too 
pessimistic. In addition, even though war would bring radical mobilisation, this 
does not mean that it would be permanently open. Society will be stabilised 
again, leaving different outsiders. Akagi (2007) himself knows that war is not 
the fundamental solution for this reason. What he really wants is not a 
destructive and once-and-for-all openness, but a society that is permanently 
open (See 2.4.3).  
 
In fact, Akagi proposes a less violent way to achieve permanent openness 
and encounters. In his work, he briefly references a story from Kurt 
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Vonnegut’s novel Slapstick, or Lonesome No More! (1976, cited in Akagi, 
2011). The people in this fictional society are supposed to form a family with 
those who have the same middle name. The point is that this middle name is 
randomly chosen by a computer. Akagi identifies his hope in this random 
system, acknowledging how a ‘meaninglessly’ enforced name can create 
affection and encourage mutual help (2011, pp.370-374). What Akagi sees in 
Vonnegut’s novel is ‘institutionalised’ random encounters rather than the 
violently forced opening brought about by the catastrophe. 
 
Be it violent catastrophe or institutionalised randomness, Akagi’s argument 
presumes some external power, which is beyond human control, intention and 
reasoning. This resonates with the language of post-structuralist political 
theory; for example, Newman argues that the beginning of the political subject 
is caused by a ‘rupture’ of the self. In a similar sense, Day introduces Simon 
Critchley’s concept of “infinite responsibility” at the heart of his affinity-based 
politics, and explains it as “always being open to the invitation and challenge 
of another Other” (Day, 2005, p.18).  
 
Critchley (2007) argues that the encounter with the incomprehensible other is 
the beginning of ethics. From this argument, we can connect the imaginary of 
radical opening with ethics, rather than that of war or ‘institutionalised’ 
randomness. Ethics is not something identifiable in advance as principles. It is 
something that each individual creates through the encounter with the others. 
Day (2005; p.177) notes that the postmodern subject will rely upon “ethics of 
shared commitments based on affinities rather than duties based on 
hegemonic imperatives.” Ethics will take the ‘postmodern’ deconstructed 
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subject out of the hopeless desire for hegemony and absolute reference, and 
instead enable them to ask how we “might” live, rather than how we “should” 
live (May, 2005).  
 
Summary and further directions 
I started this chapter by describing how the postmodern condition brought 
difficulty for us to hope for social change. In post-industrial complex society, 
almost everybody constitutes “the multitude” in Hardt and Negri’s sense (2000, 
2004), as they are penetrated by the fluid global hegemony. However, in 
reality, it is extremely difficult for us to venture outside this established norm. 
 
The hegemonic power is no longer exercised through tangible institutions. 
Often, the power operates within our choice of what to buy and how to spend 
our time. It operates within our desire for a stable, fulfilled and meaningful life. 
In such a condition, it is difficult to identify the source of frustration and 
express the hope of changing. Most people find themselves being powerless 
entities merely to accommodate the ever-shifting norm. 
  
This chapter has outlined a new political imaginary which is different from 
conventional politics with fixed identity, reason, intention, purpose and 
totalising ideology. Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic thinking (1988) provides 
a new vision of politics in which a political subject remains deconstructed and 
penetrated by the influence of complex network, but still motivates the self for 
political commitment with its own desire, and keeps experimenting with new 
potentials without any authoritarian reference. The last part of this chapter 
questioned how to open the self to others, to make rhizomatic connections 
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with them, and to continue engaging in politics. As Day (2005) notes, the 
post-structuralist politics requires ethics for radical openness, and this ethics 
of opening will be the key concept for overcoming the politics of hegemony. 
 
From the next chapter onwards, this thesis examines politics after the 
Fukushima disaster and outlines its potential as a new political imaginary. The 
Fukushima nuclear accident is the imaginary of war and disaster which 
violently brings a radical opening to the subject. Although I do not insist that 
the disaster in general constitutes a necessary part of the re-imagining of a 
new form of politics, it is evident that this Fukushima nuclear disaster has 
mobilised significant number of Japanese people to political engagement. 
This political engagement still continues in 2015, four years after the accident. 
I examine this politics after the Fukushima disaster and articulate the 
protesters’ sense of agency and ethics emerged from the mobilisation. This 
helps me to envisage a new political imaginary in the postmodern condition, 
which is the ultimate objective of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
Introduction 
Chapter two argued that, in contemporary Japanese society, people’s hope 
for a fulfilled life can no longer be described in political language. The majority 
of people accept the authority of the hegemonic power because it provides 
them with a stable identity and meanings, while the minority’s desire for social 
change sometimes takes a violent imaginary. In the postmodern condition, a 
subject is entangled in a complex social network. The source of the 
oppression is no longer clearly identified, and people have difficulty in sharing 
a universal narrative for politics. Chapter three argued that, in such an era, 
our possible resistance takes place in the sphere of everyday life, saying ‘No’ 
to the particular difficult conditions we face, and collectively searching for a 
better form of life through encounters with other people. Contemporary social 
movements are often seen as the spaces for such encounters. I argue that 
they provide new political practices without advancing an idea of a 
self-conscious political subject replete with a set of universal meta-narratives. 
Instead social movements are laboratories (Melucci, 1996, p.223) for the 
creation of new forms of subjectivity and new patterns of relations that give 
rise to novel and creative political imaginaries. 
 
This research focuses on the anti-nuclear movement after the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear accident as one such political practice. This chapter firstly 
explains why I chose this movement as a case-study (4.1). The Fukushima 
disaster highlights the complexity and precariousness of life in contemporary 
society, and I consider that the protesters in this movement are responding to 
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it politically. The next section (4.2) explains my epistemological position in 
social movement studies. My pursuit of a new political imaginary in the 
postmodern condition cannot be explained within the framework of 
conventional social movement studies, which tries to identify a general model 
of successful mobilisation. Instead, my search considers that social 
movements are the process of creating a knowledge of new political practices. 
Based on these arguments, my data-collecting methods and limitations are 
addressed (4.3), followed by a clarification of my position as the researcher 
(4.4).  
 
4.1 Choosing a case-study 
My research conducts a case-study of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movement in Tokyo. According to Snow and Trom (2002, pp.158-160), 
studying a case in a social movement is meaningful under the following 
conditions: (1) when the case is normal and therefore representative of the 
lager social movement; (2) when the case highlights the critical character of 
the movement; or (3) when the case shows the negative and extreme case. 
My case-study fits the second category. It is important to note that my analysis 
never represents the general characteristics of the entire post-Fukushima 
activism or the politics of disaster. I consider that the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear movement in Tokyo has a critical implication for politics in the 
postmodern condition, and the purpose of this research is to highlight its 
aspects. 
 
There are several reasons why I consider this movement to be important. First 
of all, the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement has become the largest 
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social movement mobilisation since the 1960s. It marked the awakening of 
‘apolitical’ Japanese citizens. In one sense, this disaster also resonates with 
the imagination of an ‘outside’ which Tomohiro Akagi (2007) addresses as the 
last resort for social mobilisation. Therefore, it is important to examine how 
this unexpected opening impacted people’s perceptions and brought about 
mobilisation. Opinions are divided amongst Japanese sociologists as to 
whether the disaster has changed Japanese society (Furuichi, 2011; Kainuma, 
2012), and whether the “endless everyday life” (Miyadai, 1998, See chapter 2) 
has ended. 
 
Secondly, the Fukushima disaster confirmed that we are living in “a risk 
society” (Beck, 1992), where rational calculation with pre-given variables will 
not necessarily guarantee the certainty of life. We cannot calculate the risk of 
a nuclear disaster from the objective data, because it is a very rare case. We 
cannot compare this incalculable risk with the benefits obtained from nuclear 
energy. Once the accident occurs, it threatens the lives of people and future 
generations over a vast area. Talking about nuclear energy in post-disaster 
Japanese society inevitably invites a lot of questions: Should we give up this 
incomplete technology before it causes another fatal disaster? With what 
alternative energy might we replace it? What will happen to the local economy 
which has been depending on nuclear energy? 
 
The Fukushima disaster exposed the precariousness of life in a complex and 
interconnected society. The fundamental question is probably as follows: How 
can we make decisions in a complex risk society when we are uncertain about 
the results of our (in)action? Or, more broadly, what kind of knowledge do we 
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need to live well in this era? To ‘do politics’ in contemporary society requires 
us to face many contradictions and ambiguities, and thinking within the scope 
of institutional politics is not sufficient. I believe that the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear protesters are practising a new way of doing politics in such a 
difficult condition.  
 
The case-study in my research focuses in particular on the protesters in the 
Tokyo area. People in Tokyo are the victims of the accident in one sense, 
because they were not notified by the government that the radioactive 
contamination had reached Tokyo soon after the disaster, despite the 
government possessing detailed data about this. However, they are not purely 
victims of the disaster. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, located in a 
depopulated rural area in northeast Japan, was generating energy for the 
Tokyo area. This signifies another entangled social relationship between the 
city and the local community, in which Tokyo people were those with the 
power over other, politically weaker and more marginalised people. Moreover, 
the Tokyo protesters are sometimes described as irresponsible ‘outsiders’ 
who protest against reactivating nuclear plants located outside of their region. 
The protesters in Tokyo have consistently been asked who they are and why 
they are making their claims. I believe that their ambiguous identity reflects 
the complex nature of contemporary society. 
 
4.2 Approaches to social movement studies 
4.2.1 Popular social movement theories 
Social movement research became popular due to the proposal of “resource 
mobilisation theory” in the 1970s, which sees social movements as rational 
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acts rather than a mere outcome of social dysfunction (Klandermans and 
Staggenborg, 2002). McCarthy and Zald (1977) proposed an examination of 
social movements’ organisation and the availability of their resources, such as 
money, labour and media effects, to identify the successful mobilisation 
factors in social movements. This model theory was further developed by the 
suggestion to examine the political opportunities in different countries and 
times (McAdam et al., 1996).  
 
These theories enabled the consideration of social movements as political 
actions rather than irrational deviance. However, their focus is mainly on the 
structural aspect and they do not examine the subjective aspect of how 
people get involved in politics. Hence, these theories are criticised for their 
dismissal of culture, identities and emotions (Melucci, 1996; Goodwin and 
Jasper, 2004).  
 
The concept of the ‘frame’ is commonly used to examine the cultural 
dimension of social movements, asking how people make sense of their 
actions (Melucci, 1996; McDonald, 2006). In this theory, actors in social 
movements are not only utilising the given opportunities but are also “actively 
engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, 
antagonists, and bystanders or observers” (Benford and Snow, 2000, p.613). 
The framing analysis added a new dimension to social movement studies, as 
McAdam et al. (1996, p.5) explain: “mediating between opportunities, 
organization and action are the shared meanings and definitions that people 
bring to their situation.”  
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Although the framing analysis explains the subjective aspect of social 
movement mobilisation, it is not sufficient to answer my question about how 
people might become political. Frame analysis identifies which frame is 
effective for social movement mobilisation; for example, Benford and Snow 
(2000, pp.619-620) acknowledge that the frame must create “resonance” in 
people, and the “credibility” of the frame and the frame articulators is 
important for mobilisation. However, they seem to treat framing as a matter of 
strategic choice and do not mention how these effective frames might be 
established.  
 
Alberto Melucci (1996, pp.292-293) addresses the subjective factors for 
mobilisation as follows. People need 1) a collective identity, or a kind of 
solidarity, a ‘we’; 2) the identification of an adversary; 3) the definition of 
purpose; and 4) an object at stake in the conflict. Conventional social 
movement studies presume these as preconditions. However, in chapters two 
and three, I argued that it is difficult for the postmodern subject to articulate 
these factors in advance.  
  
The normative social movement theories mostly focus on collective action 
within the institutional politics, using already existing resources, collective 
identity and clear purposes. In other words, these theories do not pay 
attention to the movements that challenge the dominant beliefs and symbols, 
such as countercultural movements (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). What I am 
examining as a new way of politics in the postmodern condition is exactly this 
kind of movement which the conventional social movement theories fail to 
examine.  
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Melucci (1996, p.182) argues that, in the contemporary society, exploitation 
can be defined as “the deprivation of control over the construction of meaning.” 
As chapter two explained, we subjugate ourselves to the hegemonic power of 
identification because we consider that, outside of this hegemonic power, we 
become powerless entities who cannot affirm our own values. Akagi (2007) 
implies that, once people are assigned a negative meaning by society, it is 
difficult to make a new frame to counter it. Now the operation of 
meaning-creation is the predominant power ‘over’ us. The oppressed people 
in the post-modern condition often have no access to mobilisation resources, 
political opportunities and, in particular, the ability to construct cultural 
framings. We need to find politics in such a condition.  
 
4.2.2 Social movements as knowledge practice 
Resource mobilisation and political opportunity theory has an aspect of 
“political reductionism” (Melucci, 1996, p.198), since it treats social 
movements as organisational action in the institutional political arena, utilising 
the resources which have already been used in politics. It is not enough to 
examine how people without such mobilisation tools establish a collective 
identity and articulate the source of their sufferings to become political actors. 
Although the framing analysis focuses on the subjective aspect of social 
movements, it presumes that social movement actors have access to 
effective frames, and it does not pay much attention to the postmodern 
condition where people are deprived of the ability to achieve 
meaning-creation.  
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This is why the examination of emotions (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004) has 
become crucial, as I have already noted in chapter three. It expands the 
definition of politics and social movements. It allows us to view social 
movements not as the actor within institutional politics, but as the process of 
ordinary people expressing their everyday emotions, interacting with other 
people and finding a new way of doing politics outside the formal political 
arena.  
 
If we see social movements not as organisational action with a fixed interest 
but as the processes of each participant establishing his/her identity, claims 
and practices, then what kind of knowledge will be constructed by researching 
one case of social movement? The conventional social movement theories 
have sought general criteria for successful mobilisation. However, when 
studying the complex dynamism in one movement, with a particular focus on 
emotions which are fluid and diverse, it is difficult to establish an ‘invariant 
model’ of movements (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). Hence, what kind of 
knowledge can we create?  
 
Another approach to social movement research considers that the 
movements are the subject of knowledge production rather than the object of 
knowledge (Chesters, 2012). Social movements are not mere phenomena 
whose objectives and strategies are to be interpreted and analysed by 
researchers. Within social movements, each actor is generating new 
meanings, values and practices. Chesters (2012, p.147) acknowledges that 
social movements have the “capacity to develop alternative political 
imaginaries” and establish “knowledge about how to actualise these imagined 
129 
 
possibilities.” It is more ethical for social movement researchers to explore 
this knowledge, which is generated “by” social movements, than to construct 
knowledge “about” social movements through their own frameworks 
(Chesters, 2012, p.148).  
 
In conventional social movement studies, researchers are recognised as the 
knowledge producers, while the participants are treated as data resources to 
be interpreted by the researchers or to yield some meaning. In contrast, this 
new perspective considers that social movements themselves produce 
knowledge. This blurs the distance between the people observing 
(researchers) and the people being observed (protesters). The researchers 
involve the process of knowledge construction which they are examining. This 
means that the researcher becomes one variable of changing reality, as 
Melucci (1996, p.395) claims that that “[r]esearchers must also participate in 
the uncertainty.” 
 
This approach might have a problem of generalisation and validity. Snow and 
Trom (2002) insist that although a case-study in social movement research 
has difficulty in conducting statistical generalisation, it is able to achieve 
theoretical generalisation, such as establishing a grounded theory, and 
extending and modifying existing theories. However, putting researchers into 
the movement they are examining may cause evidential problems in 
establishing generalisable knowledge; the analysis may become either very 
subjective or extremely complex to describe objectively. 
 
As a new proposal for contemporary social theory, Stones (1996) addresses 
130 
 
‘sophisticated realism’ based on the complex ontology, which opposes both 
the reductionism of ‘sociological modernists’, who believe they can obtain 
truthful knowledge about the complex social reality, and the ‘defeatist 
postmodernists’, who do not distinguish real from fiction as they abandon the 
attempt to provide any evidence for their claims. Stones (1996) accepts the 
complexity of society where multiple perspectives co-exist; however, he 
insists that this condition does not necessarily bring the inability to produce 
coherent knowledge. What the complexity of society entails is the limited 
knowledgeability, or the incompleteness of evidence. For Stones, it is possible 
to grasp reality with evidence and to construct knowledge, although it is 
imperfect. The knowledge will “typically be provisional, fallible, incomplete and 
extendable”, and the goal of such knowledge is neither to obtain absolute 
truth nor to celebrate relativism without constraints; the goal is “epistemic gain” 
(Stones, 1996, p.38). 
 
My thesis includes several steps for establishing this knowledge as “epistemic 
gain.” It includes the description “about” the post-Fukushima social 
movements in chapters five and six, although my focus is upon the subjective 
matters such as emotions and identities of the protesters. However, that is not 
my primary aim. In my research, objective identifications about the movement 
are treated as provisional, and they are extended through a process of 
dialogical engagement between myself, those I have interviewed and the 
reflexive process of articulating the political imaginaries that subsequently 
arise. Through this approach, this thesis ultimately aims to elaborate a new 
political imaginary in the postmodern condition.  
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I consider the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements to be a process in 
which ordinary Japanese people are becoming political and experimenting 
with new political practices. This has a significant implication for my pursuit of 
new forms of politics. Chapters seven and eight are devoted to this 
exploration, using the theoretical framework established in chapter three. At 
this stage, my concern is the knowledge possessed “by” social movements. 
 
This knowledge is not a complete representation of the real world which is 
extracted by the researcher, as the sociological ‘modernist’ claims. I believe 
that this type of knowledge is constructed out of a resonance in social 
movements, where countless attempts were made by different actors 
including the researchers themselves. In other words, the knowledge is 
generated in the intersection between the protesters as the producers of 
practical knowledge, myself as a researcher pursuing universal knowledge 
from it, and the many theorists to whom I refer in this thesis. 
 
4.3 Fieldwork plan and methods 
4.3.1 The process of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements 
A huge earthquake hit Northeast Japan on 11 March 2011, and a resulting 
tsunami killed nearly 16,000 people and left more than 2,500 people missing. 
This disaster caused the meltdown of three nuclear reactors at the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant. This third event displaced 150,000 people from 
their homes and left about 600 square kilometres of land uninhabitable. This 
disaster was measured as the most serious level (level 7) on the International 
Nuclear Event Scale, which was as critical as the Chernobyl accident in 1986. 
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The government and TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) failed to 
provide prompt information after the nuclear accident with regard to the scale 
of damage, contamination and the long-term impact on the human body. This 
led people to believe that their lives had been disregarded. Between spring 
and autumn 2011, several anti-nuclear rallies were held in the Tokyo area. 
Tens of thousands of people joined them, demanding the closure of all nuclear 
plants in Japan. These actions were combined with countless local actions 
nationwide.  
 
The movement further expanded in June 2012. By this time, all nuclear 
reactors had been temporarily shut down for inspection. However, the 
government decided to restart the Ohi nuclear reactors in west Japan to 
secure a sufficient energy supply for the summer. More than 100,000 people 
surged to the weekly protest staged in front of the Prime Minister’s official 
residence (the Kanteimae protest) in June and July 2012, and the anti-nuclear 
movement became a national phenomenon. In response to the pressure 
exerted by the citizens, the Prime Minister at that time, Yoshihiko Noda, held a 
meeting with the organiser of the Kanteimae protest in August 2012. Although 
the meeting ended without agreement, it showed that a huge mobilisation 
could impact on the formal political arena. 
 
However, the phase changed in December 2012 due to the snap election 
called in the lower parliament. This ended the regime of the centrist 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and reinstated the centre-right Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), which had been in office throughout most of the 
post-war period in Japan, and which was more positive about reactivating the 
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nuclear plants. The election showed that stopping the nuclear reactors was 
not the immediate issue for the majority of Japanese people.  
 
For the anti-nuclear protesters, the situation in the formal politics has 
worsened since 2012. The LDP government has solidified its hegemony 
through two other general elections in 2013 and 2014. The anti-nuclear 
movements have become far smaller than 2012 and are mostly maintained by 
the middle-aged and the older generation. However, the anti-nuclear 
movements have inspired many other collective actions since 2012. The 
anti-nuclear protesters joined the protests against racism, poverty and the 
government policy. This new activism has channelled younger generations 
into politics, and another huge mobilisation occurred in the summer 2015, 
against the LDP government’s reinvigoration of military diplomacy. 
 
4.3.2 Fieldwork term 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement has experienced several phase 
transitions: from the initial mobilisation in 2011 to the temporary decline, its 
re-ignition in the summer of 2012 and positive feedback from the formal 
political arena, and then several defeats in the general elections since the end 
of 2012. Since I was living in the UK for most of this period, the fieldwork was 
limited to (1) two months from March 2012 to May 2012, (2) another two 
months from November 2012 to January 2013, and (3) the follow-up period 
from February 2014 to June 2015, when I returned to Japan.  
  
Since my research focuses on subjective aspects, such as the emotions and 
identities of the protesters, qualitative research methods were utilised. In 
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particular, in-depth interviews with the protesters played a significant role. 
Although the interviews with the demonstration organisers partly served as 
the key informant interviews from which to obtain knowledge about its 
members, history and strategies, all interviews were primarily intended to 
investigate the respondents’ personal experiences. I focused in particular on 
how they describe their collective identity to raise their voices, what kind of 
objectives or goals they have in their minds, and how their experience of 
mobilisation has affected their perception of society and sense of agency.  
 
(1) First Fieldwork 
The first fieldwork was conducted from the 11th March 2012, the first 
anniversary of the disaster, to the 6th May 2012, the day after which all the 
nuclear reactors in Japan were shut down for inspection. This period 
represented a sort of ‘off-season’ for the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movements. It came after the first mobilisation caused by the initial shock of 
the accident in 2011, and just before the second huge mobilisation of the 
Kanteimae protests at the end of June 2012. However, this does not mean 
that people were totally inactive. There were several small anti-nuclear 
demonstrations organised in Tokyo, and the participants were continuing with 
their activism, which contributed to the second outburst of the movement a 
few months later (Oguma, 2013).  
 
The first period of my fieldwork ended on the 6th May 2012. This was the day 
after all the nuclear plants in Japan had been shut down for inspection. 
Although most protesters knew that the shut-down was temporary, they 
celebrated the moment when Japanese society became ‘nuclear-free’ for the 
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first time in 42 years. 
 
(2) Second fieldwork [11 November 2012- 13 January 2013] 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement became significantly enflamed 
after my first fieldwork, approximately between the end of June and August 
2012. In particular, the Kanteimae protest, which has been held every Friday 
since March 2012, suddenly mobilised over 100,000 people in June and July. 
This was due to the Japanese government’s decision to re-start the Ohi 
nuclear reactors in western Japan. This was the first resumption since the 
Fukushima disaster. This incited huge anger among the public because they 
believed that hardly any accident prevention measures had been taken in the 
operation of these nuclear reactors. Once the newspapers and TV news had 
reported the Kanteimae protest, the number of participants sharply increased. 
 
Since this huge mobilisation occurred after my first fieldwork, I conducted 
online observation and prepared the second fieldwork to follow up the 
situation. This was actualised between November 2012 and January 2013. In 
this fieldwork, a significant number of my interviewees were recruited from the 
largest anti-nuclear action, the Kanteimae protest. 
 
The principal objective of the second fieldwork was to examine the change in 
perception among the protesters through their experience of huge 
mobilisation. The movements were broadly reported by mass media. Many 
politicians, intellectuals and cultural figures visited the Kanteimae protest and 
gave speeches. In August 2012, even the Prime Minister (at that time), 
Yoshihiko Noda, had a meeting with the organisers. Following the Kanteimae 
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protest, similar kinds of anti-nuclear protests spread nationwide. The 
pavement in front of the Prime Minister’s official residence has become a 
space for political protests, such as against inequality and poverty, or the free 
trade scheme with the United States.  
 
Another issue in this second period was the snap general election held in 
December 2012. This became an important opportunity to examine the 
attitude of the protesters to formal politics. The result was a shocking defeat 
for the anti-nuclear protesters, as the voters handed power to the 
conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which has been pursuing a 
pro-nuclear policy in post-war Japanese society. The latter half of my second 
fieldwork was devoted to examining the reactions of protesters to this ‘defeat’. 
 
(3) Follow-up period [February 2014 - June 2015]  
Supplemental fieldwork was occasionally conducted from February 2014 to 
June 2015, as I was staying in Japan at that time. I conducted the second set 
of interviews with my former interviewees to determine whether there had 
been any change in their perceptions, feelings and ways of acting. By this 
time, the anti-nuclear protesters had also joined the counter-racist actions and 
the anti-government movements, which attracted more media attention than 
the anti-nuclear movements. I joined these actions and conducted brief 
interviews to find out whether there were any differences between the 
anti-nuclear movements. I found that the discourses in these movements 
were quite similar to those of the anti-nuclear movements, which is why I use 
the term ‘post-Fukushima activism’ in the later chapters. In addition, another 
snap election was held in December 2014, which gave me another chance to 
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examine the relation between activism and formal politics. 
 
4.3.3 Research subjects 
In planning the fieldwork, I distinguished three types of the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear protesters to interview: independent activists, demonstration 
organisers (including staffers), and demonstration participants. 
       
The first cluster is what I call the independent ‘activists’. They act 
independently rather than as members of an organised group. This cluster 
includes the precariat activist Karin Amamiya and Hajime Matsumoto, one of 
the members of the anarchist collective ‘Shiroto no Ran’ (amateur revolt), 
which organised the first large-scale anti-nuclear march in Tokyo in April 2011. 
Both Amamiya and Matsumoto were active before the Fukushima disaster 
(See chapter two). Although Matsumoto is often mentioned as a ‘member’ of 
Shiroto no Ran, this Shiroto no Ran is actually the name of the recycling shop 
he owns. Shiroto no Ran signifies the young people around him, most of 
whom are aged around 30 and are engaged in the alternative community 
movements.  
 
The second cluster is what I call the ‘organisers’. They belong to a certain 
anti-nuclear group or are involved in the movement as staffers. In particular, I 
focused on two groups: Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes (MCAN) and 
Nuclear Free Suginami (NFS), or Datsu Genpaptsu Suginami in Japanese.  
 
 MCAN 
MCAN is an umbrella network of anti-nuclear groups and activists in the Tokyo 
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area, and it was founded in 2011. Most of the member groups were newly 
established after the Fukushima disaster. For example, TwitNoNukes was 
founded by music-loving young people who were loosely connected on Twitter. 
It organised street demonstrations in Shibuya, the cultural centre of Tokyo. 
Another member group, Energy Shift Parade, has more affinity with 
environmentalism and seeks sustainable energy to replace nuclear energy. 
There are also groups that have been active since before the Fukushima 
disaster. Tampopo-sha is an environmental organisation founded after the 
Chernobyl accident; it has been providing information on the nuclear plants 
and radiation to the general public. On the other hand, No Nukes More Hearts 
had been spreading the anti-nuclear message in their events with live music 
since 2007. The core members of these groups are loosely connected in the 
MCAN network, and they provide the expertise. According to one member, 
Yasumichi Noma (2012), MCAN is a mere provider of protest spaces rather 
than taking the initiative in the anti-nuclear movements.  
 
MCAN was chosen as the target group in my research because it organised 
the first-anniversary memorial anti-nuclear rally (Tokyo Big March) on 11 
March 2012, which successfully mobilised 15,000 people. At the end of March 
2012, MCAN started organising the protect actions in front of the Prime 
Minister’s office every Friday. This is called the Kanteimae protest, and it has 
become the most popular anti-nuclear protest since June 2012. However, at 
the time of my first interview (March 2012), none of its members imagined that 
the anti-nuclear movements would become such a huge phenomenon. 
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 NFS 
NFS is a local anti-nuclear group in the Suginami area of Tokyo. NFS was 
chosen because of its ‘carnivalesque’ demonstration held in February 2012. 
Both Amamiya and Matsumoto joined this demonstration and expressed their 
praise online, which convinced me that NFS entailed some non-hegemonic 
message. NFS mainly organised demonstrations and events in its local 
community. The members were a good mixture of local shopkeepers, office 
workers, entrepreneurs, local politicians, writers, translators and so on. Their 
ages also varied from a junior high school student to former student activists 
in the 1960s. Their general meetings were open to everybody and broadcast 
online. By participating in their meetings and making online observations 
while I was not in Japan, I was able to follow how they make decisions and 
prepare their actions, and how their perception has been changing through 
their experience in activism.  
 
The third cluster of my fieldwork research is the ‘participants’. In the first 
fieldwork, most of them were recruited from the anti-nuclear demonstrations: 
MCAN’s “Tokyo Big March” and TwitNoNukes’ “Twitter Demo”. There were 
also several occupants in front of the offices of the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry. This small anti-nuclear camp named “Tento Hiroba” was 
established in September 2011 by relatively elderly protesters, and it is still 
functioning in 2015. As it has been providing a space for dialogue amongst 
the protesters, I visited it and conducted some interviews. The recruiting 
process for these interviewees was random, which was different from the 
‘activists’ and the ‘organisers’ categories. 
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To identify the motivational factors, I asked questions such as whether they 
had any previous experience of activism, what kind of image they used to 
have of activism, how they felt when they found out about the disaster, what 
made them join the first action, how they would describe their ideal society, 
what their friends and family said about them joining the movement, and so 
on.  
 
4.3.4 Role of typology 
Since contemporary social movements are often described as a mere outlet 
for dissatisfaction or space for deriving excitement (See 2.4.4), it looked 
worthwhile comparing the motivations between the ‘activists/organisers’ who 
make a serious commitment and the ‘participants’ who may have joined only 
once. However, the initial typology of these three clusters became less 
significant later in my fieldwork.  
 
This is because the initial question of whether the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear movement was a mere safety valve became unimportant. My first 
fieldwork was conducted in a slack period of the movement and I found most 
of the participant as passionate as the ‘activists’ and ‘organisers’. Most of 
them responded that they had been joining anti-nuclear actions once a week, 
or had joined ‘countless’ actions since the Fukushima disaster. Regarding the 
motivational factors, I could not find a clear distinction between these 
categories. I became more interested in each protester’s motivation to keep 
participating, and the process of deepening commitment.  
 
Although the typology provided the methodological frame for sampling, the 
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responses from my interviewees show that it fails to reflect empirical reality. 
Against this rigid categorisation, the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement 
is fluid; some protesters join as a participant, become skilful during 
mobilisation, and eventually start organising an action.  
 
For example, the interviewee Kaori Nawa is categorised as ‘the NFS 
organiser’ in my thesis, which reflects her attribution at the time of my first 
interview in spring 2012. However, she began as a ‘participant’ who took part 
in Shiroto no Ran’s protest event in April 2011 without any previous 
experience of activism (See p.162). Then she became a staffer in NFS, where 
she expanded her expertise. Later she organised smaller demonstrations in 
her own residential area. NFS itself was recognisable only in a short period. 
By the time of my second interview, some became MCAN staffers. Other 
started acting independently, such as the case of Mizuki Nakamura (See 
p.202).    
 
Establishing a category at a certain point of the movement cannot grasp the 
fluid reality of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters. Instead of making 
comparison or evaluation based on fixed types, my research focuses on 
changes in identity and perception of the protesters during the experience of 
the disaster and collective action. Examining the motivations which pushed 
them onto the street and to maintain political commitment provide more 
significant implications to consider how people can become political in a 
complex society.  
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4.3.5 Methods 
 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews became a primary data collection method in my 
fieldwork. Semi-structured interviews allow the respondents to explain their 
experiences, interpretation of reality, thoughts and memories in their own 
words (Blee and Taylor, 2002). Their open nature also enables the 
interviewee to digress or to be probed through interaction, which provides the 
researcher with new themes for analysis (Blee and Taylor, 2002). Frequently 
during my interviews, what I had initially considered an insignificant 
conversation later turned out to be a crucial theme. Hence, I tried not to 
disturb the interviewees’ flow even when they diverted my questions. 
 
In the cases of the activists and the organisers, the potential interviewees 
were deliberately chosen based on my examination of the group’s meetings, 
documents, web pages and twitter accounts. However, there were several 
cases where I recruited them directly during the mobilisation and conducted 
brief interviews. This includes follow-up questions with the same person after 
the initial interview. For the participants’ interviews, the potential interviewees 
were randomly chosen during the anti-nuclear mobilisations, although 
particular attention was paid to balancing gender and age. In total, 146 
samples were collected.  
 
Because of the movement’s expansion and the huge media attention it was 
receiving, it became significantly difficult in my second fieldwork to set up 
formal interviews with MCAN organisers. Therefore, I set up informal short 
interviews with many different members on specific topics. These data were 
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analysed together with their formal publications, comments at the talk events, 
and tweets.   
 
The interview length depended on the availability of the interviewee; formal 
interviews with the activists and organisers took between one and 
approximately four hours. Informal interviews with the participants took 
around 5-30 minutes.  
 
Table 1: List of samples 
 
 
 Direct observation 
Direct observation is a common data collection method to be combined with 
interviews as part of a triangulation approach (Blee and Taylor, 2002). In my 
fieldwork, it included anti-nuclear marches, rallies, and regular meetings of the 
activist groups, mainly those of MCAN and NFS. In most cases, direct 
observations were utilised as a supplemental tool to identify the problems and 
the immediate issues they faced in the movements. The information collected 
Group / Event 1st 2nd Follow-up  Total
Activists 4 3 3 10
Activists Total 10
Organisers MCAN 4 7 1 12
NFS 11 4 1 16
Organisers Total 28
Participants MCAN's Tokyo Big March 14 0 0 14
Twitter Demo (TwitNoNukes) 4 4 0 8
Tento Hiroba 4 0 0 4
Kanteimae Protest 0 35 21 56
Anti-poverty protests 0 2 0 2
Anti-government protests 0 0 8 8
Electoral campaigns 0 0 6 6
Other demonstrations 0 4 6 10
Participants Total 108
Total 146
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was later used to construct my questions in the interviews. However, the 
observation of NFS meetings was an exceptional case. Their meetings were 
open and frequent enough to conduct detailed analysis on their 
decision-making process.   
 
 Indirect observation 
Indirect observations were conducted through online materials, such as 
Youtube and Ustream, which report on the marches, rallies and general 
meetings of the organisers, activists’ talk events and so on. Indirect 
observation has been conducted since February 2012, one month before my 
first fieldwork. Like direct observations, this method was utilised as a 
supplemental tool to identify the potential interviewees and to devise 
questions for the interviews. When I was staying in the UK, this indirect 
observation became my primary method for the follow-up data collection.  
 
 Document analysis 
Document analysis was utilised mainly to investigate the comments of 
scholars, economists, politicians and cultural critics, who often stimulated an 
intense debate with the anti-nuclear protesters. I checked their tweets and 
blog posts, paying particular attention to the discrepancies in perceptions 
between the intellectuals and the ordinary citizens. As I scarcely had a chance 
to meet them and directly clarify their intentions, these comments were 
carefully compared to their other formal publications. In addition, the Twitter 
accounts of the protesters were observed on a daily basis and analysed to 
identify their concerns with the anti-nuclear movements. 
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4.3.6 Sampling and its limitations  
The interviewees were chosen through different sampling processes. In the 
case of the ‘activists/organisers’ categories, initial contact with them was 
made through emails, in which the background information of the project was 
provided. An effort was made in this process to establish a trustful relationship 
so that they could feel safe to give an honest opinion at the interview. Thus, in 
some cases, several emails were exchanged to clarify the aim of the interview. 
At the meeting, the interviewees were asked permission for the use of audio 
recording and for publicising their name. This excludes some organisers who 
were recruited directly at the protest event. In this case, oral consent was 
sought and these interviews were conducted in off-record situations. 
 
In the case of those in the ‘participants’ category, interviewees were identified 
and contacted during the anti-nuclear mobilisations. This recruiting process 
made it difficult to build a trustful relationship between the researcher and the 
interviewees. For the purpose of providing an unpressured environment, the 
interviews were conducted under the anonymous condition. Because of this 
sampling process, the biographical data of the ‘participants’ categories was 
limited. Most of the respondents in the ‘participants’ cluster were unable to 
track their commitment levels since the day of my interview.  
 
Regardless of such limitations, the persistence of the movement and the 
dynamism inside this movement were still examined through both direct and 
indirect observation and documentation, as well as the narratives of the 
interviewees. Also, the interviews with some ‘activists/organisers’ were 
conducted several times, which allowed me to trace their change in 
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perception and commitment levels. 
 
4.4 Ethics 
4.4.1 Interview consent 
The in-depth interviews with the protesters were conducted with the approval 
of the Committee for Ethics in Research in the University of Bradford. The 
recruitment of the interviewees excluded children under 18 years of age and 
any potentially vulnerable groups. The privacy of the interviewees was 
protected by the following procedure.    
 
In the case of independent activists and organisers, written informed consent 
was obtained at the meeting, including their consent to be identified by name 
and the use of audio recording. It was explained to the interviewees that 
recorded media would be stored and used only by the researcher, using a 
personal computer; data would not be stored or distributed online and they 
would be destroyed at the end of the project.  
 
For the interviewees categorised as the participants and some organisers 
who were contacted during the mobilisations, oral consent was obtained 
before the interview. The interviews were conducted without being 
audio-recorded and in conditions of anonymity with identification only of age 
and gender. In all cases, the personal data were under the control of the 
researcher. Data analysis was also conducted by the researcher herself.  
 
4.4.2 The researcher’s position 
At the beginning of my fieldwork, I regarded myself as an observer who stood 
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outside the protesters’ circle. At that time, I was unsure whether my research 
would remain in the realm of descriptive analysis and critical engagement with   
the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement, or whether it would also employ 
a more speculative approach. I made no assumptions about this movement, 
i.e. whether it is ‘political’ or not, subversive or not, etc. I began by broadly 
searching for the motivational factors.   
 
However, by listening to the protesters’ voices in the first fieldwork, I was 
reminded that I, too, was a part of Japanese society that had experienced the 
crucial moment after the disaster. I asked myself what I could do for my 
society, and what I could to do as a researcher to make a contribution to my 
society. During the second fieldwork period, I identified myself more clearly as 
an anti-nuclear protester as well as a researcher. I decided to develop my 
research from a mere description of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movements to a more theoretical exploration and elaboration of the 
knowledge implied by this movement.  
 
Since joining the movement as a protester, I have come across many 
emotions, and these emotions have brought new research questions and 
themes. The resonance between my own experience, the voices from my 
interviewees and the knowledge from the literature eventually sharpened my 
question: How can ‘we’ together make our society better in such an era? I 
never abandoned my identity as a researcher because I always tried to 
elaborate the knowledge constructed within this movement. However, I also 
did not try to separate myself from the protesters, because both I and the 
protesters are searching for a better way to live, and to make society a better 
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place. Thus, my thesis employs the mixed use of the terms ‘they’ and ‘we’. 
‘They’ are the protesters whom I observe, interview and learn from; yet when I 
argue a new political imaginary implied by the post-Fukushima activism, I 
chose to use the term ‘we’, because there is no separation between the 
protesters and me - we are all constructing a new knowledge and 
experimenting with a new political practice. 
 
Summary and further directions 
This chapter explained the epistemological and methodological approach 
used in this thesis. The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement was chosen 
as a case-study to explore a new political imaginary in contemporary society, 
because it is a strong political response by Japanese citizens who realised the 
precariousness of their life in complex society.  
 
The conventional social movement research mainly pays attention to the 
strategical dimension of movements, articulating a model for (un) successful 
mobilisation. On the other hand, my research assumes the social movement 
as an experimental laboratory where collective identities, political demands 
and desires are generated through actions. Here social movement is not 
treated as a mere data from which the researcher constructs knowledge 
about it; instead, I consider that the movement itself is the knowledge 
producer of how people may become political. My research intends to 
describe this knowledge generated by the post-Fukushima activism. 
 
The fieldwork was divided into three periods between 2012 and 2015, and 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 146 protesters in Tokyo. 
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Among them, in depth interviews were conducted with the independent 
activists and staffers of demonstration organizing group (MCAN, NFS), while 
random sampling and short interviews were conducted with the participants of 
street protests.  
 
My main concern were their identities, motivations for joining/continuing the 
protest, and their personal process of change through mobilisation. These 
interviews are analysed in the coming chapters five and six, and I suggest that 
the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement implies a new political agency 
and ethics in postmodernity. 
 
Seeing the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement as a knowledge producer 
questions the conventional division between the researcher as the observer 
and the protesters as the observed. While I retain the position of observer in 
chapters five and six in order to conduct descriptive and critical analysis of the 
movement, this distinction become less important in my pursuit of a new 
political imaginary in chapters seven and eight. Here I participate in the 
ongoing movement for co-creating a new way of doing politics. Chapter eight 
examines the nature of this knowledge, since it seems that this knowledge 
neither belongs to ‘scientific’ knowledge of objective description and modelling, 
nor suggests the principles of moral judgement. I argue that it is ‘affective’ 
knowledge based on a dynamic, open-ended ontology. 
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Chapter 5 Fieldwork Analysis I: 
New political agency in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement 
 
Introduction 
After the Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011, Japanese society 
experienced the biggest upsurge of activism since the 1960s. This chapter 
conducts an analysis of my interviews with the protesters in the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement in Tokyo, as they seem to signify the 
emergence of a new political subjectivity. 
 
Following a brief overview of the development of this movement and its 
reputations (5.1), the motivational factors of the protesters are examined in 
detail (5.2). The disaster revealed the precariousness of life in a complex 
society, and feelings of shock, confusion and anger brought Japanese people 
onto the streets. In particular, the protesters regret that their political apathy 
shielded the nuclear plants from critical attention. This has evoked their sense 
of responsibility for political commitment, and it constructs a new subjectivity 
without any shared ideology or preset identity.  
 
Another novelty of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements is the 
diversity of actions taking place both inside and outside institutional politics 
(5.3). The protesters explain their action as a ‘vessel’: a place for a variety of 
people to gather and interact. Each vessel takes a different approach to 
politics; some pressurise the government from the street, while others try to 
change their way of living.  
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The final section examines the relationship between activism and formal 
politics (5.4). The results of several elections since 2012 have revealed the 
gap between the protesters and those people outside the movement who 
remain apathetic. The protesters’ confidence in activism may solidify their 
actions and their ‘emotional’ language may converge into coherent political 
terms, which may render their actions closed to people outside. However, I 
argue that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement also includes the 
anarchistic current which rejects this solidification.  
 
5.1 Overview of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements in Tokyo 
5.1.1 Process of the movements 
Immediately after the disaster on 11 March 2011, several people started to 
take protest actions outside governmental institutions and TEPCO’s offices in 
Tokyo. Those actions were mainly organised by unionists and experienced 
activists (Oguma, 2013). 
 
On 10 April 2011, the anarchist collective Shiroto no Ran organised an 
anti-nuclear march in Koenji area, Tokyo. According to its spokesperson, 
Matsumoto, it was organised in 10 days and advertised through Twitter, blogs 
and flyers (Interview, 6 April 2012). They expected around 500 people to 
attend; however, 15,000 people gathered. Their carnivalesque demonstration 
with music encouraged political actions by ‘ordinary’ people, who identify 
themselves as ‘non-political’, and the anti-nuclear movement spread 
nationwide. 
 
Shiroto no Ran’s subsequent action in June 2011 successfully actualised a 
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few hours of liberated space in the centre of Tokyo. The square was occupied 
by tens of thousands of anti-nuclear protesters. The activists, scholars and 
musicians gave speeches and performances, which the political scientist 
Gonoi (2012, p.9) describes as “the realisation of a Temporary Autonomous 
Zone.” Although Shiroto no Ran stopped organising large-scale 
demonstrations after September 2011, the anti-nuclear demonstrations had 
become common phenomena by then, and they have been organised by 
ordinary citizens as well as experienced activists and well-known cultural 
figures.   
 
The protest in front of the Prime Minister’s official residence, or the Kanteimae 
protest, has been held every Friday night since March 2012. It is organised by 
the Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes (MCAN), whose members identify 
themselves as an umbrella network of the anti-nuclear groups and activists in 
Tokyo. Most of its member groups were established after the Fukushima 
disaster by people from various backgrounds, such as office workers, the 
self-employed, mothers and artists, aged mainly in their 20s, 30s and 40s.  
 
Only 300 people gathered at the first Kanteimae protest action, and their 
number remained at around 1,000 protesters during April and May 2012. 
Meanwhile, all Japanese nuclear plants were temporarily switched off in May 
2012 in order for inspections to be carried out. Despite the fifty-four nuclear 
reactors which had already been built out of economic necessity, Japan spent 
over a month as a ‘nuclear-free society’ until the end of June 2012, when the 
government decided to re-activate the Ohi nuclear plants in west Japan, 
forecasting a potential electricity shortage during summer. 
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People were enraged by the government’s decision, criticising the inadequate 
investigation of the cause of the Fukushima disaster and fearing the 
vulnerability of the Ohi nuclear plants to potential earthquakes. More than 
100,000 people besieged the protest space at its peak in the summer of 2012. 
It also attracted significant attention from politicians. Several MPs gave 
speeches there, and even then the Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda held a 
meeting with the organiser MCAN.  
  
Nevertheless, the snap general election held in December 2012 became the 
turning point of the anti-nuclear movement. Despite the huge upsurge in the 
movement in the summer of 2012, the Japanese people favoured the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), the ‘old regime’ that had long been promoting 
nuclear plants. 13 This result contradicted statistics persistently indicating that 
approximately 70% of Japanese people want a nuclear-free society sometime 
in the future. In addition, the voter turnout at this general election was the 
lowest in post-war Japanese democratic society.14 This indicates that the 
post-Fukushima activism did not have a significant impact on the overall 
atmosphere of ‘apolitical’ Japanese society.  
 
On the other hand, the weekly Kanteimae protest still continues in September 
                                                   
13 The LDP had been ruling Japanese politics since its formation in 1955 (except for a 
brief period of coalition government). In 2009, Democratic Party Japan (DPJ) achieved a 
historic regime change, and the Fukushima disaster occurred under this DPJ 
government. The result of the Lower House election in December 2012 ended the 
three-year reign of DPJ government.  
14 The voter turnout for the Lower House election in 2012 was 59.32%. It dropped further 
in the 2014 election to 52.66% (Nikkei, 2014). 
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2015, although the mobilisation has become much smaller. The pressure of 
the anti-nuclear movement makes it harder for the government to re-start the 
nuclear plants having shut them down for inspections. Two of the Ohi nuclear 
reactors had been in operation since July 2012; however, they were shut 
down again for inspection in September 2013, and Japan experienced a 
nuclear-free period of almost two years until August 2015.  
 
In addition, the MCAN’s Kanteimae protest encouraged Japanese activism in 
general. Many anti-nuclear protesters have joined the protest actions against 
poverty, racism and governmental policies since 2012. In particular, due to the 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s apparent militarist diplomacy seeking to 
re-interpret the pacifist Constitution and lift the ban on collective self-defence, 
the space in front of the PM’s office was once again occupied by tens of 
thousands of protesters shouting ‘No wars’. In between July and September 
2015, the atmosphere there has become similar to the Kanteimae anti-nuclear 
protest in the summer in 2012.     
 
5.1.2 The reputation of the post-Fukushima social movements 
As was argued in chapter two, civil activism in Japan had been stagnant since 
the so-called failure of the student movements in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Thereafter, its prosperous economy successfully established the legitimacy of 
the dominant system and norms, and the majority of citizens remained distant 
from political action.  
 
However, in post-disaster Japanese society, the silent nation appears to have 
regained its political voice. Several researchers have articulated the novelty of 
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the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement in its leaderless nature, its loose 
connection of people with diverse identities, and its mobilisation through 
social media (Gonoi, 2012; Oguma, 2013). The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movements are described as the emergence of a new form of democracy 
along the lines of worldwide social movements in 2011: The Arab Spring, the 
M15 movements in Spain and the “Occupy” movements (Gonoi, 2012; 
Oguma, 2013). The TV media reported that the movement successfully 
appealed to ordinary people who did not identify themselves as 'political’.  
 
On the other hand, the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements have also 
received some criticisms. The sociologist Hiroshi Kainuma (2012) comments 
that the anti-nuclear movements in Tokyo ignore the fact that the nuclear 
industry is deeply embedded in the local economy in Fukushima, as it has 
been providing employment opportunities for people in a depopulated area. 
According to Kainuma, the social movement in Tokyo has adopted a simple 
narrative such as “nuclear energy is bad” in order to “invent a hope and to get 
a catharsis” (2012, pp.109-110). The protesters were merely “consuming” 
catharsis; thus, he believes that the movement will soon be forgotten.  
 
The political scientist Kazuto Suzuki (2012) casts doubt on the legitimacy of 
Tokyo people’s right to oppose the restarting of the Ohi nuclear reactors, as 
the Ohi plant provides electricity outside the Tokyo area. In his view, they are 
outsiders with no right to intervene in its decision-making process.  
 
Criticisms have also come from inside the movement. The activist Seiji 
Uematsu (2012) insists that the anti-nuclear movements should have two 
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aims: to close all nuclear plants and to care for the victims of the Fukushima 
accident. He considers that many anti-nuclear protesters in Tokyo are failing 
to focus on the people in Fukushima (Uematsu, 2012).  
 
Some people even dismiss these social movements as apolitical. With his 
observation research on the anti-nuclear movements in 2011, the sociologist 
Noritoshi Furuichi (2011) expresses his impression that the movement is 
working as a convenient outlet for these participants’ everyday dissatisfaction. 
It only satisfies the protesters themselves, who derive excitement from the 
protest event. Hence, he implies that the anti-nuclear movement serves to 
stabilise the dominant system rather than change society (Furuichi, 2011). 
This claim is not new. It has been made repeatedly with regard to 
carnivalesque movements (Grindon, 2004; Bogad, 2005), questioning 
whether these movements are challenging the social order or merely serving 
as a safety valve, as “a licensed affair in every sense, a permissible rupture of 
hegemony” (Eagleton, 1981, p.148, cited in Grindon, 2004). 
 
Tomohiro Akagi, who announced that his hope for social change was ‘war’, 
also commented negatively on the street protests taking place in Ohi town, 
when the government decided to restart the Ohi nuclear reactors. In Akagi’s 
eyes, this action was initiated by the outsiders who “wield” the discourses of 
justice, but in truth they “are doing nothing but enjoying for themselves” 
(2012a). Although he actually joined the Kanteimae protest once, he has 
remained critical of it and comments that the protesters were “legitimating 
themselves” by endlessly repeating slogans with many people (Akagi, 2012b). 
He claims that the protesters “have no consideration for people who would 
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suffer when the nuclear reactors stopped” (Akagi, 2012b). 
 
These criticisms share the same assumptions: the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear protesters are using the catastrophe for their own purpose, be it 
releasing their stress, experiencing some excitement or undergoing catharsis. 
These polemics believe that the protesters are merely exploiting the tragic 
narrative of the nuclear accident from their safe territory, which is safely 
protected from the precariousness of life. Thus, for these polemics, the 
“endless everyday life” (Miyadai, 1998; See 2.3.1) has not ended even after 
this disaster. Miyadai (2014, p.46) concludes that the value that emerged after 
the disaster is just another ‘mood’.  
 
The writer Yo Henmi (2012) considers the catastrophic event of the 
earthquake, tsunami and the Fukushima disaster to have been a significant 
deconstructor of meaning for many Japanese people. No language can 
describe the event since the destruction was so huge. However, Henmi 
(2012) discovered that many Japanese people were desperately trying to fill 
the void with pre-constructed simple narratives supplied by the mass media 
and the government, such as ‘stay strong against the tragedy’ and ‘encourage 
the people in Tohoku area’. For him, the catastrophic event of 3/11 has 
changed nothing. People are still the passive consumers of pre-made and 
worn-out narratives made in the dominant system.  
 
Considering the results of general elections, Henmi’s views seem very much 
to the point. For most Japanese people, the “endless everyday life” probably 
continues even after the disaster. Hence, what of the post-Fukushima 
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anti-nuclear movement? Does this movement signify a change, or is it part of 
“endless everyday life”? Are the protesters trying to change society, or are 
they exploiting tragedy, which only endorses the logic of the dominant 
system? These are controversial questions among scholars; therefore, my 
fieldwork research starts by examining the motivation of the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear protesters.   
 
5.2 Motivation and discourses of the anti-nuclear protest 
5.2.1 Motivation for the protest 
The initial motivational factors of the post-Fukushima protesters were the 
main concern of my first fieldwork which was conducted between March and 
May 2012. This was a rather slack period between the first huge mobilisation 
by Shiroto no Ran in 2011 and the second outburst caused by MCAN’s 
Kanteimae protests after June 2012.  
 
Due to the nature of this period, most of my interviewees identified 
themselves as fairly active protesters who joined/supported actions many 
times after the disaster. They said that what initially motivated them was anger 
with the government and TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company), which 
kept failing to provide sufficient information about the disaster. In their eyes, 
the government and the company appeared to be intentionally hiding the 
seriousness of this accident. The fact that the radioactive contamination 
actually reached the Tokyo area increased people’s fear and anxiety. This 
emotional turmoil prompted some people to take action, as one Kanteimae 
protester describes: “I went out to the street because I did not know what else 
to do” (Interviewee 1).  
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However, those were not the only emotions they expressed. There was 
another reason for the protesters in Tokyo to be seriously concerned about 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster, which occurred more than 200km away. The 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, built in the rural depopulated area of north 
east Japan, was generating energy for the Tokyo area. This awakened their 
sense of regret. 
 
We had depended on these nuclear plants during the era of economic 
growth, and never questioned the risk until this disaster happened. 
That regret brought me here (Interviewee 2). 
 
Among the older generation, some showed regret for their oblivion, saying 
that they had been anti-nuclear protesters “after the Chernobyl accident” but 
had failed to maintain their support for the movement (Interviewee 3; 
Interviewee 4). Yet, this feeling is also shared by younger generation. A 
protester in her 20s commented: 
 
I realised that unless we take some action, nothing will change. Now I 
have a sense of emergency because I found that the accident 
happened during our reluctance to act (Interviewee 5). 
 
Hamanishi (2012) points out that, in Japanese society, the tendency has been 
to perceive society as stable and absolute (system/domination perspective), 
in which the citizens become a powerless entity with the ability only to 
maintain it. People were not to question the system or authoritarian figures. 
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However, the Fukushima disaster questioned their long-held 
“system/domination” perspective and provided an opportunity to take the 
“actor perspective” (Hamanishi, 2012). Here, a society is considered the 
outcome of the actors interacting with one another.  
 
As Hamanishi (2012) analyses, most Japanese people probably did not 
consider themselves political agents before the disaster. In particular, an issue 
such as nuclear energy requires highly technical knowledge and tends to be 
considered the realm of experts. However, the Fukushima disaster reminded 
people that they are part of the on-going construction of society, and they 
cannot, or should not, disconnect their private lives from its process. They 
found that their non-commitment was actually the commitment to give silent 
approval for their earthquake-prone country having more than fifty nuclear 
reactors. Hence, the demonstration organiser, Nao Izumori, even expresses a 
sense of guilt. 
 
My immediate reaction was anger against all the lies [which the 
government and TEPCO told them]. But it may be senseless. Rather, 
I feel sorry for children. We have no way of mending it. I am also to be 
blamed. I am [as sinful as] TEPCO and the government (Izumori, 
Interview, 5 April 2012). 
 
Now the protesters felt that they needed to actively engage in its construction 
of society with their own knowledge. Another demonstration organiser, Yumi 
Nakamura, states that from her experience of the Fukushima disaster and the 
anti-nuclear movement, she learned that “we cannot be the customer of 
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society” (Interview, 15 March 2012).  
 
5.2.2 The political language of emotion 
The first upsurge of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement was triggered 
by the anarchist collective ‘Shiroto no Ran’. They are loosely connected 
young people in their 30s, who run recycle shops, bars and community 
spaces in the Koenji area. They had been organising humorous 
demonstrations and small street parties since the 2000s (See 2.4.4).   
 
Its spokesperson Hajime Matsumoto explains in his interview (6 April 2012) 
that what motivated him to organise the anti-nuclear demonstration was the 
“overwhelming mood of self-restraint after the disaster.” The mass media 
were dominated by prayers for the victims of the disaster, and Matsumoto felt 
uncomfortable in an atmosphere in which nobody could talk openly about how 
critical the nuclear accident in Fukushima had been. “I thought that I must 
destroy that,” Matsumoto says;  
 
Many Japanese people are too patient. It leads them either to a huge 
explosion after a long silence, or to do sneaky things behind people’s 
back. A society becomes unhealthy unless we accustom ourselves to 
speak out when we feel frustration. [...] Although election is one way 
of participating in politics, it doesn’t take place so often. We need to 
express anger or pleasure as soon as something happens 
(Matsumoto, Interview, 6 April 2012). 
 
The language used by Shiroto no Ran for their anti-nuclear demonstration 
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was in fact as simple as “(nuclear energy is) dangerous and dreadful.” Several 
protesters who joined this demonstration later recalled that this action 
encouraged ordinary people to raise their voices. For Kaori Nawa, this was 
her first experience of joining demonstrations, which eventually led her to 
organise demonstrations in her local community as a member of Nuclear Free 
Suginami (NFS). She explains that, before joining Shiroto no Ran’s action, 
“everyone was thinking that ‘my little voice does not change anything’ or 
worried that ‘our message won’t be accepted by society.” However, when she 
saw the crowd of 15,000 people gathered for the event, she felt encouraged, 
because she knew “such a huge amount of people share the same feeling 
with me” (Nawa, Interview, 25 March 2012).  
 
Shiroto no Ran articulated a new political language for ordinary people. It is a 
language based on emotion, which enables them to express instantaneous 
reactions to what is happening now. The Kanteimae protest, which triggered 
the second upsurge of the anti-nuclear movements in 2012, also provided a 
space for expressing emotions. In March 2012, just before the start of the 
Kanteimae protest, one member of its organising body MCAN, Taichi Hirano, 
explained how they would expand the movement: 
 
Many people still avoid talking about the nuclear energy issue with 
their family, friends and colleagues. We are fragmented. I hope that, 
by sharing our feelings, each individual will be more active and the 
movement will be sustainable […]. We need to create the atmosphere 
to express our opinion freely (Hirano, Interview, 25 March 2012). 
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In fact, the role of emotions in politics has been reconsidered in recent years. 
In particular, collective actions do not always entail a rational interest, clear 
target and cognitive action plan. Analysing the American direct action group 
ACT-UP, which is tackling the HIV/AIDS epidemic, Deborah Gould (2004) 
argues that it successfully channelled people’s normative grievance into 
radical anger towards the government. According to her, an individual’s 
primitive impulse cannot be ‘felt’ until it is named, amplified and legitimatised. 
ACT-UP breached the ‘emotional norm’ which demarcates what is an 
‘appropriate’ feeling to be expressed, and articulated anger as radical political 
language (Gould, 2004, pp.170-171). 
 
Nevertheless, this new political language of emotions was partly the reason 
why several Japanese intellectuals have hesitated to support the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements. While the distinguished philosopher 
Kojin Karatani joined Shiroto no Ran’s demonstration and celebrated “a 
society with demonstrations,” the sociologist Kainuma acknowledges that 
there are also racist demonstrations in Japanese society, and asks “is a 
society that has social movements really that good?” (Kainuma, 2012, p.114). 
The critic Hiroki Azuma also comments that the emotional politics of the 
Kanteimae protest are nothing but “leftist populism” which “generates nothing” 
(Twitter, @hazuma, 14 July 2013). 
 
Some emotions in particular are seen as problematic. The fear of radioactive 
contamination was often criticised as irrational and anti-scientific. Government 
officials claim that the extreme fear of radiation will invite inappropriate 
behaviour, such as refraining from buying Fukushima foods, which have 
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proved to be harmless, and creating fuhyo-higai, the economic damage 
caused by rumours.  
 
Sometimes this discourse of fuhyo-higai is also used to describe 
psychological damage — expressing anxiety that Fukushima may be 
seriously contaminated would be inappropriate, because it could hurt the 
feelings of people living there. Such criticism of the expression of extreme fear 
comes from inside the anti-nuclear movement as well as outside. There were 
often arguments between protesters concerning whether the movement 
should exclude those who express extreme fear, in order to render the 
movement more sophisticated.  
 
Does this mean that anger may be appropriate for politics, but not fear? Are 
some emotions appropriate and others not? At what point does the citizen’s 
emotional rejection of the dominant narrative by the government and 
scientists become a reasonable counter-discourse rather than an irrational 
reaction? It would appear to be difficult to draw such a line. 
 
For some, the protesters' demand for the closure of all nuclear plants already 
sounds irrational. The economist Nobuo Ikeda (2012) denounces the 
protesters’ anti-nuclear demand as “foolish” as it merely ends up damaging 
the domestic economy and making Japan “poorer.” Intellectuals often insist 
that saying ‘No’ without proposing an alternative is irrational. However, what 
the protesters regret is precisely the fact they did not say ‘No’ to nuclear 
energy because they are not experts and are thus unable to suggest an 
alternative.  
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Ulrich Beck (1992) points out that the citizen’s criticism of modern scientific 
technology does not signify his/her ignorance. Rather, it indicates the inability 
of modern science to provide clear answers to the problems we face in 
post-industrial society. The impact brought by modern scientific technology is 
so huge and complex that rational calculation cannot guarantee complete 
prediction. Although “scientific rationality” still provides probability, it needs to 
be evaluated by the values of each society, which Beck (1992, p.30) calls 
“social rationality” in deciding how much risk they will accept. The Fukushima 
disaster revealed the limited ability of “scientific rationality” to provide a certain 
guideline for life in a complex society. The emotional language of the citizens 
seems to provide a different perspective on political decision-making in such a 
condition. 
 
5.2.3 New grammars of action 
John Holloway acknowledges that saying “No” is a positive and creative 
behaviour, since rejecting someone’s decision carries “a drive towards 
self-determination” (Holloway, 2010a, p.218). It does not offer a single “Yes” to 
be replaced with what was rejected. However, what lies ahead is “many 
Yeses.” Holloway (2010a) claims that there are many possibilities which are 
yet to be known, and we can advance only by asking. The alternative is 
generated through our action, and saying “No” is the first step for its 
engagement, which shows our acceptance of responsibility for creating 
alternatives.  
 
Political action motivated by personal emotion may not necessarily be 
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irresponsible and short-lived. Goodwin et al. (2001) point out that some 
emotions such as love and compassion, which are often based on human 
relationships, are long-lasting while anger and surprise, which mainly stem 
from events or information, may be reactive and short-term. This seems to 
suggest that interactions with other people ensure a foothold for what might 
otherwise appear to be superficial emotion.  
 
In the case of the Fukushima disaster, the initial emotions generated by the 
event seem to have been personal anger or fear. However, through the 
physical experiences of mobilisation, they were eventually coupled with other 
feelings such as regret at non-commitment or concern for other people, which 
might have become more sustainable political resources. One Kanteimae 
protester explains that, while he often forgets about the nuclear accident in 
everyday life, the protest space provides him with an opportunity to listen to 
the people from Fukushima. He describes how their voices “permeate” his 
heart, reminding him of “the pain of those who suffer the accident” (Speech by 
a male Kanteimae protester, 9 May 2014) 
 
It may be this embodied experience that generates sustainable emotional 
engagement. As McDonald (2006) notes, we cannot make a strict distinction 
between emotion and reason, or between body and cognition. As was argued 
in chapter three, McDonald (2006) insists that embodied actions shape 
cognitive thought. This indicates new political thought and practices, which 
are not entirely based on a cognitive plan.  
 
These arguments remind us of the importance of a physical space. Although 
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the recent social movements, such as the Arab Spring and the Occupy 
movements, are often studied for their effective usage of social media, their 
implications for political thought lie in their creation of the physical space for 
encounter, interaction and learning (Hardt and Negri, 2012). In the case of the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements, although Twitter played an 
important role in circulating information about protest actions, the activists 
seemed to feel that it had a limited appeal to people outside the protesters’ 
circles (Noma, 2012; Misao Redwolf, 2013). Oguma (2013) concludes that the 
social media are more of a tool for strengthening an already established 
network. 
 
While the Occupy movements and the Arab Spring maintained the public 
space in which people actually stayed and lived for weeks or months, what 
the Kanteimae protest provides is the two hours of open space every Friday 
night. Its action mostly consists of people repeating simple slogans and giving 
short speeches, and there is little opportunity for dialogue between the 
participants. Nevertheless, many protesters in my second interview explained 
that, through their participation, their interests were broadened into related 
problems, such as social inequality in the neoliberal economy. The space of 
the Kanteimae protest provides an opportunity for expanding knowledge and 
gaining motivation for further actions. These grammars of embodied action 
(McDonald, 2006) may explain why this new activism based on emotions is 
persistent and disseminative. 
 
5.2.4 New form of collective subjectivity 
The emotions expressed by the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters are 
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quite complex, and they also indicate their complex identity. Many protesters 
expressed their anger towards the government and TEPCO, which did not 
provide sufficient information about the accident. They felt that their lives had 
been neglected, and they felt betrayed by those whom they had trusted: 
 
I have listened to what my parents said, my teachers said and lived a 
decent life, but what was that for? Now you have to think with your 
own brain. People might still think that the government will protect us, 
but actually they don’t (Interviewee 6). 
 
This identification of themselves as victims of untrustworthy institutions 
became the source of strong anger and the motivation for political 
commitment. At the same time, however, the protesters also showed a sense 
of regret at being accomplices in the disaster. They felt that their indifference 
to politics had allowed their country to build many such nuclear reactors. They 
also found that their everyday lives in Tokyo had been founded on the risk to 
Fukushima people, who had accepted the nuclear plants.  
 
The protester in the local anti-nuclear group Datsu Genpatsu Suginami 
(Nuclear Free Suginami, NFS), Mizuki Nakamura, considers that the 
Fukushima disaster revealed a “hidden structure” in which “the local areas are 
sacrificed” (Interview, 13 January 2013). Similarly, a young Kanteimae 
protester comments: 
 
The disaster revealed that Japan has messed up. I have been 
thinking that this is a peaceful country, but it was not. It was like (the 
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film) ‘The Matrix’. I found out that the world is a fiction and I have 
believed the fake peace (Interviewee 7). 
 
Their lives had been proceeding in a fake peace based on the hidden 
exploitive structure. This structure was probably not clear before the disaster 
because of the entangled social relations in contemporary society. The 
relation between political minority and majority is not as clear as it used to be. 
It seems that many people could not find their political identity to raise their 
voices; however, the Fukushima disaster has changed this context. The NFS 
member Kaori Nawa signifies the emergence of a new political identity in 
post-disaster Japanese society. 
 
Traditional leftist movements focused on minority issues, such as 
claiming the right of ethnic minorities or Buraku people (descendants 
of a feudal outcast group), but I felt awkward for joining these 
movements. Although I was not quite rich, my life was blessed. My 
sympathy for minority people somehow sounded hypocritical. 
However this nuclear disaster seems to change a ratio of this majority 
– minority relations. The incident disclosed that we actually are the 
“99%” who are left out, just as the Occupy movements insist. I 
realised that we can raise our voice as the 99%, regardless of who we 
are (Nawa, Interview, 25 March 2012). 
 
Nawa’s identification of herself as part of a minority is insightful. Deleuze and 
Guattari (1988) explain the concept of majority and minority with its distance 
from the hegemonic power, rather than its size or attribution of a particular 
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identity group. In this concept, the protesters were a “minority,” whose lives 
had been exposed to fragility and uncertainty. This “minority as the 99%” is 
not based on a pre-existing solid form of identity. Hence, it may be close to 
what Castells (1997, p.8) describes as “project identity.”  
 
As was examined in Chapter three, Castells (1997) distinguishes this new 
form of identity from what he calls “resistant identity,” which aims at 
subversion based on a fixed identity. Although this “resistant identity” had 
played an important role in the political struggles of those with subjugated 
identities, the entangled relationships in contemporary society cannot always 
allow us to have such a clear collective identity to form a resistance. People 
are fragmented with different interests and, like the people in Tokyo and 
Fukushima, they are unconsciously trapped in exploitive power relationships, 
regardless of the fact that most of them belong to “the 99%” of people whose 
lives are precarious.  
 
Castells’ “project identity” (1997, p.8) is a new building of collective identity, 
which is not based on pre-existing attribution. The post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear protesters found that now their lives have become precarious. 
They have unwittingly become accomplices to what threatens their own lives 
and those of others. In this condition, what motivates them is their desire for 
change or the emotion to say ‘No’ to the system in which they live now. The 
Fukushima disaster was the experience of “deterritorialisation” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1988). They found that what they had believed to be a stable and fair 
system was unstable and unjust. Instead of going back to the fabricated 
stability, they decided to seek an alternative.  
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5.3 Political practices in the post-Fukushima activism 
5.3.1 Democratisation movement: the Kanteimae protest 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements include different types of 
actions; the demonstrations and rallies are organised by trade unionists, 
well-known cultural figures and ordinary citizens. There are also many study 
groups and film events nationwide. However, my particular focus is on the 
citizens who started questioning their method of political commitment and way 
of living through the experience of disaster.  
 
The Kanteimae protest is the biggest post-Fukushima anti-nuclear street 
action, which has mobilised many ‘non-political’ citizens. It has been held 
every Friday between 6pm and 8pm since March 2012 by an organiser called 
MCAN. They state the objective of their action very clearly: to pressurise the 
government by visualising the voices of as many people as possible (Noma, 
2012; Misao Redwolf, 2013). Hence, it has applied the least burdensome form 
of protest, i.e. standing and chanting together. Simply ‘being there’ matters a 
lot. Protesters form a long queue on the pavement stretching back from the 
Prime Minister’s official residence (kantei) or gather around the National Diet 
nearby, repeating a simple slogan such as ‘No to Nuclear energy’ or ‘No to 
restart (the reactors)’, while volunteers give short speeches in-between. 
 
The Kanteimae protest is known as a ‘well-mannered’ protest which rarely 
produces violent confrontations with the police. Maintaining a peaceful space 
is their priority in order that ordinary people might find it easy to join (Misao 
Redwolf, 2013). It is designed as the antithesis of the Japanese student 
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movements of the 1960s and 1970s, whose ideological orientations caused 
violent infighting between sects. The Kanteimae protest has overturned this 
infamous image of activism by rejecting the discourse of ideological, violent 
and anti-hegemonic revolution of the 1960s and replacing it with that of 
non-ideological, non-violent and normative reform. MCAN addresses its 
protest as a ‘single issue’ anti-nuclear action.  
 
My first interview with MCAN members took place on 25 March 2012. 
Although MCAN had not yet started the Kanteimae protest, it had just 
co-organised a demonstration on the first anniversary of the 3/11 disaster, 
together with a traditional activist group. During the interview, the MCAN 
members explained the discrepancy between their stance in activism and that 
of the traditional activists. In particular, they felt that these traditional activists 
“over-react” against the police. 
 
It seems that they have two enemies – the nuclear proponents and 
the police who represent the hegemony. But we think there is no use 
in fighting against the police. We want to expand our movement safely 
without any arrests, and their way does not fit with our aim (Misao 
Redwolf, Interview, 25 March 2012). 
 
Another MCAN member, Yasumichi Noma (2012), also insists that MCAN 
does not recognise the police as the hegemony against which to fight. The 
strategy of the Kanteimae protest is well articulated in MCAN’s reaction at the 
event on the 29th June 2012, when the mobilisation reached its peak. The 
unexpected size of the crowd eventually overflowed from the pavement and 
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occupied the entire street. Suddenly, what appeared was a liberated open 
space in which the organiser MCAN saw the beginning of chaos. It called off 
the protest before the scheduled end and persuaded the protesters to 
withdraw.  
 
For MCAN, the success of the movement rests on the continuous 
visualisation of people’s anger. They strategically choose conformity to some 
extent, as it best appeals to ordinary people who tend to equate activism with 
violence. It also precludes the police from prohibiting their action on the street 
(Noma, 2012). Most participants have eventually internalised MCAN’s policy, 
which has allowed the action to continue for more than three years. 
 
The Kanteimae protest successfully attracted ordinary people with these 
‘normative’ and ‘reformist’ frames. Its expansion shows how the ordinary 
citizen has come to feel empowered through mobilisation. The Kanteimae 
protest started with only 300 people. The independent journalists and the 
participants themselves kept publicising their actions online, eventually 
catching the attention of the major media. Finally the TV reports triggered a 
huge mobilisation. One MCAN member commented that she now believes 
that the ordinary people can make their action meaningful (Interviewee 8).  
  
Anti-nuclear movements are primarily categorised as what Melucci (1996, 
pp.34-5) would call a “claimant movement.” In such a movement, people 
make demands based on a pre-formed identity and try to realise them through 
the existing political system. The Kanteimae protest surely has this aspect. As 
MCAN claims, it is a single-issue action to pressurise the government to 
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abandon nuclear power.  
 
However, it also has an aspect of what Melucci (1996, p.35) calls a “political 
movement,” which changes the manner of people’s political participation. The 
Kanteimae protest brought politics into the sphere of everyday life. The newly 
mobilised protesters have become accustomed to raising their voices when 
representative politics become dysfunctional.  
 
The MCAN members consider the Kanteimae protest a ‘democratisation’ 
movement. It sends the voices of ordinary people into the ‘windless’ formal 
political arena and creates discord. At the very early stage of the Kanteimae 
protest, Misao Redwolf had already remarked: 
 
I would like to make a new standard of political participation. […] It is 
time to throw away the democracy as the dead-letter. Democracy 
should not be something given to us, but we need to seize by 
ourselves (Misao Redwolf, Interview, 27 April 2012). 
 
There is no doubt that this action encouraged Japanese activism as a whole. 
The MCAN-style action, which utilises people’s anger to counter the 
overwhelming power, has become popular in the later social movements. 
While the Kanteimae protest and the anti-nuclear movements in general have 
become smaller and are now largely maintained by elderly people, these 
newly emerged movements are supported and organised by the younger 
generation, including university students and teenagers. 
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For example, many anti-nuclear protesters have joined anti-racist actions 
since 2013. These actions aim to physically disturb the racist group 
Zaitokukai,15 whose members march in the streets making abusive hate 
speeches against Korean people. This opposition was initiated by several 
core anti-nuclear organisers such as Yasumichi Noma, and it gained support 
from teenagers who love Korean culture. By the nature of their aims, these 
counter-racist actions are more confrontational than the ‘polite’ Kanteimae 
protest. However, they share the same political attitude of visualising simple 
anger against hegemonic power: in this case, against the racists who 
proclaim majoritarian power based on their nationality.  
 
In the formal political arena, the centre-right Liberal Democratic Party won 
both the Lower and Upper House elections in December 2012 and July 2013. 
The LDP government is actively reforming the Japanese post-war regime by 
introducing the state secrets protection law and trying to lift the ban on 
collective self-defence which has been prohibited by the pacifist Constitution 
of Japan. Against this right turn, the anti-nuclear protesters and 
counter-racism activists quickly developed anti-government views and started 
organising demonstrations as a newly formed group, Tokyo Democracy Crew 
(TDC). In addition, university students formed a group called SEALDs 
(Students Emergent Action for Liberal Democracy) are actively organising 
direct actions against the government in 2015.  
 
                                                   
15 Its full name is Zainichi Tokken wo Yurusanai Shimin no Kai, which means ‘Association 
of Citizens against the Privileges for Koreans in Japan’. Their objective is to eliminate the 
'unfair privileges' which they believe that Korean people in Japan enjoy.  
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5.3.2 Criticism of the Kanteimae protest 
As was seen, the Kanteimae protest brought a sense of agency to 
‘non-political’ Japanese citizens, showing them that their voices have power. 
However, when the anti-nuclear movement created a groundswell in the 
summer of 2012, the movement was criticised on the grounds that it was 
proclaiming a new authority and suppressing minor voices. When one 
anti-nuclear author declared at the gathering that the slogan ‘No nuclear 
energy’ had become the “nation’s voice,” one conservative newspaper 
published a critical column:  
 
A minor voice to support nuclear energy is denounced as 
un-Japanese. If such a day comes, it is more terrifying than radiation 
(Sankei Shimbun Newspaper, 2012).  
 
In particular, since the Kanteimae protest aims at making the public 
anti-nuclear sentiment into a dominant opinion in order to pressurise the 
government, its hegemonic orientation was also problematised from inside 
the movement. In fact, establishing an effective frame in the movement 
means constructing a new dominant norm, and it could end up by denying 
diversity inside the movement. Hence, in my interview, the activist Seiji 
Uematsu warns: 
 
Misao (Redwolf, of MCAN) shouts her slogan in front of the Prime 
Minister’s office. She tries to represent herself as a strong subject […]. 
MCAN still has the language of the old movements and power-based 
culture. They consider politics as power-versus-power. Why can we 
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not express ourselves as the weak who yet never give up being 
ethical? (Uematsu, Interview, 3 January 2013) 
 
Uematsu insists that social movements without a totalising ideology should 
avoid a hegemonic nature. To him, such non-ideological movements 
inevitably require people “to wander, waver and become entangled” (Uematsu, 
personal email to the author, 8 January 2013). 
 
One participant in the Kanteimae protest also expresses her disappointment 
at MCAN’s controlling tendency. She was joining the protest when the 
mobilisation reached its peak in June 2012 and MCAN called off the action:  
 
I felt it strange that they [MCAN] told me to go back. I wanted them to 
respect our choice. I wanted them to ask us what we wanted to do, 
because we are proud of ourselves acting on our will (Interviewee 1). 
 
The activist Kengo Matsunaga finds that the Kanteimae protest lacks the 
space for dialogue. Although the participants are able to give speeches, they 
are restricted to a few minutes and mostly end up by presenting their own 
opinions. 
 
Now the anti-nuclear protesters just insist on their claim and they are 
not interested in other voices. The nuclear proponents just pursue 
their own interest and do not listen to other voices. They are not at the 
same table. This situation does not solve anything (Matsunaga, 
interview, 4 December 2012). 
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That is why Matsunaga started to organise a gathering after the Kanteimae 
protest, which he called a ‘general assembly’ after the Occupy movements. 
Matsunaga was inspired by this movement in 2011 and the idea of the 99%. 
He had already organised a demonstration to show solidarity with them. At the 
time of my interview in December 2012, his general assembly was a small 
meeting of between five to ten people. However, Matsunaga seemed unsure 
about whether this type of forum suits Japanese activism. 
 
I thought that it was too early to do the Occupy movements in Japan. 
Maybe it will not expand until we have more and more people 
unemployed. […] For me, this is like an experiment (Matsunaga, 
interview, 4 December 2012). 
 
As his somewhat pessimistic view indicates, his ‘assembly’ trial ended after 
about six months as no one showed up for the meeting. The attempt at 
dialogue costs time and effort. The reason why the Kanteimae protest has 
become so popular is probably because it is the easiest action to take. 
Although the Kanteimae protest removed barriers to political participation, the 
adherence to normative and easy political action may have a binding effect. 
 
These criticisms of MCAN and the Kanteimae protest, such as its hegemonic 
orientation, controlling tendency and lack of diversity, are all important and 
very much to the point. However, the critical role of this action in the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements should never be dismissed. The 
Kanteimae protest introduced and legitimised emotions as new political 
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language to counter the dysfunctional representative politics. MCAN’s effort to 
frame its action as non-violent, normative action changed the old image of 
activism and brought political action into people’s everyday lives. 
 
In addition, it should be noted that the organiser MCAN does not completely 
control the space. When the Kanteimae protest started, it consisted only of 
simple chanting and short speeches. However, as the movement expanded, 
the participants brought diversity to this action. Now some play instruments 
and others sing. There is a cyclists’ protest around the area and a ‘guerrilla 
cafe’ provides refreshments for the protesters.  
 
More importantly, the normative and repetitive Kanteimae protest is one mode 
of action among many others in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements. 
The organiser MCAN itself is a mere network of different anti-nuclear groups 
and individuals, and they all have different attitudes to politics except the one 
basic claim of ‘No Nukes’.  
 
5.3.3 Broadening the political: Nuclear-Free Suginami 
It can be said that the Fukushima disaster gave people an opportunity to 
reconsider a way of political participation, and the Kanteimae protest is one 
response to that. However, it is not the only political reaction to have emerged 
from the disaster. The Fukushima disaster also forced people to reconsider 
their way of life, since they found that it was not only TEPCO and the 
government that supported nuclear energy. In the very narrative of their own 
lifestyles, the protesters found a blind approbation of economic growth and 
convenience that excused the existence of nuclear energy.  
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At the anti-nuclear rallies and marches in 2012, I often heard a song entitled 
‘human ERROR’, played by the Japanese rock band Frying Dutchman. It 
contains a strong message against nuclear power, and the protesters seemed 
to have been emotionally connected with this song. As well as criticising the 
state, electric companies and mass media, its lyrics also contain a critique of 
civilisation: 
 
You can buy a house, but you can't buy a home. 
Money buys you a watch, but it can't buy you time. 
You can buy a book, but you can't buy knowledge. 
You can buy a bed, but you can't buy sleep. 
Money pays the doctor, but it can't cure disease. 
Buying electricity destroys nature.16 
  
The Fukushima disaster was the moment when the protesters reconsidered 
how and for whom they use their money, how and with whom they spend their 
time, and what they value the most in their lives. This tendency is particularly 
apparent in the local community-based anti-nuclear group Datsu Genpatsu 
Suginami, or Nuclear-Free Suginami (NFS). NFS was founded in January 
2012 in the Suginami area of Tokyo, and the group joined the MCAN network 
later. Its members are a broad mixture of people such as local shopkeepers, 
office workers, entrepreneurs, local MPs, writers, translators, students and 
                                                   
16 Frying Dutchman (2011) “human ERROR”. The song was originally written in 
Japanese. English subtitles are taken from their YouTube video: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q5p283KZGa8 
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former student activists from the 1960s.  
 
Their first action was a local demonstration in February 2012; this was more 
like a carnival with a Karaoke machine and a mobile bar, whose 
characteristics were  adopted by the anarchist collective Shiroto no Ran, 
which has its base in the same Suginami area. In fact, both Hajime 
Matsumoto of Shiroto no Ran and the precariat activist Karin Amamiya joined 
this action. Throughout the year 2012, NFS organised several local 
demonstrations and community gatherings. To prepare these actions, they 
held general meetings which were open to everyone and also broadcasted 
live online. 
 
They describe their meetings as ‘chaotic’ as the participants frequently 
change their opinions after hearing the passionate voices of others. During 
my participation, I sometimes witnessed the entire plan being reversed by one 
participant’s remark. It was not logic but passion that persuaded people. In 
addition, they often proposed actions that sounded almost absurd. I thought it 
was a joke when they decided to seek TEPCO’s permission to let them use 
the TEPCO-owned sports ground to hold a local anti-nuclear event.  
 
NFS members identify themselves as Uzomuzo, meaning a swarm of people 
who are insignificant.17 This term was originally proposed at their meeting by 
the translator and peace activist Kayoko Ikeda, as a Japanese translation of 
the term “multitude.” Ikeda articulates the NFS protesters as the “multitude” in 
                                                   
17 The term Uzomuzo literally consists of four Chinese letters ‘U’ ‘ZO’ ‘MU’ ‘ZO’. ZO in 
this sense means figure, U means existence and MU means non-existence. 
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Hardt and Negri’s (2001, 2004) sense, because NFS is “formless” and “they 
never talk about maintaining their organisation” (Ikeda, Interview, 30 March 
2012). The Japanese term Uzomuzo is often used by the hegemonic power to 
look down on ‘useless’ people. The NFS protesters changed the meaning of 
this term into something creative rather than something devalued.  
 
Seeing NFS as Uzomuzo may explain what Hardt and Negri (2004, p.99) call 
the “plural singularities.” According to them; 
 
Singularities interact and communicate socially on the basis of the 
common, and their social communication in turn produces the 
common. The multitude is the subjectivity that emerges from this 
dynamic of singularity and commonality (Hardt and Negri, 2004, 
p.198). 
 
NFS members act together on the basis of what they share in common 
(desire for a nuclear-free society), but their identities remain different. Their 
demonstrations welcome all kind of people including right-wing activists. Nao 
Izumori, who played the role of the moderator at the NFS meeting, explains: 
 
Of course everyone can join us. [...] If someone with a Japanese 
national flag says that [he/she protests against nuclear power 
because] we should not spoil the land of the emperor, I will just 
respond ‘well, I don’t think so, but come in anyway’. Our 
demonstration is nothing but an empty vessel (Izumori, Interview, 5 
April 2012). 
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As a moderator at the meetings, Izumori comments that it is enjoyable for him 
to observe how the voices of the participants “create peculiar swells and 
eventually construct one decision” (Izumori, Interview, 5 April 2012). To him, a 
chaotic meeting attended by various people is a space to create swells; no 
one can predict its outcome.  
 
Unlike the Kanteimae protest, which aims to put pressure on the government, 
NFS considers its action a communication tool, to think together and to create 
a new way of living. For example, NFS invented an idea called Demo-wari, or 
‘demonstration discount’. They asked local bars and shops to support their 
actions by providing a discount for the protesters. Originally, the intention was 
to make their demonstrations more beneficial both for the protesters and for 
the local community, because local shops might attract the excited protesters 
after the demonstration. However, they discovered that this was also an 
attempt to regain control over their money. Directing the flow of money into 
their community rather than into large corporations might form part of the 
resistance to the dominant economic system. 
 
While MCAN limits its activities to effecting a change in representative politics, 
the target of NFS may be the power in everyday life that normalises a certain 
social relationship and a way of life. In this sense, it may be close to what 
Melucci (1996, p.35) calls an “antagonist movement” that questions the 
dominant system. In other words, their struggle forms the “exodus” from the 
state form and the current mode of production, which instead pursues 
democracy based on community experience (Virno, 2004a, 2006b).  
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The Suginami area represents the foundation of this community-based 
politics; the first nationwide anti-nuclear movement started from Suginami in 
the 1950s, initiated by mothers who stood against nuclear weapons testing 
(Oguma, 2013). On 2 June 2012, both old and new anti-nuclear activists 
gathered and adopted the “appeal of the residents for a nuclear-free society.” 
The activist Karin Amamiya and Shiroto no Ran’s Hajime Matsumoto joined 
this meeting, commenting that the appeal would show the government that 
“we are no longer obeying you.” 
 
5.3.4 Action as a ‘vessel’ 
It seems that MCAN and NFS have quite different tactics. Nevertheless, their 
fundamental worldviews are similar. Both sets of members believe that their 
actions work as a “vessel.” Inside the vessel is a variety of people with 
different identities and interests, but they all come together in one vessel for 
one purpose: to shut down all the nuclear reactors.  
 
The MCAN staffer Taichi Hirano notes that the Kanteimae protest is a vessel 
that belongs to no one. To him, “it is supposed to go out of the hand of the 
creator” and the role of the organiser is nothing more than the “occasional 
maintenance” to ensure that this vessel does not break (Hirano, Twitter@ 
fancy_karate, 25 June 2012). His remark indicates that no one can control the 
trajectory of the movement. It depends on the resonance between various 
people inside interacting with one another. Noma (2012) emphasises that 
MCAN is a practical maintainer of the protest space and its members never 
discuss their political ideologies.  
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The NFS members also call their action a vessel, albeit probably in a different 
sense. The NFS staffer Yumi Nakamura believes that their chaotic meetings 
work as a vessel where people “propose their plan, call for volunteers and 
create action together” (Y. Nakamura, interview, 15 March 2012). 
 
While MCAN’s vessel (the Kanteimae protest) unites the emotional language 
of the protesters in order to present it as a coherent political message, the 
voices in the vessel of NFS remain incoherent. Nao Izumori was the first 
person to use this term ‘vessel’ at their meeting, when they were preparing the 
next action after their first successful demonstration. This remark indicates 
that he could not identify what NFS really was and what it was capable of: 
 
This group is...well it’s not a group, is it? This is Uzomuzo’s... I’m not 
sure what this is. Anyway, I think it is a mere vessel. Can we have one 
unified will and engage in politics? Another group is already doing that. 
Then, what we can we do with this vessel, which is not a group, which 
does not have leaders? Well, let’s continue what we have been doing. 
Say whatever we want to say in the meeting, and make a decision 
after long discussions, because that is democracy in Suginami 
(Izumori, NFS meeting, 26 February 2012).18  
 
Perhaps this is the difference between a vessel for representation and a 
vessel for creation. In the NFS vessel, people celebrate different colours of 
                                                   
18 From the author’s indirect observation of NFS meeting online. Recording is available 
at: http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/20710353 (Accessed 9 October 2015) 
186 
 
individuals because this generates creative new patterns. On the other hand, 
in the Kanteimae protest individuals possess power precisely because they 
lose their colour. Anyone can join the vessel, as long as they abandon their 
colour in order to represent a strong united voice of the multitude.  
 
Yumi Nakamura is the core staffer of both NFS and MCAN, and she 
successfully distinguishes the nature of these two actions. According to her, 
MCAN is “a hard vessel” (personal communication, Twitter, 6 August 2012); 
inside are diverse and fluid people, but as a claimant/political movement, the 
expression of the vessel must be coherent and normative. Thus, it needs 
some kind of regulation. MCAN may not be the leader of the Kanteimae 
protest, but it must at least be a manager of this vessel to make it acceptable 
both to the formal political arena and to Japanese society.  
 
On the other hand, NFS-type action is what Nakamura considers a “soft 
vessel,” which is more open to diversity. Another NFS member emphasises 
that heterogeneity is the strength of NFS: 
 
The attempt of unification inevitably sets up taboos. In NFS, the 
participants freely propose what they want to do, and the person who 
proposes must engage in that project. It is like a building that is 
constantly expanded and extra parts added. Sometimes maintenance 
will be needed, though. [Interviewer: Who does the maintenance?] 
Everyone does (Interviewee 9). 
 
The NFS member and local politician Akira Harada even insists that they 
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need people who are “beyond their comprehension” (Harada, Interview, 10 
April 2012). The appeal for their first demonstration clearly states this 
tendency:  
 
Toward a nuclear-free society, we, the multitude in Suginami area, will 
keep raising our voice doggedly, and connect with anybody 
indiscriminately!19 
 
NFS is a formless vessel to which people add their colours. It corresponds to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “rhizome,” which they describe as the 
conjunction of “and…and…and…” (1988, p.25). The rhizomatic connections 
never converge at a single point. It always explores a new arrangement, while 
the arboreal form is heading toward the fixed meaning of “to be.” In fact, NFS 
meetings celebrate contingency, and they do not necessarily reach 
agreement. Rather than finding a consensus over what they should do 
together, each participant expresses their desire on what they want to do, and 
those who share this passion offer help. 
 
What they value is the energy and passion for the commitment. Izumori 
comments: “we need to say goodbye to the people with all talk and no action” 
(Interview, 5 April 2012). In their meeting, I noticed that two principles 
simultaneously coexist. The first is that the person who proposes the action 
must make a commitment to it. However, this seems to be supplemented by a 
hidden second principle that no one ever blames the person in charge even if 
the action fails. These two principles allow them to create many actions as 
                                                   
19 From NFS Website. Available at: http://www.mcri21.com/uzomuzo/calls/ 
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experiments.  
 
The formless nature of NFS made this ‘vessel’ almost invisible one year after 
its first demonstration. By the time of my second interview in late 2012, the 
members of NFS were acting independently rather than as NFS; some were 
helping the Kanteimae protest as staffers of MCAN, others had joined the 
alter-globalisation movement, and others were organising small gatherings at 
the local level. As Yumi Nakamura describes, “NFS is always changing, not 
staying at the same place” (Interview, 19 November 2012).  
 
For the NFS member Kaori Nawa, the actions in the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear movement are something like an “inn”: “people meet there, 
exchange information, and go different places” (Interview, 25 March 2012). 
This is reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) other concept, the 
plateaus. In the rhizomatic network of social movements, each action creates 
a temporary “swell,” from which something new emerges.  
 
5.4 Activism and representative politics 
5.4.1 The 2012 general election: Setback of the movements 
As was seen above, the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements attracted 
many Japanese people who used to be indifferent to politics, and their 
non-ideological commitment seems to create a new way of doing politics. 
However, the movement still remains within a limited circle. Even after the 
upsurge of the movement in the summer of 2012, one interviewee described 
how the outside of their circle was like “another planet” where people still 
believed the dominant narratives in which the protesters had already lost faith 
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(interviewee 10). Another protester expressed her disappointment at hearing 
her friends say that they were “too busy with their jobs, housekeeping and 
childrearing” and had “no time for thinking about politics” (Interviewee 11). 
 
The biggest setback for the anti-nuclear protesters was the Lower House 
general election in December 2012, in which the centrist government of the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was replaced by the pro-nuclear, 
centre-right Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has been ruling for most of 
the post-war period in Japan. The results of this election seemed to contradict 
a report claiming that almost 70% of the Japanese people hope for a 
nuclear-free society sometime in the future. 
 
The media analysis shows that people’s disappointment in the DPJ 
government produced a landslide victory for the LDP.20 This DPJ government 
ended the LDP’s half-century reign in 2009 with the support of the Japanese 
people, who hoped for political and economic reform. Nevertheless, the 
political reform promised by the DPJ to overcome the old-style bureaucratic 
decision-making eventually became bogged down, and many people found 
the DPJ’s facilitation for economic recovery to be poor (Yamada, 2012). 
 
The DPJ government did not satisfy the anti-nuclear protesters either. It was 
this DPJ government that decided to restart the Ohi nuclear reactors in the 
summer of 2012. However, to the protesters, the DPJ government seemed a 
                                                   
20 According to the opinion survey conducted by the Yomiuri newspaper and the Nippon 
TV (NTV, 2012), 55% of the respondents stated that the victory of LDP was due to 
‘disappointment’ with the DPJ party. 
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much better choice than the pro-nuclear LDP, because the former at least 
responded to the anti-nuclear movement by announcing a ‘new energy 
strategy’, which aims at achieving a nuclear-free society by 2040. 
 
After the election, many of the anti-nuclear protesters in my interviews 
analysed how the LDP’s landslide victory could have occurred in the 
overwhelming anti-nuclear atmosphere. The main argument focuses on three 
factors: the undemocratic electoral system, the strategic failure of the 
anti-nuclear side, and public indifference. 
 
First of all, criticisms of the electoral system were commonly heard. The 
Lower House general election combines the first-past-the-post voting system 
and the party-list proportional representation system. The protesters claimed 
that the former system amplified the LDP victory; the actual number of votes 
they achieved shows that the LDP did not receive overwhelming support. 21  
 
This is a common criticism of first-past-the-post voting in general. However, 
the problem with this system is the amplification of the majority’s vote. This 
does not explain why the majority’s desire for a nuclear-free society was not 
reflected in their voting behaviour in the first place. 
 
The second aspect identified by the protesters is the strategic failure to 
represent the anti-nuclear will. Although the ‘Japan Future Party’ (JFP) was 
                                                   
21 LDP obtained 227 out of 300 seats under the first-past-the-post voting system, which 
means that they won 79% of the total seats. However, the actual percentage of vote they 
achieved was 43%. Under the party-list proportional representation system, LDP was 
supported by only 27.62％of the voters (Kurebayashi, 2013).  
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newly established by anti-nuclear politicians to reflect public opinion against 
nuclear power, it had insufficient time to become publicly known and establish 
trust. This was a snap election and the anti-nuclear citizens were scarcely 
able to prepare for it. The newly-built JFP gave the impression of being a 
mere scratch party.  
 
The most fundamental reason, however, seemed to be that, for most 
Japanese people, abolishing nuclear plants was not the immediate issue. The 
political scientist Atsushi Sugita commented that it was “presentism” that 
encouraged people to vote for the LDP, which was prioritising the economic 
recovery (Sugita, Talk event, 22 December 2012).22 
 
Furthermore, the voter turnout in the Lower House election in December 2012 
was 59.32%, the lowest in history.23 This shows that many Japanese people 
are still indifferent to politics per se. Misao Redwolf summarises the general 
election of December 2012 that, “although the majority of Japanese people 
hope for a nuclear-free society, there are different layers of willingness” and 
the movement needs to channel the modest hopes of the general public into 
politics (Misao Redwolf, MCAN’s talk event, 6 January 2013). After this 
election, MCAN started distributing free leaflets to the general public to 
provide basic information about nuclear energy; i.e. whether it is cost-effective, 
whether any alternative energy sources are available, and so on. 
 
                                                   
22 The comment was made at the talk event ‘Shinseiken ni dou taijisuruka’ (How to tackle 
the new government?) on 22 December 2012, held in Tokyo. 
23 It dropped further to 52.66% in the 2014 lower house election. 
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The NFS staffer Mizuki Nakamura has expressed her shock at finding that 
many Japanese people had not changed after the disaster. They still maintain 
the same value system as they had before the disaster. She feels that “people 
still think that affluence is the happiness,” and “they just think that they are 
happy there and now” (M.Nakamura, Interview, 13 January 2013). Hence, she 
also emphasises the importance of local actions. 
 
Doing demonstrations is not enough. Now the participants have 
become fixed. There are still few people who can transfer their 
thinking into actions. We need more casual space such as cafes and 
local events, where we can talk [about society and politics] 
(M.Nakamura, Interview, 13 January 2013). 
 
Although these activists remained positive about planning new actions to 
appeal to the general public, it was clear that the general election of 2012 
highlighted the gap between the protesters and those people outside the 
movement. For the protesters, the Fukushima disaster meant the experience 
of “deterritorialisation” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). The disaster destabilised 
their identities and narratives which they had taken for granted. Facing 
feelings of shock, anger and regret, the protesters have been cultivating a 
sense of responsibility and developing their political practices. However, for 
many people, the initial shock caused by the 3/11 disaster has already 
become a thing of the past. One protester expresses her confusion as follows: 
 
People think that some sort of sacrifice (such as re-operating the risky 
nuclear reactors) is necessary to maintain economic growth. People 
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are willing to protect what they have already got. How do we make 
them open their hand clenched so hard? Do we persuade or do we 
make a deal? It is very difficult to explain a value that cannot be priced 
(Interviewee 1). 
 
5.4.2 The 2014 Tokyo governor election: the division within the 
movement 
The elections have not only revealed the gap between the protesters and 
those outside the movement but have also highlighted the different attitudes 
of the protesters toward representative politics, which have sometimes 
seemed almost irreconcilable.  
 
The collective action as a ‘vessel’, such as the Kanteimae protest and NFS’s 
demonstrations, is a non-ideological action in which people do not necessarily 
accept the entire blueprints of movements. Various people with different 
identities and worldviews have joined the vessel of NFS, which allows NFS to 
create new political practices in everyday life. Various people have joined the 
vessel of the Kanteimae protest which allows it to pressurise the government 
from beyond the bounds of electoral politics.  
 
Nevertheless, elections are still absolutely important for the protesters 
because it is governmental policy to maintain nuclear power. Hence, in the 
Lower House general election of 2012, almost all the interviewees expressed 
their strong willingness to vote for an anti-nuclear candidate, and many of 
them engaged in the electoral campaign. On the other hand, there was no 
united campaign under the banner of the anti-nuclear movement. MCAN 
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declined to nominate a particular candidate for whom to vote as this would 
have divided the movement.  
 
There is an ambiguous relationship between the anti-nuclear movements, 
whose strength is diversity in a vessel, and electoral politics, which needs one 
united political will. This caused a critical rupture in the movement in the 
Tokyo Governor’s election in February 2014. This was more than a mere local 
election for the anti-nuclear protesters in Tokyo, since Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government is a loyal stakeholder of TEPCO. On this occasion, the 
protesters in Tokyo had a huge argument over whether they needed a unified 
anti-nuclear candidate to counter the LDP-supported candidate.  
 
There were two major anti-nuclear candidates with very different natures. 
Kenji Utsunomiya was a lawyer who had been working on behalf of debtors. 
Morihiro Hosokawa was a former Prime Minister and retired politician. The 
former had the image of a leftist grass-roots candidate, while the latter was 
tagged with another former Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, who used to be 
known as a neo-liberalist reformer in LDP.  
 
The anti-nuclear protesters were divided over which candidate to vote for. The 
Utsunomiya supporters claimed that the anti-nuclear issue was merely 
another issue in the election, and that the problem of poverty was more urgent 
than realising a nuclear-free society. The opposing side recognised 
Hosokawa as a more electable candidate than Utsunomiya and argued that 
Hosokawa would be able to have a greater impact on national politics.  
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The campaign eventually turned into a framing war. Utsunomiya supporters 
described Hosokawa’s side as single-issue environmentalists who would 
shake hands with the neo-liberalists. On the other hand, Hosokawa’s 
supporters claimed that they had greater political awareness because they 
were concerned with making a larger impact on national politics while the 
Utsunomiya supporters cared only about a local issue.  
 
The social movement organisers were powerless to mediate in such a 
situation, as they were mere providers of a ‘vessel’. Although some cultural 
figures collectively announced their support for Hosokawa as a candidate 
more likely to win, this did not impress most protesters who were accustomed 
to the leaderless social movements. 
 
The result of this election saw the LDP-supported candidate win with more 
votes than both Utsunomiya and Hosokawa combined. Thus, the failure of the 
anti-nuclear movement to nominate a single candidate did not directly affect 
the result. However, the dispute definitely created a huge rupture in the 
movement; the MCAN organiser Misao Redwolf comments that it “made me 
absolutely sick. [...] For the first time in my life, I was thinking about 
withdrawing from actions” (Twitter@MisaoRedwolf, 27 September 2014).  
 
Their arguments seemed almost irreconcilable as they had different levels of 
trust in representative politics. The Utsunomiya supporters emphasised the 
term ‘democracy’ in their electoral campaign and articulated their intention to 
‘reform’ representative politics in order that the true representatives of citizens 
might be elected. As a result, Utsunomiya came second in the electoral race, 
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gaining more votes than the Hosokawa-Koizumi alliance. Most of the 
Utsunomiya supporters considered this a positive result as it seemed to 
confirm that their activism was workable in representative politics. 
 
This electoral campaign proved that this was the movement of 
reclaiming democracy and expanding it. [...] We believed the one 
[Utsunomiya] and just advanced with that belief (Hirano, 
Twitter@fancy_karate, 9 February 2014). 
 
On the other hand, the Hosokawa supporters seemed to be less interested in 
claiming Hosokawa as their legitimate representative. They saw Hosokawa as 
more of a tool to create discord in national politics. One of Hosokawa’s 
supporters, Misao Redwolf, insists that choosing the Hosokawa-Koizumi 
alliance would not have led to the acceleration of neo-liberal society because 
“Koizumi is a populist, and he just follows the strongest flow that the citizens 
create” (Misao Redwolf, interview, 16 April 2014). It almost seems as though 
the Hosokawa supporters do not believe in elections for actualising 
democracy; they are utilising the election as a simulacra, not as the legitimate 
process of democracy.  
 
5.4.3 The 2013/14 general election: solidification of the movements? 
At the national political level, the Upper House general election took place in 
July 2013, and the voters again favoured the LDP. This meant that the LDP 
had obtained overwhelming hegemony in both Lower and Upper houses of 
parliament. 
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However, the anti-nuclear protesters seemed positive after this 2013 general 
election. The main reason was that the nuclear opponents won two out of five 
seats in the Tokyo area, and these two newly elected MPs were fresh faces -- 
one is Yoshiko Kira, a woman in her early 30s from the Japanese Communist 
Party,24 and the other is Taro Yamamoto, an actor and activist who once lost 
in the Lower House election in 2012.25 A similar hope was seen in the Tokyo 
Governor’s election in 2014, in which the Utsunomiya supporters felt that 
citizens had the power to impact on representative politics. This positive 
feeling among the protesters was maintained in the Lower House elections in 
December 2014 as well.  
 
This 2014 general election came completely out of blue. After gaining power 
in the 2012 general election, the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had been 
promoting his controversial policy to lift a ban on collective self-defence and to 
enact a state secrets protection law. Nevertheless, his cabinet was enjoying a 
relatively high approval rating of around 50%, mainly due to his economic 
policy. Abe insists that his government has successfully awoken Japan from 
the long period of deflation. However, the government decided to postpone an 
increase in the consumer tax rate from 8% to 10%, which was originally 
scheduled for 2015. The consumer tax had already risen in April 2014 from 
5% to 8%, thereby causing a slump in consumption in the Japanese economy. 
Standing at the turning point of his economic reform, he called a snap election 
in December 2014 to gauge public support for his economic policies. At this 
                                                   
24 Kira is a familiar figure for the Kanteimae protesters as she has been present ever 
since the protest began. 
25 It is rare in Japanese society for celebrities to speak about politics. Yamamoto became 
a symbol of the anti-nuclear side in the two general elections he contested. 
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election, his LDP again won overwhelmingly. The LDP has not only 
maintained its power but now also holds two thirds of the seats in the Lower 
House together with its coalition partner, the Komei Party. 
 
Despite this situation, several protesters made positive remarks in my 
interview at the Kanteimae protest, conducted five days after the election. The 
points mentioned by these people were as follows. The Japanese Communist 
Party won 21 seats, having previously held only eight. In Okinawa, where 
70% of the US military bases are concentrated, the LDP lost all four seats. 
Although the LDP won overwhelmingly at the national level, it ended up with 
three fewer seats than before. “LDP losing seats is, although it is only three 
seats loss, a victory” (Noma, talk event, 20 December 2014)26 — this was the 
typical discourse from the post-Fukushima protesters, which confused 
outsiders.  
 
The critic Hiroki Azuma concludes that what the post-Fukushima protesters 
claim to be the critical defects of the Abe government, such as its nationalistic 
stance, are not at all significant for the ordinary people who hope only for a 
stable economy and, hence, stable politics (Azuma, talk event, 20 December 
2014)27. This view of Azuma is highly relevant; just as the 2012 general 
election did, this 2014 election shows the gap between those inside and 
outside of the movement. Moreover, this gap might have become even wider. 
                                                   
26 From the author’s indirect observation. This remark was made by the 
anti-nuclear/anti-racist activist Yasumichi Noma in the talk event titled “Han heito no ronri 
to awaremi no rinri” (The logic of anti-hate and the ethics of compassion) held at 
Genroncafe, Tokyo, on 20 December 2014. 
27 This remark by Azuma was made at the same event with Noma, listed above. 
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One Kanteimae protester honestly comments:  
 
The result [of the 2014 election] was expected, but still I was 
disappointed. I mean, after all this time, still so many people voted for 
LDP. Now I spend more and more time with those who are already 
interested in politics, and avoid those who are not. [...] We complain 
about current political situation, and think what should be done, but 
this is always between those who already share the same view. It 
never goes out of this circle. It’s irritating (Interviewee 12).  
 
By this time, in 2014, the protesters have broadened their experiences in 
activism. They are confident that their actions have an impact on society. 
Through these actions, they have deepened their sense of responsibility for 
commitment, which has encouraged them to take further actions including 
engagement in electoral campaigns. Political terms such as democracy have 
become important to them, and even the ideologies of political parties no 
longer sound empty.  
 
Although Hosokawa’s supporters in the Tokyo Governor’s election had a 
slightly cynical view of representative democracy, they made a commitment 
anyway. They may have taken the pessimistic view that elections cannot 
represent their will, but they were still hopeful enough to believe that they 
could make use of this system.  
 
Perhaps we can say that, for the protesters, the conventional political terms 
were recuperated by their embodied experience of direct action. Yet this may 
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also mean that their initial language of emotions (Goodwin et al., 2001) or the 
“grammar of embodiment” (McDonald, 2006), which mobilised many ordinary 
people, seems to have become something solid and sophisticated in the 
frame of institutional politics.  
 
On the other hand, on the outside of all these resonating “plateaus” (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1988, p.22) or what the protesters call “vessels,” there are many 
people who have not shared this experience, and they may find this 
sophisticated political language to be detached from their lives. Those people 
may find the sophisticated discourse of the post-Fukushima protesters empty 
and disembodied, just as those protesters used to avoid politics because the 
conventional political language sounded empty.  
 
Just after the 2014 election, the critic Azuma expressed a feeling of unease 
with the discourses of the post-disaster politics. 
 
In recent days, people tend to celebrate the attitude to keep talking 
hope and to advance with that hope. They say that that is the attitude 
of a responsible and mature individual. However, I think that this 
tendency makes society stifling. What is not possible is not possible. 
We can just give up with it, and we might be able to make the 
alternative way (Azuma, Twitter@hazuma, 15 December 2014).   
 
Although he did not mention it, this clearly indicated the tendency of the 
post-Fukushima protesters who passionately encourage people to vote. 
These protesters believe that being nihilistic is irresponsible, and we need to 
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construct hope in order to continue political commitment. On the other hand, 
Azuma takes it as the prohibition of the expression of despair, which is an 
inevitable feeling in life.  
 
When the Fukushima disaster “deterritorialised” the protesters’ stable beliefs 
and identities, they took to the streets in order to ask people around them and 
themselves what they might be able to do. They walked by “asking,” as 
Holloway (2010a, p.215) describes the Zapatistas movement. However, the 
question now is this: What will happen to the movement once we find the 
language to narrate a hope? Do they stop asking and instead start solidifying 
it? Does the language of emotion lose its fluidity, and is it polished into the 
solid, authorised language of formal politics?  
 
5.4.4 Beyond elections and representative politics 
It seems to me that some of the ‘emotional’ language initially created in the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement has become sophisticated and has 
been poured into formal politics. However, some language remains open and 
stays outside of it. For example, Shiroto no Ran and NFS create the 
anarchistic current of this movement. They stand up when they feel tempted, 
and they show little interest in institutionalising it. Although Shiroto no Ran 
organised the highly influential anti-nuclear demonstrations in 2011, it 
subsequently withdrew from this role as demonstration organiser and put 
more effort into creating a space for encounter in their local community. In my 
interview, Matsumoto even commented that he was “fed up with” organising 
demonstrations (6 April 2012). 
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Similarly, NFS was only active for a year, and its members soon moved on to 
different actions. One of the core members of NFS, Mizuki Nakamura, shows 
her discomfort at the attempt to solidify. My second interview with her was 
conducted in January 2013, which was less than a year after the first 
demonstration. By this time, she had already left NFS and had started her 
individual actions such as organising community markets and film-viewing 
events. She says: 
 
Honestly, I am not interested in NFS at this moment. Now people (in 
NFS) start arguing ‘this action is not what NFS is like’, and talking as if 
NFS is an established brand. That is not what I wanted. When we 
started, we all had strong emotion. Our action was an eruption, and it 
is difficult to create that eruption regularly (M.Nakamura, Interview, 13 
January, 2013). 
 
Their attitudes seem to trace the principles that James Williams extracts from 
Deleuzian philosophy. The first principle he suggests is to “connect with 
everything” that can bring about change (Williams, 2013, p.5). This is 
precisely stated in NFS’s appeal for their first demonstration: “connect with 
anybody indiscriminately” (See 5.3.4). Their attitude also fits the second 
principle proposed by Williams (2013, p.5), which is to “forget everything”. 
Williams acknowledges that although we “connect with everything” for new 
creation, we should forget them before its connections are solidified. This is 
an insightful suggestion, which allows us always to try new connections and 
keep asking. 
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These indiscrete attempts at connection and disconnection cut into the 
solidified language and actions and rearrange them into something new. Here, 
even the electoral system becomes something different. In fact, although 
Matsumoto appeared in the 2012 electoral campaign to speak on behalf of the 
candidate Taro Yamamoto, his intentions did not lie in the frame of electoral 
politics:  
 
I do not trust the electoral system, though at least I go to vote to show 
my will that I do not want some bad guys to win. For me, the election 
and demonstration is the same. We cannot change society by 
elections, but we can use the opportunity to show that we are in fever. 
It would be better if by chance we win (the election), but the important 
thing is to create a fever (Matsumoto, interview at the electioneering 
event, 15 December 2012). 
 
Matsumoto himself once stood as a candidate for the Suginami ward 
assembly in 2007. Although he was not elected, Matsumoto explains that his 
intention was NOT to become a politician but to create a public open space 
legitimately (Matsumoto, 2011). Under the guise of an electoral campaign, 
Matsumoto transformed the square in front of Koenji station into a space for a 
street party with rock music and dance. Matsumoto admits in his interview that 
he “was looking down on the electoral system” (Interview, 6 April 2012). His 
action was close to what the situationists would call ‘détournement’ (See 
3.1.1), as he was hijacking the electoral system and rearranging it with a 
totally different objective.  
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Although his intention lies completely outside formal politics, and although he 
seems vastly unconcerned with electoral democracy, his action has an impact 
on it. Akira Harada, a young local politician in the Japanese Communist Party 
and also a member of NFS, explains the shock he experienced when he 
encountered Shiroto no Ran’s ‘politics’. 
 
At the end of 2011, Matsumoto said that one-year anniversary of the 
disaster was coming in few months, and we MUST stop nuclear 
plants BY THEN. I was shocked, because in our case (of the political 
party), we tend to think that the problem lies in deep structure of our 
society and we need a long-term strategy. Our schedule is always 
well planned in advance. But he was different. I felt that we need that 
strong passion to stop nuclear plants (Harada, Interview, 10 April 
2012). 
 
Actually, Harada stood for the same local election in 2007 when Matsumoto 
‘used’ it. Harada recalls that time:  
 
I thought that it was terribly rude to use the election for a live 
performance, but actually it looked attractive. Shiroto no Ran is the 
movement to fill the gap between those who are serious about politics 
and those who are nihilistic. They are involving people whom nobody 
could mobilise (Harada, Interview, 10 April 2012). 
 
Their action and discourse remain open and fluid, and they will never be 
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institutionalised. It is a strength of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement 
to have this creative current, which cuts into the closed political system and 
language and reshapes it so that it “fills the gap,” as Harada addresses. 
 
Summary and further directions 
This chapter examined the political agency of the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear movements by focusing on the motivational factors of the 
protesters. The Fukushima disaster marked the experience of 
deterritorialisation, and the protesters encountered strong emotions such as 
anger and fear. This emotional turmoil took them into the streets to collectively 
search for a way to react to it. 
 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements imply that political commitment 
does not necessarily require a totalising and coherent discourse. Although 
their emotional language was criticised as being inconsistent and reactive, I 
argued that the protesters’ sense of regret at the past indifference brought 
them a strong sense of responsibility for social commitment and constructed a 
new political subjectivity beyond pre-determined identities. 
 
Rather than having a social movement organisation to facilitate the movement, 
these protesters consider that a social movement provides a “vessel” or a 
space for people to interact together and create powers for change. While 
MCAN’s vessel (the Kanteimae protest) works by putting pressure on the 
government by representing people’s unified will, NFS’s vessel has the more 
creative role of collectively inventing a new political practice outside formal 
politics.  
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The post-Fukushima activism has not succeeded in having a positive impact 
on formal politics. The elections revealed the gap between the inside and the 
outside of the movement. While the protesters deepened their sense of 
responsibility through mobilisation and expanded their political commitment, 
many Japanese people did not share these experiences, and they remain 
apathetic. I argued that the protesters’ confidence in activism will render their 
language and action stiff and closed. However, it should be noted that the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement includes an anarchistic current 
whose actions and discourses remain fluid, allowing them to fill the gap.  
 
Meanwhile, the fundamental question posed by these elections remains 
unanswered in this chapter. While the protesters accepted the experience of 
deterritorialisation and started reconsidering their political practices and their 
way of life, the majority of Japanese people seemed to have returned to the 
normal and are trying to protect their own stable territories. During my 
fieldwork, I often asked myself what makes this different attitude. It seemed 
that, behind their political commitment, the protesters share a certain culture 
and ethics. This is my main topic in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Fieldwork Analysis II: 
Ethics of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters 
 
Introduction  
The last chapter argued that the Fukushima disaster brought the experience 
of “deterritorialisation” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). The Fukushima disaster 
destabilised what the protesters had previously believed to be a stable life and 
exposed them to the uncertainty and precariousness of life. Therefore, this 
event was a radical openness just as Tomohiro Akagi had hoped for with his 
imaginary of war (2007). The experience of deterritorialisation seemed to 
promote the re-emergence of activism in post-Fukushima Japanese society. 
 
However, the previous chapter also indicated the difficulty of 
“deterritorialisation.” Although the anti-nuclear movements became national 
phenomena in the summer of 2012, the result of the elections seems to 
indicate that many Japanese people have returned to life as normal. As Akagi 
claims with his imaginary of war, the event of radical opening may be once 
and for all; whoever becomes the winner of the war will try to cement society, 
creating other outsiders (Akagi, 2011, p.241). Akagi’s pessimistic view implies 
that, although ‘the 99%’ of us are now facing the precariousness of life in 
contemporary society, the collective political subject for social change, which 
Hardt and Negri (2004) identify as the “multitude,” will never be formed 
because some of the ‘upper side’ of the ‘99%’ usually close their territory to 
protect what they have now. 
 
On the other hand, my argument in the last chapter indicates that the 
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post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters may be the exception. The protesters 
are forming a new political subjectivity to say NO to their previous way of living, 
in which their precarious lives were fragmented and each of them became the 
powerless entity who is only capable of protecting their own life by closing 
their own territory from an outside.  
 
The simple question I posed at the end of the last chapter is as follows: What 
makes this difference between the protesters and those who returned to the 
dominant norm? The problem of this question is that seeking to identify 
invariant factors in social movement mobilisation, in particular by examining 
psychological factors such as emotions, seems to lack plausibility. Rather 
than identifying the objective criteria of what makes people go back or remain 
open, this chapter reframes the question as ‘how we might stay open’ and 
examines the ethical practices of the protesters as possible examples. 
 
The first section argues that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements 
signify a new form of relationship with others (6.1). Their actions are not 
motivated by the moralistic sense of obligation to act ‘for’ the people with 
subjugated identities. Rather, the movements are the struggles of those 
people who have experienced deterritorialisation. Using the framework by 
Critchley (2007), I argue that the attitude of the post-Fukushima protesters in 
accepting this radical openness is ethical as it forces them to keep feeling, 
thinking and acting for a better society.  
 
The second section examines the protesters’ sense of the self (6.2). Through 
the Fukushima disaster, they realised that individuals are always insufficient 
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to know what should be done and they tend to be forgetful. With the concept 
of humour (Critchley, 2007), I examine the protesters’ exploration of how such 
incomplete subjects act ethically. Although their actions seem to be motivated 
by their own desires, these desires are not self-contained, as they already 
internalised otherness within them and their desires are generated as such 
intermingled selves.  
 
This led me to further explore their concept of life (6.3). While many young 
Japanese people in contemporary society seem to struggle to perfect the self 
into a recognisable form to make their lives meaningful, the protesters 
describe a fulfilment of life without signification, which I examine with 
Deleuze’s concept of a life (2001). Here, a sense of satisfaction is obtained 
when a ‘dissolved’ self becomes part of a movement and engages in a 
collective process of changing society as an assemblage. 
 
The last section argues the meaning of these post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movements in contemporary Japanese society (6.4). The protesters’ 
emphasis on the embodied experiences and their awareness of social 
complexity shares a lot with the Zenkyoto movement of the 1960-70s (Kosaka, 
2006). While Zenkyoto adopted ideological terms to theorise their politics 
which led their movements to an impasse, some anarchist actions in the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement reject any attempts to solidify their 
political actions and discourses. In the conclusion, however, I state that, to 
maintain the fluidity of this movement, it actually needs some kind of 
theorisation as a new political imaginary, which will become my final 
endeavour in chapters seven and eight. 
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6.1 New form of ethics after the disaster 
6.1.1 From obligation to interaction 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement has often been criticised for 
being unethical rather than ethical. As noted in the previous chapter, Akagi 
(2012a, 2012b, See 5.1.2) comments that the emotional reaction of the 
movement’s adherents offered no comfort to the people in Fukushima. This 
criticism is also voiced from within the movement.  
 
It seems that such criticism was based on the simple equation of social 
movements with ‘identity politics’, in which the people with subjugated 
identities are fighting for their own recognition. In this view, the people in 
Fukushima are the minorities whose voices should be prioritised over 
majoritarian Tokyo people. Hence, the activist Seiji Uematsu insists that the 
anti-nuclear movements in Tokyo must represent the voices of the Fukushima 
people (See 5.1.2). He claims that the representation and amplification of the 
minor voices is an ethical attitude, and by failing to do so the anti-nuclear 
movements in Tokyo could be reduced to taking selfish actions (Interview, 3 
January 2013). 
 
Prioritising the voices of Fukushima sounds fair, and there is no doubt that 
what Uematsu suggests is an ethical attitude. However, this type of ethics is 
difficult to practise due to the nature of complex society, where we face the 
difficulty of representation. There is no united voice of ‘the Fukushima people’. 
An anti-nuclear activist in Fukushima, Ruiko Muto (2013), acknowledges a 
“division” among the Fukushima people, between those who have left their 
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homeland because they were afraid of radiation, those who have stayed there 
but are still concerned about radiation exposure, and those residents who do 
not care about it. They also have divided opinions about nuclear energy. The 
voices of ‘the Fukushima people’ can never be represented in general; there 
are only many different choices and different necessities.  
 
People have diverse values in contemporary society, and the complex nature 
of society makes us difficult to agree with whose voice should be prioritised in 
politics. The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement attracted many people in 
Tokyo because it was the expression of their own anger rather than 
representing the anger of Fukushima people. This does not mean that their 
political demand reflected the interests of the Tokyo residents; quite oppositely, 
their anti-nuclear demand signified the rejection of the identity of Tokyo 
residents whose lifestyles were supported by risky nuclear energy generated 
in Fukushima. Hence, it is the struggle of “non-identity” (Holloway, 2010a, See 
3.2.2). It also proposes a different type of collective identity, which Castells 
(1997, p.8) calls a “project identity” to distinguish it from the pre-fixed 
“resistant identity.” The protesters are building a new collective identity based 
on their own emotions when they faced the disaster.  
 
It may still be controversial to claim that their political actions based on their 
own emotions are ‘ethical’. In fact, some Fukushima people have expressed 
discomfort with the anti-nuclear actions in Tokyo because they feel that the 
protesters in Tokyo are insensitive to the complex feelings of the Fukushima 
people about nuclear energy. In one TV program, those two parties had a 
dialogue, and the MCAN member Yasumichi Noma responded to the criticism 
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from the Fukushima people; 
 
If we all try to avoid hurting someone, we will inevitably shut our 
mouths. We will have a totally quiet society where nobody hurts but 
everybody is completely suppressed. We need to accept some pain 
to establish a ground for earnest discussion (Noma, NHK-ETV, 6 
December 2012). 28  
 
His view seems to be at odds with ethics in the conventional understanding. 
Although this sounds quite individualistic, the implications appear to be 
important. In a complex society where our interests are entangled, we may 
unwittingly disturb the interests of other people and possibly hurt someone. If 
we avoid hurting anybody, we cannot say anything or take any actions. Rather 
than caring for the most disadvantaged people and speaking for them, Noma 
insists that it is more important to create a place where everybody speaks with 
their own voice, and he believes that the Kanteimae protest works as such a 
place. 
 
Hajime Matsumoto, an activist in Shiroto no Ran, expresses a similar 
individualism. When invited to a charity event for the 3/11 disaster, Matsumoto 
was asked what he could do for Fukushima. He answered as follows: 
 
If you ask me what I can personally do for Fukushima, I don’t think 
that I can do something. Talking about a society in general, I think 
                                                   
28  From the author’s observation of NHK-ETV (2012), Fukushima wo Zutto Miteiru TV.  
(Broadcast on 6 December 2012). 
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that we should stop following what we are told. The nuclear 
promoters and LDP are maintaining the prevailing power because 
many of us follow them without critically thinking. I hope that more 
and more people start acting on their own will, and turn their backs on 
those who give us orders. That is why I am creating a free space in 
Shiroto no Ran’s action. […] I think that we need this kind of space 
everywhere, including Fukushima (Matsumoto, talk event, 23 
December 2012). 29 
 
Matsumoto does not insist that his political action is ‘for’ the Fukushima 
people; rather, he talks about his desire. Nevertheless, this does not sound 
selfish. He believes that what he is doing for himself will resonate with the 
lives of other people, including those in Fukushima, and help create a new 
potential.  
 
As the previous chapter examined, Noma and Matsumoto have quite different 
approaches to politics. However, what they share is this new form of political 
agency in contemporary society. They do not try to represent what they 
consider the most legitimate voice in politics. They admit their inability to 
speak and act for other people; yet they still remain open to the unknown 
others and to interaction with them in a public space. Their attitudes and 
claims should not be judged in the typical opposition of individualism versus 
altruism. Each person takes action with his/her own experience and emotion, 
                                                   
29 From the author’s online observation of the talk event with Matsumoto, Misao Redwolf 
and the film producer Hitomi Kamanaka. It was held in Tokyo as part of “Fukushima 
Charity Festival” on 23 December 2012. 
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but it goes beyond self-contained action.  
 
6.1.2 Deterritorialisation as the beginning of ethical awareness 
Sociologists such as Furuichi (2011) and Kainuma (2012) indicate that the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters in Tokyo are using the tragedy of the 
disaster for their own ends. According to Kainuma (2012), the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements simplify the complex economic 
relations around the nuclear industry and establish “a false hope” of a 
nuclear-free society in order to rediscover their orientation.  
 
However, my arguments in the previous chapter show that the impetus for 
their initial action was a sense of confusion, fear and anger. The protesters 
gathered in the streets because they felt betrayed by what they had trusted. 
They felt that their lives were threatened, but they “did not know what else to 
do” (Interviewee 1). In this sense, they were less hopeful than Akagi, who at 
least identifies his ‘hope’ as war. For him, war would bring some meaning and 
the opportunity for social change. In contrast, what the Fukushima disaster 
brought was the void of meaning. The protesters realised that, “unless we 
take some action, nothing will change” (Interviewee 5). The MCAN member 
Ryo Takenaka, who is of the same generation as Akagi, criticises him as 
follows:  
 
Akagi is not hopeless enough […] I don’t believe that we can actually 
achieve what we want. But I am doing this protest because I cannot 
rely on somebody else to do it. I am doing this because I have no 
hope (Takenaka, 28 December 2012). 
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The protesters may be more ‘hopeless’ than Akagi; unlike Akagi, they cannot 
wait for someone or something to change society drastically or bring some 
meaning. The Fukushima disaster is a mere point of “deterritorialisation” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) for the protesters, from which the all previous 
meaning has gone. Unless they take action, nothing meaningful will emerge. 
Another MCAN member, Norimichi Hattori, claims that they are protesting 
because they “gave up on giving up” (Interview, 11 January 2013). 
 
Thus, we might say that they are not gathering under the one ‘hope’ of a 
nuclear-free society. What they share is a sense of despair that they cannot 
disconnect themselves from the precariousness of life entailed by the present 
system. This has motivated their political engagement even though they do 
not know the correct way of doing so. 
 
Simon Critchley (2007) notes that a traumatic experience demands ethics. 
The traumatic experience “comes from outside the subject” without warning 
and “leaves its imprint within the subject” (Critchley, 2007, p.60). In this event, 
people are exposed to unavoidable otherness and have their subjectivity split 
by the demands of the incomprehensible other. Using a framework derived 
from the work of Levinas, Critchley argues that ethics is generated through 
people’s attempts to respond to its demand, although this demand of the other 
can never be fully comprehended by the subject who responds.  
 
The experience of deterritorialisation may not necessarily be a catastrophic 
event in society. In my interviews, several activists mentioned more personal 
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experiences as the motivation for their social commitment. The MCAN core 
member Misao Redwolf talked about her experience of mental distress. When 
she was in meditation, she “saw” the scenery of the forest in old Japan and 
“heard the voice of the ancestor” (Interview, 16 April 2014). For her, the 
experience of deterritorialisation connected her mind to the past, and led her 
to take action to protect the historical land from the construction of nuclear 
reprocessing plants. 
 
In the case of the activist Kengo Matsunaga, it was the death of his father. His 
loss made him reconsider his life. His pain at losing a family member turned 
his eyes to the suffering happening around the world, in particular the victims 
of the Pakistan earthquake in 2005, because it happened at almost the same 
time as his loss. “Luckily or unluckily, I just realised them [the pains in the 
world]. Then how do I live with them? I just decided to face it” (Matsunaga, 
Interview, 17 May 2014). He resigned from a large, well-regarded company 
where he had worked for 18 years, and started travelling around the world. 
 
These personal stories remind us that most of us have probably had the 
experience of deterritorialisation in our lives. In such stressful times, we 
accidentally allow radical otherness to intrude into our lives, and we are asked 
how we might live with this. Some may choose to face it, while others may try 
to eliminate it, forget it and return to the normal. 
 
6.1.3 Fear of oblivion and the role of places 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements are also criticised on the 
grounds that their emotional reactions are temporary and the movements will 
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soon be forgotten (Kainuma, 2012). In my interview, the protesters 
themselves seemed to be well aware of their own oblivion; in fact, that 
seemed to be one reason why they embraced activism.  
 
The organiser Kaori Nawa recalls that when she saw the explosion at the 
Fukushima nuclear plants, she felt that she “had been a part of this.” She felt 
that the accident was a result of her oblivion about the past wars and nuclear 
disasters which had shocked her once but were soon forgotten: 
 
These memories [of wars and disasters] sometimes came back to me, 
but I was soon distracted by busy everyday life, and I justified it. 
However, when I saw the explosion, I swore that I should never repeat 
this [oblivion]. If I bury what I feel now into everyday chores, I will not 
be able to hold my pride. Then I started Twitter, because I thought that 
by publicising my opinion with my name, I can force myself to think 
(Nawa, Interview, 17 Dec 2012).   
 
In addition, at the anti-nuclear rally three years after the accident, a woman in 
her 20s explained her motivation to participate as an “admonition against 
myself who tends to forget” (Interviewee 13). Had she done nothing at all, the 
memories of 3/11 and the Fukushima disaster would have soon disappeared; 
thus, she forced herself to feel by mobilising her body at the rally.  
 
This fear of oblivion seems to be the important component of ethics, as well 
as the experience of deterritorialisation. The precariat activist Karin Amamiya 
explained her motivation for engaging in activism by recalling her experience 
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in Iraq. As was mentioned in chapter two, Amamiya was one of the ‘battlefield 
hunters’ who were desperate to feel a sense of living. In 1999, she joined an 
inspection tour to visit Iraq “out of curiosity” (Amamiya, Interview, 19 March 
2012). There she learned about the serious damage to the health of Iraqi 
children caused by depleted uranium used in the Gulf War. Then, one 
shocking thought came to her mind: 
 
I thought that [once I go back to Japan] it would be possible to stop 
thinking about this and live my life peacefully. It would be easy for me 
to spend my life pretending that these things have never happened. 
Then I felt terrified about that. I know that I can be indifferent to any 
movement. That is why I force myself not to be (Amamiya, Interview, 
19 March 2012).   
 
Her shock at seeing war-torn Iraq was transformed into the fear of her own 
indifference. Amamiya’s ‘fear against the self being indifferent’ is similar to 
that of the post-Fukushima protesters described above.  
 
It appears that activism provides them with an opportunity to recall their 
emotions and their responsibility to keep on thinking. The disaster may be a 
‘once and for all’ opening, and people tend to forget. However, these 
protesters are mobilising their bodies to the protest space in order to remind 
themselves of their responsibility for social commitment.  
 
The journalist Makoto Uchida comments that the ethics in post-Fukushima 
society require us “to be in charge of our initial feeling of hatred toward 
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nuclear energy,” which we had when we first saw the Fukushima accident. He 
believes that people mobilise their bodies to the Kanteimae protest every 
Friday to “engrave” a sense of responsibility internally (Uchida, Talk event, 22 
December 2012).30 Maintaining this place is meaningful to them as it is a 
place for them to practise ethics. In that condition, ethics might be as simple 
as to ‘be open’, i.e. ‘not to forget’. Hence, one protester describes the 
Kanteimae protest as being like a ‘live coal’, from which the flame can be 
recovered when the time comes (Interviewee 6). 
 
6.1.4 Language and embodied experience 
The encounter with other people in activism itself entails an ethical aspect, as 
it forces the subject to keep feeling and thus keep thinking. However, the 
problem is that these embodied thoughts will eventually become general 
concepts and will be closed to real experience. As examined in the previous 
chapter, the protesters’ ‘embodied’ political action based on their anger, 
confusion and regret tends to become more institutionalised later, thus 
generating less resonance with those who did not share the same experience.  
 
The last section of the previous chapter suggested that not all the currents in 
the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement are heading towards 
convergence and solidification, because the anarchistic movement such as 
Shiroto no Ran rejects any institutionalisation. Moreover, I met several 
protesters who were trying to reinvigorate the once solidified and disembodied 
political language with new actions.  
                                                   
30 The comment was made at the talk event ‘Shinseiken ni dou taijisuruka’ (How to tackle 
the new government?) on 22 December 2012, held in Tokyo. 
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Since language aids an abstraction of experience, their affective politics of 
emotions might be easily disembodied when they frame their action in 
cognitive terms. Therefore, I asked some of my interviewees whether they 
had a particular political slogan in demonstrations that they hesitated to chant, 
and how they reacted to it. The NFS member Kaori Nawa said that, in her 
early days of activism, she felt uncomfortable with the slogan ‘Fukushima 
Kaese (Give us back Fukushima)’ because “Fukushima is not mine” (Interview, 
17 December 2012). She thought that she had no right to recite this phrase 
together with the Fukushima people, who must have suffered enough to claim 
it for themselves.  
 
However, she later had an opportunity to visit Fukushima, where she met 
evacuees from the contaminated area and spent some time with them. 
Through this encounter, the slogan “Give us back Fukushima” started to have 
meaning for her. Now she shouts this slogan, thinking about “my home and 
my land”, and expresses her anger “together with the people in Fukushima” 
(Nawa, Interview, 17 December 2012). 
 
Another protester told me that she had hesitated to demand ‘Hairo’ (nuclear 
decommissioning) when protesting. This is because she actually had an 
opportunity to listen to the decommissioning crew. She remembers that one 
worker confessed to feeling uncomfortable with the anti-nuclear protesters 
shouting ‘Hairo’, because he felt that the protesters blindly expected him to do 
his job with the serious risk of radiation exposure. Hearing this story, she 
thought: “I cannot demand nuclear decommission without thinking about 
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those who are going to do it” (Interviewee 1). Her bewilderment led her to 
study the problem of low-wage labour and poverty.  
 
The society might need some people to stay poor because we need 
someone to do risky jobs (such as nuclear decommissioning). Without 
knowing the reality surrounding them, without seeing them, I cannot 
demand ‘hairo’ (Interviewee 1).  
 
She even visited the site where the administration evicted homeless people. 
She needed to witness the people who may be affected by her political claim 
and share the pain with them. This shows how the experience in activism 
recuperate the disembodied political language through action and reconnect 
politics with ethics. 
 
6.2 The concept of the self and the other 
6.2.1 Disaster and the ambiguity of the self 
In the previous section, I argued that although the post-Fukushima activism 
relies on personal experiences and emotions, this does not mean that the 
protesters’ politics are self-satisfied or self-enclosed, because they are open 
to the ‘outside’. However, the openness does not always bring blessings. The 
encounter with otherness may deconstruct one’s sense of identity, and few 
people are willing to undertake it. The resonance between my action and that 
of other people will not necessarily generate a creative relationship. Moreover, 
the previous chapter also examined the difficulty of ‘keep opening’. The 
confidence in activism may solidify their political discourses and affective 
emotions may be lost. Hence, it is important to investigate what makes people 
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open to the otherness, and what might motivate people to remain open.  
 
It appears that the Fukushima disaster has brought a sense of ambiguity of 
the self. The disaster revealed the fact that although we tried to eliminate the 
risky otherness from our own territory, it is actually impossible to completely 
protect ourselves from the risky otherness.  
 
Nawa believes that although most of us are ‘the 99%’ of those whose lives are 
precarious, “there was something in society which prevented us noticing that 
we are the 99%.” Thus, people were forced to compete:  
 
[Before the disaster] I made my effort to acquire whatever I can reach. 
A house. Good education. I forced myself to be independent. I guess 
that I wanted my place in the upper side of the 99% (Nawa, Interview, 
17 December 2012). 
 
However, the disaster showed the fluid and open nature of our world — “the 
disaster showed that even the value of immovable property loses its value.” 
(Nawa, Interview, 17 December 2012). The disaster revealed that our lives go 
beyond our intentions, no matter how hard we try, except for those in the top 
1%. The effort to protect the self-contained life is almost meaningless in such 
a society. Nawa also comments that, before the disaster, she was living her 
life based on what she believed to be right. However, she now believes that “it 
was not enough” because she had “never involved other people in it” (Nawa, 
Interview, 17 Dec 2012).  
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One’s reason, imagination and morality are limited. Therefore, rather than 
perfecting themselves, they chose to explore a better way of life as an 
assemblage. We do not know the right way or the ultimate goal; therefore, we 
need to be open to connections with others, obtain a response from them and 
proceed through the resonance. This is to walk by “asking”, as Holloway 
(2010a, p.215) describes the Zapatistas movement.  
 
This ‘incomplete’ subjectivity is illustrated by Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 
1988) through the concept of “machinic” assemblage. They describe the world 
as being composed of a series of machines that are “plugged into one another” 
(Marks, 1998, p. 49). The subject as machine is like a nodal point of social 
relationships, and it does not have an essential, pre-determined identity. 
One’s identity is not self-sufficient and it is always open to being coupled with 
other machines. It can be said that the activism in post-Fukushima Japanese 
society is such a “machinic” assemblage of people who are incapable to know 
the entire picture in advance. 
 
6.2.2 The role of humour and redemption  
This acceptance of incompleteness seems to be what Critchley (2007) 
describes as humour. According to him, humour is one way of preventing us 
from being exhausted by our responsibility to remain open to the outside 
(Critchley, 2007, p.78).  
 
In his interpretation of Levinasian philosophy, Critchley notes that the 
exposure to the radical outside is the beginning of ethics. However, this ethics 
of radical openness entails a huge burden, since it significantly destabilises 
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the subject’s identity. How can the ethical subjects live up to the ‘infinite 
responsibility’ of being ever-open? Critchley (2007) explores several ways: we 
may need a healing project for the split subject by providing catharsis; 
otherwise it may require an anesthetisation of the pain by giving a heroic fate. 
However, he ultimately abandons these projects and proposes that the ethical 
subject should possess “humour” rather than masochistic self-flagellation. 
 
According to him, humour is explained as laughing at the “inauthenticity” of 
the self; in other words, it is a self-ridicule of “endless inadequacy of (one’s) 
action” to the demand of the other (2007, p.78). Critchley argues that humour 
reduces the burden of infinitely responding to the other, because one’s 
responses are never required to be adequate.  
 
This celebration of humour is seen in the anti-nuclear actions of NFS. One 
member emphasises the importance of “looseness” (Interviewee 9). In his 
view, the student movements of the 1960s and 1970s failed because the 
activists pursued the “pureness” of their motivation and objectives. As a result, 
a hierarchy was established in accordance with their pureness; some radical 
groups conducted purges and other students exhausted themselves through 
strict discipline. He argues that this pureness is impossible to achieve 
because we “cannot be absolutely right.” Then, 
 
Probably what we can share is the ‘looseness’ derived from the 
perception that we are not perfect and everyone has something for 
which to be blamed. Humour could be the expression of this 
looseness (Interviewee 9). 
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Rather than blaming themselves for being imperfect, probably what they seek 
is a ‘loose’ way to exercise their responsibility. A Kanteimae staffer who also 
joined the NFS demonstrations, Kazumasa Kawaguchi, posted on Twitter: 
 
Time passes. Every day, many things happen and the life goes on. I 
thought that I must not forget about those who are suffering from the 
disaster. I must not let it pass. I told this to the people in the 
disaster-hit area. The reply was “it is OK to forget. You can forget, and 
you can remember again” (Kawaguchi, Twitter @kazsoul, 2 July 
2013). 
 
People will forget about the disaster because they are not perfect. However, 
they at least make an effort to be ethical by opening themselves up to 
unknown encounters and making connections with them. Unlike an 
ideology-led movement, in which the moralistic subject tries to achieve the 
ideal self or society, these post-Fukushima protesters started from the 
recognition that people are imperfect, lazy and forgetful, but they are still 
capable of acting ethically.  
 
In particular, the NFS movement tried to make this infinite responsibility 
enjoyable. For example, NFS’s marches had a mobile karaoke machine and a 
bar. NFS was often criticised for pursuing mere enjoyment by using the 
anti-nuclear discourse as a means to the ends of the carnival. However, 
enjoyment may be the means for them to cope with the responsibility that 
post-Fukushima Japanese society requires.  
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The acceptance of inauthenticity may also enable the movement to be open 
to the people outside. After the 2012 election, which revealed a gap between 
the protesters and ‘ordinary people’ outside, Kaori Nawa commented that she 
“won’t be angry about ‘indifferent’ people,” because “that is me the last year” 
(Interview, 17 December 2012). She knew that individuals tend to close their 
territory and become indifferent to the other, because she used to be like that. 
However, she is now doing what she had never thought about before the 
disaster. Instead of showing her disappointment for these people outside the 
movement and separating herself from the ‘apolitical’ people, she expressed 
her hope for sharing her experience in activism with them. Her experience of 
seeing herself changing after the disaster encourages her to keep believing 
that people will change.  
 
Once people accept incompleteness, ethics no longer asks them to be perfect. 
It only asks them to be ever open to others and to keep responding. In this 
kind of movement, the boundary between right and wrong or inside and 
outside becomes vague. What remain are endless encounters, connections 
with others, and thousands of acts of forgetting and remembering, through 
which we shape ourselves and a better society.  
 
6.2.3 Desire of the dissolved self 
Critchley’s argument imply that the openness and the acceptance of 
inauthenticity seen in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement compose 
an important part of ethics. This form of ethics does not provide the coherent 
principle that works as the foundation of their decision-making. Rather, their 
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ethical actions are improvised at the intersection between themselves and a 
particular event that elicits strong emotions. In this sense, many protesters 
claim that they are motivated by their own emotions and are taking action ‘for 
themselves’.  
 
This term ‘action for themselves’ is misleading and gives the impression that 
their action is unethical. As the sociologists Furuichi (2011) and Kainuma 
(2012) explained, the actions ‘for themselves’ can be interpreted as exploiting 
catastrophe, using it to pursue their self-interest.  
 
However, their discourse of the ‘action for themselves’ does not seem to imply 
an action to achieve their own interests. For example, one female Kanteimae 
protester comments as follows: 
 
Why am I here...? It sounds negative if I answer that it is ‘for 
self-satisfaction’ [...] but I come here because I want. I feel 
comfortable for myself being here, being a part of this movement. I 
have the same feeling when I am doing the volunteer work [at the 
disaster-hit area in North East Japan]. Sometimes nobody is there; I 
have no communication with the local people. It is freezing and 
exhausting...yet I feel good...satisfying. I feel good not because I am 
doing for the other people. I am doing for myself (Interviewee 14). 
  
Their identification of the self as being a part of the movement, without any 
recognition from other people, is shared by many Kanteimae protesters. They 
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often identify themselves as “plus-one” of the protesters (Interviewee 15, 16)31 
or “a tree” on a mountain (Interviewee 17, 18). They describe themselves as 
an entity without signification.  
 
If they say that they feel satisfied with their social engagement as no one, then 
it seems unlikely that they are exploiting the movement for their self-interest, 
be it for achieving catharsis or excitement. Rather, it almost sounds as if their 
satisfaction is achieved when their sense of self is “dissolved” (Deleuze, 
1994) in the movement. 
 
Their selfhood is not independent. However, neither is it completely 
embedded in the collectivity of the movement. It seems that its individuality 
exists, but it is intermingled with other people, and it is inseparable. We can 
examine this dissolved subjectivity in the words of Misao Redwolf. She refutes 
the criticism that the anti-nuclear movement in Tokyo is “selfish”:  
 
They criticise that Tokyo people do not take the part of the Fukushima 
people. But this claim exactly separates Tokyo and Fukushima. They 
are not feeling the Fukushima people (Misao Redwolf, Interview, 16 
April 2014). 
 
Here she seems to distinguish two different types of ethical relationship that 
the protesters in Tokyo might have with the people in Fukushima. One is an 
obligational relationship in which the protesters rationally recognise the pain 
of the Fukushima people and act for them. Yet, for Misao, this separates the 
                                                   
31 Precise Japanese is ‘Atamakazu wo tasu’. 
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protesters from the people in Fukushima, while her actual identity is 
inseparable from them. Her pain is indiscernible to the pain of Fukushima 
people, and she takes action based on her own pain. Thus, Misao declares 
that she engages in the anti-nuclear movement “for herself,” who “has to live 
in this system” and who “never hopes the neo-liberalists will control [her] life” 
(Interview, 16 April 2014). What she is expressing is neither the desire of a 
fixed independent self nor the desire of the other. She talks of the desire 
coming out of her life, in which her selfhood is entangled with the lives of 
others.  
 
Another interviewee at the Kanteimae protest, a male in his 30s, visited 
Fukushima after the disaster because he thought that he “has to know the 
people there.” He ate and slept together with the people there. He explained 
that, through that experience, “my identity expanded. The problem of them 
has become mine” (Interviewee 19). At the time of my interview, he was 
wearing a white protective suit with the messages of the Fukushima people on 
it. He told me proudly that now he “has Fukushima on his back.” It seems he 
meant that he is neither representing the Fukushima people nor speaking for 
them; he is living with them. This identity expansion is also examined in those 
who tried to reactivate political language with their action to feel the pain of 
other people. 
 
6.3 Emergence of the politics of life 
6.3.1 Two concepts of life 
As I have been arguing, in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement, 
people are not only practising a new way of political engagement but also 
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experimenting with a new way of relating to other people, and a new way of 
living. A young Kanteimae protester states that this movement is “for 
protecting children and lives”; therefore, it is “primitive politics” rather than 
“politics based on ideology” (Interviewee 15). In fact, the protesters share the 
notion that the anti-nuclear movement is a matter of “life”; thus, it is a more 
fundamental issue than the conflict between political theories such as left 
versus right. 
 
Several protesters in my interview commented that the Fukushima disaster 
had changed their idea of how they want to live their lives. For example, one 
protester insisted that “prioritising economic growth cannot protect our lives” 
(Interviewee 20) and another protester emphasised that “we should not be 
wealthier by depending on something uncontrollable” (Interviewee 21). The 
slogans ‘protect lives’ (Inochi wo mamore) and ‘protect children’ (Kodomo wo 
mamore) are common at the anti-nuclear demonstrations, as are ‘no to 
nuclear plants’ (Genpatsu iranai) and ‘no to restart (the nuclear reactors)’ 
(Saikado hantai).  
 
This term ‘life’ may sound like an embodied meta-narrative for politics in 
contemporary society. However, we need to be careful lest even such a 
seemingly universal slogan as ‘protect lives’ sounds empty to certain people. 
Tomohiro Akagi claims that the anti-nuclear protester’s discourse of ‘life is 
more important than money (economy)’ is a utopian statement of middle-class 
people, whole lives are already stable. He ironically comments that those 
people “will be fine” even if the economy shrinks as a result of the abolition of 
nuclear plants, because “it is only the poor people who suffer from the 
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damage of an economic shrinkage” (Akagi, Twitter @T_akagi, 22 Jun 2012). 
He implies that the anti-nuclear protesters know that their own lives are 
sufficiently protected from their own moralistic claim of deterritorialisation to 
save the lives of other people, such as the future generation. Akagi even 
argues that the slogan 'for the sake of children' is the preserve of wealthy 
people who can afford to establish a family with children (Akagi, Twitter, 10 Jul 
2012).  
 
What Akagi does not notice is that the protesters’ statements to ‘protect 
children’ and ‘protect lives’ seem to go beyond the concept of the individual 
lives of themselves, their own children or the people around them. For one 
Kanteimae protester, the disaster revealed that we “need to value life as 
inochi (life-force) rather than as kurashi (the way of individual living).” She 
distinguishes these two as follows: 
 
Inochi is something that relates to our cells, and it is connected with 
the future, while kurashi is the way of life in a limited time. It looks like 
a difference between ethics and common sense. Common sense 
varies in time, while ethics are woven by the accumulation of data we 
acquire through the interaction with others (Interviewee 22). 
 
Her metaphor of a cell as a life is very insightful. From her explanation, we 
can see that what she actually meant by cells is probably the genome, which 
is the “accumulation of data” of all who once lived on earth, and which is to be 
passed on to future generations. Perhaps this is another example of ‘the 
otherness’ living within the self. In this case, ‘the other’ does not even exist, as 
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it is either the past or future generation. Although the voice of such a 
non-existent other cannot be politically represented, it is already living within 
the subject. We feel it rather than recognise it, and that ‘feeling’ affects our 
political decisions and our perceptions of how we want to live. 
 
For this female protester, the slogan ‘protect lives’ (inochi) means more than 
the protection of individual lives. By inochi she means a flow that accumulates 
from the past, involving her own life and continuing to the future. The 
Fukushima disaster shocked her because radioactive contamination, which 
persists for decades, has distorted this life as flow in a way she never wanted. 
Another protester comments: 
 
We could recover from the war, but (the highly contaminated area in) 
Fukushima will remain uninhabitable for a long time. It has happened 
during my lifetime. I want an excuse for our children and 
grandchildren, saying that I have done something (to fix it). I used to 
believe that I would complete my own peaceful life, but I shouldn’t, in 
such a huge mess (Interviewee 23).  
 
Examining the perceptions of Japanese citizens, the philosopher Morioka 
(2012) points out that, for them, the term inochi possesses contradictory 
characteristics of finiteness and infiniteness. On the one hand, life belongs to 
the individual and encompasses birth and death. In this context, life is 
regarded as an independent ‘particle’ with a clear border and limitation. 
However, life can also be seen as a network or a stream of these individual 
lives, which expands through the universe and continues through history 
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(Morioka, 2012). The protesters’ concept of life described above falls under 
the latter description. In such a concept of life, the existence of the self is 
dissolved in a flow of life, as I have examined in the previous section.  
 
It seems that traumatic disaster highlights life as an assemblage. The 
Fukushima disaster revealed the impossibility of the self being disconnected 
from the network of complex society. The slogan ‘protect lives’ could be 
understood as protecting this life as an assemblage, a networked life, rather 
than protecting each independent life. By chanting this slogan, the protesters 
may be declaring that they are part of the flow of life and accepting their 
responsibility to direct it in a better way.  
 
6.3.2 The meaning of life for the post-Fukushima protesters 
If there are two aspects of life, i.e. a solid/closed life-as-particle and a 
fluid/open life-as-assemblage, then there will be two ways of fulfilling one’s life 
or making one’s life meaningful. Manuel De Landa (2011) acknowledges that 
the term ‘meaning’ also has “two meanings”; one is linguistic “signification,” 
and the other is pragmatic “significance.” For instance, a sentence such as 
‘what do you mean?’ asks for signification, clarification and disambiguation. 
However, when someone says his/her life has no ‘meaning’, he/she indicates 
that his/her life is not significant/important to anybody. De Landa (2011) 
mentions that the term ‘significance’ relates to the “capacity to make a 
difference.”  
 
The linguistic form of meaning (signification) and non-linguistic form of 
meaning (significance) appear to have contrasting natures, since the former is 
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about identity, fixation and territorialisation while the latter implies difference, 
change and deterritorialisation. De Landa (2011) notes that these two are 
often confused. In my opinion, those who pursue ‘the meaning of life’ will be 
the greatest victims of the confusion. 
 
Although signification does sometimes make one’s life significant, it may lead 
to self-enclosure. As we have already examined in chapter two, young 
Japanese people have been struggling to perfect the individual life into a 
certain form. They are desperately hoping to have meaningful lives and are 
falling into over-conformity to the dominant value system which provides the 
identification (signification) of themselves.  
 
On the other hand, the meaning of life for most post-Fukushima protesters 
has less to do with signification, or completing the self into some pre-fixed 
form. The MCAN core member Misao Redwolf indicates a value of life without 
signification. After the Fukushima disaster, Misao left her job as an illustrator 
to concentrate on organising the anti-nuclear actions. She explains that her 
“soul desires to be a stone for the foundation of a better society” rather than 
leaving her name as an artist.  
 
Moreover, among all my interviewees Misao Redwolf is the one who talks the 
most about Japanese history and tradition. She appreciates her connection 
with her ancestors, as she believes that it makes us “stop thinking ourselves 
like a dot,” and therefore, 
 
We recognise a vertical line from the past to the future. When we 
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recognise it, what comes to us is a different pride from what we think 
now. Well, probably now I sound like a nationalist, though (Interview, 
16 April 2014). 
  
There is some kind of passivity in Misao’s discourse, as if her life is embedded 
in the background history. However, she also emphasises that she is 
protesting “for herself.” She prioritises individual freedom, saying that 
“freedom means liberation of mind. It means to make a decision on your own” 
(Interview, 16 April 2014). Her entire discourses signify that although her 
sense of ‘self’ is permeated by others in the past and future, she makes her 
own choices, together with those historical others.  
 
Misao’s example shows that a “dissolved” self still has a sense of pride and 
fulfilment that her life is meaningful, enabling her to proudly state that she is 
acting for ‘herself’. The protesters lost “signification” in an assemblage: they 
become a nameless ‘tree’ or a mere ‘number’. Feeling proud of and satisfied 
with this means that they know this nameless existence still has “significance” 
in the assemblage, as it makes a difference to themselves, to others and to 
society. Deleuze explains:  
 
The life of such individuality fades away in favour of the singular life 
immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be 
mistaken for no other. A singular essence, a life... (Deleuze, 2001, p. 
29). 
 
Here, a sense of pride, freedom and a meaningful life are obtained when we 
236 
 
accept that our own lives are confined and restricted to some extent by the 
force of others permeating the self, while we respond to this with our own 
ability and desire, and make a difference to ourselves and society. As Protevi 
(2009, p.37) claims, an individual is both “embodied and embedded” and 
“connected and individuated.” Then, the desire for life as such an individual 
inevitably become political, and potentially ethical. 
 
6.3.3 Politics as the experimentation of bodies 
Morioka (2003) distinguishes two forms of desire in our lives. The “desire of 
the body” relates to life as particle, which seeks self-protection and 
self-reproduction within a closed environment. In contrast, the “desire of life” 
indicates the passion for opening up one’s individual life to new encounters 
and renewal; therefore, it relates to the act of deterritorialisation. Morioka 
(2003) states that, although both are aspects of life, pursuing one form of 
desire limits the pursuit of another form of desire. Desire for a new encounter 
and creation will threaten the stability of the self, and the adherence to 
self-protection denies the opportunity for new creation.  
 
Morioka argues that our civilisation has prioritised the desire for stability and 
self-protection, which he calls “the painless civilisation” (2003). This resonates 
with Osawa’s explanation that, in contemporary Japanese society, people are 
hoping for “the other without otherness” (2008, p.193), and also with 
Baudrillard’s notion that postmodernity is “the hell of the same” (1993, p.122), 
as we have excluded the otherness that threatens our stability.  
 
The Fukushima disaster was a radical crack in such an enclosed society. The 
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post-Fukushima protesters regret their past way of living in the closed territory 
and have now started celebrating new encounters and creation. However, at 
the same time, these protesters, particularly those in NFS, have made it clear 
that they are not completely rejecting the desire for stability and closure. As 
was seen in their celebration of humour, they seemed to concede such a 
desire, because it is also a part of life. Humour is the acceptance of the 
inadequacy of the self to act for other people. An individual life as a particle 
becomes forgetful and lazy and tends to be indifferent to the outside. Instead 
of blaming this desire for self-enclosure, the protesters seek a way for such a 
body to live ethically. The NFS protester Nao Izumori approves of worldly 
desires:  
  
It’s not bad to have economic growth and the culture of affluence. We 
should not stop advancing, because it means to realise a more equal 
society. We should not deny our desire for that. We (as the 
anti-nuclear protesters) should declare “YES, I LOVE urban life, I 
LOVE consumption; but still I dare say this (that we must stop nuclear 
plants)” (Izumori, Interview, 5 April 2012). 
 
He does not deny a self-contented life. Yet he suggests that we at least need 
to try opening it, as it is our responsibility. Through their actions, the 
post-Fukushima protesters may find their own balance between the openness 
and self-closure of life. Its structure is like a “discursive membrane” that has a 
double function to “both isolate cells and connect them to others” (Peltonen, 
2006, cited in Escobar, 2008, p.260).  
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Recently, there has been a tendency to refer to a biological system in the 
search for a new social and political imaginary for the postmodern condition, 
when people can no longer form a cognitive unification based on the common 
cause (De Landa, 2006; Escobar, 2008; Protevi, 2009). In fact, what 
motivates the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters to engage in politics is 
not the humanistic idea of rights or obligations. As one protester comments, 
the anti-nuclear politics is “a matter of life” and “primitive politics” (Interviewee 
15). Izumori summarises this primitive politics of life as follows:  
 
Society is too complicated. Our interests are entangled, and I might 
find myself being a stakeholder of the institutions I hate. If you think 
that it is our sin, then we have to say that we should not be born. A life 
does not have such a thing as theory. It just desires to live. Who can 
judge who is to blame or who is wrong? Nobody can. We need an 
indulgence to accept that and enjoy life... If you can do that, it’s 
natural for you to have no goal (of life). (Izumori, Interview, 5 April 
2012) 
 
His comment suggests that we may need to stop searching for a coherent 
theory for a better life. We have been asking questions framed as ‘what’ and 
‘should’ — what our political responsibility is, to what extent we should care 
for other people, or to what extent we should sacrifice our enjoyment for 
others. These questions seek a solid model of the life that we should live. On 
the other hand, the knowledge sought by the protesters deals with how we 
might enjoy deconstructed lives and make our life-as-particle fulfilling.  
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This may even deconstruct the notion of responsibility. In the NFS 
demonstration, one of its members, Mizuki Nakamura, positively commented: 
 
It is such a terrible time, and it might sound imprudent to say, but I feel 
excitement too, because I can make connection with various people 
locally and create new actions (M. Nakamura, Interview, 6 May 2012). 
 
After the 2012 election, which seemed to reveal the ‘unwillingness’ to change 
by Japanese society in general, I met her again and asked how people might 
accept the responsibility to stay open and to change, instead of pursuing 
self-enclosed stability. She answered as follows: 
 
I just think that stopping nuclear plants and choosing the alternative 
way will be VERY exciting. Anyway the money generated by the 
nuclear industry never comes to our pocket. So what was that for? 
The nuclear plants just separated urban areas (as the consumers of 
nuclear energy) and rural areas (as the producers), creating a huge 
gulf between them. Now we can utilise sustainable energy such as 
solar power and windmills. If we do it locally, we can promote the 
local economy. Nobody loses (M. Nakamura, 13 Jan 2013). 
 
There was no preaching about what we should do in her words, but her 
passion and her smile were so persuasive that I thought that it would indeed 
be very exciting, and I wanted to try it. Another NFS member Yumi Nakamura 
explains her experience of the NFS meetings. There, her opinion changed 
frequently after hearing the passionate voices of the other participants. She 
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recalls that it “felt good” to have her opinion completely changed: 
 
I think that people naturally feel good to change. People have desire 
to change. In NFS, someone’s passionate presentation makes me 
want to do it too, and I feel happy about that. […] It is the feeling of 
opening something that you squeeze so hard. It is like taking a deep 
breath at the top of a mountain, absorbing fresh air into my cell. I 
breathe out some of me, and absorb something new from the other 
people (Y. Nakamura, Interview, 5 June 2015). 
 
It seems that there is something in a body, or a solid self, which desires more 
than mere self-protection. In this sense, ‘Lifeness’ might be created in this 
threshold between the limited body and the flow of life, when the limited body 
carefully tries to dissolve it in order to make a difference in the flow, and in so 
doing it makes its individual life meaningful. The politics of life suggested by 
the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement is not so much about the battle 
against the enclosed body, but more like an experimentation of the body for 
“setting and then breaking limits”:  
  
[W]e don’t know the outcome, and we can’t measure our success. 
Instead we find ourselves working with a different idea of time and 
space, experiencing moments of intense creativity which resonate 
and amplify with others, throwing up new worlds, and new possibilities 
(Free Association, 2006, p.23). 
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6.4 Implications of the post-Fukushima activism 
What kind of implications can be derived from the post-Fukushima activism, 
for the political impasse in contemporary Japanese society? It is probably 
inaccurate to insist that the characteristics of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
protesters described here are completely new to Japanese activism. On the 
contrary, I found that one memoir of the Zenkyoto movements in the 1960s 
and 70s, written by an activist, Shuhei Kosaka, contains strikingly similar 
descriptions to the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements: 
 
For me, the Zenkyoto movement was the attitude when I face the 
other, and when I face myself. [...] The ethical questions have always 
existed in any political movements. However these movements have 
been asking what our obligation is [...] or accusing the gap between 
the moralities and our actual behaviour. Zenkyoto asked completely 
new questions, which was our attitude rather than the rightness. [...] 
The meaning of Zenkyoto cannot be clearly described and conveyed 
in language. It firstly goes under the water, and comes up again with a 
form of affect and the way of life.[...] What is important in life often 
comes beyond one’s intention, and in this sense, I use the term 
‘destiny’ (Kosaka, 2006, pp.204-206). 
 
From Kosaka’s analysis (2006), we can see that what he was pursuing in the 
Zenkyoto movement was not the abstract principle of how he should live; 
rather, he was exercising how he might live. The Zenkyoto students were 
sensing the coming of a new society, in which the conventional political 
ideology becomes incompatible with reality.  
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However, because this ‘sense’ had no language, they had to express it 
through the old frameworks. Their embodied “sense” was moulded into 
dogmatic political terms (Kosaka, 2006; Oguma, 2012). The politics of 
“attitude” became the politics of “rightness”, which is a more familiar 
evaluation of the entire Zenkyoto movement with the image of bloody 
infighting and purges. The Zenkyoto movement could not create a new 
political language based on their sense. In this memoir published a year 
before his death, Kosaka (2006) notes that Japanese society has not yet 
produced any concept to articulate a hope for a new society, even in 2006.  
 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements entail similar politics of attitude 
based on sense. The difference is that the post-Fukushima protesters are 
living in a more ‘postmodern’ world without any transcendental meta-narrative 
for reference. They are more aware that their politics needs to stay in touch 
with their bodies and emotions rather than being conceptualised into abstract 
theory. Still, as argued in the previous chapter, we can observe a tendency to 
solidification and conceptualisation in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movement, in which their emotional discourse becomes disembodied. Yet the 
conceptualisation itself is inevitable, and it is important not to regard this 
tendency as signifying that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement may 
end up with the same impasse as that faced by the Zenkyoto movement.  
 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement includes several currents which 
reject the convergent process and cognitive language. Hajime Matsumoto 
seemed to be uninterested in my question about his ‘goal’ or his ‘ideal 
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society’.  
 
Many people ask me that question, but I don’t know. Ideal society… 
my goal...how can I speak about that? Well, one thing I can say is that 
I want my place to be diverse with many different people. I hate 
capitalism, because it standardises things. It filters whether it makes a 
profit, or whether it is useful. I don’t like that. I like a place filled with 
many people with different sense of value, with people beyond my 
understanding. I hope that those places will exist all over our society. 
Every time I go somewhere, I will be able to get a surprise. It will be 
very interesting to have ourselves and society always open to 
surprise (Matsumoto, Interview, 6 April 2012).  
 
He does not have a goal to reach. Nevertheless, he is not rootless. He seems 
to have an anchor, which he calls a ‘place’ for encountering something which 
gives him surprise. His anchor is not an abstract ideology but the intersection 
between him and other people. It does not guarantee him a permanent resting 
place; rather it brings desire as the impetus for action. In such a movement, 
people anchor themselves with the very network they create, and which they 
are changing (Escobar, 2008, p.268).  
 
Of course, not everyone can live with this level of radical openness like 
Matsumoto does. The precariat activist Amamiya, who has joined many 
actions by Shiroto no Ran, admits that people in Shiroto no Ran are 
communicative and relatively well-educated (Interview, 19 March 2012). 
Moreover, the Koenji area, where they have their base, has traditionally had a 
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counterculture atmosphere. The same thing cannot be achieved everywhere. 
 
However, the NFS member Nawa believes that their lifestyle still gives us 
inspirations to rethink how we might live. Shiroto no Ran was the pioneer of 
going ‘outside’ of the dominant norm. According to Nawa, they are “already 
living in a society without nuclear energy” and “if we keep them in our sight, 
our life will change” (Interview, 17 December 2012). Nawa explains that her 
perspectives have actually been changed by keeping them in her sight: 
 
Before, I wanted to be a normal person. Living a decent life had been 
a guideline of my life. [...] I have tried to be a fully-fledged person. I 
believed that would make my life more fulfilling. But now I realise that 
there was also another way, which is to reverse it (the concept of 
‘fully-fledged’). From now on I will be reversing these unnecessary 
titles (Nawa, Interview, 17 Dec 2012).  
 
A meaningful life, for her, used to be the construction of herself according to 
the dominant norm of society, or of being regarded as a ‘fully-fledged’ member 
of society. However, she found another kind of value in the practice of Shiroto 
no Ran. This corresponds with Matsumoto’s comments about his anti-nuclear 
action. Although he does not think about what he can personally do for other 
people, he believes that, by seeing his action of rejecting authority, “more and 
more people start acting on their own will” (Matsumoto, Shiroto no Ran, talk 
event, 23 Dec, 2012). This is actually happening. 
 
Matsumoto’s view is shared by another anarchistic activist, Kengo Matsunaga. 
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He organised a demonstration in support of the Occupy movement in 2011, 
creating a space for dialogue for the Kanteimae protesters when I first 
interviewed him in 2012; he was studying the mutual help system ‘time bank’ 
when I interviewed him again in 2014. In this second interview, he recalled all 
his experiments and commented: 
 
I don’t think that I personally can make the world better. Yet if 
someone feels empathy with me and joins me one by one, then the 
movement expands, and society will change gradually. [...] I will do 
what I want to do. I am very grateful if my word evokes a response 
from someone (Matsunaga, Interview, 17 May 2014). 
  
Their political efforts never generate one righteous answer or coherent 
principles; however, they do have affects. They convey the desire for opening 
and change to those who encounter them. Their politics is creating “affective 
resonance, where imagination shifts through the interacting bodies” (Shukaitis, 
2007). 
 
The politics in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements tell us that the 
struggle of one person makes a swelling force, and such individual force 
resonates with one another, and forms new actions; then such actions 
resonate and create a new movement, which supplies energy for individuals 
to keep experimenting. Protevi (2009, p.191) calls it the “body politic”; we live 
our lives as “imbrications of the social and the somatic,” from which affect, 
empathy and love are generated. I believe that this is a new political 
imaginary which the activists of the 1960s and 1970s were probably unable to 
246 
 
fully develop, but we are now in the process of developing it again. 
 
Conclusion and further directions 
Many sociologists in Japan have been questioning whether the Fukushima 
disaster or the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements have changed 
Japanese society (Furuichi, 2011; Kainuma, 2012; Miyadai, 2014). In 
addressing such questions, my research at least shows that the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters are signifying a change. However, the 
more important implication of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements is 
that such questions are not particularly useful and need to be changed.  
 
What the protesters learned from the Fukushima disaster was that we are all 
part of on-going social reproduction, and nobody can be a neutral observer. 
Hence, the question to be posed to this movement is not whether it is effective 
or meaningful, but how ‘we’ can make it effective and meaningful for a better 
society. In chapter five and in this chapter, I examined the many struggles of 
the protesters who have experienced “deterritorialisation” and who are trying 
to respond to it in their own way. Rather than posing objective questions and 
making a judgement about “their” actions, we need to ask ourselves how we 
might learn from their practices, and construct our own struggles for a better 
life and society.  
 
This chapter explored the ethics of the protesters, which have replaced the 
political ideology to guide them. Before the disaster, most of the protesters 
believed that their lives would be stable as long as they made an effort to live 
normative lives. However, the disaster revealed the contingent and entangled 
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nature of our lives in contemporary society, where we have difficulty in 
predicting how our own actions will have an impact. The protesters accept 
that they are too forgetful and incomplete to become a rational and moralistic 
subject to work ‘for’ other people. Hence, they mobilise their bodies onto the 
streets and force themselves to feel and think. This chapter identified this as a 
new form of ethics, i.e. of being open to the other.  
 
Several protesters mentioned this openness as their own desire. I argued that 
it is a desire as a ‘dissolved’ self who lives in an indiscernible status with the 
self and the other, and the space of activism is providing the opportunity for 
identity deconstruction and expansion. Those protesters feel proud of, or 
satisfied with, the ‘dissolving’ self in an assemblage, as the encounter with 
unknown people allows them to create new potential together. Hence, I 
argued that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements indicate that 
personal desires might be ethical too. The post-Fukushima activism provides 
a space for affective politics, where a struggle of limited bodies affects other 
bodies, creates new desires and triggers changes in themselves and the 
surrounding environment.  
 
As I wrote in the last section, Kosaka’s description of the Zenkyoto movement 
as the politics of “attitude” (Kosaka, 2006) explains many aspects of the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement. It is very difficult to logically describe 
the post-Fukushima activism because it is in fact the attitude of each 
individual in facing the lives of the others and the self. However, I believe that 
the effort is absolutely necessary to theorise this as a new political imaginary. 
Without this effort, this movement would be judged by the conventional 
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framework of politics, which sees the novelty of this movement as a mere lack 
of what there should be, such as rational plans or moral obligations. What is 
worse is that the people inside the movement are forced to explain it using 
existing theories that are incompatible with the nature of this movement, 
rather like what seemed to happen to the Zenkyoto movement. 
 
For this reason, the rest of this thesis attempts to delineate a new political 
imaginary implied by this post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement. I consider 
this project to be the continuation of a previously discarded attempt in the 
1970s, and it also succeeds many painful struggles by young Japanese 
people in contemporary society. In short, I hope to construct a new political 
imaginary at the intersection of all these struggles in post-war Japanese 
society, the political efforts of the post-Fukushima protesters and my own 
position in academia.  
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Chapter 7 Synthesis discussion I: 
A political imaginary in postmodernity 
 
Introduction 
Chapters five and six analysed my fieldwork research and argued that the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements emerged from the experience of 
“deterritorialisation” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) — the protesters found that 
what they had been blindly accepting, such as the discourses of the 
government, scientists and the mass media, were no longer trustworthy. The 
belief that their lives would be stable collapsed. Those people were motivated 
by their own emotion to join social movements, and this new political 
language of emotions encouraged many other forms of activism in Japan.  
 
Nevertheless, the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements are often 
evaluated by what they lack – an alternative plan, a shared ideology, coherent 
and rational discourses, a sense of obligation, and so on. The conventional 
political theories fail to recognise that their politics operate on a different logic 
with a dissolved subject, affective connections and an ethics of desire, as we 
have already seen in the previous chapter.  
 
Hence, this chapter tries to conceptualise the implications of the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement as a new political imaginary in the 
postmodern condition. First, I provide an overview of the position of this 
anti-nuclear movement in the history of post-war Japanese activism (7.1). The 
novelty of the post-Fukushima activism lies in the motivational factors of the 
protesters because it is neither led by a totalising ideology nor based on the 
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interests of an existing identity. The protesters are building a flexible collective 
identity in the movement based on their personal emotions. 
 
How can this ‘molecular’ language of emotions become political? I argue that 
the post-Fukushima activism signifies two types of political tactics. The 
Kanteimae protest and the subsequent movements are reinvigorating abstract 
universal concepts such as justice and democracy through their embodied 
experience (7.2). I argue that these movements adopt a concept similar to the 
“agonistic” politics proposed by Mouffe (2005). It consists of a form of 
engaged dialogue with the established institutions of power. While it can 
appear antagonistic towards the present political system, it remains 
necessarily, both in its repertoire of action and its acceptance of the location 
of power, a largely ‘majoritarian’ movement. It is therefore constituting a 
hegemonic configuration of power despite and because of its engagement in 
emotional work. 
 
While followers of such liberal trends see emotions as a political resource 
within institutional politics, there are also anarchist currents in the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements, whose emotional politics involve 
creating connections and affects. In the following section (7.3), I explore their 
political imaginary through post-anarchist philosophy (Call, 2002; Day, 2005; 
Newman, 2001, 2007). Although there are some discrepancies between these 
theorists, they all reject the constriction of the absolute foundation and 
reference for politics. Exponents of these ‘minoritarian’ politics celebrate new 
encounters in order to create a new way of living. 
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The final section (7.4) pays attention to the ontological position of the 
post-Fukushima protesters. Political theories normally attempt to provide a 
fair and legitimate political model which all the participant agree with. In this 
framework, what one sees in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements is 
the confrontation of different theories. However, I argue that post-Fukushima 
activism should be seen as a force field where the energies created from 
many different political efforts interact and resonate. The concept of “rhizome” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) explains this political ontology of the protesters 
who are moving around different attractors. I conclude that the novelty of this 
movement lies in this flexible subjectivity which engages in different 
experiment. The political imaginary needs this flexible ontology in order to 
respond to the precariousness of lives in the postmodern condition. 
  
7.1 Post-Fukushima activism as postmodern politics 
In the history of contemporary Japanese activism, the largest mobilisation 
occurred in the student movement in the 1960s. As was examined in chapter 
two, the protest against the revision of the Ampo Treaty (a Japan-US security 
treaty) created turmoil nationwide in 1960. The Zenkyoto movement in the 
late 1960s had a more complex nature as it questioned the hegemonic power 
within the students themselves – within their identity as majority Japanese 
(Iida, 2002). This was the politics of “attitude,” which needed a new political 
language (Kosaka, 2006); however, it was framed by the politics of legitimacy, 
which drove them towards the violent annihilation of what was identified as a 
hegemonic nature within themselves and their fellows (Oguma, 2012). The 
search for a new political language was abandoned in the Japanese 
economic boom, as this provided Japanese people with stable lives and a 
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plausible narrative to follow (Iida, 2002). For most Japanese people, it had 
been considered legitimate to maintain the prevailing system and norms. 
 
On the other hand, new social movements occasionally flared up during this 
period. The Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 triggered the anti-nuclear 
movement in Japan. It was mainly supported by middle-class housewives 
who demanded safe food for their children. According to Suga (2012), this 
movement combined ecologism and feminism to counter the ‘masculine’ 
discourse of politics. Environmental activism successfully stopped the dam 
construction on the Yoshino River in 2000 via a referendum (Takagi, 2004). In 
2003, around 50,000 people joined the march in Tokyo to protest against the 
Iraq war. This mass mobilisation changed the image of street protest with its 
carnivalesque style incorporating music and art, which was adopted in the 
later movements including the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements 
(Gonoi, 2012).  
 
These single-issue movements are often understood as what Melucci (1996, 
pp.34-35) calls a “claimant” movement. It claims policy changes based on a 
clear collective identity, and tries to realise this within the dominant systems. 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement is seen as a single-issue 
claimant movement, because it essentially aims to stop the operation of 
nuclear reactors. As a claimant movement, the impact of this anti-nuclear 
movement is limited. It was unable to prevent the Ohi nuclear power plant 
from resuming operations in 2012, followed by the Sendai plant in August 
2015.  
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However, the evaluation of this movement as a mere claimant movement fails 
to appreciate its crucial impact on contemporary Japanese society. As was 
examined in chapter two, the recession since the 1990s has been 
undermining the once ‘super-stable’ Japanese society, and now a significant 
number of people have been forced to lead precarious lives. However, the 
majority of Japanese people still accept the dominant system and norms. It is 
still rare to hear the foundation itself being questioned. As Akagi (2007, See 
chapter two) indicates, it is his ‘own fault’ that he is poor. His struggle is 
isolated from any social movements based on a pre-existing minoritarian 
identity. While the existing political theories fail to respond to the complex 
nature of society and the fragility of life, the hope for change by some 
alienated young Japanese people turns into violence against the self and 
others. 
 
The most common reaction of political apathy is illustrated by Furuichi (2011). 
As his book entitled The Happy Young People in the Nation of Despair (2011) 
signifies, those young people are ‘enjoying’ their self-protective lives in a 
closed community. In Furuichi’s view, withdrawal into an enclosed life is a 
survival strategy in a complex society. However, this survival strategy drives 
many of them to the painful over-conformity to the prevailing norms of the 
closed community, resulting in the problems of karoshi and suicide. In addition, 
this self-contained lifestyle ignores those who have already lost the stability of 
life and leaves them completely hopeless, as seen in Akagi’s claim. 
 
Hence the premise of postmodern political condition in Japanese society is as 
follows. Unlike the revolutionary movements in the 1960s and 1970s, any 
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totalising political ideology has lost plausibility and people no longer share any 
common cause for revolt. However, unlike the era of high economic growth, 
the fragmented identities of Japanese people are no longer protected by 
social stability. Now they fear poverty, unemployment and overwork, and the 
feeling of alienation is becoming serious. It is obvious that we now need a new 
political theory to reshape our society under these postmodern conditions. 
 
The Fukushima disaster was a critical event because it revealed the fact that 
most people are now facing the precariousness of life. For many Japanese 
people, the Fukushima disaster meant the collapse of the belief that their lives 
would be stable and satisfied as long as they followed the dominant norms. 
The disaster revealed that it was almost a “fake peace” (Interviewee 7, See 
5.2.4) which was hiding the fragile nature of the system. I called this the 
experience of “deterritorialisation” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) in which the 
Japanese people are exposed to the radical ‘outside’. Although this 
experience of deterritorialisation is not always caused by such a catastrophe, 
it seems that the Fukushima disaster brought this experience on an extremely 
large scale, and the anti-nuclear movements became a massive experimental 
field for those people trying to re-create their society in a less painful form.  
 
This awareness of a fragile life pushes the protesters’ imagination beyond the 
existing identities. I argued that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters 
are responding to this precariousness of life by building a new collective 
identity, which Castells (1997, p.8) calls “project identity.” Their form of politics 
is not based on the existing identity which is already fragmented, nor is it led 
by a totalising ideology capable of uniting such fragmented identities. It is 
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each individual’s anger, fear and regret that has fuelled their political action to 
reject reality. Hence, it is beyond the scope of the claimant movements. The 
protesters are reconsidering how to engage in politics and how to relate with 
other people.  
 
Hence I argue that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement marks an 
important milestone in Japanese activism. It came out of the dominant 
atmosphere of hopelessness in contemporary Japanese society, and it is 
probably the first activism to directly tackle the postmodern predicament by 
inventing a new way of doing politics. In the light of the many experiments 
conducted in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement, the rest of this 
chapter attempts to elaborate the new political imaginary in postmodern 
Japan, which is neither ideological politics based on meta-narratives nor 
identity politics based on predetermined attributions.  
 
7.2 The molecular politics of emotions 
7.2.1 Liberalism and the limit of rationality  
The prevailing argument in political philosophy for dealing with a complex 
society remains in the domain of liberal theory, which tries to re-establish 
some kind of meta-narrative and define a solid political subject. John Rawls’ 
theory of justice (1999) is one of the most prominent ones. Rawls proposed 
the famous thought experiment for a fair decision-making procedure. This 
thought experiment places all the participants in what he calls the “original 
position”; they wear “the veil of ignorance” to extinguish all identities and 
interests of individuals (Rawls, 1999). Rawls considers that, in such a 
hypothetical environment, people will agree on the fair principles of justice.  
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Rawls (1999) then elaborates the justice principle that might achieve a 
consensus in such a thought experiment. For example, he considers that 
people in the original position would agree with the “difference principle” 
which allows inequality as long as it provides the greatest benefit for the least 
advantaged person (Rawls, 1999). These principles are all sophisticated and 
plausible. Yet the most attractive point of Rawls’ theory is his explanation of 
the genesis of the justice principle. What, he asks, is the legitimate procedure 
for people living in a complex society to agree with the principle of justice? His 
answer is the hypothetical non-identity situation. This imaginary may be close 
to that of disaster or war, in which everyone becomes equal by losing all they 
have.  
 
On the other hand, Rawls’ theory of justice and his concept of original position 
were criticised on the grounds that political subjects cannot emerge from such 
a non-identity situation. Communitarians offer the most obvious critique, 
claiming that there are no "unencumbered selves" (Sandel, 1982). People are 
embedded in their community and no one can be totally detached from the 
surrounding environmental and cultural constraints. The motivation for any 
political choice must have its roots in one’s identity. This criticism sounds 
plausible. If we problematise identity as skewing fair political decision, what 
else will motivate us to any political commitment?  
 
Habermas (1990) provides an alternative procedure of fair decision-making, 
which concerns the actual identity of people. In his theory, the legitimacy of 
decision-making is guaranteed through the actual deliberation between 
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people with different identities. What is necessary in politics is the public 
sphere that allows all participants to freely discuss and reach agreement. 
 
However, these theories face the problem of membership to claim their 
legitimacy. Neither Rawls’s original position nor Habermas’s public sphere 
can include the voices of the future generation in their legitimate decision 
making procedure. This issue of the future generation is crucial for making 
decisions on nuclear energy, as it leaves highly toxic nuclear waste for 
thousands of years. In addition, any accident may cause huge contamination 
lasting for decades.  
 
In a complex society, we have difficulty constructing a ‘fair’ political decision. 
This is the case not only because of the impossibility of representing the voice 
of the future generation, but also because the interests of the present 
generation have already become unclear. In a diverse society, finding a 
common interest is difficult. Moreover, the Fukushima disaster revealed that 
even personal interests are sometimes unclear, since we are often not fully 
aware of the risks of advanced technology such as nuclear energy until an 
accident occurs.   
 
In my fieldwork, several post-Fukushima protesters commented that their 
stance had “always been anti-nuclear,” but they did not act politically before 
the disaster. These participants regretted the fact that they had expressed 
anti-nuclear opinions only when asked in petitions (Interviewee 24) or 
questionnaires (Interviewee 25) but “had not taken further action.” People’s 
feelings are often too weak to take political action. We were not so sure about 
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our interest, and it was only after the disaster that “I realised this system at 
last. I realised that while I was ignorant, many things had already been 
decided” (Interviewee 26). 
 
Before trying to establish a fair platform for decision-making, the complex 
nature of society requires political theories to consider how we identify our 
political interest to make a commitment in politics. As was mentioned in 
chapter two, the social dissatisfaction among young Japanese people has not 
been channelled into politics. Sometimes they do not even feel it as 
dissatisfaction, as shown in Tomohiro Kato’s comment that he had a “doubt” 
about his unfair treatment but “was not dissatisfied” (See 2.4.2). Similarly, in 
Furuichi’s argument (2011), most young people describe their lives as being 
satisfied despite seeming to feel unbearable pressure to grasp a majoritarian 
life to make their lives satisfied (See 2.3.3). It seems that some liberal theories 
have too much faith in human rationality for them to form the basis of political 
action, while the political impasse in postmodernity actually stems from the 
fact that ordinary people living in a complex society are not always conscious 
of their political claims. 
 
7.2.2 Radical democracy by the inconsistent subject  
Several liberal political theorists try to reflect the nature of complex society by 
reducing the overdependence on human rationality. The theory of liberal 
“ironism” by Richard Rorty (1989) is one such attempt. His ironism derives 
from his attitude of accepting the contingency of the self, who has no “final 
vocabulary” (Rorty, 1989). Based on this notion of inconsistent subjectivity, 
Rorty claims that “we should abandon the hopeless task of finding politically 
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neutral premises which can be justified to anybody” as the legitimate condition 
of democratic politics (Rorty, in Mouffe, 1996, p.4).  
 
In Rorty’s view, we will be able to create solidarity not by rationally sharing the 
universal discourse but “by increasing our sensitivity” (1989, p.xvi), in 
particular, by cultivating the “ability to suffer humiliation” (1989, p.91). Hence, 
Mouffe notes:  
 
Against the type of liberalism that searches for universal rational 
justification and believes that democratic institutions would be more 
stable if it could be proven that they would be chosen by rational 
individuals under the veil of ignorance or in a situation of undistorted 
communication, Rorty’s pragmatism reminds us of the limits of the 
claims of reason (Mouffe, 1996, p.6). 
 
Mouffe categorises Rawls and Habermas as rational universalists, and she 
credits Rorty’s pragmatism. However, Mouffe (1996) casts doubt on Rorty’s 
optimism, since Rorty still believes that there will be an ultimate agreement on 
one liberal value to realise a fair society. Mouffe cannot agree with this. For 
Mouffe, Rorty is not very far from Habermas because both “envisage moral 
and political progress in terms of the universalization of the liberal democratic 
model” (Mouffe, 1996, p.7). Both believe that the creation of consensus is 
possible, and the difference lies in the way of achieving it. While Habermas 
calls for rational communication, Rorty believes that ‘sentimental education’ 
and economic growth would bring a unity to a liberal society. 
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Like Rorty, Mouffe (2005) accepts the contingency of a subject and 
emphasises the role of passions in the formation of political identities. 
However, for her, non-rational discourses are not for building a consensus. 
Rather, Mouffe suggests discarding the pursuit of consensus and argues that 
we should not avoid confrontations because they are the condition of 
democracy (Mouffe, 2005, p.29). Hence, we need a democratic outlet for our 
passions to engage in “agonistic” politics. In her view, democracy is a 
dynamism of hegemonic confrontation between different values, claims and 
political passions, rather than the deliberation towards consensus. When 
democracy is in crisis under the dominance of a single hegemonic power, 
Mouffe seeks a way to “pluralize hegemony” (2005, p.118) by agonistic 
politics with emotions. 
 
Yet it seems that Mouffe’s radical democracy remains in the framework of 
institutional politics. Although Mouffe pays attention to the formation of 
political identity which the conventional theories usually ignore, she seems to 
presume that emotional claims naturally forms a solid political demand to be 
actualised through the existing political institutions. But how can emotional 
expression construct solid political claims that are coherent enough to 
compete with each other? Is this always achievable through the existing 
political system?  
 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements show the process of how the 
initial emotional burst becomes political. Although the anti-nuclear movements 
include several different political thought, the Kanteimae protest deploys the 
similar tactics to Mouffe’s proposal to “pluralize hegemony” (2005, p.118). 
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Mouffe claims that in order to counter the oppression of the present institute of 
sovereignty, we need several other hegemonies to compete with it. When the 
organiser of the Kanteimae protest MCAN states that the purpose of its action 
is to pressurise the government (Noma, 2012; Misao Redwolf, 2013), it 
appears that they are establishing this counter-hegemony. As I mentioned in 
chapter five, the “vessel” of the Kanteimae protest collects people’s anger in 
one place, legitimates its expression and amplifies it. In this process, the 
emotions of ordinary people become the political voice to compete with the 
hegemony of the government. 
 
Yasumichi Noma, who is active in both MCAN and Counter-Racist Action 
Collective (C.R.A.C), claims that their activism works as the re-embodiment of 
liberal values. He points out that the political language of the liberal left used 
to be disembodied and failed to impact on many ordinary people:  
 
The counter-racist actions were previously attempted by the 
well-mannered liberal left. However, sadly, their rational discourse 
preaching that “we can never allow such exclusionism in our society” 
has never reached people’s minds, even though what they said was 
right. […] When you come across those who are shouting on the 
street “Kill the Koreans” or “kick them out of here,” how come you 
keep calm? Isn’t it a more normal reaction to shout back at them, 
“what the hell are you talking about?” (Noma, 2013). 
 
In Noma’s view, the traditional rational liberal discourse became detached 
from the embodied experience of people. Critically, this discourse could not 
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describe anger. In contrast, C.R.A.C’s counter-racist action uses strong 
language in order to denounce the racists. For this reason, their action is 
sometimes criticised for being as violent as that of racists. However, Noma’s 
position is clear: to tackle evil, we have to tactically descend to the same level 
as its perpetrators to form counter-hegemony. Noma still believes that “justice 
is with us” (Noma, 2013).   
 
In the same interview, Noma refers to Rawls’s concept of justice as fairness, 
and his words suggest his liberal tendencies. He is hostile to so-called 
postmodernism, because it deconstructs even the concept of justice. To him, 
justice exists as the transcendental, universal value, but it has been a 
disembodied concept due to the laziness of the traditional liberal left who 
preferred rational intellectual discussion to physical confrontation. Noma 
argues that we need “training and practice” to react immediately to injustice 
when we come across it, and the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement 
worked on such training (Noma, Twitter@kdxn, 6 September 2014).  
 
The anti-government movement is another form of post-disaster activism that 
is similar in nature to the anti-racist actions. Since the LDP’s huge victory in 
the 2012 general election, the LDP-led government proceeded with 
controversial policies by introducing the Secret Information Protection Act and 
lifting a constitutional ban on collective self-defence. In such conditions, those 
‘trained’ protesters quickly organised anti-government actions. Wakagi 
Takahashi (2014), a political scientist and anti-government activist in the 
Tokyo Democracy Crew (TDC), follows Noma’s view and comments that their 
movements are “visualising their anger” (Takahashi, 2014), which has been 
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suppressed in the conventional liberal left. 
 
The notable aspect of these actions is the reintroduction of the language of 
the liberal left into their activism. The terms ‘justice’, ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’ 
and ‘peace’ are frequently mentioned in the movement. Their emotions and 
embodied experiences in activism reinvigorate the once discarded old values. 
Takahashi claims that their actions are “defending post-war democracy” from 
Prime Minister Abe’s revolutionary attempt to destroy it. This re-embodiment 
of liberal values is described well in the message of the rapper and activist 
ECD for the anti-racist campaign: “Let the glossed-over language have power 
(Kireigoto ni chikara wo).”32 
 
7.2.3 Major politics of emotions  
These practices of the post-Fukushima activism indicate that the role of 
non-rational language is crucial for political mobilisation. It forms a political 
counter-discourse and creates dynamism in politics, as Mouffe suggests. 
However there is another concern about emotional language in regard to its 
legitimacy. Mouffe discards the idea of universal consensus whereas most 
liberal theorists usually pursue a consensus because it is the source of 
legitimacy. Without a consensus, how can we justify our decisions?   
 
Actually, Mouffe does not say that we do not need any kind of universal 
consensus. She (2005) acknowledges that we need to agree with the 
grounding principles which enables antagonistic political debate to be 
                                                   
32  From the website of ‘People's Front of Anti-Racism’ [in Japanese]. Available at: 
http://antiracism.jp/march_for_freedom/supporter-289.html 
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possible without descending into unethical antagonism. In short, the platform 
of agonistic debate needs to be institutionalised in advance based on a 
consensus; once the participants accept this rule as legitimate, any decisions 
made by this rule are legitimate. However, this invites another question: how 
can we agree with this rule in the first place? To form a consensus, we 
probably require a rational and coherent subject. It seems that as long as we 
pursue some kind of general principles to guarantee the legitimacy of our 
decision-making, we arrive back at the same problem of how to reach a 
consensus.  
 
Although the Kanteimae protest is adopting an attempt similar to Mouffe’s 
agonistic democracy, the protesters are doing so outside the political 
institutions. While Mouffe legitimates the emotional discourse to become a 
counter-hegemony by institutionalising the system of agonistic democracy, 
the Kanteimae protest skipped this process.  
 
The advantage of emotional language is its promptness, as Noma comments. 
When people feel anger, it directly fuels political mobilisation without the 
legitimation process such as deliberation. Using the terms of Deleuze and 
Guattari (1988), it might be said that the politics of emotions creates 
“molecular” flows, rather than a “molar” planning and ideology. However, how 
such molecular language of emotions on the street can claim its legitimacy to 
form a counter-hegemonic power without the mediation of political 
institutions? 
 
As I examined in Chapter five, the Kanteimae protest frames people’s 
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emotions in everyday life into the mainstream voice in order to compete with 
the present hegemony in the formal political arena. In order to do so, the 
number of the participants is extremely important, as the organiser Misao 
Redwolf (2013) states, because it shows their power and legitimacy of their 
claim. This orientation is also clearer in later movements such as anti-racism 
actions and the anti-government movements. The TDC member Takahashi 
explains:  
 
We identify ourselves as the citizen ‘inside’ the society, and as the 
strong people with sovereign power. In the era when the politicians 
are short-sighted and disgraceful to us, we need to prove that it is we 
who have sovereign power. […] We already have anger and 
dissatisfaction; so we need to visualise it for society. For that, 
politicians who trample on the democratic process should be pointed 
out as the enemy and told to resign (Takahashi, 2014). 
 
This is exactly what Mouffe (2005) considers “the political”; it is this 
antagonism that Mouffe tries to express in agonistic politics in order to fluidise 
the static political order based on laws and morals. The ‘molecular’ language 
of emotions is flexible, and their political actions are changing according to the 
situation. However, the direction, timing and speed of change are regulated in 
order to form a unified power. Although their ‘molecular’ political force of 
emotions does not pursue the objective of establishing another hegemonic 
institution, they may be creating a single flow of emotions to counter the 
existing form of sovereignty, which is somewhat closer to the term 
‘atmosphere’ (See chapters two and three). This is a form of hegemonic 
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power in Mouffe’s sense: for her, hegemony means the creation of the order 
which excludes other possibilities (2005, p.18). 
 
It is the novelty of the Kanteimae protest that it creates new political practices 
based on emotions, to challenge the present system. However, they accept 
the existing political system based on sovereignty, and its tactics are 
elaborated to work within it. They are challenging the existing hegemonic 
institution by insisting that their political claim is more legitimate and should 
become dominant. 
 
The Kanteimae protest is largely ‘majoritarian’ in a sense of Deleuze and 
Guattari (1988, p.105), who define majority as “a constant” and 
“homogeneous systems” while minorities are “subsystems”. A majority is not 
necessarily defined by its size but it is rather “a model you have to conform” 
(Deleuze, 1995, p.173); therefore when “a minority creates models for itself, 
it’s because it wants to become a majority”. The Kanteimae protest is 
establishing this majoritarian model, and therefore this action should be 
distinguished the non-hegemonic and “minoritarian” anarchist current of the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement, which I later explain in this chapter 
as the politics of affect.  
 
As I already mentioned, this hegemonic nature of the Kanteimae protest is 
criticised by several intellectuals as populistic. For example, the sociologist 
Hiroshi Kainuma (2012) comments that the protesters are imposing their own 
justice. The critic Hiroki Azuma illustrates the Kanteimae protest as “leftist 
populism” and claims that “nothing comes out from it” (Twitter, @hazuma, 14 
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July 2013). While Mouffe’s agonistic democracy is institutionalised and she 
presumes that “pluralised” hegemonic powers compete under the agreed rule, 
the Kanteimae protest constitutes a hegemonic flow outside of political 
institutions in order to influence representative democracy. It may therefore be 
reasonable for the political scientist Kazuto Suzuki (2012) to call this action 
“undemocratic.” As politics on the street may establish another unchallenging 
hegemony outside formal politics. 
 
The political scientist and anti-nuclear activist Chigaya Kinoshita has a 
different view. He admits that the post-Fukushima activism signifies the nature 
of populism (Kinoshita, 2012, 2013). However, he emphasises that the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement is a grass-roots form of populism as 
opposed to the populism incited by the authoritarian nationalists. 
 
Kinoshita’s distinction is important to refute the simplistic equation of populism 
with problematic politics. However, the majoritarian nature of these actions 
certainly has a disadvantage as well as advantages. Although the protesters 
started from fluid emotional language, their orientation to majority-ness 
eventually solidifies their action and language and excludes other potentials. 
The activist Seiji Uematsu criticises MCAN for framing themselves as forceful 
people, as their voice may drown out the voices of the further politically weak 
people. Instead of ‘power-versus-power’ politics, Uematsu is searching for a 
way to “express ourselves as the weak” and wants the movement “to wander, 
waver and becoming entangled” (Interview, See 5.3.2).  
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7.2.4. Minor politics of emotions 
I agree that this majoritarian tendency in the Kanteimae protest has a problem. 
However my view is also different from that of Uematsu as my fieldwork 
suggests that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters largely shared an 
aspect of wandering. Although the unified political claim of the Kanteimae 
protest looks majoritarian, the narratives of the Kanteimae protesters as 
individuals were mostly based on personal emotions of anger, confusion and 
regret.  
 
It is notable that the discourses of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters 
were mostly occupied with their personal emotions, especially the period 
before the series of general elections, while the subsequent activism such as 
anti-racism and anti-government movements put more emphasis on universal 
values such as justice, equality and democracy. Despite the fact that 
significant amount of protesters in these actions overlap, usage of such 
abstract political concepts were less in the anti-nuclear movements.  
 
This may be because the anti-nuclear movement was the first large-scale 
activism by ‘non-political’ citizens for decades. For them, expressing their 
emotions may have been the only way of doing politics. Their language may 
have naturally become more polished in the subsequent movements as they 
became more experienced. 
 
However, another reason may lie in the nature of the anti-nuclear movement 
itself. The issue of nuclear energy inevitably highlights the complex power 
relations between the government, municipalities, scientists, the nuclear 
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industry, electronic companies, employees and consumers. The anti-nuclear 
protesters face many criticisms; abandoning nuclear energy may damage our 
economy. It will reduce employment opportunities in the depopulated area. 
Rather than framing their claim as universally and morally right, the protesters 
tended to make their political claim based on their personal desire. 
 
These personal discourses themselves are in fact already political, even 
without conceptualisation or legitimatisation. The practices of the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters notify us that politics is more than the 
coordination of political demands and the actualisation of it through the 
existing institutions, or the construction of the legitimate order. Their emotional 
expressions are the rejection of their past selves who passively accepts the 
ready-made discourses, and it contains what we call micropolitics, or a 
cultural exploration for “creating new modes of being and relating” (Osterweil 
and Chesters, 2007, p.254). 
 
Connolly (2013, p.188) calls this politics the accumulation of “role 
experimentation” by people, who are reconsidering a place to shop or things 
to buy, who start travelling to broaden their perspectives or seeking new 
friends, and so on. This is exactly what the anti-nuclear protesters are doing, 
especially those in Shiroto no Ran and NSF. The protesters in Shiroto no Ran 
and NFS were not trying to prove the legitimacy of their claim to other people. 
Instead they expressed their desires about how they want to live, which 
affects and being affected by the people around them. I believe this is another 
kind of politics based on the molecular language of emotions.  
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Hence, I argue that this ‘molecular’ political language actually has two 
dimensions. It is possible to say that of Shiroto no Ran, NFS and MCAN and 
the subsequent movements are all motivated by the participants’ own 
emotions and their particular experiences, which signifies the novelty of the 
post-Fukushima activism. Yet we need to distinguish two tendencies of the 
molecular language of emotions. The difference lies in the way they use this 
emotional language. The politics of the Kanteimae protesters and their 
subsequent actions mostly claim the legitimacy of their molecular flow of 
emotions by showing unity, while the emotional politics implied by Shiroto no 
Ran and NFS’s action is non-hegemonic experiments outside this legitimacy 
claim.  
 
The difference is seen in their slogans too. In MCAN’s Kanteimae protest, the 
participants express the power of the people by chanting “it’s our turn to make 
them (the government) obey us.” This is also often heard in the 
anti-government actions. In contrast, Shiroto no Ran adopted the policy “we 
are not obeying them.”33 NFS also seems to have this tendency. While the 
former is a molecular-“majoritarian” movement which pursues the hegemonic 
power, the latter is molecular-“minoritarian,” which signifies the flight from the 
hegemonic power, in the sense of Deleuze and Guattari (1988). In this case, 
emotional language does not claim legitimacy by forming a majority; it simply 
                                                   
33 It is said that both slogans belong to the same person, a rapper called ECD. On his 
Twitter account, he explains that he changed his original slogan of “We are not the 
people who obey you” into “it’s our turn to make them obey us” after the 3/11 disaster 
(ECD, Twitter@ecdecdecd, 16 August 2012), which signifies his shift from 
non-hegemonic to hegemonic politics. On the other hand, Matsumoto in Shiroto no Ran 
still repeats this ‘non-hegemonic’ discourse of “not obeying you” as we have already seen 
in chapters five and six. 
271 
 
creates an affect and disseminates new actions. This trend cannot be 
explained within the framework of political liberalism, and we need to focus on 
anarchism. 
 
7.3 Understanding the politics of affect 
7.3.1 Anarchism of subjectivity 
According to Newman (2001, p.40), radical political theories are “haunted” by 
questions such as “what replaces the state?” or “what replaces power?” He 
insists that both Marxism and liberal political theories are based on the 
concept of social contract and paradigm of the state. On the other hand, 
anarchism goes beyond these ideas of governance based on social contract - 
“Anarchism is the story of man” (Newman, 2001, p.37). Hence, an anarchist 
might reframe a political question to enquire how individuals might live 
satisfactorily.  
 
Anarchism itself has many trends. It seems that traditional anarchists have an 
essentialist notion of human subjectivity. For example, Newman (2001, p.39) 
notes that Bakunin uses an “enlightenment humanist framework” and 
considers that human beings are essentially moralistic and rational. 
Meanwhile, Kropotkin presumes that the human being has an instinctive drive 
for mutual help (Newman, 2001). The assumption is that human nature is 
fundamentally good, moralistic or cooperative; therefore, if we liberate it from 
suppressive hegemonic institutions, those individuals will naturally create a 
harmonious society. In short, the political project of traditional anarchism is 
summarised as the liberation of this human nature from state power (Newman, 
2001; Call, 2002). 
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This essentialist view held by traditional anarchists appears similar to that of 
the liberal theorists: they presume that people are naturally social and political. 
However, the subjects in complex contemporary society have little idea about 
how their actions impact on society, other people and themselves. The social 
relationship is not as simple as that between the oppressive institution and the 
subject. We may deliberately choose an action that ends up narrowing our 
own life potential, or we may be unwittingly sacrificing others for our own life.  
 
The complexity of post-industrial society was analysed by the Situationist 
International in France in the 1950s and 1960s (See 3.3.1). They argued that 
it is not the hegemonic institutions outside of us that oppress us. We 
internalise the consumerist norm within ourselves and mould our desire in 
accordance with the market trend. Hence, instead of claiming the liberation of 
essentially rational or moralistic subjects from the hegemonic institutions, the 
situationists claim that we should follow our authentic desire within ourselves 
for a lived experience (Debord, 1983; Vaneigem, 1983).  
 
This political project of liberating desire seems to be a subversive approach 
against the invisible hegemony in a complex society. This philosophy is 
shared by anarchism in the postmodern era, such as Hakim Bey’s “Temporary 
Autonomous Zone” (1991, See 3.1.1). Shiroto no Ran may be seen as part of 
this trend, as the political scientist Gonoi (2012) compared the liberated space 
they created in their anti-nuclear mobilisation with the concept of TAZ.   
 
However, as chapter two has already pointed out, this ‘liberated desire’ could 
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flow in the direction towards the major power that oppresses us. Moreover, an 
unrestricted desire might be equated with the selfish pursuit of own interest by 
sacrificing other people. Liberation of the personal desire is also the claim of 
neoliberalism, which rejects state regulation and celebrates individual 
competition. Taylor (2013) notes that the post-anarchists’ anti-ideological 
pluralism is similar to the neoliberalist view of “End of History”. In addition, 
both celebrate creativity; the former’s Do it Yourself (DIY) ethos is compatible 
with Entrepreneurialism (Taylor, 2013). 
 
The anarchist tendency in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements 
received criticism in this context. The critic Hidemi Suga (2012) notes that the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement entails an individualistic culture which 
shares the same worldview as that of neoliberalism. For example, Shiroto no 
Ran remained indifferent to the protesters arrested during its mobilisation, 
whereas in the traditional left movement, activists are more unified and 
organise support. For Suga (2012), their anarchist ethos is based on 
‘self-responsibility’, which endorses the neoliberal discourse. Suga (2012) 
also points out that Shiroto no Ran and the other post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
protesters lack a global perspective. Although these protesters are passionate 
about shutting down nuclear plants in Japan, they are relatively indifferent to 
Japan’s policy of exporting nuclear reactors. In short, the politics of ‘desire’ 
are denounced as lacking ethics.  
 
However, chapter six has argued that the politics of desire pursued by the 
post-Fukushima protesters is actually ethical, due to the notion of the 
“dissolved” self (Deleuze, 1994). Comparing the libertarian theorist Robert 
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Nozick with Deleuze, Bell (2003) argues that although both will agree that no 
social entity should transcend individual desires, Deleuze does not claim that 
individuals are transcendent entities. His philosophy not only discredits the 
idea of absolute social entities but also disproves a solid individual entity. As 
the subject of the desire is not a solid entity, the desire cannot be 
self-contained. 
 
The ambiguity of the selfhood was highlighted by the Fukushima disaster, as it 
was a force from the ‘outside’ that destabilised the self. Connolly (2013) 
analyses that although neoliberals celebrate the spontaneous order in the 
market, they tend to see the market system itself as a closed system which 
works under the “impersonal rationality.” However, the market system is a part 
of the open system where the different forces interpenetrate; therefore, this 
system is affected by a variety of unpredictable outside factors and renders 
the lives of the individuals in this network more precarious than they imagine. 
 
The awareness of this open system was mentioned by my interviewee Nawa, 
who said that the Fukushima disaster “showed that even the value of 
immovable property loses its value” (See 6.2.1). The disaster made her 
realise that they are the “99%” of people who face the precariousness of life, 
and who cannot disconnect their lives from a fluid and complex society.  
 
A life is not complete within itself, and it always goes beyond the 
comprehension of one individual. Therefore, the protesters seek encounters 
in the street and make connections. Although the awareness of the 
incomplete self does not become a motivation for resistance, it brings a desire 
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for encounters and connections. Their desire for a better life is not 
self-contained. It involves other people. Here we can see the different 
worldviews of the politics of desire between neoliberalism and 
post-anarchism.  
 
A capitalist entrepreneur is looking for potential moments of excess in 
order to enclose it, to privatise it, and ultimately feed off it. Our angle 
is to keep it open, in order to let others in, and to find out how it might 
resonate with others and hurl us into other worlds and ways of being 
(Free Association, 2006, p.18). 
 
This notion of the inconsistent and ambigious self is not an entirely novel 
concept of postmodernity. Newman (2001) traces it back to Max Stirner. 
Newman insists that Stirner’s concept of the self is “empty, undefined, and 
contingent,” and it is constantly in the process of recreating (2001, p.66). 
There is no authentic self to be liberated from the oppressive power. For him, 
insurrection means to reject one’s enforced identity and liberate one’s 
potential to “reinvent oneself” (Newman, 2001, p.68). Hence, Newman notes 
that Stirner proposes an “anarchism of subjectivity” rather than “anarchism 
based on subjectivity” (Newman, 2001, p.66).  
 
Nietzsche is another thinker who insists on an “anarchy of subject” (Call, 
2002). Call (2002) claims that Nietzsche deconstructed the conventional 
human subjectivity which penetrates the Enlightenment-based modern 
political theory. The modern political theory presumes a subject who is always 
consistent and rational. On the other hand, Nietzsche believes that human 
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subjectivity is in a state of flux and “change is the very heart of who and what 
we are” (Call, 2002, p.50). Call (2002) argues that Deleuze and Guattari find a 
revolutionary possibility in this subjectivity, which engages in a constant value 
creation and self-overcoming.  
 
Call even notes that reprogramming or redesigning ourselves is “our primary 
duty” (2002, p.52). Although this term ‘duty’ sounds moralistic, the previous 
chapter noted that several post-Fukushima protesters had expressed this 
self-overcoming as their own desire rather than their duty. The NFS organiser 
Mizuki Nakamura felt “excited” by her political commitment as it would bring 
new connections. Another organiser, Yumi Nakamura, also commented that 
encountering different opinions and having oneself changed might be part of 
our desire (See 6.3.3). These examples from among the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear protesters show how the ‘post-anarchistic’ desire takes a different 
path from neoliberalism. 
 
The post-anarchist theory challenges the self-enclosure of neoliberalism by 
claiming that complete closure is impossible in a fluid and open system. In 
contemporary Japanese society, people like Akagi are told that their 
precarious lives are their own fault as they cannot accommodate themselves 
to the ‘impersonal rationality’ of the market. Liberals will be able to counter this 
by calling for human rationality to form solidarity and establish a fair, inclusive 
political order. Yet, there are always people whom such political communities 
fails to include, due to the limitation of our imagination and also due to rapid 
changes in society. Akagi claims that he is in such an air pocket. The future 
generation tends to be outside of our rational concern. Hence, another 
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political approach is needed to ‘fill the gap’. We need this anarchist politics of 
desire which encourages encounters and making connections, where there 
are no existing theories, collective identities and political concepts.  
 
7.3.2 Reconciling unity and diversity? 
Call (2002, p.118) briefly outlines the academic theories that might contribute 
to post-anarchism. Based on this outline and his arguments, I summarise that 
it celebrates the following:  
1) An anarchy of the subject, or the notion of the self as the process of 
becoming, as suggested by Nietzsche 
2) Foucault’s micropolitics as the resistance to the power to mould our way of 
life  
3) Critique of representations, seen in the work of the situationists and 
Baudrillard 
4) Incredulity towards meta-narratives, proclaimed by Lyotard 
5) Rhizomatic nomad thinking of Deleuze, as opposed to the convergence 
towards universality 
 
It seems that the earlier criteria may also be met by some liberal political 
theories, while the latter criteria are more specific to anarchists. For example, 
Rorty’s (1989) view of the subject is anarchic rather than coherent, as I 
mentioned earlier. This notion is mostly shared by the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear protesters I observed, such as MCAN, NFS, and Shiroto no Ran. 
It can be noted that these are not the entire characteristics of the movement, 
as there are also the old revolutionary left and right-wingers in this movement. 
However, my fieldwork did not focus on those who are internalising a totalising 
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ideology. This is because the anarchy of the subject is the starting point of my 
research, which asks how this ambiguous self can avoid being apathetic.  
 
The second criterion of micropolitics still explains most of my research targets. 
MCAN’s Kanteimae protest is less clear about this, because its aim is to 
impact on the government. However, they reject the traditional 
anti-hegemonic view which equates the political struggle with the battle 
against the state. MCAN members and the Kanteimae protesters are more 
cautious of the complex and entangled nature of power in contemporary 
society (See 5.3.1).  
 
Nevertheless, MCAN, C.R.A.C and TDC are clearly distinguished from the 
post-anarchistic currents because they do not meet the remaining criteria, 
which are the rejection of representation, meta-narratives and celebration of 
rhizomatic dissemination. Actually, these are usually considered political 
defects. Although the rhizomatic nature of NFS and Shiroto no Ran brought 
creativity to political practice, their policy to “connect with everything” 
(Williams, 2013; See 5.4.4) is incompatible with electoral politics, which 
requires a consensus on ‘what to connect’ in order to win. Their other policy, 
to “forget” once-established organisations, makes their actions quite 
short-lived. As I mentioned in chapter five, Shiroto no Ran withdrew from its 
role as the influential demonstration organiser after six months. As the 
interviewee Mizuki Nakamura states (See 5.4.4), NFS was also a temporary 
emotional eruption, and the participants moved to different actions without 
sticking to their “brand”.   
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Hence, while Call (2002) celebrates the loss of meta-narratives and 
rhizomatic dispersion in political movements, another post-anarchist theorist, 
Saul Newman (2007), emphasises that politics need some kind of consensus. 
On the one hand, Newman’s anarchist perspective claims that politics are 
possible for a dissolved subject, because he/she is motivated by his/her own 
emotions aroused by a particular event. On the other hand, as I analysed in 
chapter three, Newman (2007) argues that these particular actions are 
vibrating each other and eventually converge into “unstable universalities,” 
which become the basis of democratic politics.  
 
Although his concept of these “unstable universalities” is not articulable in 
advance, it is a kind of a meta-narrative, or a transcendental reference, which 
is created retrospectively in the movement. Newman notes that we need “a 
new International” which runs a global project of constructing “a common 
political imaginary, a common vision of what the world should be” (Newman, 
2007, p.189). In his idea, “the basis for this new International might be found 
in the existing anti-globalisation movement, although it obviously requires 
much greater political elaboration and organisation” (Newman, 2007, p.189). 
What could be this new political project? Newman notes that although it 
emphasises organisation and unity, it should not sacrifice the difference seen 
in the anti-globalisation movement.  
 
To become a consistent and coherent political project, it requires some kind of 
moulding. We probably need a logic of legitimacy and rational discourse for 
the moulding process, and this will invalidate the affective aspect of emotional 
language. In the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement, this moulding 
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process divided the protesters rather than unified them, as was seen in the 
debate over the elections (See 5.4).   
 
It seems that these arguments still presume that politics is only about fair 
collective decision-making; therefore, in order to make a fair decision, 
legitimacy is required. Even these theorists reject a rational and coherent 
subject in politics; they still share the premise that politics needs a model. In 
this sense, Newman’s suggestion may be not so far away from those of 
Mouffe (2005). I agree with Newman when he criticises Mouffe’s proposal of 
resisting the single sovereignty by pluralising hegemony, claiming that: “I fail 
to see why this is necessarily a better scenario: rather than having one single 
site of oppression and domination, we have several” (Newman, 2010, p.94). 
However, when Newman proposes a global project with “a common vision of 
what the world should be,” which is “much greater political elaboration and 
organisation” than anti-globalization movements (Newman, 2007, p.189), it 
sounds like he is excluding some other potentials of politics in his favour of “a 
new International.” 
 
Mouffe’s radical democracy defines a legitimate system while allowing 
divergence as a result. On the other hand, Newman rejects any fixed political 
arena and assumes some sort of universality as a result. Despite the 
methodological difference, both believe that a political project needs a 
universal model, and both try to reconcile particularity and universality, 
emotions and reasons, diversity and unity. However, the problem is that 
agreeing on a single model often sacrifices particularity, emotions and 
diversity.  
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It is not my intention to invalidate these theories of radical politics, since they 
all share the awareness of an inconsistent self in a complex society, where 
social relationships are entangled. In such a condition, our political concern is 
bound to the here and now and is limited to what is achievable in the existing 
systems. This is why they try to reflect emotions into politics in order to bring 
fluidity in politics. This approach is necessary. However, my point is that the 
attempt to make a universal political model appears problematic, as it reduces 
its flexibility in politics. 
 
Newman (2011) acknowledges that there are two trends in post-anarchism: 
“transcendence” and “immanence” (See 3.4.3). As noted in chapter three, 
Newman seems to favour transcendence rather than immanence. On the 
other hand, referring to the “immanent” philosophy of Deleuze and Foucault, 
Smith (2012, p.346) argues that the “error of transcendence would be to posit 
normative criteria as abstract universals, even if these are defined in 
intersubjective or communicative terms.” From the viewpoint of “immanence,” 
these transcendental norms must be thrown into the process of changing, and 
its process “must account for both the production of the norm and its possible 
destruction or alteration” (Smith, 2012, p.346-7).  
 
Patton (2000, p.9) notes that, if we understand the world as “a complex of 
interconnected assemblages,” then the only possible ‘norm’ is “that of 
deterritorialisation.” Deterritorialisation brings turmoil and creates many 
accumulation points, or what Deleuze and Guattari (1988) call “plateaus,” 
where new identities and new practices are created. Deleuze also notes that if 
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we dare to use the term ‘essence’, it is “precisely the accident, the event, the 
sense” (Deleuze, 1994, p.191). The Fukushima disaster was one such event 
that marked a point of deterritorialisation and brought many political actions 
as new creation.  
 
The ‘norm of deterritorialisation’ does not signify the completely atomised 
individuals wandering hopelessly in a world of pure chance. It is neither 
presuming the re-establishment of transcendental reference. What it assumes 
is some immanent forces within individuals that enable them to make 
assemblage, keep asking and creating. Only in this way we can pursue some 
coherence in diversity without sacrificing diversity; and among Call’s criteria of 
post-anarchism, the concept of “rhizome” thinking by Deleuze and Guattari 
(1988) signifies the potential of such collectivity. 
 
7.3.3 Post-anarchism and the concept of rhizome 
As I have examined in chapter five, the rhizomatic thinking is seen in the 
post-Fukushima protesters around NFS and Shiroto no Ran. Shiroto no Ran’s 
Hajime Matsumoto seems to be disinterested in any attempts of making 
consensus. When he visited Zuccotti Park in New York City in October 2011, 
he even found the attempt to form a human microphone “unpleasant.” 34 
What inspired him in the Occupy Wall Street movement was the alternative 
                                                   
34 From the author’s indirect observation. This comment was made by Matsumoto at the 
talk event entitled “Demo kara furikaeru 2011 nen (Looking back the demonstrations in 
the year 2011) held on 17 December 2011 in Tokyo. Matsumoto was talking with a 
cultural anthropologist, Masanori Oda (a.k.a. Illcommonz). Available online at YouTube: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEnun7Pq2gU or Magazine 9: 
http://www.magazine9.jp/article/gakko_report/5010/ 
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way of living that occupants attempted in the park, rather than their process of 
collective consensus-building, which attracted many academic researchers.  
 
Matsumoto disclosed that, when he was asked by local activists there about 
how to make a consensus in Japan, he answered, “we get drunk and it goes 
smooth.”35 The space which Shiroto no Ran created in 2011 was a temporal 
space that existed for just a few hours. It was more like a chaotic space of 
encounters than a space for consensus-building or deliberation. Perhaps 
what he expects from a public sphere is not so much linguistic deliberation to 
establish a commonness but, rather, infectious dissemination through 
emotional attachment.  
 
NFS has similar characteristics. NFS has meetings, but what the participants 
celebrate is not the moment when the argument reaches a consensus but 
creates a “swell” which completely turns over what the participants expect and 
brings somewhat eccentric ideas. In short, they are enjoying the act of 
creation in chaos rather than finding an answer acceptable to all the 
participants. Although these actions are short-lived, the energy created in 
such actions remains and encourages each participant to create different 
actions. 
 
Still, the rhizomatic philosophy of post-anarchists seems unpopular in politics. 
Shiroto no Ran has received criticism from its closest neighbours, who accept 
the anarchy of the subject. A core member of MCAN and C.R.A.C (Counter 
Racist Action Collective), Yasumichi Noma, shows his disagreement with 
                                                   
35 From the same talk event as listed above. 
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anarchistic politics. He reveals that MCAN’s protest style, with its simple and 
repetitive slogans, was adopted from one of its member groups, 
‘TwitNoNukes’, of which Noma was a staff member. He notes that the 
demonstrations by TwitNoNukes were the “antithesis” of Shiroto no Ran-type 
anarchism (Noma, 2012, p.259) because their carnivalesque movements are 
not acceptable to everyone. In fact, carnivals bring a rupture in everyday life 
and make people feel uneasy. The Kanteimae protest enabled huge 
mobilisation because it is a normative action that exists on the extension of 
our everyday activities.  
 
Noma claims that Shiroto no Ran’s anarchist policy – “fight playfully in a 
restrained life” -- does not match the atmosphere of the time. It inherits the 
counterculture spirit of the 1990s, which was, for Noma, “a mere pretence of 
social dropouts only enabled by the prosperous economy” (Twitter@kdxn, 21 
November 2014). As Shiroto no Ran appeared in the post-bubble recession in 
the mid-2000s, they reframed their action as “the revolts by the poor”; 
however, Noma insists that their politics of ‘creating chaos in nasty society’ is 
already a “luxury” for many young people now, as they are facing more 
serious threats in their lives. Holding a street party is “wasting the space” for 
politics; Noma comments: 
 
While the older generation enjoyed creating disorder in society [to 
change it], the young generation knows that if society is broken down, 
it is them who suffer the most. That is why their [younger people’s] 
expression becomes more straight and stylish, showing their anger 
and saying that we are serious (Noma, Twitter@kdxn, 21 November 
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2014). 
 
Noma makes the point that simple expression of anger in front of the 
Kanteimae protest may be more accessible for ordinary people compared 
with the norm-breaching carnivals, and it is also compatible with the mood of 
this era. Thus, the Kanteimae protest successfully mobilised huge number of 
people, which pressurised the government to listen to them. Noma’s criticism 
against Shiroto no Ran looks similar to the description that the carnivalesque 
alter-globalisation movement (AGM) received as somewhat ‘immature’ 
politics.  
 
Gerbaudo (2014) argues that the so-called ‘squares movement’ such as the 
Occupy Wall Street (OWS) indicates the “maturity” of activism compared with 
AGM. According to him, the squares movement emphasises unity and totality, 
while AGM has more post-anarchist tendency to emphasise autonomy and 
diversity. He argues that the AGM’s lack of coherence could not exclude 
militant tactics and violent repression against it. On the other hand, he 
describes OWS as more coherent political project, in which a different political 
colour of individuals created a “fusion” which became a coherent whole, and 
they could represent themselves with a common identity as “the 99%”.  
 
Gerbaudo (2014) describes OWS as “majoritarian” movement, which 
represents itself as the unity of ordinary people without a particular political 
colour, whilst the AGM is a “minoritarian” movement which stresses sectional 
identities. Here Gerbaudo (2014) uses the term “minoritarian” politics in the 
same sense as identity politics, and argues that the emphasis on this identity 
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in the AGM hindered a coherent political project. However, the argument of 
AGM as “minoritarian” movement does not mean that the movement has its 
basis on a particular attribution; instead, it refers to the act of “becoming minor” 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) sense, in which established and fixed 
identities are reconfigured through encounters and connections (Chesters 
and Welsh, 2006). 
 
Examining the protest events in Prague in 2000 against the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, Chesters and Welsh (2004, 2006) argue that 
the implementation of different colours in the march helped to form a temporal 
unity between the groups with different political orientations, whilst it 
simultaneously sustained the difference and tension between them. The 
protest space is not described as making a fusion of different identities, but a 
resonance of different identities. This type of politics does not establish a fixed 
collective identity as a form of more legitimate representation; instead, it 
creates new political repertories and reconfigures the identities of individuals 
and groups (Chesters and Welsh, 2006). 
 
In this sense, OWS should also be said as ‘minoritarian’ movement. However, 
this minoritarian aspect cannot be evaluated within the conventional political 
framework of representation. Gerbaudo seems to put more importance on the 
squares movement rather than AGM, because its collective identification as 
the 99% and its consensus making process is also understandable in the 
conventional politics of representation.  
 
There is similar presumption in Noma’s view that the Kanteimae protest is 
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more developed politics compared with the carnivalesque Shiroto no Ran. 
This may look plausible, as my fieldwork shows that the carnivalesque 
movement initially encouraged the people’s emotional outburst, and later the 
Kanteimae protest proposed more normative action to work within the 
representative system. However, can we describe it as a process of 
“maturation”? Are the carnivalesque movements to be eventually replaced by 
more consistent form of politics to work within institutional settings?  
 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement shows that it is not a linear 
process. Minoritarian actions co-exist with the Kanteimae protest. Moreover, 
when the confidence in activism and the engagement in electoral politics 
makes the protesters’ discourse solid and closed from outside, it seems to be 
these carnivalesque actions that escape this ‘reterritorialisation’ and fill the 
gap between the protesters and the people outside.  
 
Hence, rather than being ‘immature’ politics, Shiroto no Ran indicates a 
different type of politics. This does not mean that Shiroto no Ran is the model 
of postmodern politics. “Shiroto no Ran is not the answer,” as the NFS 
protester Kaori Nawa comments (Interview, 17 December 2012). Their politics 
is something like: “if we keep them in our sight, our life will change” (See 6.4). 
It has a role of catalyst. People receive energy from it and pour it into their 
own struggle. 
 
If we need to choose only one model, carnivalesque politics is certainly 
problematic. However, the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements contain 
diverse political attempts that come out of the event of deterritorialisation. It 
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will never converge into one political model. There are some flows escaping 
the convergence and recreating actions, practices and identities. Hence, my 
proposal to the political theorists is to stop assuming that there is only one 
coherent political order. “Unity in diversity” may not be achieved as a political 
model which reconciles unity and diversity. Can we pluralise and fluidise 
politics itself, rather than making a more flexible political order?  
 
Chesters and Welsh describes AGM as a “plateau” from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1988) concepts, and it constitutes of “a parallelogram of forces” 
(2006, p.128) by different identities, such as peasant, socialist, anarchist, 
feminist, liberal and environmentalist. This plateau works as “a strange 
attractor,” where encounters between these different identities generate an 
unexpected outcome (Chesters and Welsh, 2006).  
 
After the Fukushima disaster, “deterritorialised” individuals gathered and 
constructed assembles, each of which generated different type of actions. 
Some assemblages generated strong force fields which attracted many 
people; for example, the attractor created by the Kanteimae protest enabled 
people to make a stable revolving orbit around it. On the other hand, Shiroto 
no Ran created a more irregular force which took an unpredictable trajectory; 
it destabilised the stable closed system and brought reconfiguration.  
 
Social and political theory needs a new imaginary to describe this dynamism 
of different actions resonating with one another. As Holloway (2010b) notes, 
we cannot have the right answer for our political struggle. There are only 
many examples to keep ‘in our sight’ in order to create our own image of a 
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better life. Its politics consists of many experiments and infectious 
relationships between them. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts such as “rhizome” and “plateau” (1988) 
explain this dynamism of attractors, instead of proposing one model for 
politics. Patton claims that their work in A Thousand Plateaus should be seen 
as “a political ontology that provides tools to describe transformative, creative 
or deterritorialising forces and movements” (Patton, 2000, p.9). What this 
ontology presumes for politics is not a single model but minoritarian 
subjectivities, who are open to encounters, moving around many different 
force fields, receiving energy from them and creating something new.  
 
7.4  A new political imaginary of disaster 
7.4.1 Post-Fukushima activism and the rhizomatic ontology 
Ontological difference among the protesters are the most crucial, but least 
tangible factor in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements. The 
movements include many different actions, politically left and right, ideological 
and non-ideological, majoritarian and minoritarian. However, the most critical 
controversy arises between their ontological differences; some believe that 
politics have a proper model while others think it consists of endless 
experiments. Some desire to build “a coherent project of counterpower,” 36 
while others “allow for incoherence within the ranks of those who oppose the 
neoliberal order, each for their own reasons” (Day, 2005, p.152).  
 
                                                   
36 Day cites this phase from Hardt and Negri (2001). Day analyses that Hardt and Negri 
still remain in the hegemonic paradigm, as I have already argued (See 3.3.3). 
290 
 
The ideology-based actions clearly belong to the former. On the other hand, 
Shiroto no Ran, NSF and MCAN are not ideology-led movements. These are 
the actions of inconsistent, ambiguous people who are advancing by asking. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that they all share the latter type of ontology. 
Some post-Fukushima protesters seem to look for universal reference for an 
effective political model in a certain condition, be it radical liberalism or 
anarchism. This thought still seems to belong to the former type of ontology. 
 
In contrast, if we see politics as the experimental field of many actions, neither 
Shiroto no Ran, nor NSF nor MCAN are proposing the ultimate answer. They 
are all experiments that resonate with one another. Deleuze and Guattari 
explain this worldview with the concept of “rhizome,” which develops through 
the encounters and conjunctions, without having a blueprint of the whole. It is 
a network that “has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) 
from which it grows and which it overspills” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p.21). 
Unlike an arboreal order which has a linear structure to converge into a single 
point, the rhizome “connects any point to any other point” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1988, p.21). They assert: “Where are you going? Where are you 
coming from? What are you heading for? These are totally useless questions” 
(1988, p.25).  
 
Hence, we may need to change our questions about political theory. We 
should stop asking who the legitimate political subject is, or what kind of 
universal foundation we need. In the absence of all these transcendental 
references, what does the concept of rhizome ask? The practices of the 
post-Fukushima protesters indicate that it asks what to connect with, when 
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and how, and what kind of impact that particular connection may bring.  
 
Therefore, the significance of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements is 
perhaps not so much about the politics of molecular language reinvigorating 
liberalism or renewing anarchism. The more crucial novelty lies in the fact that 
the movements include both the politics of legitimacy and the politics of affect, 
the majoritarian actions and the minoritarian actions. The MCAN and NFS 
member Yumi Nakamura claims that both have different roles and both are 
important. While MCAN provides a “hard vessel” with which to confront the 
existing hegemony, NFS is a “soft vessel” which provides an opportunity to 
“reconsider own lives, and changes from the local level by making 
connections with people” (Interview, 19 November 2012).  
 
Paul Patton (2010) insists that majoritarian and minoritarian politics do not 
always contradict one another. He admits that democratic politics entails 
majoritarian tendencies. It requires a doxological plane in order to regulate the 
free play of opinion. From Rawls to Mouffe, political theorists consider 
creating coherent and legitimate principles to derive the correct decisions. It is 
a reconstruction project of equilibrium in the postmodern era (Patton, 2010). 
  
On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari prefer ‘minor’ politics without the 
hierarchal order, and they suggest a politics of creation rather than 
reconstruction (Patton, 2010). This invites suspicion like that of Mengue (in 
Patton, 2010), who claims that Deleuze and Guattari are hostile to democracy 
itself. Patton opposes this view and suggests that what they are challenging is 
not democracy per se but a fixed form of democracy mediated by political 
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institutions and the concept of universal rights. For Deleuze, the concept of 
human rights is a new form of transcendence which is “unable to evolve in 
accordance with the requirements of a particular case” (Patton, 2010, p.173). 
For Deleuze, such fixed and ahistorical concepts are incompatible with the 
nature of our lives. Hence, he notes: “There are no ‘rights of man,’ only rights 
of life, and so, life unfolds case by case” (Deleuze in Patton, 2010, p.175). 
 
Surely such a general principle easily becomes an empty signifier, as Akagi 
(2007) finds that the conventional liberal left does not provide any hope for his 
particular struggle. Deleuze and Guattari’s minor politics is not reconstructing 
a universal reference with desires and emotions. Their minor politics 
envisages democracy without the political order based on transcendental 
universality. 
  
Patton emphasises that the minor politics is not providing “an alternative to 
the politics of majority will formation” but it “operates alongside or below the 
realm of democratic deliberation” (Patton, 2010, p.176). Liberal democracy 
does not need to be replaced with minoritarian politics, but it needs to be 
supplemented by it. In the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements, the 
anarchist-type minoritarian actions aided the emergence of political agency 
that works alongside the majoritarian institutional politics (such as the 
Kanteimae protest) and within the institutional politics (such as electoral 
campaigns). 
 
In a complex society where our political interests are unclear, political 
commitment will not naturally occur. Political theories need to consider a 
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process of subject formation, asking how people come out of their closed 
territory in the first place. The minor politics may work in this stage, and 
eventually a collective political identity and interest may be formed. Yet, this 
does not mean that the minor politics of affect is eventually replaced by the 
major politics of legitimacy. We have already seen that when the anti-nuclear 
movement started losing the language of affect in the process of solidification, 
there were several protesters who escaped this process. They leave the 
action when it becomes routine, and follow their desire for change and 
creation.  
 
Hence the post-Fukushima activism shows the potential of democratic politics 
where the ‘vessels’ for the major and the minor politics exist in parallel and 
resonate with one another. This becomes possible only because many 
protesters join these different types of actions. These protesters have a 
“rhizomatic” ontology, which considers politics as an experimental field of 
different actions affecting one another, rather than a search for the most 
effective model or legitimate order.  
 
7.4.2 A new political agency of “crossing the border” 
It is not new to find one person joining several social movements with different 
political issues; however, it is interesting when one person joins both major 
politics such as the Kanteimae protest and minor politics such as NFS, 
because they require individuals to play different roles. The Kanteimae protest 
makes an individual a colourless ‘number’ who represents a single claim of 
‘No Nukes’, while NFS celebrates each participant’s different colours.  
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Such a flexible subjectivity seems to be a crucial aspect of the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters. This flexibility was also seen in their 
engagement in electoral politics. In the Tokyo governor’s election in 2014, a 
certain number of anti-nuclear protesters supported the ex-Prime Minister 
Morihiro Hosokawa, who was tagged with another neoliberal ex-PM, Junichiro 
Koizumi. One of the supporters was Misao Redwolf of MCAN. In her Twitter 
account, she often expresses her opposition to neoliberalism and sometimes 
shows her sympathy with the Zapatistas movement. Regardless of this 
orientation, she still chose the Hosokawa-Koizumi duo instead of another 
grass-roots anti-nuclear candidate because Hosokawa was “more likely to 
have an impact in state politics” (Interview, 16 April 2014). She explains: 
 
We need to win. It’s not the matter of principles. My choice is made in 
accordance with situations in which I am engaging. We need to be 
flexible. This is what the left movements in the past did not notice and 
they made a mistake. They fell into “the hell of rightness” (Interview, 
16 April 2014). 
 
In my view, she takes actions that conflict with her own beliefs. In my interview 
(16 April 2014), she mentioned that “breaking into the National Diet” is her 
“dream”; however she was one of the MCAN members who stopped the 
Kanteimae protesters from breaking into the National Diet when the 
mobilisation peaked in 2012. She explains that she saw no chance of success 
at the time, because there were only a few people who actually wanted to go 
inside. I asked her whether there was any conflict between her belief and her 
action as the organiser. She replied: 
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Although my policy is to pursue the truth, it does not apply to every 
case I come across. It is not to compromise. I am just separating 
myself according to the case and choosing the way which looks better 
(Interview, 16 April 2014).  
 
“Separating oneself” explains MCAN very well. MCAN refuses to become a 
theorist or agitator, and remains a mere provider of the protest space. 
However, this does not mean that each individual has discarded their own 
political ideology. They have different beliefs and ideologies, but as MCAN 
members they share the flexibility to “separate” them.  
 
This flexible political agency allows the parallel existence of these different 
‘vessels’. The protesters choose a vessel with the appropriate timing and 
provide whatever ability is necessary to the vessel – sometimes it is a mere 
body to add to the number in the mobilisation, and at other times it is their 
talent. This flexible agency allows them to join in both minor and major politics, 
both institutional politics and everyday politics. He/she sometimes behaves 
like a conventional liberalist in formal politics and then suddenly acts in an 
anarchistic way when the time comes. Hence, what the rhizomatic ontology 
proposes is not a new political principle that reconciles the fluid and the solid, 
or the major and the minor, but a political agency wandering between major 
and minor.  
 
In fact, Deleuze and Guattari prefer a verb to describe their philosophy, such 
as the term “becoming” instead of a noun as a final status. When they actually 
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articulate a noun, they say “people to come” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 
p.218). They are interested in inventing a new subjectivity, which is “a people 
in the process of becoming other” (Bogue, 2007, p.24). In other words, their 
political imaginary is the creation of “a revolutionary collectivity capable of 
opening up new possibilities for life” (Bogue, 2007, p.108).   
 
The critic Hiroki Azuma’s works imply how changing the focus in political 
theory from a system to an agency brings a different evaluation of activism. In 
a book entitled Ippan-ishi 2.0 (General Will 2.0), Azuma (2011) envisages a 
Mouffe-like conjugated political system of rigid and fluid. He proposes to 
connect the closed parliamentary politics with the online subculture 
community where the molecular emotions of people are constantly visualised 
in real time. He insists that visualising people’s unconscious desires would 
pressurise parliamentary democracy (Azuma, 2011). This concept was similar 
to the Kanteimae protest a year later, since the Kanteimae protest is an 
emotionally motivated intervention in parliamentary politics. Nevertheless, 
when MCAN’s Noma pointed out its similarity in the talk event in early 2013, 
Azuma expressed his disappointment at the anti-nuclear movement, mainly 
because of its defeat in the general election. Azuma almost seemed to doubt 
his own theory, saying that unconscious, emotional language floating online 
may never be political; people are self-enclosed and self-satisfied within their 
own territory. 37 
                                                   
37  From the author’s observation of the online talk event “Talking about Demo 6: Demo 
wa seiji wo kaeru noka: Kinyo Kanteimae kogi kara kangaeru” (Will demonstrations 
change politics? The case of the Kanteimae protest). The panellists were Azuma, Noma 
and the sociologist Daisuke Tsuda. It was broadcast on 23 January 2013 by Dommune: 
http://www.dommune.com/  
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However, the disappointment with the online emotional language shifted his 
interest to physical experience. In 2014, Azuma published a book entitled 
Yowai Tsunagari (The weak ties), which is an essay on life rather than politics. 
Here, Azuma reformulates his philosophy. What he celebrates is not a 
particular political system but a particular way of life moving between the 
network of strong ties (the world of intention, meaning and language) and the 
network of weak ties (the world of contingency, non-meaning and body). He 
defines this subjectivity as that of a “sightseer”, who is neither a villager nor a 
nomad. “Sightseers” offer a somewhat irresponsible opinion because they are 
not the residents there; however, their opinion is not completely irresponsible, 
as it stems from their own physical experience of sightseeing (Azuma, 2014). 
 
Interestingly, with this philosophy of a “sightseer”, he re-evaluated the 
post-Fukushima activism positively. After his second dialogue with Noma in 
2014, by which time Noma was known as an anti-racist activist rather than an 
MCAN member, Azuma almost followed Noma’s claim by commenting that 
the anti-racism action is “untangling the sense of justice [of the ordinary 
people] that has become stiffened” by encouraging people to take action 
based on their emotions; hence, at least “it has been changing the people’s 
attitude toward politics” (Azuma, Twitter@hazuma, 7 Sep 2014).38  
 
Post-Fukushima activism is creating political people who take actions with 
                                                   
38 This tweet of Azuma’s was made as a summary of the talk event “Demo no genzai to 
mirai: soredemo shakai wa kawarunoka (Demonstrations in the present and the future: Is 
it still possible to change society?” on 5 September 2014 at Genron Café, Tokyo. It was 
panelled by Azuma and the political scientist Ikuo Gonoi, but was later joined by Noma. 
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their own emotions and embodied experience. Hence, it signifies the 
emergence of new political agency as a “sightseer” (Azuma, 2014) rather than 
the realisation of the ideal political form of “unconscious democracy” (Azuma, 
2011). 39 A “sightseer” is neither a completely rootless nomad nor a stable 
“villager” in the closed community with a fixed value. These “sightseers” 
wander between the territory where they have a fixed identity and the 
unknown place where they lose a fixed identity. They construct their own 
desire and value through these experiences of sightseeing.  
 
Richard Day (2005) finds a similar agency in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept 
“the smith”. They note that there are “no nomadic or sedentary smiths. Smiths 
are ambulant, itinerant”; and the place where they live “is neither the striated 
space of the sedentary nor the smooth space of the nomad” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1988, p.413). For Day, a new political subjectivity has a twin 
formation; it has both fluid and yet has stable relationships with social entities, 
and it engages in both deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. It is a 
“subject who does not love the state form, but can co-exist with it if they must” 
(Day, 2005, p.176). Also citing Gloria Anzaldúa, he explains it as a subject to 
cross borders rather than eliminating borders, and a subject who knows the 
“necessity of choosing when to cross borders with whom and how to open” 
(Day, 2005, pp.185-186).  
                                                   
39 It should be noted that Azuma does not positively evaluate the anti-nuclear 
movements such as the Kanteimae protest. He worries that the mass excitement in 
activism will pull the protesters apart from the grounded physical experience. He finds 
this nature in the anti-nuclear movement, and that is why he calls the movement 
‘populism’ (Twitter, @hazuma, 14 July 2013). He is also not actively joining or supporting 
the post-Fukushima activism, as I later argue in chapter eight. 
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7.4.3 Politics of life in the postmodern condition 
My argument suggested that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements are 
creating a new political subjectivity whose members mobilise their own bodies 
to the space of encounters, form a rhizomatic connection with others and 
create temporary assemblages which may be molar or molecular, major or 
minor. This is a quite different political imaginary from the conventional one, 
which identifies one political model for everyone. I have argued that it is the 
politics of legitimacy which needs a foundation for judgement, be it the 
principle of justice elaborated by the consideration in the original position 
(Rawls,1999) or the process of fair consensus-making (Habermas, 1990), or 
the outcome of agonistic debate (Mouffe, 2005). Those political theories 
presume some kind of transcendent reference for a political subject.  
 
Although I believe that such attempts are necessary, my point is that these are 
not enough to think about politics in the postmodern condition. In a complex 
society, it seems to be difficult to find a consistent, coherent ‘model’ to solve 
any problem that we come across. As we examined in chapter two, the young 
Japanese people, who face what Amamiya (2010) calls ‘ikizurasa’ (pain of 
living), cannot identify the cause of their suffering, and they are sometimes 
alienated from their feeling of pain. How can they reject the intangible 
hegemony which alienates them? The political theories need to consider this 
before the legitimate order, and even before the fixed concept of subject, 
interest, impetus and objective for political action. Political theories need to 
think beyond the fixed models for reference. We need to think about a new 
subjectivity that can respond to their particular struggles in such a complex 
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society.  
 
The political subjectivity signified by the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
protesters and their ‘rhizomatic’ ontology are pragmatic in one sense. They 
put their own ideological consistency aside, separate their bodies and connect 
them with the entities that seem to create the most effective impact at a 
certain time and in a certain condition. Patton (2010) addresses the similarity 
between Deleuze’s ontology and Rorty’s pragmatism. For both theorists, the 
role of philosophy is not the pursuit of truth to describe the world but 
“providing intellectual tools for particular human ends” (Patton, 2010, p.63).  
 
Here, knowledge does not provide a universal guidance for taking action. This 
is why so many criticise the post-Fukushima protesters unethical, because 
they take action based on their own desire, and seem to utilise knowledge at 
their convenience. However, as Patton argues, “desire always requires a 
machine or assemblage” (2000, p.70). The desires of the protesters are 
already involving other people, such as the people in Fukushima or the future 
generation. They remain open to the unknown others and respond to it by 
changing themselves. What I found in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movement is the creation of a new kind of subjectivity, “which [relies] upon an 
amoral, postmodern ethics of shared commitments based on affinities rather 
than duties based on hegemonic imperatives” (Day, 2005, p.177).  
 
This inconsistent but ethical subjectivity seems to be a natural response to the 
disaster. Connolly cites the economist Karl Polanyi, commenting after the 
Great Depression, that political and economic thinking must become more 
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“situational” and open to contingency, as we readily become “too confident 
about our ability to give complete explanations” (2013, p.191). Disaster is an 
event that breaks such confidence. In the politics of disaster, each individual is 
thrown into a state of disorder. The politics emerges when they try to respond 
to the outside forces. They have no idea about what should be done and 
therefore need experimentation. The post-Fukushima protesters are exploring 
how an imperfect, forgetful and inconsistent individual, who does not share 
any ideology, can still be politically active and ethical. They are exposing their 
bodies to the eyes of others, forcing themselves to keep feeling and thinking, 
and weaving ethics from the experience. 
 
This political imaginary does not guarantee any stability, equilibrium and order, 
unlike liberal politics. Rather, this politics emerges from contingency, 
dislocation and disequilibrium. In fact, we cannot assume any ultimate resting 
place. Williams acknowledges that a problem is always changing, because it 
is “a series of changing tensions” (Williams, 2013, p.142). A problem emerges 
out of the tension between the social requirements of a particular time and the 
existing laws, technological culture or theories. In such a condition, what we 
need is “a series of creative reactions” rather than “a lasting solution” 
(Williams, 2013, p.130). We need “something like a way of living with the 
problem, rather than solving it” (Williams, 2013, p.62). 
 
Hence, Osterweil and Chesters (2007) consider that people in the new 
political imaginary would operate in artisanal practices. While the architect 
tries to implement “a grand design” and become a “master” of the material, 
the artisan never tries to direct and form things into pre-determined plans 
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(Osterweil and Chesters, 2007, p.259). The artisanal creation is generated 
through the interaction between the creativity of the artisan and the material, 
and neither he/she nor the material has the pre-existing image of its final 
product.  
 
The conventional political theory underestimates this type of situational 
knowledge, to react creatively to what we encounter. Yet I believe that it is this 
knowledge that motivates people to take action in the complex postmodern 
condition. It is not knowledge telling us how we should live, but it 
demonstrates many potentials of how one might live (May, 2005). The 
post-Fukushima activism is inventing many ways of “living with the problem” 
(Williams, 2013, p.62) more creatively, playfully, or at least less painfully. The 
accumulation of such experiments does not establish a model, but it creates 
resonance in assemblage, new desires and energies for creation. Then, only 
one question remains regarding this political imaginary: What kind of force 
does each of us elicit from this assemblage of the post-Fukushima activism, 
and how do we create our own struggle to respond to our political 
disillusionment? 
 
Summary and further directions 
Throughout this chapter, I have argued that we need to reconsider the political 
theory for the postmodern condition. Now, we share neither the political goal 
to reach nor the fixed collective identity to engage in politics. We can no 
longer presume the existence of a rational subject who is motivated by a clear 
interest or objective. In such a condition, the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
protesters use their emotions arising from the catastrophic event for an 
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impetus for political commitment. The post-disaster activism in Japanese 
society has provided many types of 'vessels' which channel such emotions 
into politics.  
 
There are several political thoughts on how to turn such fluid “molecular” 
language of emotion into effective political resources. Some liberal theories 
try to provide models of political institutions for such emotional language to 
freely discuss or to compete. On the other hand, the post-anarchist theories 
consider that such emotional language should remain outside the fixed 
intuitions. There seems to be further differences among the post-anarchist 
theorists on whether the resonances of such actions eventually converge into 
one united political project, or whether they repeat endless encounters, 
connections and disconnections, which contribute to the dispersion of 
movements. Yet they all suggest that each struggle of individual bodies, which 
are deterritorialised by a particular event, create swelling forces to interact 
one another, form a temporary assemblage and create new potentials out of 
its resonance. 
 
These different tendencies towards the politics of emotions are also examined 
in the post-Fukushima activism. On the one hand, the emotional language in 
the post-Fukushima activism is understood as reinvigorating the abstract 
concept of liberalism. On the other hand, it is also used to create empathy and 
affect, and it encourages experimentation in a new way of living. These two 
were distinguished as the molecular-majoritarian movement of MCAN and the 
molecular-minoritarian movements of NFS/Shiroto no Ran.  
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It is often considered that, as political theories, these two tendencies are 
contradictory and irreconcilable. The minoritarian politics is misunderstood as 
rejecting liberal democracy in general. However, as Patton (2010) notes, 
these two can co-existent, and democracy needs both major and minor 
politics simultaneously. The concept of rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) 
explains this ontological thought, which allows different forms of political 
movement. Here, emotional language fuels both major and minor politics, but 
it is never fixed into one political form.  
 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters show this rhizomatic ontology, 
which allows them to join many different 'vessels.' I have argued that such 
people with rhizomatic ontology activate politics in postmodernity. We need to 
overcome our obsession with the legitimate models and instead elaborate a 
new subjectivity and new form of living. A new political imaginary needs to 
reflect the nature of life, which is complex, spontaneous and ambiguous. It 
needs to provide tools to encourage us to keep responding creatively to 
ever-changing problems. 
 
As I have already examined in chapters five and six, the practices of the 
post-Fukushima protesters show many examples of how we might 
accomplish this. They mobilise their bodies on the streets, force themselves 
to feel and think, and practise ethics to be open; at the same time, however, 
they accept the incompleteness of the self with humour. Now I would like to 
conceptualise my own experiments of ‘how I might live’ in the postmodern 
condition, which I envisage from the resonance of this post-Fukushima 
activism. This is my final project in chapter eight. Although I will not propose 
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any general model, I believe that my experiment will also resonate with those 
who read it and that it will encourage new experiments. 
306 
 
Chapter 8 Synthesis discussion II:  
Knowledge and life after the disaster 
 
Introduction 
The aim of the previous chapter and this chapter is to elaborate a new political 
imaginary from the implications of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movements. Chapter seven suggested that the ‘rhizomatic’ thought 
suggested by the protesters may bring new angles in political thought. Instead 
of identifying general models or legitimate procedures for the decision-making 
process, this view considers politics as the on-going experiments of each 
individual seeking a better way to live with other people.   
 
This chapter continues this argument. As I noted in the previous chapter, in 
order to become ‘political’, we need to think about how we want to live. 
Disasters often pose such questions to us, because they destroy the certainty 
of life and reveal the limitations of existing knowledge.  
 
First of all, I argue that the Fukushima disaster led us to reconsider ethics 
(8.1). In complex society, we cannot rationally predict how our actions will 
affect society. Hence, our responsibilities to others become vague and we 
tend to withdraw into our own territory to protect our own interests. Although 
there have been several attempts to articulate new ethical principles from the 
imaginary of disaster (Jonas, 1985; Dupuy, [2002] 2012), my focus is on 
ethical relationships rather than principles, indicated by thinkers such as 
Levinas and Deleuze. I explore the potential of ethico-politics, in which 
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individuals with limited imaginations open themselves to other people, force 
themselves to think and feel, and collectively seek a way of social change.  
 
The next section (8.2) re-examines the concept of the self and the other as an 
agency for this ethico-politics. The Fukushima disaster was the unexpected 
force from the outside that destabilised Japanese people’s sense of identity. 
The anti-nuclear protesters show that this “dissolved” self (Deleuze, 1994) 
takes action without any mediation of stable identity. Moreover, they feel their 
satisfaction and pride in life not through the recognition of their identities but 
by engaging with “the art of life” (Foucault, 1996) in which they create 
changes in themselves and in society by interacting with other people.  
 
Another thing to be reconsidered in the post-disaster society is the role of 
knowledge itself (8.3). Conventional knowledge is based on the ontology of 
‘being’ which seeks invariant and general models. In contrast, the knowledge 
generated in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements signifies a different 
type of knowledge based on the ontology of ‘becoming’. This view, taken by 
philosophers such as Bergson and Deleuze, considers that the world is 
constantly changing. Using the concept of ‘self-organisation’ (Connolly, 2013; 
De Landa, 2013), I argue that the knowledge based on this ontology provides 
tools for responding to this changing reality better, rather than discovering the 
essence of reality.  
 
In the final section (8.4), I demonstrate how the knowledge generated in the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements respond to the political predicament 
in the postmodern condition. While political theories often avoid the 
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philosophical questions of life in favour of the practical arguments in the 
actualised world, I argue that the desire for political commitment is generated 
when an individual encounters a force from the ‘outside’ which is beyond 
his/her intentions. The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters are collectively 
inventing a better way to respond to this, and their struggles are already 
political and ethical. I argue that what motivates this ethico-political action is 
the desire for dignity (Holloway, 2011) rather than the desire for identity, 
recognition and completion; and by dignity I mean that the ‘dissolved’ self 
intermingles his/her own ability with that of others to create changes. 
 
8.1 Reconsidering ethics 
8.1.1 Disaster and the limit of rational knowledge 
A catastrophe often challenges human knowledge and renews it. A case in 
point is the Lisbon earthquake of 1755; it led Voltaire to become disillusioned 
with conventional optimism which insists that world was created by God in a 
way that “all is well.” The Lisbon disaster destroyed the coherent worldview 
based on God’s purposiveness. In his work Poem on the Lisbon Disaster 
([1755] 1912), Voltaire simply mourns the meaninglessness of the world and 
expresses a sense of powerlessness before it. In his novel Candide (Voltaire, 
[1759] 1918), he concludes that all we can do in the world of senselessness is 
to “cultivate our own garden.”  
 
In contrast, at the collapse of the old order, Rousseau ([1756] 1967) provided 
another explanation. Refuting Voltaire’s poem, he insists that the Lisbon 
disaster was caused not by senseless force but by human beings themselves; 
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I have shown that most of our physical pains […] are also our own 
work. […] it was hardly nature who assembled there twenty-thousand 
houses of six or seven stories. If the residents of this large city had 
been more evenly dispersed and less densely housed, the losses 
would have been fewer or perhaps none at all. 
 
What Rousseau provided was a scientific explanation based on a coherent 
causal relationship. The Lisbon earthquake was a ‘man-made’ disaster; 
hence, we know how it might have been avoided. Rousseau’s remark is 
considered the beginning of ‘modernity’ because it implies that this man-made 
disaster was preventable by human rationality. 
 
The Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 was also described as being due to 
human error. The official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Independent Investigation Commission declares that the accident “cannot be 
regarded as a natural disaster” and concludes that it was “a profoundly 
manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and 
prevented” (National Diet of Japan, 2012, p.9).  
 
Referring to Rousseau’s insight, the political scientist Yoshie Kawade also 
notes the lesson of the Fukushima disaster as follows: “our decision should be 
based on scientific calculations, which enable us to collate the benefit of 
nuclear energy with its risk” (2014, p.150). Although Kawade shows her 
sympathy with Voltaire in the sense that scientific knowledge cannot explain 
everything, Kawade basically encourages us to embrace Rousseau’s reason 
rather than Voltaire’s ‘pre-modern’ awe.  
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On the other hand, the French philosopher Jean-Pierre Dupuy ([2005] 2011) 
argues that Voltaire has provided a ‘postmodern’ insight rather than 
‘pre-modern’ awe. In a society with diversity and complexity, the rational 
decisions of each individual do not always result in the expected outcomes as 
a whole. The identification of the individual cause of a disaster does not 
necessarily allow us to prevent it.  
 
Dupuy’s view here is important. The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters 
would agree that the nuclear disaster was down to ‘human error’. They 
believe that what allowed the disaster to occur was their ignorance and 
indifference, as well as the profit-oriented thinking in Japanese society. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that they might have prevented it. One of 
my interviewees, the demonstration organiser Nao Izumori, made this point 
clear. He commented that, because “society is too complicated” and “our 
interests are entangled,” we may unwittingly become a “stakeholder” of the 
institutions we hate (Izumori, Interview, 5 April 2012, See 6.3.3).  
 
We are not always certain whether our decisions based on our rational 
knowledge bring blessings. As Connolly (2013) puts it, our society is an open 
system and lives are implicated in countless forces, both human and 
non-human. The problem, for him, is as follows: 
 
In a world more scientifically and technically advanced, we are not 
that much better equipped culturally, philosophically, politically and 
spiritually to address these entanglements (Connolly, 2013, p.7).  
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Hans Jonas also acknowledges that our “predictive knowledge falls behind 
the technical knowledge that nourishes our power to act,” and he argues that 
this gap should be overcome by establishing a new form of ethics, which is “a 
new conception of duties and rights” (Jonas, 1984, p.8). Jonas insists that, 
because we are now surrounded by uncertainty, we at least need certainty in 
our ethical principles. 
 
What might be the new ethical principles in a complex society? Jonas claims 
that the conventional ethical principle based on mutual reciprocity is 
unworkable, since this concept does not include the future generation, which 
does not yet exist. It is often the case in contemporary society that a decision 
by the present generation has a significant impact upon the future generation, 
and ethical imagination must overcome this generational gap. Hence, the 
guideline that Jonas proposes is somewhat divine and transcendental rather 
than a reasonable moral law. He claims that, when we can no longer 
accurately predict our future with scientific knowledge, we need to assign 
“greater weight to the prognosis of doom than to that of bliss” (Jonas, 1985, 
p.34). 
 
Dupuy ([2002] 2012) takes Jonas’s suggestion and elaborates his 
‘apocalyptic perspective’. The fact that we can no longer foresee the future 
makes us reluctant to think about it. In such a condition, what motivates us to 
take action for future generations is, according to Dupuy, our fear that the 
worst catastrophe is now unavoidable in the future. He argues that, by forcing 
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ourselves to believe that the apocalypse will occur in the future, we create a 
sense of fear that evokes our sense of responsibility to stop it.  
 
These suggestions perhaps indicate the ‘emotional turn’ in ethical judgement, 
which goes beyond the relationship based on practical reason. However, it 
still lacks the explanation of initial motivation to strongly believe that the 
catastrophe is unavoidable. In Japan, another disaster is actually 
unavoidable; it is predicted that Japan will be hit by another huge earthquake 
in the near future.40 However, even this ‘fact’ does not evoke a strong sense 
of fear impelling many Japanese people to take action. Then who can actually 
believe the catastrophe to come? The ruling Liberal Democratic Party has 
proposed to utilise nuclear energy as a ‘baseload energy source’ in Japan by 
2030, stating that their disaster prevention measures are sufficient (Watanabe 
and Urabe, 2015).  
 
Therefore, although Jonas’s and Dupuy’s attempts to establish a coherent 
ethical principle in the imaginary of disaster are attractive, they appear to lack 
a significant variable that motivates people to impose these principles on 
themselves in the first place. As I argued in the last chapter, we are not 
usually driven to make a commitment to society simply on the basis of 
coherent and legitimate moral principles. 
 
                                                   
40 For example, the probability of the Magnitude 8 or 9 class Nankai Trough earthquake 
occurring within the next 30 years is estimated at 70% (Headquarters for Earthquake 
Research Promotion, 2014). Experts predict that, in the worst-case scenario, this 
earthquake would trigger a 34-meter tsunami, resulting in at least 323,000 deaths (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2012). 
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8.1.2 Moving away from ethical principles 
On the contrary, chapter six pointed out that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
protesters do not describe their motivation for political commitment as their 
moralistic obligation. With the implications of their practice, I explore a new 
form of ethics which does not articulate any general principles internalised by 
the subject. 
 
Just as the Lisbon disaster of 1755 signified to Voltaire the collapse of the 
meaningful world, the triple disasters in Japan in 2011 destroyed the certainty 
of life for many Japanese people. Fear and anger motivated tens of 
thousands of people to take to the streets to protest against nuclear energy. In 
my interviews, many of these protesters expressed their sense of 
responsibility, which indicated an ethical notion behind the movements.   
 
Simon Critchley (2007) acknowledges that an ethical subject is composed 
through a traumatic experience, which exposes people to the outside of their 
familiar territory. Critchley refers to the philosophy of Levinas (1969), who 
describe ethics as the infinite responsibility to respond to the “face of the 
other.” The ethics of Levinas does not identify any pre-existing general rules 
or procedures. For Levinas, the ethical motivation stems from the actual 
relationship with the particular, existing other (Critchley, 2002).  
 
Citing the argument of Stanley Cavell, Critchley (2002) acknowledges that 
there are two types of “moral philosophers.” The first is the “legislators” such 
as Rawls and Habermas, who “provide detailed precepts, rules and principles 
that add up to a theory of justice” (Critchley, 2002, p.27-28). On the other 
314 
 
hand, Levinas is categorised in another type called “moral perfectionists,” 
since Levinas “is seeking to give an account of a basic existential demand, a 
lived fundamental obligation” (Critchley, 2002, p. 28). The difference lies in 
whether the ethical obligation is ascribed to a coherent institutional law or 
generated from an abstract concept based on somewhat anarchic lived 
experiences. In a slightly different way, Levinas himself separates his 
ethics/religion from politics. He notes that while politics “tends toward 
reciprocal recognition” and “ensures happiness,” religion (and ethics) “is 
Desire and not struggle for recognition” and “the surplus” of responsibility and 
sacrifice (Levinas, 1969, p.64).  
 
Critchley argues that we need both legislators and moral perfectionists. 
Levinasian ethics, which is motivated by desire, will encourage people to 
pursue legitimate order in politics. Thus, “ethics is ethical for the sake of 
politics, that is, for the sake of a more just society” (Critchley, 2002, p.25). 
This may partly explain the mobilisation process of the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear movement. The Fukushima disaster was the rupture which 
intruded on the protesters’ self-contented lives. They are facing the fragility of 
life in contemporary society and are responding to it with their embodied 
actions. This is an ethical attitude, according to Critchley, and this ethical 
awakening has encouraged them to make a commitment to politics.  
 
However, it is not sufficient to explain the entire dynamism of ethical 
awareness and political mobilisation in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movement. Neither is it enough to map out the potential of ethics without 
general principles. Firstly, it is necessary to clarify Levinasian ethics, since 
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calling him a ‘moralist’ is slightly confusing. Referring to Foucault’s view, 
Deleuze states that morality and ethics have opposite natures. Morality 
consists of “a set of constraining rules of a specific sort” which judges actions 
and intentions “in relation to transcendent rules”. Ethics, in contrast, is “a set 
of optional rules that assess what we do, what we say, in relation to the ways 
of existing involved” (Deleuze, 1995, p.100). In this distinction, Levinas is 
offering ethics rather than morality, because Levinasian ethics “does not rest 
in a series of rules to be followed, but rather in inexorable and constant 
exposure to alterity” (Nealon, 1998, p.xi-xii).  
 
Nevertheless, Critchley’s description of Levinas as a “perfectionist” is 
convincing, because the alterity or “the face of the Other” for Levinas is posed 
as the absolute reference. This brings Levinas’s ethics quite close to the 
‘moralist’ perspective. For Levinas, ethics arose from the desire of the subject 
who faces the radical otherness, and he describes this desire as living for the 
sake of the Other, or “offering him one’s being” (1969, p.183). It is a complete 
submission of the self to the otherness.  
 
For Levinas, ethics is the practice of perfection, motivated by the desire to be 
taken over by the Other. This is a passive attitude, and Levinas himself states 
that it is the attitude of “the holy” rather than ethics (Critchley, 2002, p.27). 
This passiveness of Levinasian ethics makes it difficult to apply on the 
practical level, since the infinite responsibility requires a heavy burden and a 
sense of guilt. Although I agree with Critchley that political practice needs 
such an ethical subject whose thought goes beyond the notion of self-interest, 
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Levinasian ethics requires too much self-sacrifice in the name of the Other, 
which is rooted in his religious faith.  
 
Hence, Richard Rorty (1996) is strictly against bringing Levinasian 
transcendental ethics into politics. Politics for him is “a matter of reaching 
accommodation between competing interests” and it is to be “deliberated 
about in banal, familiar terms” without philosophical presuppositions (Rorty, 
1996, p.17). I agree with him that politics should not be based on sublimity; 
political practice needs to be acceptable to ordinary people.  
 
The “perfectionist” tendency of Levinasian ethics is at odds with some of the 
ethical practices of the post-Fukushima protesters, such as NFS and Shiroto 
no Ran, because they seem to accept the incompleteness of the self. Their 
ethical orientation is neither that of ‘legislators’ nor of ‘moral perfectionists’. It 
is obvious that they are not ‘legislators’ because their actions do not reference 
any pre-set rules. Their ethics is generated through their experience of radical 
openness and the particular encounter with other people. In this sense, it 
would be appropriate to refer to Levinasian ethics.  
 
However, they are not ‘perfectionist’ either. I believe that the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear movements show the possibility that ‘banal’ politics can be 
simultaneously ethical. This is ‘imperfectionist’ ethics. While the tendency for 
radical opening was clearly seen in the protesters in NFS and Shiroto no Ran, 
they were accepting the imperfectness of their action in responding to others, 
and they were often celebrating it. In chapter six, I described this attitude as 
humour, which Critchley (2007) acknowledges as laughing at their own 
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inauthenticity. Unlike the perfectionist notion of Levinas, humour allows 
incompleteness. In fact, Critchley (2007) himself mentions humour as a 
mitigation for Levinasian sublimity.  
  
8.1.3 Ethico-politics of desire 
Humour played a significant role in the ethics of the post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear protesters, especially in those people in NFS (See 6.2.2). They 
know that they cannot completely understand other people; however, their 
attempts show that people still act ethically without the notion of being perfect. 
 
What exactly is the ethical subject like without a notion of perfection? NFS 
and Shiroto no Ran celebrate the radical encounters because they provide an 
opportunity to make new connections with people and bring creativity to their 
lives. For example, Mizuki Nakamura of NFS commented that she felt “excited” 
to be part of anti-nuclear movements because she could make new 
connections with local people, organise events and create new practices. 
Hajime Matsumoto also expressed his desire to obtain “surprise,” which 
motivated him to create a space for encounters (See 6.4). Although those are 
personal desires, they are not self-enclosed. Matsumoto expects his actions 
to encourage people with the same desire, and the accumulation of these 
actions will change society. 
 
These protesters describe their openness to others and political engagement 
as something they want to do, rather than what they have to do. Moreover, for 
them, this desire is not for perfection but for connection and change. “Desire 
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is productive in the sense that it produces real connections,” as Patton notes 
in Deleuzian philosophy (Patton, 2000, p.70).  
 
It can be said that both Levinas and Deleuze reject the concept of moral 
obligation which exists as invariant principles. For them, ethical awareness 
arose when the alterity permeates the selfhood (Islam, 2001). The “forces of 
the ‘outside’” would “impinge and impact upon us, upon what we think we are 
and what we think we are capable of becoming” (Ansell-Pearson, 1999, p.84). 
However, they seem to have a different concept of desire that comes out of 
this encounter with the outside force. Levinas (1969) addresses the desire for 
holiness, to live for the sake of the Other. Hence, Levinasian ethics leads to 
“alterity politics” (Nealon, 1998, p.2) as opposed to identity politics, which 
pursue recognition. 
 
On the other hand, the politics of desire implied by the philosophy of Deleuze 
pursues connection, mutation and production. The deconstructed subject 
seeks his/her way through the connections with others. Here, what stands 
against identity politics is not alterity politics. Rather, it is the politics to make a 
difference through encounters with others. The desire for connection, change 
and new creation motivates individuals to engage with others and take action 
for social change. It is an ethical act because it means opening themselves to 
the radical otherness. Rather than bridging the ethics of the sublime and the 
politics of banality, it shows that actions based on the desire for connection 
and mutation are already ethical and political. 
 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements show how this ethico-politics of 
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desire may work. In order that the desire for connections might result in 
ethical actions rather than domination or taming of the others, it requires a 
unique concept of self, which I examined in chapter six as “a dissolved self” 
(Deleuze, 1994, p.259).  Many protesters indicated that their feelings of 
satisfaction and pride were generated when they contribute for the movement 
by becoming “a plus-one” of the protesters, which signifies a nameless, 
non-personal entity to compose social assemblage. The MCAN organiser 
Misao Redwolf did not distinguish herself from people in Fukushima (See 
6.2.3). For her, speaking ‘for’ the Fukushima people means the separation 
between her and them, while her struggle is actually indiscernible from that of 
the people in Fukushima. Another female protester linked her life with her 
‘cell’. The genome in a cell includes the historical other which will be passed 
to the future generation (See 6.3.1). These signify the otherness inside their 
self, or the expansion of selfhood into other bodies. 
 
Furthermore, the NFS protesters in particular appreciated the inconsistency 
and ambiguity of the self. The awareness of themselves being incomplete 
motivated them to open up to other people. The NFS meetings created a 
chaotic swell. They were enjoying the experience of finding their own opinions 
frequently changing as a result of listening to the passionate voices of others, 
and they were celebrating the fact that the outcomes of their meetings would 
be totally unexpected (See 5.3.3).  
 
Although these are different types of actions, I found that the novelty of the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements is this notion of the indiscernible, 
inconsistent and fluid self, which is shared by many protesters. As the 
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previous chapter noted, this flexible sense of agency allows them to 
participate in different political actions inside and outside institutional politics. 
More importantly, this notion of ‘indiscernible self’ allows them to engage in 
ethico-politics, in which the personal desire for fulfilled life becomes ethical. 
  
When Levinas explains the ethical desire as the substitution of the self for the 
other, he still seems to distinguish the self from the other. There is a subject of 
desire. On the other hand, for Deleuze, “[t]here is no subject of desire, any 
more than there is an object. There is no subject of enunciation. Fluxes are 
the only objectivity of desire itself” (Deleuze and Parnet, 2006, p.58). Here, 
the distinction between the self and the other is blurred. The agency of 
ethico-politics may be such a dissolved self, who is invaded by otherness, 
who is ambiguous about him/herself, and who therefore desires to make more 
connections with others.  
 
8.2 Reconsidering identity and meaning 
8.2.1 The Self and the Other 
As the previous section examined, the alternative form of ethics, or the 
ethico-politics, offers a new perspective of non-subjective agency which goes 
beyond the familiar framework of political/social thought based on identity. 
One might wonder how these ‘dissolved’ selves make commitments and 
decisions, or how they acquire desires in the first place to become political 
and ethical. 
 
For Deleuze, desire does not reside in an entity who is fully conscious of 
his/her intention. It is a certain ‘event’ that forces people to feel and think, and 
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it is the sensation caused by this event that brings desires. Colebrook (2002, 
p.88) gives an interesting example of plants and their ‘action’. The plants 
perceive the sunlight, respond to it by moving their bodies towards it, and 
generate energy through photosynthesis. Likewise, human beings perceive 
an event, respond to it with their bodies and, in that process, desire and 
thought are generated (Colebrook, 2002, pp.87-88). Hence, what exists is not 
a solid subject but a process of ‘individuation’ or a mode of our response and 
expression when we come across a certain event (Williams, 2013). We 
“cannot own our subjectivity in terms of some fixed and secure property” 
(Ansell-Pearson, 1999, p. 33). 
 
In a process of individuation, the unconscious entity encounters an event, 
feels and responds to it. The Fukushima disaster was an ‘event’ which caused 
confusion and anger throughout Japanese society, and some responded by 
taking to the streets. Their desire to create a nuclear-free society or to 
establish new political practices was generated by this event of disaster and 
the subsequent mobilisation through which they experienced a sense of 
responsibility, pride and empathy. The protesters were often criticised for 
being reactive and inconsistent; however, being reactive and inconsistent is 
the very nature of life, as Colebrook’s example shows.  
 
This ‘individuation’ has different types, according to Deleuze (1995). The 
‘subject-type’ individuation constructs a self with a fixed identification and a 
clear personality, while there is also an ‘event-type’ individuation where there 
is no subject. In such a condition, 
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We're not at all sure we're persons: a draft, a wind, a day, a time of 
day, a stream, a place, a battle, an illness all have a nonpersonal 
individuality. They have proper names. We call them "hecceities." 
They combine like two streams, two rivers (Deleuze, 1995, p.141). 
  
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters are considered to be practising a 
variety of individuation processes. Sometimes, they became a collective 
political subject with a clear identity and interests, such as seen in the 
Kanteimae protest. In the Kanteimae protest, the protesters followed a certain 
fixed style and presented themselves as normative in order to be recognised 
as legitimate political actors. As I have pointed out in chapter five, this type of 
assemblage is hegemonic and relatively closed. However, this assemblage 
consists of subject-less people, who also join in the various actions. NFS 
hardly has an aspect of collective subjectivity. Its members describe it as a 
swelling force or a collective wandering, which resembles Deleuze’s 
expression of ‘a wind’ or ‘a stream’ (1995). 
 
Deleuze explains this unique concept of individuality using many terms, such 
as an ‘event’, ‘intensities’ and ‘hecceity’. ‘Hecceity’ is probably the term that is 
most clearly opposed to the concept of a fixed, self-conscious subject. For 
Deleuze, hecceities “are simply degrees of power which combine, to which 
correspond a power to affect and be affected, active or passive affects, 
intensities” (Deleuze and Parnet, 2006, p.68). The question to be posed then 
is how this force as hecceity enters into a relationship with other forces, and 
what kind of communications they might employ. 
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The capacity to affect and to be affected by this subject-less entity is 
highlighted by Deleuze and Guattari’s (1984, 1988) concept of ‘machine’ or 
machinism, which counters the humanistic model of relationships. For 
example, an ‘organism’ highlights the ‘whole’, which already has a narrative, 
intention or goal. On the other hand, a ‘mechanism’ focuses on the isolated 
parts, each of which has a particular function and role. Both presuppose a 
fixed identity, and therefore both are closed to new connections.  
 
In contrast, a “machinic” agency is open to connections, since it does not 
have pre-existing identities, functions and objectives. A machine itself has no 
meaning, unless it is connected to other machines. Each encounter and 
connection with other machines brings a new identity, function and objective 
(Colebrook, 2002, p.56). In this concept, “a thing is known better through its 
conditions […] or through what it expresses than through an isolated 
examination of what it is” (Williams, 2013, pp.18-19). A machinic assemblage 
does not require any transcendental entity to reveal what it is. Each machine 
consisting of an assemblage has the capacity to connect, affect and 
co-produce new meanings together with other machines. 
 
In political thought, the anarchist current celebrates the encounter with others 
as such a creative source. In my interview, Hajime Matsumoto in Shiroto no 
Ran and Akira Harada in NFS expressed their desire to meet with those 
beyond their understanding and give them a surprise. Their desire might be 
said to be ‘machinic’. 
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The transgression of a boundary between the self and the other is seen as a 
creative action, as Donna Haraway’s “cyborg” metaphor shows (1991). In 
recent days, this transgressional imaginary of ‘cyborg bodies’ has been 
actualised in the attempts of body hackers. For example, as a body hacker 
with a small magnet implanted in his finger, Greiner (2014) explains that a 
‘cyborg body’ not only brings a new sense to the body hacker but also has a 
broader impact on society. Since they blur the boundary between the self and 
the other, cyborg bodies open a pathway to what he calls a ‘cyborg society’, 
which is a “collective form of living and intelligence sharing” (Greiner, 2014, 
p301). 
 
Nevertheless, a body hacker represents a controversial form of ‘border 
transgression’. While post-anarchists such as Lewis Call (2002) celebrate the 
creative potential of this plugged-in machinic entity, Newman (2007) describes 
it as a mere reflection of “the ultimate fantasy of capitalism and the ultimate 
nightmare of technology” (2007, p.81). In contemporary society, our bodies 
are exposed to and penetrated by the uncontrollable power realised by global 
capitalism and advanced technology. The force from the outside is not always 
enjoyable. We are more likely to be threatened by it.  
 
The relation with the otherness in contemporary society seems more complex 
than simply affirming or avoiding. For Baudrillard, the Other means something 
that betrays the self; therefore, it is “what allows me not to repeat myself for 
ever” (1993, p.174). However, he argues that modern science and technology 
have enabled us to eliminate and or control the otherness, as seen in the 
development of sanitation, immunisation and genetic engineering (Baudrillard, 
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1993). In addition physical encounters in society have been replaced by those 
in artificial reality, and unpredictable events have been replaced by something 
programmed (Baudrillard, 1993).  
 
In Baudrillard’s view, the project of eradicating otherness will invite a 
catastrophic outcome because it creates more dangerous others outside of 
our territory, such as religious extremists (Baudrillard, 1993). The problem in 
contemporary society is the parallel existence of the deadly stagnant inside 
without otherness and the outside as a completely different world with 
incomprehensible and irreconcilable ‘others’. Under this condition, all the 
possible encounters with others become extremely destructive.  
 
Hence, the otherness in contemporary society is close to the imaginary of 
disaster, which falls into the stagnant ‘hell of the same’, and indicates that 
complete stability is impossible. We cannot totally control the environment, 
and we always need to prepare for the unexpected rupture that is beyond our 
intention. This world-view is quite pessimistic. It makes us passive entities 
facing some kind of transcendental force, like Voltaire and the Lisbon disaster.  
 
While Levinas’s opening to the otherness is voluntary passivity, this kind of 
passivity is involuntary. In this sense, the latter is probably no more suitable as 
a political manifesto than the former. This involuntariness seems to have 
affinity with the biological examples. While Baudrillard explains the intrusion of 
radical alterity into the self through the analogy of disease (1993), Deleuze 
and Guattari’s ‘A thousand plateaus’ (1988) refers to the openness of genetic 
code to mutation by a viral infection. The mutation occurs through genetic 
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information “jumping from one already differentiated line to another” (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1988, p.10).  
 
This catastrophic imaginary seems to describe the nature of the otherness 
more accurately than the imaginary of cyborg. In our life, the otherness is 
something we can neither avoid nor willingly invite when we want. We are 
simply open to the encounter with the other, and we do not know how we will 
change as a result of its encounter. Like an encounter with virus, it may result 
in the disaster, or it may bring creative evolution.  
 
8.2.2 Beyond identity and recognition 
An good example of this ‘involuntary’ relationship between the self and the 
other in our society is found in Foucault’s (1996) term “passion,” which he 
contrasts with the concept of love. For Foucault, love is relationships between 
people, who have subjectivity. Passion, on the other hand, is always an event 
without subjectivity. Passion is “something that falls on you out of the blue” 
and which “grips you for no reason”; one “doesn’t know where it comes from” 
(Foucault, 1996, p.313). Hence, we probably cannot describe this 
communication as the relationship between the self and the other. It is more 
like an intertwining of different non-subjective forces.  
 
This communication as an intermingled force field is important, as it seems to 
provide an alternative perspective on the conventional relationship based on 
identity and recognition. As we have already examined in chapters two and 
three, meaning in life is usually tagged with the concept of identity and 
recognition in contemporary Japanese society. Yet the pursuit of an identity 
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may lead to self-subjugation to the dominant authority that provides us with 
recognition, meanings and stability in life. This is both a sociological and a 
political problem because it discourages people from desiring social change 
even when their lives are oppressed under the current social system. 
 
The need for identity and recognition among young people is often pointed out 
in sociological analyses of contemporary Japan. The 14-year-old Boy A 
(Sakakibara Seito) who carried out the Kobe school murders in 1997 wrote a 
confessional statement explaining that he had committed the murders in order 
to attract public attention because he felt he was living “a transparent 
existence” and hoped to be “recognised as a real, living human being” (Asahi 
Shimbun Osaka Shakaibu, 2000; See 2.3.2). The online diary of the female 
high school student Aya Nanjo, who reported her history of self-harming and 
drug overdosing up to her death in 1999, was also analysed by Doi (2008) as 
a cry for attention and recognition (See 2.3.2).  
 
When the alienated young temporary worker Tomohiro Kato murdered seven 
people on the streets of Tokyo in 2008, the polemics of his generation also 
analysed that what Kato wanted was recognition (Amamiya and Kayano, 
2008; Akagi et al., 2008). Kato himself noted later that he was desperate for a 
“connection with society,” by which he meant a connection with somebody. 
The online community was the only space in which he could make 
connections, and he kept posting fictional stories to attract attention from the 
community (See 2.4.2).  
 
Fictionalising characters and narratives in order to be recognised from society 
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is not an unusual phenomena, as we have examined the case of Shukatsu 
activity in which the young Japanese people simulate the self into what a 
company wants (See 2.3.3). According to Baudrillard, the contemporary 
society is full of simulacra, which are the images without any reference to 
reality; those image never represents the real, but they are accepted as real.  
 
If we believe the notion of coherent and authentic self, the simulated bodies 
seems to be a problematic disaffirmation of life because it falsifies the self. 
The pain of living is hidden under the simulacra. The contradiction we saw in 
“the era of the impossible” (Osawa, 2008) was that to make our life valuable, 
we need to gain recognition, and to gain recognition, people need connection, 
and make their life into simulacrum in order to connect.  
 
However, being desperate for connections does not necessarily mean that 
Kato wanted recognition. The need for recognition presupposes a static 
notion of the self to be recognised. This actually contradicts Kato’s comments 
in his autobiography. For example, Kato recalls the time when he planned 
suicide out of loneliness. He notes that the suicide was supposed to be a 
message to convey his pain to his friends, who did not care for him:   
 
By killing myself, I can make a connection to society [because the 
death conveys the message]. […] People may say that it is nonsense 
because anyway I die. However, for me, it was not at all important 
whether I would die or not. All that mattered was whether I was lonely 
or not (Kato, 2012, p.27). 
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He did not even care about dying, as long as it gained him a connection. If 
what he had really wanted from a connection with other people was 
recognition, what would have been ‘recognised’ after he had died? Was it his 
name, or the fact that he had once existed? Kato thought that he could 
sacrifice his somatic body, because it was meaningless unless it was 
connected with someone else. As an individual, he thought that he had no 
essence; therefore he needed meaning through connection. What he hoped 
seems to be a meaningful life, but it should not be carelessly combined with 
the desire for “recognition”, since his sense of self is very weak.  
 
As was argued earlier, the desire for ‘meaningful life’ should primarily be 
understood as ‘making difference’ (significance) rather than ‘getting 
recognition’ (signification) (De Landa, 2011, See 6.3.2). Then, such a desire is 
“machinic” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). A ‘machinic’ entity does not have its 
own essential identity. It acquires meanings through connection and by 
forming an assemblage. 
 
However it does not mean that the assemblage as a whole supplies meaning 
to each component of the assemblage. De Landa (2006) describes that 
machinic assemblage is against the notion of totality, which considers that the 
harmonious unity of the whole defines the meaning of parts. The authentic 
meaning exists nowhere, neither as an essence of the part nor as the totality 
of the whole. Meanings are generated by the action of each component, 
interacting and resonating one another in an assemblage.  
 
Deleuze’s philosophy acknowledges that there is no original meaning in life, 
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because they are all in the process of change (Colebrook, 2002). There is no 
distinction between the original and copy. Under this notion, simulation is no 
longer a force of falsification, but it is productive force of creation (Colebrook, 
2002). Hence, for Deleuze, life has always been a simulation, which never 
has a fixed status, and is always engaged in the process of creating a new 
image (Colebrook, 2002).  
 
Then, perhaps the problem with Kato was not that he made his ‘authentic’ self 
into a simulacrum, as there is no authentic self but a process of change. The 
problem is that Kato used his desire for meaningful life and his capacity of 
simulation (creation) to gain recognition as a fixed subject, rather than to 
create difference. The problem in contemporary society is not that it is full of 
simulacra which never reflect reality, but that society operates with a system 
of recognition, and the power of simulation is always used to create 
something recognisable.  
 
The act of recognition operates “by comparing the new to that which is 
already known” (Williams, 2013, p.127). De Landa (2013) argues that, in the 
essentialist world-view, each life form is measured by a resemblance or 
“degrees of perfection” in comparison with the fixed archetype. Under this 
system, something new is only understood through the framework of the 
already-known. We cannot evaluate things without any mediation of 
representation, which means that we cannot value the unknown.  
 
Opposing this, De Landa (2013) proposes the Darwinist “norm of reaction,” 
which considers life as the dynamism of several variables affecting one 
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another, such as genotypes and outside environment (De Landa, 2013, 
pp.52-53). Here, the distinction between the subject and the object 
disappears, and all entities become dependent variables affecting one 
another. Things are in the process of permanent change, or that of 
‘becoming’.  
 
To become is never to imitate, nor to ‘do like’, nor to conform to a 
model, whether it’s of justice or of truth. There is no terminus from 
which you set out, none which you arrive at or which you ought to 
arrive at (Deleuze and Parnet, 2006, p.2). 
 
In Deleuzian philosophy, being means alteration; it means to engage in the 
process of invention, innovation and differentiation (Hallward, 2006, pp.12-13). 
Here, what one desires is not to be recognised but to engage in the process of 
invention. “To affirm is to create, not to bear, put up with or accept” (Deleuze, 
1986, pp.185-186). In other words, to affirm someone’s life is not to accept 
and celebrate his/her existence but to permeate it, intermingle with it and 
create something new together with it. It is the act of “making an event” no 
matter how small it may be (Deleuze and Parnet, 2006, p.49).  
 
Amamiya and Kayano (2008) acknowledge that a possible prescription for 
postmodern alienation is to provide a ‘home base’ and ‘unconditional 
recognition’ to young people, just like a mother’s love for her child (See 3.1.3). 
However, when we deconstruct this relationship between solid subjects who 
recognise and are recognised, love is explained in very different manner: 
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For my pathetic wish to be loved I will substitute a power to love: not 
an absurd will to love anyone or anything, not identifying myself with 
the universe, but extracting the pure event which unites me with those 
whom I love […]. Loving those who are like this: when they enter a 
room they are not persons, characters or subjects, but an 
atmospheric variation, a change of hue, an imperceptible molecule, a 
discrete population, a fog or a cloud of droplets (Deleuze and Parnet, 
2006, p.49). 
  
I believe that this is more like ‘passion’ in Foucault’s sense. Loving those who 
are not “subjects” is not done to give or receive recognition. To love someone 
without subjectivity is to create something new together. This is one of the 
most powerful example of machinic assemblage, which dismantles the 
distinction between the subject to give meaning and the object to be 
interpreted. The desire for being part of this assemblage should not be 
confused by the desire for recognition, as it has much more creativity.   
 
8.2.3 Life as an art 
Post-war Japanese society used to have a ‘model’ for social change that 
Osawa (2008) calls the imaginary of the “anti-real” (See chapter two). After 
WWII, the United States became the ideal model, and it was challenged by 
Marxism espoused by the student revolutionaries of the 1960s and 1970s. 
These ideologies encouraged people to make a commitment to politics in 
order to actualise its model. The questions of life were the matter of how to 
perfect one’s life into the suggested model (Osawa, 2008). However, in 
Osawa’s analysis, this model has become less clear in the later era, and it has 
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disappeared in what he calls “the era of the impossible.” We lost our shared 
imaginary for the model of our life in this era, which in my view is the condition 
of postmodernity.  
 
As we have examined, there have been a number of attempts to establish 
another invariant model in the postmodern condition, such as those by Rawls 
(1999), Habermas (1990) in chapter seven, and Jonas (1985) in the earlier 
part of this chapter. However, my position is more pessimistic as I feel that we 
can probably no longer find or establish a viable model for a complex society. 
The practice of the post-Fukushima protesters implies another type of 
social/political thought that is not based on a fixed model, but on their own 
desires.  
 
Of course, the celebration of emotions and desires itself is not new, because it 
is capitalism that unleashed the flow of desire and liberated people from the 
old norm of ‘who I should be’. However, as Deleuze and Guattari (1984, p.33) 
note, capitalism creates an “axiomatic” which regulates the flow of desire by 
articulating the object of the desire. The market economy deliberately creates 
lack, and directs our desire to fill the lack in the form of needs and wants 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1984). Hence, desire only becomes a creative and an 
ethical force when it is liberated from this notion of lack, and any form of 
model to complete, which identifies “whom I want to be.” 
 
This meaning in life without identity is called by Foucault (1996) “art” of the 
self. While conventional thought presupposes the necessity of knowing the 
self in order to act, he argues that it is possible to imagine a society without 
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questions of identity. In such a society, what is worth the effort is “to make 
one’s being an object of art” (Foucault, 1996, p.318).  
 
What does this art of the self actually mean? It seems to turn one’s own life 
into something different from what is already known, rather than to complete 
one’s life into the pre-imagined form. Here, rather than finding another 
“anti-real” model to realise, our effort for change needs what Deleuze calls 
“counter-actualisation” (1990, p.150, 161): a technique of decomposing the 
once fixed arrangement and recreating it anew. Under this concept of 
counter-actualisation, our lives are placed in the middle of a complex force 
field rather than in the linear movement towards the one ideal model.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988) explain the dynamism of this force field through 
different types of lines. According to them, a “molar” line draws a clear border 
between things and engages in the process of identification. Then, there is a 
more fluid “molecular” line which enables the entities to intermingle with one 
another and reformulate themselves. Finally, the most creative line is a “line of 
flight”, which “‘carries us away’ towards a destination that is neither 
foreseeable nor pre-existent” (Hallward, 2006, p.28). According to Hallward, a 
subject with fixed identity comes into existence when the creative movement 
of the line of flights is temporarily slowed down or solidified. This subject starts 
perceiving the world according to his/her self-interest. The world-view of the 
solid subject is limited - just as a cow only sees grass as food and has no 
interest in its creative function of producing oxygen (Hallward, 2006). 
Subjectivity moulds a creative potential of things into a recognisable form. 
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Hence, to create, “one has to lose one’s identity and become imperceptible” 
(Hallward, 2006, p.3).  
 
Yet Deleuze and Guattari do not highlight a dualism between the molar lines 
and the lines of flight; instead, they are interested in “co-evolution of them 
within any given assemblage” (Ansell-Pearson, 1999, p.168). This is because 
every living thing has tendencies both towards “ordering and stratification” 
and towards “creative dispersion or productive chaos” (Colebrook, 2010, 
p.33).  
 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters seem to be developing the 
attitude of balancing this openness and closeness. The protesters know that a 
solid subject tends to become indifferent to the outside. The street protest 
offers them a space in which to remember their emotions. They mobilise their 
limited bodies onto the street in order to engage with other people who force 
their bodies to feel, to think and to change. As Colebrook explains; 
 
[A life] is a fleeting and fragile perception that at once gets caught up 
in territories and recognition, only to break down again when life is 
blessed with enough violent power to overcome self-maintenance 
(2010, p.166). 
 
The MCAN organiser Misao Redwolf used the term ‘pride’ as the motivation 
for her action (See 6.3.2). She obtains her pride when she passively accepts 
the force of the outside permeating her, while she responds to it with her own 
creativity and desire. The accumulation of these passive but creative 
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responses makes up one’s life, and the resonance between these individual 
reactions composes political and ethical struggles. I believe this is what 
Foucault calls making “one’s being an object of art” (1996, p.318).  
 
8.3 Reconsidering knowledge 
8.3.1 Self-organisation and the ontology of becoming 
The last element to be reconsidered through the context of the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement is knowledge itself. As I have already 
noted, Japanese political theories mostly focus on re-establishing a 
self-conscious subject, a legitimate procedure for decision-making and a new 
meta-narrative to guide people in the postmodern condition. Social theories 
seek a reconstruction of the sense of identity by finding a legitimate authority 
that might provide recognition and acceptance. While these theories seek 
invariant references, general principles and models, this thesis has been 
arguing that these concepts are not enough to deal with the precariousness of 
life.  
  
Henri Bergson (2001) insists that our intellect fails to think about life. For 
Bergson, a living thing is in a state of flux; hence, “[t]here are no things, there 
are only actions” (Bergson, 2001, p.240). On the other hand, our intellect tries 
to find an invariant pattern in changing reality, because the role of the intellect 
is to predict and prepare the next actions. Here, the changing reality is 
explained with inert concepts and is understood as a series of snapshots from 
a certain stage to another, rather than as a continuous movement (Bergson, 
2001).  
337 
 
 
Bergson (2001) believes that this intellect generates two types of knowledge 
which he distinguishes as mechanism and finalism. Mechanism tries to 
understand the world from its constituent parts. The world is explained by the 
accumulation of each part functioning through causal relations. In that sense, 
the mechanistic view entails the reductionist notion. On the other hand, 
finalism presumes a fixed objective or meaning of the world that pulls the 
components into harmony, which is also referred to as holism. The problem 
for Bergson (2001) is that mechanism and finalism share the same ontology; 
they presuppose some sort of invariant elements, either for the components 
or for the whole, which is at odds with the nature of life.  
 
I share this view as I believe that, in complex society, we cannot identify any 
fixed value of life either in the social components (such as the ideal subject) or 
in the whole (such as the ideal goal). Looking at a catastrophic event such as 
the Fukushima disaster, we notice that there is no fixed meaning to each 
aspect that composes our complex social assemblage. Nuclear energy used 
to be welcomed by most of the Japanese people as an ideal energy source 
that is clean and cheap. It would still have been accepted, had the accident 
not have taken place. However, the Fukushima accident changed the context. 
Now around 60 to 70 per cent of Japanese people are against the operation of 
nuclear reactors. 41 
 
                                                   
41 For example, in an opinion poll by Asahi Shimbun (2014a), 59% of the respondents 
are opposed to restarting the nuclear reactors in Japan. Reuters introduces public 
research in which 70% of respondents are against restarting them (Hamada, 2015).     
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This shows that there are no fixed evaluations for modern technology. There 
are just our inconsistent desires to possess it or not possess it in certain times 
and situations. Our lives are entangled with many forces, both human and 
non-human, and we do not know how we should live. Thus, as the 
demonstration organiser Nao Izumori says, “a life does not have such a thing 
as theory. It just desires to live” (See 6.3.3).  
 
His view entails the open ontology proposed by theorists such as Bergson 
and Deleuze, for whom life is understood as “becoming” rather than “being” 
(Colebrook, 2002; Connolly, 2013). This ontology of becoming views the 
hidden flow and movement beneath what is usually explained as a fixed and 
solid entity. While the ontology of “being” pursues knowledge as a form of 
general laws and models, the knowledge based on the ontology of “becoming” 
seeks how to respond to this change. These responses are temporal and 
particular; nevertheless, they are not completely random. They operate in 
another type of order, which is often explained as the order of 
“self-organisation” (Escobar, 2008; Protevi, 2009; Colebrook, 2010; De Landa, 
2013; Connolly, 2013).  
 
Self-organisation operates without any central control. According to Connolly 
(2013, p.87), in the self-organising system the movement is neither “pulled by 
a final purpose” (holistic) nor “reducible mostly to chance” (anarchic) nor 
“simply explicable as a mechanic process” (mechanistic). The self-organising 
system introduces a new element of instability into its own system and 
reformulates it in order to adapt to a new condition (Connolly, 2013). The 
clearest example of this may be the evolutionary process. By introducing 
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alterity from the outside, the system experiences a state of disequilibrium; and 
through the efforts to respond to it, the system is renewed, which we 
understand as mutation (Connolly, 2013; Deleuze and Guattari, 1988).  
 
The self-organising system is not just the characteristics of living organisms. It 
applies to any assemblages whose formation is organised spontaneously out 
of the interactions of its components. The process of self-organisation 
operates in the balance between a certain energetic requirement of matters 
and the constraints of the surrounding environment. For example, De Landa 
(2013, p.7) exemplifies the structure of a soap bubble, whose spherical form 
is acquired by minimising surface tension, and of a salt crystal which shapes 
itself into a cubic form by minimising bonding energy. 
  
This system of self-organisation is important in social and political theories too. 
In fact, the explanation of this system corresponds to my description of the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters: accepting an unexpected force from 
the outside and trying to respond to it. The self-organisation system shows an 
existing example of a ‘third way’, where our actions become neither 
self-enclosed behaviour completely detached from the outside nor complete 
surrender to the outside force, be it that of God, nature, the state or the face of 
the Other. 
 
Furthermore, the self-organisation highlights the different types of knowledge. 
The system of self-organisation appears complicated when we explain it with 
inert concepts, while it is actually a very simple movement from a certain 
perspective.  For example, Bergson (2001) exemplifies a moving hand from 
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the point A to the point B. Looking at this movement objectively, one might 
describe it as a certain curve, AB, which is calculated using a complex 
formula. This is a mechanistic view. Otherwise, it is also possible to find a 
certain meaning of its entire movement. A finalist view may be interested in it.  
However, when I move my hand from A to B, it is just a simple movement felt 
within me (Bergson, 2001, p.88). Neither mechanism nor finalism notices this 
simple mobility ‘felt within’.  
 
Bergson’s explanation of mechanism and finalism resonates with what 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988) call mechanism and organism. Hence, what 
Bergson explains as the knowledge ‘felt within’ will be akin to the knowledge 
of machinism. When explaining the concept of the machine, Deleuze refers to 
the novelist Heinrich von Kleist’s short story On the Marionette Theatre 
([1810] 1972). Here, Kleist describes the knowledge of a marionette operator 
in a similar way to Bergson. Kleist acknowledges that we must not suppose 
that every single limb of the marionette is controlled by the operator; instead, 
the operator only controls “a center of gravity” (Kleist, [1810] 1972, p.22). The 
movement of this gravity centre is quite simple, although it creates a complex 
dance of the marionette because each limb swings freely in accordance with 
the movement of the gravity centre. 
 
Here, the machine operator should not be understood as the transcendental 
existence who controls the marionette by his own will. Instead, the operator is 
“present in the machine, ‘in the centre of gravity’, or rather of speed, which 
goes through him” (Deleuze and Parnet, 2006, p.77). The machine operator 
situates himself within the marionette and tries to create actions in balancing 
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between the gravitational force and the ability of the marionette’s body. That 
knowledge can only be acquired through practice and sympathy, by feeling 
these forces from inside. 
 
This knowledge is totally different from the objective knowledge gained by 
calculating each movement of the parts, or by interpreting the intention of the 
whole movement. It is what Bergson calls intuition, which is “lived rather than 
represented” (Bergson, 2001, p.169). Hence, it is knowledge not for 
perception but for “palpation” (May, 2005, p.20). It entails the attitude of 
learning (William, 2013, p.171). As the ontology of becoming considers that 
reality is in an ever changing state of flux, it requires experimental knowledge 
of “how to live best with that change” (Williams, 2013, p.5). Without assuming 
any final status to be reached, “we must experiment with our thoughts and our 
bodies” (Williams, 2013, p.11) each time we encounter the problem. 
 
Conventional political and social studies seem to fail to examine the internal 
forces within ourselves; hence, they are unable to provide this type of 
knowledge for experimentation and learning. Without this type of knowledge, 
we cannot explore how our desire for a fulfilled life might better respond to the 
postmodern condition instead of responding by suicide, mass murder or 
political disenchantment. The role of emotions and desires is crucial in politics 
because they are such internal forces. These internal forces are probably 
unsuited to being the object of knowledge for finding invariable models, as I 
noted in chapter four. The study of emotions in politics is meaningful under 
the ontology of becoming, because these emotions motivate the 
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self-organisation system, in which each entity tries to respond to a given 
condition.  
 
8.3.2 Philosophy and the epistemology of creation 
The ontology of becoming and the system of self-organisation is often linked 
with complexity theory, because the formation of its system cannot be 
explained by a linear causal relationship. As De Landa (2006) explains, in the 
system of self-organisation, examining the characteristics of each component 
cannot allow us to predict the outcome as the assemblage. Our lives are open 
to a variety of forces and their interaction may cause unexpected disasters. In 
the case of social assemblage, although each individual can make its own 
move based on their own intention, the consequences as the assemblage 
would be unintentional (De Landa, 2006, p. 24). 
 
The complex system which goes beyond the linear causal relationship, and 
the entangled relation between the observer and the observed, are widely 
mentioned in the systems of physics, biology and informatics, as well as in 
social systems. In most cases, these self-organising systems are approached 
scientifically. However, my research attempts to take a more philosophical 
approach. 
  
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) distinguish science, philosophy and art from the 
attitude to chaos. Scientists isolate independent variables from the chaos and 
establish a comprehensive reference to the world; therefore, science engages 
in “acts of capture” of unknown forces, constructs models and brings order to 
the chaotic movement of reality (May, 2008). On the other hand, art and 
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philosophy are concerned with the creative potential of a chaotic field. While 
artists retrieve “affect” from the chaos and express it in the actual world 
through their artworks, philosophers extract a pure energy from chaos and 
create new concepts (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994).  
 
In the ontology of becoming, any knowledge will require experimentation, be it 
science, philosophy or art, since what we see is a series of particular 
phenomena of matters responding to the changing environment. 
Nevertheless, according to the definition of Deleuze and Guattari (1994), 
science still engages in identifying independent variables, measuring them, 
and bringing order to chaos, even though it is temporary. It will articulate 
patterns, establish a model and possibly make a prediction. What science 
values is certainty (Ansell-Pearson, 1999); even the ontology of becoming 
states that it can only be a partial stability. This is also adaptable to social 
science, as Stones (1996) attempts to construct knowledge based on 
‘sophisticated realism’ (See 4.2.2).  
 
However, the ontology of becoming implies that scientific knowledge cannot 
provide a complete picture of our world. It cannot guarantee the perfect 
certainty of the future, because our lives are more than we are conscious of, 
and our cognitive identification inevitably becomes partial and temporal.  
Although scientific knowledge will provide us with safer nuclear energy in the 
future, the speed of its progress may not be fast enough. There are still many 
unknown variables in operating nuclear power plants in Japan, such as the 
risk of another earthquake and tsunami, volcanic eruptions and terrorist 
attacks, and we are unable to know how serious the damage would be. In 
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addition, there is no fundamental solution to the huge amount of nuclear 
waste. Our scientific knowledge is not enough to harness the entangled 
forces of complex society for our benefit, and it may also bring disaster. This 
is why I argue that another type of knowledge is needed, one that does not 
intend to control chaos and create stability.   
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1994), philosophical knowledge is distinct 
from scientific knowledge. Philosophy does not seek any stable reference of 
truth. Instead, “it will always have to work with an obscure edge that it can 
only experiment with, rather than grasp” and what it asks is “how exactly that 
experimentation should take place” (Williams, 2013, p.32). Hence, philosophy 
is supposed to replace “the values of completion and certainty with the values 
of openness and indeterminacy” (Williams, 2013, p.248). Philosophical 
knowledge creates a new potential of living rather than securing the certainty 
of life.  
 
The scientific knowledge, particularly that of natural science, aims at 
constructing ‘empirical theory’ about ‘what it is’, and eliminates value 
judgement. Social and political science has been following this tradition; 
however recently, the knowledge for value judgement is re-evaluated, and 
some political theorist actively engaging in the debate of social justice, seen 
as the attempt of Rawls and Habermas (Bauböck, 2008). The role of such 
‘normative theory’ to provide ‘what we should do’ is important move of political 
theory. I agree with Bauböck (2008) that there is ethical requirement of 
political theory to go beyond an objective description of reality to make some 
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proposal, and normative theory can be founded and improved by empirical 
theory.   
 
Nevertheless, what I have been arguing in this thesis is that the complex 
society requires even more than normative theory of ‘what we should live/act’. 
That is why I emphasis on the knowledge of ‘what one might live’ (May, 2005). 
In my fieldwork, especially the anarchist trend embodies this type of 
knowledge. They express what they want to do rather than what they think 
they should do. Their actions affect those who encounter with them and 
encourage those people to take new action. It is neither the knowledge to 
represent the world, nor to suggest one right answer. It is ‘affective knowledge’ 
which stems from creative desire and brings becoming (Semetsky, 2009). It 
seems that when Deleuze and Guattari contrast scientific knowledge with that 
of philosophy and art, the latter signifies this affective knowledge. 
 
The tendencies of science and philosophy seem to be moving in opposite 
directions; however, they work in a complementary manner, as Deleuze and 
Guattari demonstrate with the movement of lines. Philosophical knowledge 
allows us to palpate an unknown variable in chaos; science will then identify it, 
analyse it, establish an order and harness it. This is an interaction between 
molar lines, molecular lines and lines of fight, and the movement is only 
described as the repeating process of territorialisation and deterritorialisation.  
 
As Bergson (2001) addresses, we might be too accustomed to seek models 
and principles. Even our values of life are strongly tied with certainty, 
identification and completeness. On one hand, it is necessary to describe 
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complex reality with fixed concepts and models. It allows us to predict the 
future and make decision. It may help normative theorists to establish a 
principle of what we should do. However, as May (2005, p.172) puts it, “[there 
is] always more” about our lives, which cannot be known. Making a static 
model means to eliminate this ‘unknown’. Therefore, we need another 
knowledge to palpate the problem which escape from its formula.  
 
The concept of self-organisation inspires such exploration to live with 
uncertainty. As I mentioned earlier, the self-organising system could be 
approached both scientifically and philosophically. Predominantly in natural 
science but also to some extent in social studies, the self-organising system 
becomes the object of knowledge, which is to be elucidated and modelled.42 
Although these attempts are important, my argument is that the 
self-organising system also creates philosophical knowledge to pursue ‘how 
one might live’ (May, 2005). Social movements are among the self-organising 
systems that produces knowledge for experimentation. I argue that politics 
need all of these: the scientific knowledge to describe what it is, normative 
knowledge to suggest what we should, and affective knowledge to palpate 
how we might. Those should never be confused, and we need to think which 
knowledge is required when.  
 
 
 
                                                   
42 A clear example of the scientific analysis of a ‘political self-organising system’ is seen 
in the work of Aguilera et al. (2013). Here, they mathematically model the complex 
process of mobilisation in Spanish social movements through Twitter. 
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8.3.3 The position of my research 
Based on the argument in this section, I would now like to clarify the position 
of my research. My ontological position is that of ‘becoming’. Therefore, 
providing the invariant reference of reality is not my primary objective. Also I 
am aware that my limited fieldwork is insufficient to construct a complete 
representative image of post-Fukushima Japanese society or the 
post-Fukushima activism in general.  
 
What I attempted in chapters five and six still falls under the category of social 
science because it attempted an explanation, categorisation and critical 
evaluation of what I observed in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement. 
However, as I stated in chapter four, it is a partial and temporary identification 
to be used for another exploration. The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movements are knowledge producers as well as being the objects of 
knowledge. In the movements, the protesters respond to problems of the 
postmodern condition, such as the loss of shared meanings, the ‘dissolved’ 
subjects who are entangled in a complex network in society, and the limitation 
of rational knowledge in open systems, all of which are highlighted by the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster.  
 
Hence, analysing this movement motivated me to take the next step to 
elaborate a new political imaginary from their knowledge and think about how 
we might ‘respond well’ to the postmodern predicament instead of responding 
with suicide, mass murder, over-conformity or passive nihilism. Chapters 
seven and eight are devoted to this exploration; therefore, this work might be 
described as a philosophical attempt at creation rather than a scientific 
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attempt at providing certainty. Yet this imaginary of ‘postmodern’ politics will 
never be the absolute reference as well. It does not provide a new political 
project to regain our control over life from the invisible power of global 
capitalism or uncontrollable technology. Holloway (2010b, p.256) notes that, 
in our struggle, there is “no Right Answer” but “just millions of experiments”; 
hence, we need knowledge not to find the right answer but to keep on 
experimenting.  
 
Deleuze (1995) exemplifies two ways of reading a book, an approach through 
which I think he is describing different functions of knowledge. Some readers 
treat a book like a ‘box’ with contents inside it. Just as people investigate what 
is inside the box, these readers seek the meaning in the book and examine 
what it signifies. Other readers treat a book as “a little non-signifying machine” 
(Deleuze, 1995, p. 8). Such readers only ask how a book=machine works.  
“There's nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. It's like 
plugging into an electric circuit” (Deleuze, 1995, p.8). What matters is whether 
a book passes something on to a reader or not, whether it has an affect or not. 
Such readers expect unknown encounters that make them feel and think. 
Here, knowledge is not representing the world: it is “making connections or 
becoming ‘desiring machines’” (Colebrook, 2002, p.62).   
 
The knowledge I aimed to construct in this thesis is precisely this ‘machine’ for 
making connections and opening up to new perspectives. The encounter with 
the Fukushima disaster forced the protesters to search for a way to respond 
to it, and through the practice of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements, 
knowledge is generated for the dissolved, incomplete self to live politically and 
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ethically. By connecting myself with their knowledge practice, I produced 
another knowledge which I describe as a new political imaginary to respond to 
the political impasse in the postmodern condition. I believe that this 
knowledge will be further connected with the alienated young people in 
contemporary Japanese society and provide a tool for their struggles, and 
new knowledge will be generated at the intersection of my knowledge and 
these struggles. 
  
8.4 The politics of disaster and its knowledge contribution 
At the very end of this thesis, I demonstrate how my ‘tool’ would respond to 
the political predicament in contemporary society.  
 
There have been many attempts to establish a viable model of politics in the 
postmodern condition; they have proposed a new form of democracy, new 
ethical principles to encourage inactive people, or a new political project to 
resist the neoliberal order. There are already many concepts, such as the 
public sphere (Habermas, 1990), agonistic democracy (Mouffe, 2005), 
struggles of the multitude against Empire (Hardt and Negri, 2004), the attempt 
to establish Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey, 1991), and so on.  
 
However, all these political theories face the same problem of political 
disenchantment and self-subjugation in contemporary society, as was 
examined in chapter two. Most of the ‘99%’ of the people, or what Hardt and 
Negri (2004) call the multitude, are busy protecting what they have now, and 
they maintain the system, knowing that it does not affirm their lives. Akagi’s 
(2007) frustration at liberal politics, Amamiya’s (2010) ‘pain in life’ (ikizurasa), 
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and Furuichi’s (2011) cynicism for politics all indicate that the existing political 
models are not providing hope.  
 
My concern is that there now seems to be an unnecessary separation 
between political theories and philosophical questions of life. For example, 
Hallward (2006, 2015) seems to criticise the use of the philosophy of Deleuze 
for a down-to-earth political project, because Deleuzian philosophy 
encourages us to go beyond this actualised world. I agree with Hallward’s 
description of Deleuzian philosophy as being ‘extra-worldy’, and I am even 
able to accept Hallward’s claim that “Deleuze’s work is essentially indifferent 
to the politics of this world” (2006, p.162). Hallward has a normative definition 
of politics as organised collective action based on a fixed identity and interest. 
43 In this sense, Deleuzian philosophy may have nothing to do with it.  
 
However, my point is that such a molar political project cannot deal with our 
lives so entangled in complexity and thus facing uncertainty. I believe that 
politics needs to be liberated from the actualised ‘this world’, because many 
Japanese people seem to be completely disillusioned with the politics of ‘this 
world,’ despite they feel that their life is threatened. I cited Deleuze and 
Bergson in a political context because I believe that politics needs the 
imaginary of an outside. 
                                                   
43 For example, in his lecture in Japan, Hallward (2015) notes that “by ‘politics’ I propose 
to refer to that collective dimension of human experience  (i) which cannot be reduced to 
more ‘elementary’ or ‘natural’ forms of organisation […], and (ii) which presumes, as a 
matter of principle, that the participants who constitute a distinctively ‘political’ or ‘civic’ 
collectivity relate to each other on the basis of equality and inclusion, and not on the 
basis of hierarchies adapted from other spheres of life.”  
351 
 
  
I am not objecting to the view that politics takes place in the actualised world, 
and it often needs institutions and subjects with solid interests. However, the 
political and ethical commitment to social change may never occur without the 
emotional attachment to something beyond this actualised world, and beyond 
the self. We have examined this in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movements. The rupture of the self, caused by the Fukushima disaster, 
brought people onto the streets in order to meet with other people. 
 
The post-Fukushima protesters accepted a life with this openness, as they 
learnt that it is impossible to disconnect themselves from the complex social 
network. The protesters’ desire for social change emerged when they 
absorbed unexpected forces from the outside. They feel pride when they are 
affected by other people, such as people in Fukushima, create their action out 
of their emotional experience in its encounters, and pass their creation on to 
other people, such as the future generation. Bergson’s concept “elan vital” 
(2001) or Deleuze and Guattari’s “desire” (1984, 1988) describe the force to 
go beyond the somatic life. My research shows that such forces played a 
significant role in the politics that have emerged in post-disaster Japanese 
society. 
 
Against the common separation between the political practice and the 
philosophical imaginary of an outside, the post-Fukushima protesters imply 
that politics is inseparable with the philosophy of life. We can tell this from one 
of my interviewees’ reaction to the cultural critic Hiroki Azuma, who draws a 
similar separation between politics and philosophy of life, as does Hallward. 
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As the previous chapter examined, Azuma is a fairly ‘postmodern’ theorist 
with an open ontology; however he seems to believe that the political 
imaginary must have a fixed reference. This position requires Azuma to 
defend his open ontology from dogmatic politics. On Twitter, he insists that 
cultural critics, of whom he is one, “should forget about changing society and 
just quest what it means to live or to love” (Azuma, Twitter, @hazuma, 25 
November 2014).  
 
Here, Azuma separates people who cherish non-subjective forces to go 
outside (such as love) from those who involve politics, which is about the 
hegemonic confrontation between the subjects. He identifies himself as 
among the former and deplores that people such as he are criticised by 
‘political’ people as being ‘irresponsible’ to society. Azuma counters these 
criticisms by insisting that their dismissal of the philosophy of life makes 
politics unattractive. As a cultural critic, he defends his thoughts thus:  
 
We do not care about elections. Instead, we just want to think about 
God and love. Many people would say so. […] Our life is limited, and 
what matters is how to utilise its time. […] Is it irrational to say that I 
am not willing to spare any more time (for politics)? How long do I 
have to put up with this nonsense game called a state? (Hiroki Azuma, 
Twitter@hazuma, 25 November 2014). 
 
I share Azuma’s concern that politics now dismisses thoughts on love and life. 
In addition, I personally share his cynical view on elections and the state. 
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However, I disagree with his attitude of completely giving up talking about 
politics and social change in his defence of the philosophy of life. One of the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters criticises him:  
 
Azuma asked: “how long do we have to put up with a nonsense game 
called a state?” and here is my answer: “until we die”. We cannot 
escape it; then the only remaining way is to enjoy this boring game 
through participating in it (Yumi Nakamura, Twitter @run-bun, 17 
December 2014).  
 
In one sense, this Nakamura’s remark seems to be the passive acceptance of 
reality, suggesting that we enjoy life under the established rule. I see similar 
passivity in other MCAN members: for example, in Hattori’s comment that he 
“gave up” on giving up, and in Takenaka’s word that he protests because he 
has “no hope” (See 6.1.2). Even though the ‘actual’ institutional politics is 
hopeless, they cannot disconnect it from their lives, because they are living in 
an actual world with a state.  
 
Azuma considers it as the entrapment in the actuality and the abandonment of 
other potentials. However, I argue that the engagement in the actuality does 
not necessarily mean the abandonment of the imaginary of an ‘outside’. My 
research demonstrated that what motivates the protesters is this thought of an 
‘outside’ that permeates their selfhood.  
 
Moreover, the practice of NFS and Shiroto no Ran showed that politics is 
more than the action taken to realise a goal or establish a legitimate system. It 
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is about encountering the other, connecting with them and collectively 
responding to the changing situation. Hence, politics is a movement that 
encompasses one’s entire life. This allows Nakamura to refute Azuma’s 
argument that politics is not the question of ‘how long’. We are never 
discharged from politics. For her, politics and life is the same, which repeats 
de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation and keeps creating difference.  
 
Far from ignoring the questions about life, their politics actually produces a 
new perspective for thoughts on life. The post-Fukushima activism created 
many examples of how ‘imperfect’ individuals live well with their 
responsibilities, using their bodies, emotions, humours and desires. It is a life 
as a non-subject, who cannot be clearly identified and recognised, but each of 
them “brings something new into the world” (Bergson, 2001, p.231). The 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement seems to be one of those successful 
assemblages where these non-subjective forces are affecting and being 
affected by one another. The protesters desire to bring the best of their 
capacity into the assemblage and create an effect that goes beyond their 
somatic lives. I believe that this desire of the ‘machinic’ entity (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1984, 1988) motivates us to take political and ethical actions.  
 
Nevertheless, the same desire may lead people to destructive violence when 
it receives no positive reactions from other machines, as Kato’s mass murder 
shows. In contemporary society, our lives are entangled with so many 
uncontrollable forces. Because these complex connections make our lives 
precarious, people try to disconnect themselves from the risky ‘otherness’ 
(Baudrillard, 1993). They subjugate themselves to the hegemonic power 
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which provides them with security and identity. The lives in the postmodern 
Japan are bounded by the invisible authoritarian power and fragmented from 
one another. Kato’s desperation for the “connections to society” emerged out 
of this painful inconsistency and led him to destructive actions such as suicide 
and mass murder. Therefore, how might we respond to his desperation for 
connections?   
 
We might agree that creating a space (basho) for making connections is 
important. However, in Japanese sociology, the term basho (space) is 
frequently linked with the concept of ibasho. As Amamiya and Kayano (2008) 
argue, ibasho means ‘a home base’ to which people belong and where they 
are given unconditional recognition (See 3.1.3). This concept may be 
problematic as it does not challenge the hegemonic power to provide 
recognition and meaning. It cannot liberate us from the painful effort to 
complete ourselves to the pre-existing value. As I pointed out in chapter three, 
it brings a political void to our struggle in life. 
  
On the other hand, the space of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement 
does not work as ibasho where individuals belong, or where they are 
recognised by others as important. Rather, it is a space in which to become a 
subject-less entity, to encounter other people, to collectively invent actions to 
struggle more successfully. This space allows a person to make connections 
without a fixed identity. Instead of a subject who is to be recognised, this 
space generates a political actor who keeps learning and experimenting. 
These are ethical actors too, because they open themselves to others and 
allow those forces of the outside to permeate the self. In doing so, they affirm 
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the lives of others, not by recognising their identity but by co-creating a 
change in the self and in society.  
 
I believe that this desire should be called the desire for ‘dignity’ rather than for 
‘recognition’; and by ‘dignity’ I mean that the ‘dissolved self’ brings his/her 
ability to affect into an assemblage, intermingle it with that of others, and 
co-create a difference in the self and society. For this reason, I agree with 
John Holloway (2011) that dignity is a meta-narrative in postmodernity. It is 
not a transcendental concept which guides our lives, but it resides in our lives 
and encourages us in the political struggle in postmodernity, which is to 
engage in “millions of experiments” (Holloway, 2010b, p.256). 
 
Summary 
The Fukushima nuclear disaster disclosed the insufficiency of rational 
knowledge to predict the outcome of our (in)action in complex society. This 
prompted a reconsideration of our knowledge and, in particular, highlighted 
the importance of ethics. In the conventional notion, ethics is thought of as an 
obligational law between solid individuals. However, I argued that establishing 
a coherent obligational law is not sufficient to motivate us to take action for 
social change, since our minds are easily occupied with the here and now. 
 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters show that such a body, which is 
living in busy everyday life and tends to be self-enclosed, can still be 
motivated to political and ethical action. The Fukushima disaster revealed that 
their lives cannot be completely disconnected from the forces of the outside, 
which intrudes into their stable lives and destabilises their identities. This 
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‘dissolved’ self is ambiguous about what should be done, which is why the 
protesters took to the streets to encounter other people.  
 
The protesters feel pride and satisfaction when they become nameless 
entities in the assemblage and create new political practices and a new way 
of living together. Although their political actions are motivated by their own 
desire for fulfilled lives, their openness to the outside also makes their action 
ethical. Hence, I argue that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement 
demonstrates a potential form of ethico-politics which is based not on a sense 
of obligation to the other people but on a desire for creation and change. 
 
The concept of ‘dissolved self’, implied by the politics of disaster, would 
discharge us from the question of identity and our effort to complete ourselves 
into certain models. Instead, it encourages countless encounters with other 
entities in order to create new potentials. This challenges conventional 
knowledge which provides certainty in how to control the chaotic world. The 
knowledge created in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement signifies 
the ontology of becoming, which is seen in the philosophy of Bergson and 
Deleuze, who consider reality to be in ever-changing flux. The 
knowledge-practice of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement does not 
provide a general answer to the problem, but it shows many ways of 
responding to the changing situations, which I explained through the concept 
of self-organisation.  
 
The social movements that have emerged in post-disaster Japanese society 
imply a new political imaginary, which is without any fixed identity to be 
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recognised or meta-narratives to be led. It is politics by a ‘dissolved self’ 
whose life is affirmed when his/her own ability resonates with that of other 
people in an assemblage, and when its resonance generates some difference. 
I argue that our struggles in the postmodern condition are motivated by the 
desire for such dignified lives. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
9.1 How I started my research 
In this thesis, I examined the potential of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movement as a new political imaginary in the postmodern political impasse. 
There have already been several studies on this movement (Gonoi, 2012; 
Oguma, 2013). In addition, several sociologists have reached the hasty 
conclusion that the movement has not signified a change in Japanese society 
(Furuichi, 2011; Kainuma, 2012). However, my research takes a different view 
from these existing evaluations concerning what this post-Fukushima 
anti-nuclear movement is about, or whether this movement has changed 
Japanese society or not. My primary research question was, as I stated in 
chapter one, how we might change society, in an era when people seemed to 
have given up hope in politics. My premise was that since this 
post-Fukushima activism emerged in the prevailing atmosphere of political 
disillusionment in contemporary Japanese society, it has certain implications.  
 
In post-bubble Japanese society, an increasing number of people are facing 
the precariousness of life. Against the once-held image of Japanese society 
as wealthy and stable, even cases of people “starving to death” are becoming 
familiar news stories (Allison, 2013). Japanese society is a “sliding-down 
society” (Yuasa, 2008); one step away from mainstream stability immediately 
draws people down to the bottom. The fear of falling down pushes people to 
cling fiercely to the stability of the dominant norm, causing social problems 
such as suicide and death from overwork.  
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The sense of hopelessness and the feeling of having ‘no way out’ is 
expressed by the temporary worker Tomohiro Akagi (2007), who claims that 
his “hope is war” — war being the only imagination of change. His claim 
unmasked the political impasse in contemporary society, where the hope of 
change lies not in collective action or revolution but only in the destruction 
wrought by war. This hopelessness was the starting point of my research, and 
my objective was to envisage a new ‘political’ imaginary to illustrate some kind 
of hope in contemporary Japanese society. 
 
In order to accomplish this ultimate objective, this thesis took three steps. The 
first step was to examine how the condition of political hopelessness emerged. 
Hope for change among young Japanese people was expressed politically in 
the 1960s and 1970s, while in contemporary society the hope to go ‘outside’ 
of reality is hardly expressed, apart from some violent attempts at creating 
change by a few individuals hurting themselves or others. Chapters two and 
three examined the historical process of ‘losing political voices’ in Japan and 
analysed how political theories might respond to it.   
 
After the huge catastrophe of the earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear 
accident in the Fukushima Daiichi plant in March 2011, anti-nuclear 
movements emerged from such a political impasse. Therefore, I examined 
this movement as a case-study of how we might become political in 
postmodernity, which was developed in chapters four, five and six. Based on 
my interview research in Tokyo between 2012 and 2014, I conducted an 
analysis on what motivates the protesters to political commitment, and what 
kind of identity and ethics they have.  
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As the final step, chapters seven and eight were devoted to the invention of a 
new political imaginary in contemporary Japan, from the implication of the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements. This was a synthetic attempt at the 
first analysis of postmodern political impasse and a second analysis of the 
practices of the post-Fukushima protesters, and I illustrated possible political 
agency, ethics and ontology, which encourage political actions in 
postmodernity. 
 
9.2 Findings (Chapters 2 & 3): Social struggles in the postmodern 
condition 
Chapter two examined the process of ‘losing political voices’ using the 
concepts of the sociologist Masachi Osawa (2008). Post-war Japanese 
society used to have a clear model of life and society, which Osawa (2008) 
calls “the era of the ideal.” The democratic system and the material affluence 
of the United States became a role model. The student movements in the 
1960s and 1970s challenged this role model in their protest against the 
revision of the Japan-US security treaty and the Vietnam War. However, in the 
complex post-industrial society, the source of oppression became “intangible” 
and the distinction between the oppressor and the oppressed became unclear 
(Iida, 2002). The Zenkyoto movement in the late 1960s articulated the 
hegemonic nature within the protesters’ identity, claiming that their way of life 
unwittingly supports the dominant power. In this sense, the movement needed 
a “new language” (Miyauchi, 2006) to fight against the intangible hegemony; 
nevertheless, their radical politics that aimed to change society could only be 
explained by another rigid political project based on Marxism (Kosaka, 2006; 
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Oguma, 2012). Some student groups became extremely radicalised to 
exterminate the ‘enemy within’.  
 
The student uprising and the search for a new political language in the 
Japanese sixties movement have much in common with Western society. 
While these struggles in Western society seemed to remain as the 
‘counter-culture’ and broadened the political spectrum (Stephens, 1998), 
Japan’s booming economy provided for the legitimacy of the dominant system. 
Due to economic stability, the lives of many Japanese people were safely 
protected by the fluid and complex society; and they could enjoy consumption 
without exposing themselves as the labour force of this fluidity and complexity 
(Iida, 2002; Azuma and Kasai, 2003). 
 
This ‘high noon’ of the consumer society is what Osawa (2008) called the “era 
of the fictive.” The outside of this prevailing norm was sought by young people 
who pursued spiritual satisfaction in a materially affluent society. Yet their 
imaginary has appeared not as a counter-culture movement against 
hegemony but more like a self-enclosed ‘subculture’ within the system, where 
young people reflect their hope for change in the fictional story of nuclear war 
(Osawa, 2008; Uno, 2011). The sarin attack on the Tokyo metro in 1995, 
conducted by the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo, was thought of as the 
actualisation of this fictional imaginary of the anti-real, with their apocalyptic 
narrative and practices for spiritual perfection (Castells, 1996; Iida, 2002). 
 
Osawa (2008) calls the period since 1995 “the era of the impossible”, in which 
the pursuit of ‘an outside’ itself was discarded. On the one hand, the Aum 
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incident left the lesson to “live an endless everyday life” (Miyadai, 1998) 
instead of hoping for an ‘outside’ of it. This lesson still seems to be largely 
shared in Japanese society. A young sociologist, Furuichi (2011), claims that 
his generation are ‘satisfied’ with their self-contained lives.  
 
On the other hand, this self-contained stable life was threatened more than 
ever in the post-bubble economic recession. Those who slipped down the 
“sliding society” (Yuasa, 2008) face poverty and alienation while Japanese 
society still operates under the narrative of the era of economic growth, 
considering that those who are poor should accept their own 
‘self-responsibility’ (Allison, 2013). Mass murders such as the Akihabara 
incident occurred out of such a sense of ‘no outside’; the perpetrator Kato was 
unable to accommodate himself to the dominant system, but he had no 
imagination of an alternative. With many young people feeling what Amamiya 
(2010) calls ‘ikizurasa’ (pain of living), Japanese society needs a new political 
language to describe hope for change, before it gives way to self-enclosed 
cynicism or turns to violence against the self or others.  
 
The sense of hopelessness in contemporary Japanese society signifies the 
failure of the existing political and social theories to provide any hope in the 
postmodern condition. While liberal political theorists emphasise the universal 
values of peace, equality and justice, Akagi (2011) claims that most of the 
promoters of such values are actually busy protecting their own stability of life 
in a complex society. Although sociologists are paying more attention to the 
alienation of young people, the proposal to provide ‘recognition’ lacks a 
political aspect, rendering young people passive entities to somehow be given 
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recognition.  
 
Hence, chapter three attempted to construct a framework of ‘postmodern’ 
politics which is rarely discussed by Japanese political theorists. In 
contemporary society, the source of oppression is no longer identified in 
hegemonic institutions outside the subject; rather, the subject internalises a 
certain identity, role and way of life through which the power operates. Thus, 
the political struggle against oppression takes place in everyday life rather 
than as a battle against the state. It is a ‘flight’ from a certain enforced identity 
and role, seeking to change a way of living (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988; Day, 
2005; Holloway, 2010a). 
 
However, the question of who might be the agency of such micropolitics of 
‘flight’ is controversial. While situationist theory encourages people to reject 
enforced identity based on their authentic desire for lived experience (Debord, 
1983; Vaneigem, 1983), the capitalist system captures such desires, pours 
them into commodities and endorses its system. When this dominant system 
provides values and meanings in our life, the outside of this system becomes 
unimaginable.  
 
In a post-industrial complex society, almost everyone’s life becomes 
precarious. Hardt and Negri argue that these lives penetrated by the global 
network-power can form a collective resistance as “the multitude” (2000, 
2004) based on this network; however, being in the network does not 
automatically construct a new collective identity for resistance, as Newman 
(2007) points out. Our desire for a better life may render us protective. In 
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order to avoid instability, we may end up accommodating ourselves to the 
oppressive norm. We become self-enclosed because we are connected and 
its connection brings instability to our live. We self-subjugate to the existing 
hegemony because it provides us with stability. As Holloway (2010b) notes, 
we need to overcome our own complicity.  
 
As well as the problem of agency, the goal of political action has become 
unclear in a complex society, which makes many people hesitate to join 
actions for social change. Liberal theorists consider that our human rationality 
enables us to re-establish shared universal values if we find an appropriate 
condition (Rawls, 1999; Habermas, 1990). However, more ‘post-structuralist’ 
theorists claim that a rational and moralistic subject is almost impossible when 
we are living with uncertainty and surrounded by a huge amount of 
information which affects our sense of value (Call, 2002; Newman, 2007).  
 
Hence, the role of emotions is being reconsidered in contemporary political 
theories (Goodwin et al., 2001). Social movements are considered to channel 
people’s emotions into politics. The embodied experience in mobilisation 
constructs cognitive demand, expands knowledge and generates motivation 
for further actions (McDonald, 2006; Chesters and Welsh, 2006). Although 
there are different views on whether this emotional politics in activism 
eventually constructs ‘unstable universalities’ to become a coherent project 
(Newman, 2007) or creates rhizomatic dissemination of actions (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1988; Call, 2002), these theories signify that politics is possible 
without a rational subject and without any predetermined blueprint of a 
coming society. A subject who is penetrated by the influence of a complex 
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network can still politically motivate him/herself with his/her own emotions. 
This provides an alternative picture to the politics of fixed identities, intentions, 
purposes and totalising ideologies. 
 
9.3 Findings (Chapters 4, 5 & 6): Identity and ethics in the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements emerged from political 
disillusionment in Japanese society. The Fukushima disaster was the 
actualisation of the imaginary of “war” as Akagi claims, which violently 
intruded on people’s everyday lives. Although there is a negative evaluation 
that the disaster has not changed Japanese society (Kainuma, 2012; 
Miyadai, 2014), it has certainly triggered the largest political mobilisation 
since the 1960s. It is meaningful to examine this movement and explore how 
politics have become possible in the ‘postmodern’ condition.  
 
As I argued in chapter four, social movement research has been trying to 
discover a general model for mobilisation by analysing social movement 
organisations, their resources, surrounding structures, strategies and frames, 
etc (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McAdam et al., 1996; Benford and Snow, 
2000). While these analyses focus on the already established collective 
identities, organisations and political interests, my research explored the 
potential of politics for those who have no access to these resources. My 
argument was that social movements generate collective identities, political 
demands and desires through countless encounters in the mobilisation.  
 
Therefore, my research was devoted to articulating the knowledge created “by” 
367 
 
the movement, rather than objectively describing knowledge “about” this 
movement (Chesters, 2012). The purpose of my fieldwork was to examine 
how each post-Fukushima protester comes to engage in politics and keeps 
motivating themselves. As well as interviewing key activists and 
demonstration organisers, I also paid close attention to the non-ideological 
participants in the street protests in Tokyo, because their condition reflects the 
nature of ‘postmodernity’ very well; those were the people who usually remain 
‘apolitical’ because they do not have any predetermined political identity in the 
entangled power structures of contemporary society. 
 
Chapter five mostly examined these protesters’ motivation for an initial 
political commitment after the Fukushima disaster. I identified that the 
Fukushima disaster had evoked strong emotions such as anger, fear and 
confusion. The disaster shattered their belief that their lives would be stable 
as long as they clung to the dominant norm. In this sense, I argued that the 
disaster brought an experience of “deterritorialisation” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1988). 
 
The protesters joined the street demonstrations as a response to their 
emotional turmoil. Although such an emotional reaction is criticised as 
inconsistent, Goodwin et al. (2001) point out that emotions are not always 
short-lived, especially when they arise from relationships with other people. I 
articulated that the protesters’ sense of regret was such a key emotion. They 
regret that their previous indifference to politics shielded the nuclear plants 
from critical attention, thus allowing the huge accident to occur. They also 
found that the Fukushima nuclear plant was generating energy not for the 
368 
 
Fukushima people but for themselves in Tokyo. The disaster unmasked the 
precariousness of lives and entangled social relationships in postmodernity, 
where they are unwittingly threatening the lives of other people as well as 
themselves. It evoked their sense of responsibility for social commitment. 
 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements provide various types of 
“vessels” (spaces) where people can express their emotions. The vessel of 
the Kanteimae protest pressures the government by representing the unified 
will of the people. Thus, the protest remains normative and simple in order 
that many people might easily join it. On the other hand, there is another type 
of vessel, seen in the spaces created by Shiroto no Ran and NFS. They give 
emotions the more creative role of making affective connections with other 
people, reconsidering how to spend their time or money, with whom they want 
to live, and what they value the most in life.  
 
Despite these different types of vessels, their politics with emotions are 
changing the manner of political participation and encouraging Japanese 
activism as a whole, as was seen in the subsequent actions against racism or 
the government’s security policy. Nevertheless, the anti-nuclear movement 
had little impact on the general elections, which resulted in the restarting of 
the nuclear reactors. The series of elections since 2012 have revealed the 
gap between the inside and the outside of the movement. While the 
post-Fukushima protesters acquired confidence in activism, deepened their 
sense of responsibility and expanded their political commitment, many 
Japanese people did not share these experiences, and seem to remain 
apathetic. The same disaster “deterritorialised” some people and mobilised 
369 
 
them into politics, while other people just seemed to return to their 
self-enclosed lives. It is natural to ask what makes this difference.  
 
Instead of identifying the general criteria which divide protesters and ‘apolitical’ 
people, chapter six reframed the question of how the protesters remain open 
to the outside and keep their commitment to society. I argued that their politics 
emerged from despair. People used to believe that their lives would be stable 
as long as they made an effort to live normative lives. However, the 
Fukushima disaster was the force of an outside which revealed that they 
cannot completely disconnect themselves from the unstable outside. This 
somewhat passive acceptance of openness is the beginning of ethics, as 
Critchley (2007) notes, because it forces the subject to keep responding to 
incomprehensible others.  
 
In addition, chapter six argued that the disaster brought a sense of ambiguity 
of the self. The protesters seemed to know that their imagination is limited, 
and they are forgetful. While these protesters accept their incompleteness 
with a sense of humour, they still try to act ethically by mobilising their bodies 
onto the streets in order to encounter others who force themselves to feel and 
think. The protest space of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement 
constructs not only a political subject but also an ethical one. 
 
In my interviews, several protesters explained that their political commitment 
was based on their own desire, rather than a sense of obligation to others. 
However, this does not mean that their desire is self-contained, and that they 
are using the movement for their own excitement or to achieve catharsis, as 
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several scholars point out (Furuichi, 2011; Kainuma, 2012). The protesters’ 
self-identification seems to be embedded in an assemblage. They express 
their satisfaction and a sense of pride for becoming a ‘plus-one’ to add to the 
numbers involved in mobilisation. In addition, their concept of life itself seems 
to be embedded in an assemblage, in which their somatic lives are penetrated 
by the force that succeeded from the past and will pass to the future 
generation. I argued that their desire seems to be the desire as this 
intermingled self, or a dissolved self in an assemblage that lives in an 
indiscernible status with the self and others. It signifies that politics motivated 
by personal desires could be ethical. 
 
One’s body has a limited boundary and that is why people become forgetful 
and indifferent to others. I concluded that this ‘dissolved’ self does not try to 
completely eliminate this boundary. What the protesters signify is the agency 
which crosses the border when necessary, as Day (2005) notes. In the politics 
that emerged from the Fukushima disaster, each ‘incomplete’ body with 
limited imagination is trying to respond to the unexpected force from the 
outside. The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movements provide a space for 
such bodies to interact, learn from one another, create new desires and make 
changes to the self and to society.  
 
9.4 Findings (Chapters 7 & 8): New political imaginary in the postmodern 
condition 
The politics of disaster emerging in the post-Fukushima Japanese society 
works by a different logic from conventional political theory, which presumes a 
totalising ideology, a shared collective identity, or rational discourses to 
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describe an alternative plan. The absence of these aspects is usually 
considered a deficit in politics, whereas it actually signifies the existence of a 
different logic with a dissolved subject, affective connections and ethics of 
desire. The knowledge created in this activism has significant implications for 
a contemporary Japanese society immersed in a sense of hopelessness, 
because in this activism many protesters are experimenting with how to relate 
themselves better to other people, how to balance the openness of life with 
stability, and how to make their somatic lives more meaningful. The final 
objective of my thesis was to theorise this as a new political imaginary. 
 
Chapter seven firstly compared the politics of the post-Fukushima activism 
with existing political theories which respond to a complex society. Some 
liberal theorists criticise the overdependence on rationality in politics and 
emphasise the importance of emotions for political engagement (Rorty, 1989; 
Mouffe, 2005). I found that the Kanteimae protest adopts a concept similar to 
Mouffe’s (2005) agonistic democracy, which intends to ‘pluralise’ hegemony 
and make them compete in the political arena. The Kanteimae protest is 
establishing a counter-hegemony by legitimating and amplifying the 
participants’ expression of anger. I argue that this tendency is also seen in the 
subsequent actions against racism and the government’s security policy. In 
these actions, emotions and physical experience of activism reinvigorate the 
universal values such as justice and democracy. 
 
The critics of this type of emotional activism ask how the protesters might 
prove the legitimacy of their claims. While Mouffe presumes the legitimate 
process of hegemonic competition by institutionalising antagonistic debate, 
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the politics on the street does not have this institutionalised rule. This is why 
their ‘majoritarian’ tendency is criticised as ‘undemocratic’ (Suzuki, 2012), 
because it may ultimately become the unchallenged hegemony outside 
representative politics and exclude minor voices from politics.     
 
However, I argued that not all the emotional language amplified in the vessels 
of post-Fukushima activism have this majoritarian nature, as this movement 
also contains the anarchist trend. As seen in the politics of Shiroto no Ran and 
NFS, they celebrate emotional expression not for creating one unified will but 
for making new connections and creating different perspectives. I explored 
this “minoritarian” politics with post-anarchist philosophy (Call, 2002; Day, 
2005; Newman, 2007), which claims that particular struggles in their everyday 
lives resonate with one another and create power to change society. This 
politics of affect is another ‘emotional politics’ which should be distinguished 
from the politics of legitimacy. 
 
The criticism of post-anarchism is that it has the same nature as 
neo-liberalism, as it prioritises individual desires over the universal value and 
insists on liberating desires from social entities. However, while neo-liberals 
still presume that there is a solid self who utilises the logic of the market to 
fulfil his/her desires, the self for the post-anarchist is more heterogeneous, 
ambiguous and open to unexpected influence (Connolly, 2013). This 
tendency was in fact seen in the dissolved, intermingled subjectivity of the 
post-Fukushima protesters.   
 
My fieldwork suggests that emotional language in activism can both 
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reinvigorate the liberal universal concept and constitute ‘ethical’ anarchist 
practices. The most crucial aspect lies in the fact that these major and minor 
politics are co-existing with and influencing one another. This becomes 
possible only because many people actually join both. This signifies that their 
ontology is different from the conventional one.  
 
Conventional political theories mostly pursue one universal system or model. 
Although some radical political theorists, such as Mouffe, try to fluidise 
political processes by introducing emotions, their adherence to the articulation 
of one coherent universal model ultimately causes them to sacrifice flexibility. 
On the other hand, many of the post-Fukushima protesters actually sacrifice 
their own coherence and attend different actions, as they seem to consider 
politics as a force field of many different attempts resonating one another and 
bringing about a change in reality.  
 
I described this ontology as “rhizomatic” thought, posited by Deleuze and 
Guattari (1988), which does not converge into one, but connects randomly 
and spreads without any central control. This rhizomatic ontology does not 
postulate a legitimate political system as a universal order; rather, it requires a 
new political agency whose constituents wander between various types of 
vessel; some may be majoritarian and others minoritarian. They are flexible 
enough to choose appropriate vessels in time and condition, and they provide 
whatever ability is necessary in each vessel.   
 
Chapter eight further explored the potential of this thought to reconsider not 
only a political theory but also a broader philosophy of life. The Fukushima 
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disaster revealed that our political concepts are now too narrow to envisage a 
better life in a complex society. The political theorists seem to be preoccupied 
with articulating a legitimate system to coordinate already established claims 
based on a clear identity; however, this cannot explain how alienated subjects 
who are ambiguous about their political claim can ever take action.  
 
The post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement is ‘primitive’ politics, in which 
people respond to the unexpected force coming from outside of their sensible 
world. This imaginary is probably rather the realm of ethics. Several moral 
philosophers, such as Jonas (1985) and Dupuy ([2002] 2012), try to extract 
new principles from the imaginary of disaster, regarding how we should act 
ethically in a complex society. However, I avoided the construction of any 
transcendental principles and instead explored ethics as the actual attitude 
with which to face the particular other.  
 
I focused on the philosophy of Levinas and Deleuze, as they describe such 
ethics as opposed to establishing moral principles. It seems that what 
separates Levinasian ethics from that of Deleuze is, again, the notion of the 
self. While Levinas (1969) explains ethics as the self being a substitute for the 
other, such distinction between the self and the other itself is unclear from the 
beginning in Deleuze’s philosophy. For Deleuze, all entities are, be they 
individual or social, a machinic assemblage in which a variety of forces 
intermingle. These forces, or “hecceities” (Deleuze and Parnet, 2006), are the 
individualities without signification or recognition although they still have the 
ability to make a difference to an assemblage. This is close to the ethics of the 
post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters, who explain the desire as a 
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‘dissolved’ self in an assemblage.  
 
This desire seems to have been underestimated in conventional political and 
social studies, as they mainly focus on tangible and observable factors to 
establish invariant models. Such attempt is criticised by philosophers such as 
Bergson and Deleuze, who consider that the world is constantly changing, 
and invariant models cannot grasp this dynamism. What they provide is more 
situational knowledge to respond to the changing situation, which is explained 
in the concept of ‘self-organisation’ (Connolly, 2013; De Landa, 2013).  
 
In the self-organising system, each entity organises itself as a response to the 
surrounding entities. Such entities do not have solid identity as the self, 
because they are already entangled in a complex network and constantly 
affected by the variety of force. However they still have their own desire for 
creation, and they have ability to make a difference to the assemblage they 
constitute. A new creation emerging from the resonance of the component in 
the assemblage, and it can neither reduced to the ‘essence’ of component nor 
to the predetermined intention as a whole (De Landa, 2013). 
 
The process of knowledge production in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movements is like this self-organising system. The ‘deterritorialised’ subject 
responds to the unimaginable force from the outside by expressing their 
creativity, and seeks a way to live in a radical openness, instead of enclosing 
him/herself within the small territory or becoming completely nomadic in 
chaos.  
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I believe that this movement gives a powerful message to the alienated lives 
in postmodern Japanese society. Now their lives are devoted to completing 
themselves into a certain norm in order to gain recognition, meaning or 
stability. In other words, these are "[fighting] for their servitude as stubbornly 
as though it were their salvation" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, p.38). The 
practices of the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement do not suggest a 
general solution to this self-subjugation. Rather, it shows many ways of how to 
open the self and relate with the other. The openness of anarchism is not 
acceptable to everyone, but its life influences the way we think. I argued that it 
is ‘affective’ knowledge rather than normative knowledge.  
 
What seems to be common to this politics of disaster is their effort to open 
themselves to an outside, to mingle their force of desire with that of others, 
and to co-create a new way of responding to the changing problem. It 
suggests to live in a force field, where our bodies encounter with the various 
outside forces; we create new forces in this intersection, and this new force 
goes beyond our somatic bodies to affect other bodies. It signifies a new way 
to relate with others and to affirm lives, which composes a new political 
imaginary. Such affirmation of life is probably not acquired by gaining 
recognition or signification as a solid self. The affirmation of life needs to be 
described as dignity. It stems from our own desire to create a difference and 
make our lives significant. 
 
9.5 Implications and contributions 
“Hope goes out of our lives, hope goes out of our work, hope goes out of the 
way we think”— I started my thesis with these words of John Holloway (2002), 
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because that was exactly how I felt in Japanese society. Just as Akagi claims 
that his “hope is war” (2007), I found all the existing terms to describe hope, in 
particular the term ‘peace’, empty. I found Holloway’s words very ethical, 
because he starts his quest for knowledge by describing a sense of 
hopelessness. Moreover, he describes it with the term ‘we’, with no clear 
identification of who ‘we’ are (Holloway, 2002).  
 
This sense of ‘us’ is not usually allowed to be expressed in academia, 
because it cannot be logically explained. However, I believe that it is the very 
starting point of any political struggle. I feel hopeless, and when I see the 
news about a young mass murderer, I somehow connect my frustration to that 
of the perpetrator, and gain this ambiguous collective identity that ‘we’ are 
hopeless. Although people can feel this sense of ‘us’, it cannot become 
political collective identity. Few political theorists try to grasp what connects 
this ‘us’. Holloway (2011) explains that it is an emotional scream to say “no” to 
reality, and our desire for “dignity”.  
 
The current ‘emotional’ turn in political theories (Goodwin et al., 2001; Gould, 
2004) signifies that political scientists have now come to realise the 
importance of this intangible internal factor to motivate people to act. However, 
it is the nature of scientific knowledge to capture things, articulate them as 
independent variables and establish laws between them (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994; Ansell-Pearson, 1999; May, 2008). Thinking about politics, 
for many theorists, means thinking about legitimate political processes, 
although efforts are now being made to reflect fluid emotions to its theory. In 
sociology, emotions are also the object of analysis to identify certain problems 
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to be solved. When alienated young people try to express their language-less 
desire with their bodies, our quest for knowledge is preoccupied with efforts to 
rationally understand it through categorisation or generalisation, and we try to 
solve it by establishing a new system.  
 
I am not claiming that such knowledge is useless. It is absolutely important; 
however, it does not bring ‘hope’. Hope is not given by anyone as the ultimate 
answer. I believe that it must come from within ourselves, and it is an 
immanent driving force rather than a transcendental solution. The 
post-Fukushima activism shows that emotions and desires are the energy for 
creation. In the assemblage, the participants are affected by the desire of 
other people, receive energy from them, and create new knowledge of how 
we might live. This seems to be an ethical attitude to the desires of other 
people. Rather than analysing them and discovering some truth about them, 
we connect with their desires and create something new together with them. 
We need this type of knowledge for connection in politics, as well as 
knowledge for analysis. 
 
The politics of disaster that emerged in post-Fukushima Japanese society is 
affective politics (Protevi, 2009) rather than politics based on legitimacy. This 
politics entails affective ethics rather than moral obligation. Hence, what the 
movement created is affective knowledge rather than knowledge about 
discovering truth or establishing a model. My research questions, concerning 
‘how to change society’ and ‘how people might be political’, can never be 
described as a general model, but only as affective knowledge.  
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Hence, I have no intention of claiming that post-Fukushima social movements 
are ‘the hope’ in contemporary Japanese society. Nevertheless, my research 
demonstrates that new knowledge is constructed when each ‘deterritorialised’ 
subject, who has no idea what to do, tries to respond to the outside force with 
their own creativity and with countless encounters with the desire of the other 
people. Then, the encounter with such practices enabled me to co-create a 
new imaginary of how I might live. In this sense, this thesis is my struggle to 
face my own hopelessness, encountering unfortunate desires for a dignified 
life which turned into violence, learning from more creative political attempts 
by the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear protesters, and responding to all by 
envisaging a new political imaginary.  
 
What I constructed is the knowledge as machine, as Deleuze (1995) claims, 
which is to be connected with other entities to generate new meanings. As a 
contribution to Japanese society, my theoretical exploration offers many 
examples of how we might better live with our desire for fulfilled lives. As a 
contribution to academic knowledge in social and political studies, this 
research provides a new perspective of emotions and desires; they should be 
seen not only as the object of modelling, but also as a creative force to drive 
people’s perceptions beyond their own intentions, and to invent a new way of 
living. Such ‘affective’ knowledge for connection and experimentation needs 
to be more valued in social and political studies, because a life is always more 
than the theories of ‘what it is’ and ‘what we should be’ might suggest.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List of interviewees (those who appeared anonymous) 
 
1. Female (30s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 3 January 2013.  
2. Male (60s) Participant in MCAN’s ‘Tokyo Big March’,11 March 2012. 
3. Male (50s) Participant in in the Kanteimae protest (MCAN’s ‘One million 
people’s large occupation’), 11 November 2012 
4. Female (60s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 23 November 2012. 
5. Female (20s) Participant in MCAN’s ‘Tokyo Big March’, 11 March 2012 
6. Female (60s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 23 November 2012 
7. Male (20s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 2 May 2014  
8. Female (30s) Staffer of the Kanteimae protest, 28 December 2012 
9. Male (40s) Staffer at the NFS meeting, 15 March 2012  
10. Female (40s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest (MCAN’s ‘One million 
people’s large occupation’). 11 November 2012 
11. Female (40s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 30 November 2012 
12. Female (60s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 19 December 2014 
13 Female (20s) Participant in Nuclear Free United Action, 9 March, 2014)  
14. Female (60s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 21 February 2014 
15. Male (10s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 21 December 2012 
16. Female (50s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 23 November 2012 
17, Male (60s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 30 November 2012 
18. Female (60s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 21 December 2012 
19. Male (30s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 30 November 2012 
20. Male (60s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 21 December 2012 
21. Male (50s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 11 January 2013 
22. Female (60s) Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 16 November 2012 
23. Female (50s), Participant in the Kanteimae protest, 14 December 2012 
24. Female (60s) Protesters in Tokyo Big March, 11 March 2012 
25. Female (30s) Protesters in Tokyo Big March, 11 March 2012 
26. Male (50s) Protesters in front of the governmental office, MEXT, 23 
November, 2012 
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Appendix 2: Fieldwork schedule 
 
First Fieldwork (11 March 2012- 6 May 2012 at Tokyo) 
 
11 Mar 2012 One year from the Tohoku earthquake 
11 Mar 2012 Tokyo Big March (Observation, Participants interview) 
15 Mar 2012 Interview with Y. Nakamura (NFS) 
NFS meeting (observation), interview with other members 
19 Mar 2012 Interview with Amamiya 
25 Mar 2012 Twitter Demo (Participants interview) 
Interview with Nawa (NFS) 
Interview with Hirano and Misao Redwolf (MCAN) 
MCAN meeting (Observation) 
30 Mar 2012 Visiting Tento Hiroba (Participants Interview) 
NFS meeting (Observation) 
Interview with Ikeda (NFS) 
5 Apr 2012 Interview with Izumori (NFS) 
6 Apr 2012 The Kanteimae protest (Observation) 
Interview with Matsumoto (Shiroto no Ran) 
8 Apr 2012 NFS meeting (observation) 
10 Apr 2012 Interview with Harada (NFS) 
Visiting Tampoposha (Interview) 
Visiting Tento Hiroba (Interview) 
15 Apr 2012 NFS festival  
Interview with Yohane Yamamoto (NFS) 
20 Apr 2012 NFS meeting (Observation) 
Interview with Fukushima (NFS) 
25 Apr 2012 NFS meeting (Observation) 
27 Apr 2012 The Kanteimae protest (Observation) 
Interview with Misao Redwolf and other staffs 
MCAN meeting (Observation) 
1 May 2012 NFS meeting (Observation) 
5 May 2012 Visiting Tento Hiroba (Interview) 
5 May 2012 All nuclear reactors stopped due to inspection 
6 May 2012 NFS demonstration 
Interview with M. Nakamura (NFS) 
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Second Fieldwork (11 November 2012-13 January 2013 at Tokyo) 
 
11 Nov 2012 A million people’s occupation (MCAN’s protest) 
(Participant’s interview) 
16 Nov 2012 Dissolution of the lower house of parliament 
16 Nov 2012 The Kanteimae protest (Participatory observation, 
participants interview) 
Kamome no Hiroba general assembly 
19 Nov 2012 Interview with Y. Nakamura (NFS) 
NFS meeting (Observation) 
20 Nov 2012 MCAN’s protest against LDP (Participants interview) 
Interview with Misao Redwolf (MCAN) 
Anti-TPP protest (Participants interview) 
23 Nov 2012 The Kanteimae protest (Participants interview) 
Kamome no Hiroba general assembly (Participatory 
observation) 
Interview with Matsunaga 
25 Nov 2012 Twitter Demo  (Participatory observation, participants 
interview) 
30 Nov 2012 Zenkyo Oneday Occupy Demonstration (Participatory 
observation) 
The Kanteimae protest (Participants interview) 
Kamome no Hiroba general assembly (Participatory 
observation) 
3 Dec 2012 NFS meeting (Observation) 
4 Dec 2012 Interview with Matsunaga 
5 Dec 2012 Anti-poverty protest (Observation, Participant interview) 
8 Dec 2012 Yamamoto Taro’s election campaign (Observation) 
9 Dec 2012 Nuclear Free Nakano meeting (Observation) 
14 Dec 2012 The Kanteimae protest (Participant interview) 
15 Dec 2012 Sayonara Nuclear energy rally and demonstration 
(Participatory observation, participants interview) 
Taro Yamamoto’s election campaign 
Interview with Matsumoto and other participants 
16 Dec 2012 General election   
17 Dec 2012 Interview with Nawa (NFS) 
21 Dec 2012 Kanteimae protest 
MCAN meeting (Observation) 
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22 Dec 2012 Participating the event titled ‘how to stand against the new 
government?’  
Todenmae action meeting (Observation) 
24 Dec 2012 Nishiogi anti-nuclear demo (Participatory observation) 
Joining a talk event by Noma (MCAN) and Ikeda (NFS) 
25 Dec 2012 Protest against Keidanren (Participatory observation, 
Participant interview) 
Interview with MCAN staffers 
MCAN meeting (Observation) 
28 Dec 2012 MCAN meeting (Observation) 
Interview with Noma, Takenaka (MCAN) 
Kanteimae protest (Participatory observation) 
3 Jan 2013 Interview with Uematsu 
Interview with a participant in the Kanteimae protest/ 
Kamomeno hiroba general assembly 
6 Jan 2013 Joining MCAN’s new year’s party 
11 Jan 2013 Kanteimae protest (Participatory observation, Participant 
interview) 
Interview with Hattori and other staffers 
13 Jan 2013 Interview with M. Nakamura (NFS) 
 
 
Follow up Fieldwork (7 Feb 2014- 6 June 2015 at Tokyo) 
 
7 Feb 2014 Tokyo governor electoral campaign (Participant interview ) 
Kanteimae protest (Participant interview) 
9 Feb 2014 Tokyo governor election 
21 Feb 2014 Kanteimae protest (Participant interview) 
9 Mar 2014 Demonstration for ‘Nuclear Free United Action’ by MCAN 
(Participant interview)  
11 Mar 2014 Three year from the Tohoku earthquake 
14 Mar 2014 Kanteimae protest (Participant interview) 
16 Mar 2014 Anti-racist counter action (Participatory observation) 
16 Apr 2014 Interview with Misao Redwolf (MCAN) 
2 May 2014 Kanteimae protest (Participant interview) 
3 May 2014 Demonstration against the State Secret Protection Law 
(Participant interview) 
17 May 2014 Interview with Matsunaga 
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5 Jul 2014 Demonstration against the Abe government (Participant 
interview) 
28 Jul 2014 No Nukes Day demonstration (Participatory observation) 
14 Dec 2014 Lower house general election 
19 Dec 2014 Kanteimae protest (Participant interview) 
5 Jun 2015 Interview with Yumi Nakamura (NFS) 
Protest against the Abe government by SEALDs 
(Participatory observation) 
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Appendix 3: Sample of interview questions  
 
(1) General questions for activists / organisers / participants  
 
History, experience 
 When was your first time joining the anti-nuclear protest movement? 
 How often do you participate in anti-nuclear protests? 
 How did you find out about this protest? 
 Have you ever joined social movements before this? Which one? 
 Are you joining any other social movements? 
 
Identity/Perception 
 What was your initial thought when you saw the Fukushima disaster? 
 What was your initial motivation in joining the anti-nuclear movements (or 
other movements)? 
 What was your previous image of activism? 
 What was the reaction of your family/friends to you joining the protest? 
 What kind of people do you think are joining this movement? 
 What is the motivation for you to keep protesting? 
 Are there any particular slogans in the movement that agree or disagree 
with?  
 
Change 
 What kind of impact do you think this action can make? 
 In your opinion, who/what should be changed the most, in order to 
accomplish a nuclear free society? 
 Do you find any change (in you, in society etc) through mobilization? If so, 
what is that?  
 What kind of action do you wish to take in future to realise a nuclear free 
society? 
 
Elections (before) 
 What do you think about the coming election?  
 Are you going to vote? Have you already decided which party/candidate 
to vote?  
 Are you joining the electoral campaign too? 
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Elections (after) 
 What do you think about the result of the election? 
 To whom/which party did you vote? 
 How do you find the present political situation? 
 
(2) Optional questions for activists / organisers  
 
Organisational issues 
 Have you found any problem in the movement? 
 What do you think about other actions in the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear 
movement? 
 Is there any disagreement in your organisation, or between other 
organisations? What is that, and how do you manage it? 
 
Strategies, Objectives 
 How do you evaluate your previous actions? 
 What is your next action? 
 How do you describe the goal of your action? What is your ideal society? 
 How do you try to mobilise those who still remain apolitical? 
 What do you (does your organization) plan for the coming election? 
 
Others 
 In your opinion, with whom can we make solidarity? 
 How do you balance your personal life with activism? 
 What do you think about the global social movements in 2011, such as the 
Occupy Wall Street movement and the Arab Spring? 
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Appendix 4: Sample of cover letter 
 
My name is Azumi Tamura and I am an MPhil student at the University of 
Bradford, researching social movements. As part of my dissertation, I will be 
looking at the newest form of Japanese street protest movement which are 
sometimes described as similar to a ‘carnival’ or ‘parade’. As an 
organiser/participant of this form of movement activity I would be grateful if 
you could take part in my research through participating in an interview 
about your involvement in this type of activity.  
 
The interview will be conducted at your convenience from March until the end 
of April. It should take between one or two hours. This interview is to examine 
the strategy of these social movements and the motivations and perspectives 
of participants, and organizers of these movements.  
 
The purpose of this research is to assess the effectiveness and potential 
growth of this form of collective action. I hope that my analysis could 
contribute to a discussion in Japanese society about how these movements 
might actually change our society.   
 
The protection of your identity is taken seriously. Your name or personal 
details will not be identified in the research unless you agree. Confidentiality 
will be assured and pseudonyms or other appropriate identifiers will be used 
for data analysis. Your data will only be used for the purpose of this research 
project. 
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Appendix 5: Interview consent form 
 
Research project:  
Who needs social change? How can autonomist theories of social change 
explain social movement mobilization in contemporary Japanese society? 
 
Interview Consent Form  
 
Name:_______________________________________________________ 
 
Contact address:______________________________________________ 
 
 
1. I have received the information about the research project. □ 
2. I agree to be interviewed for the purpose of the research. □ 
 
3. Please choose  a) or b): 
 
a)  I agree that my name will be used for the purpose of the research. 
□ 
 
b)  I do not wish my name to be used or cited, or my identity otherwise 
disclosed, in the research. □ 
 
My preferred pseudonym:______________________________  
 
4. I am aware that I can choose either to have the conversation recorded or 
notes made about the discussion between me and the researcher. □ 
 
 
5. Please choose  a) or b): 
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a)  I agree that my conversation can be recorded by electronic device. 
□ 
 
b)  I do not with the interview to be recorded. □ 
 
 
 
6. I agree that a copy of the recording and notes taken during the interview 
will be stored in a secure location by the researcher. □ 
 
7. I am aware that I will be provided with a copy of the recording at my 
request. □ 
 
 
I declare that I am willing, of my own free will, to participate in this 
research project. 
 
 
 
Signed __________________________________________________ 
 
Date__________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
